The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal : a case study in structural issues of international arbitration by Seifi, Seyed-Jamal
THE UNIVERSITY OF HULL 
THE IRAN-UNITED STATES CLAIMS TRIBUNAL :A 
CASE STUDY IN STRUCTURAL ISSUES OF 
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 
being a Thesis submitted for the Degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy in Law 
in the University of Hull 
by 
Seyed-Jamal Seifi, LL. B, 
LL. M, FCIArb, Member of the 
Iranian Judiciary (1979-85) 
February 1990 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
In preparing this thesis I have been helped and supported by many, to 
whom I am deeply grateful. In particular, I would like to thank Mr Scott 
Davidson for his continuous encouragement and support during the 
supervision of my work and for his invaluable comments on the draft of my 
thesis. I am also deeply grateful to Mr R. Smith and Mr David Freestone of 
the Hull University Law School who have fully supported me during my 
studies at Hull. 
The staff at the Secretariat of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal 
and in particular Mr W. A. Hamel, the Deputy Secretary-General, have been 
very helpful in providing me with the Annual Reports of the Iran-US Claims 
Tribunal as well as with other up-to-date information on the Tribunal. So also 
have the staff at the Brynmor Jones Library of the University of Hull, in 
helping me locate the material, some of them through the Inter-Library Loan 
system. I find it appropriate to express my thanks to all of them. 
Finally, I would like to express my deepest thanks to my mother, my 
sisters, Rouh-Angiz and Sorour, and in particular my wife Mitra and my 
children Noshin and Sohrab, who all accepted a long period of sacrifices 
during my studies at Hull, and to whom I would like to dedicate this work. 
S. J. Seifi 
ii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Table of Cases ix 
Table of Statutes xviii 
Table of Treaties xx 
Table of Other Documents xxiv 
Abbreviations xxvi 
Introduction 1 
Chapter One 
Background and Reasons for the Establishment of 
the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal 
Introduction 8 
I- Iran-U. S. Political and Economic Relations 8 
A- Political Issues 8 
B- Economic Relations 10 
II- Origins of the Existing Claims 13 
III- Hostage Crisis 19 
A- U. S. Recourse to International 21 
Organizations 
B- U. S. Unilateral Measures Against 23 
Iran 
C- Legality of the Freeze of Iranian 26 
Assets 
IV- A Survey of Claims Involved 30 
A- Bank Claims 31 
B- Nationalization Claims 35 
C- Standby Letters of Credit Claims 39 
D- Related Issues 41 
V- Negotiating History and Terms of the 42 
Algiers Accords 
A- Negotiating History of the Accords 42 
11 
B- Terms of the Algiers Accords 48 
Conclusion 52 
Chapter Two 
International Arbitration in General 
Introduction 55 
1. The Concept of Arbitration 55 
H. Arbitration in International Law 57 
III. Effectiveness of International Arbitration 61 
A. Public International Arbitration 61 
B. Commercial International Arbitration 66 
IV. Forms of International Arbitration 69 
A. Public International Arbitration 70 
B. Commercial International Arbitration 73 
V. Basic Issues in International Arbitration 82 
1. Terms of Reference 82 
2. Composition of Arbitral Tribunals 84 
3. Rules of Procedure 88 
4. Basis of Decision and the Award 89 
Conclusion 91 
Chapter Three 
Administrative and Organizational Aspects of the 
Iran-US Claims Tribunal 
Introduction 93 
1. Place of Arbitration 94 
II. Secretariat of the Tribunal 97 
1. The Registry 98 
2. Legal Services 100 
3. Language Services 100 
III. Financial Issues 101 
IV. Statistics of the Claims 103 
1. Claims Filed 103 
2. Claims Terminated 104 
IV 
3. Amounts Awarded 105 
Chapter Four 
Composition of the Iran-US Claims Tribunal 
1. Generally 107 
2. Forms of Composition of Arbitral Tribunals 108 
3. Forms of Composition of the Iran-US Claims 112 
Tribunal 
Section A 
International Arbitration : Judicial or Quasi- 
Judicial 
I. Generally 116 
II. Compromise Decisions 118 
III. Special Characteristics 121 
IV. Case A/1 124 
V. Case A/15 132 
VI. The Influence of Meta-Legal Factors 141 
VII. Internal Politics 147 
Conclusion 152 
Section B 
National/Party-Appointed Arbitrators 
I. Elaboration 156 
II. Theoretical Aspects 160 
III. Institutional Autonomy 166 
a- Appointment 166 
b- Resignation 171 
c- Financial Independence 175 
IV. Assessment 176 
a- Individual Opinions 177 
b- Method of Reasoning 182 
c- Voting Behaviour 184 
Conclusion 185 
V 
Section C 
Cultural-Legal Background of International 
Arbitrators 
I. Generally 
II. International Adjudication and the 
Developing Countries 
III. Background and Qualifications of the 
Neutral Arbitrators of the Iran-US Claims 
Tribunal 
IV. The Process of Appointment of the Neutral 
Members of the Tribunal 
V. Assessment 
Conclusion 
Chapter Five 
Withdrawal of Arbitrators 
Introduction 
Section A 
Withdrawal of Arbitrators in The Iran-US Claims 
Tribunal 
1. Relevant Rules of Procedure 
II. Facts Pertaining to the Problem 
III. A Factual-Legal Confusion 
Section B 
The General Problems of Withdrawal of 
Arbitrators 
I. Generally 
II. Theoretical Analysis 
II(1). The Principle of Equilibrium 
11(2). The Principle of Effectiveness 
III. The Notion of Third Party Replacement 
III(1). The Codification of International 
Arbitral Procedure by the ILC 
188 
193 
197 
203 
214 
232 
235 
237 
240 
256 
259 
262 
263 
267 
275 
279 
vi 
111(2). The Concept of Enforced 292 
Replacement in International 
Commercial Arbitration 
IV. Precedents 297 
IV(1). Arbitration Continued Because of 302 
Express Agreement 
IV(2). Arbitration Continued in the 305 
Absence of Express Provision 
IV(3). Arbitration Discontinued in the 310 
Absence of Express Provision 
IV(3)-(A). Tribunals with More 310 
than Three Members 
IV(3)(B). Three-Member 314 
Tribunals 
Conclusion 320 
Chapter Six 
Procedural Remedies Against Awards of the Iran- 
US Claims Tribunal 
Section A 
Procedural Remedies Against International 
Arbitral Awards 
I. The legal Possibility of Nullity of Arbitral 325 
Awards 
H. Principle of Nullity in Private Law 330 
III. Nullity of Awards in Relation to the 332 
Irregularities in Composition of the Tribunal 
IV. Forms of Remedies Against Arbitral 334 
Awards 
Section B 
Procedural Remedies Against Awards of the Iran- 
US Claims Tribunal 
I. Generally 339 
II. The Relevance of the Character of the Iran- 342 
US Claims Tribunal 
vii 
III. Remedies within the Tribunal System 356 
III(l). The Relationship between the 356 
Full Tribunal and the Chambers 
IH(2). Revision of the Award 361 
IV. The Role and Function of the Escrow Agent 366 
in Relation to the Validity of the Award 
Conclusion 370 
Chapter Seven 
Conclusion 373 
Appendixes 
Appendix One: Declaration of the Government 382 
of Algeria of 19 January 1981 (The General 
Declaration) 
Appendix Two: Declaration of the Government 389 
of Algeria Concerning the Settlement of Claims 
by Iran and the United States (The Claims 
Settlement Declaration) 
Appendix Three: Undertakings of the 393 
Government of the United States of America 
and the Government of the Islamic Republic of 
Iran with Respect to the Declaration of the 
Government of Algeria (The Undertakings) 
Appendix Four: Iran-United States Claims 396 
Tribunal Rules of Procedure 
Bibliography 438 
viii 
TABLE OF CASES 
Alabama Claims Arbitration of 1872, Wetter, Vol 1, p. 27. 
Alan Estates, Ltd. v W. G. Stones, Ltd., [19811 3 All E. R., p. 
481. 
Alan Craig v Ministry of Energy, 2 September 1983,3 Iran- 
USCTR. p. 280. 
Ambatielos Arbitration, 23 ILR., p. 306. 
Ambatielos Case (before the ICJ), May 19,1953, ICJ Rep. 
1953, p. 10. 
AMCO Asia Corp. v Republic of Indonesia, Annulment 
Decision of 16 May 1986,25 ILM (1986), p. 1439. 
American Bell International v the Islamic Republic of Iran, 
474 F. Supp. p. 420. 
American Bell International Inc. v Iran, (Iran-US Tribunal) 12 
September 1985,9 Iran-USCTR. p. 409. 
American International Group, Inc v Islamic Republic of Iran, 
493 F. Supp. p. 522. 
American International Group, Inc. v Iran, Award of 19 Dec. 
1983 (Iran-US Tribunal), 4 Iran-USCTR. p. 96. 
Aminoil Arbitration, 21 ILM, (1982), p. 976. 
Amoco International Finance Corporation v Iran, 14 July 
1987,15 Iran-USCTR. p. 189. 
Amoco Iran Oil Co v Iran, (Case No. 55), 2 Iran-USCTR. p. 
345; 3 Iran-USCTR. p. 297. 
Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. Case, ICJ Rep. 1952, p. 93. 
Arab Republic of Egypt v SPP, 23 ILM, (1984), p. 1048. 
Aramco Case, 1958,27 ILR, p. 117. 
Arbitral Award in the Taba Dispute, 27 ILM, p. 1421. 
Ix 
Arbitral Award Made by the King of Spain on December 23, 
1906. ICJ Reports, 1960, p. 192. 
Bagell v Iran, 7 August 1986,11 Iran-USCTR. p. 300. 
Banco National de Cuba v Sabatino, 367 U. S. 398 in 11 U. S. 
Sup. Crt. Rep. p. 804. 
Behring International v Iranian Air Force, 475 F. Supp. p. 383. 
Behring International Inc. v Iranian Air Force, (Iran-US 
Tribunal), 4 Iran-USCTR. p. 89; 3 May 1984,6 Iran-USCTR. 
p. 30. 
Blount Brothers Corp v Ministry of Housing, 3 Iran-USCTR. 
p. 225. 
BP v Libya, 53 ILR, p. 297; and BP v Libya, Request for 
Revision, Wetter, Vol II, p. 559. 
Buraimi Oasis Arbitral Tribunal Case, (1955), Wetter, Vol 3, 
pp. 357/368. 
Cal-Main Foods, Inc v Iran, 31 May 1984,6 Iran-USCTR. p. 
52. 
Casablanca Case, Scott, Hague Court Reports, 1st Series, 
(1916), p. 110. 
Case A/1, (Iran-U. S. ), 30 July 1982,1 Iran-USCTR. pp. 144, 
189. 
Case A/2,1 Iran-USCTR. p. 101. 
Case A/15, (Iran-U. S. ), Interlocutory Award of 20 August 
1986,12 Iran-USCTR. p. 40; Partial Award of 4 May 1987,14 
Iran-USCTR. p. 311. 
Case A/16,5 Iran-US CTR. p. 57, and 9 Iran-USCTR. p. 97. 
Cases Nos. (111,582,591, A/16), 3 Iran-USCTR. p. 316. 
Cases Nos. (A/16,582,591), 3 Iran-USCTR. p. 380. 
Cases Nos. (1,2,3), 1 Iran-USCTR. p. 129. 
Cases Nos. (37,87,178), 3 Iran-USCTR. p. 87. 
Case A/18,5 Iran-USCTR. p. 251. 
Case A/20,11 Iran-USCTR. p. 271. 
X 
Case A/21,4 May 1987,14 Iran-USCTR. 324. 
Case B-1, (Islamic Republic of Iran v the United States), 4 
April 1986,10 Iran-USCTR. p. 207. 
Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and 
Against Nicaragua, ICJ Rep. 1986, p. 14. 
Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff 
in Tehran, Provisional Order, Dec. 15,1979, ICJ Rep., 1979, 
p. 1 and Judgement of May 24,1980, ICJ Rep., 1980, p. 1. 
Case Relating to the Interpretation of the Peace Treaties with 
Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, (Peace Treaties Case), 
Advisory Opinion, First Phase, ICJ Rep., (1950), p. 65; Second 
Phase, ICJ Rep., (1950), p. 221. 
Chase Manhattan Bank v Iran 79 Civ (TPG)(S. D. N. Y. Filed 
Dec 4,1979). 
Chas T. Main v Mahab, 2 September 1983,3 Iran-USCTR. p. 
270; 4 Iran-USCTR. p. 60. 
Chorzow Factory Case, PCIJ Rep. Series A, No. 9, p. 31; 
reproduced in Hudson, 1 World Court Rep. p. 589. 
Continental Grain v Government Trading Corp, 5 September 
1983,3 Iran-USCTR. p. 319. 
Dallal v Bank Mellat (Iran-US Tribunal), 10 January 1984,5 
Iran-USCTR. p. 74. 
Dallal v Bank Mellat, (Q. B. D. ), [1986] 2 W. L. R. p. 745. 
Dames & Moore v Reagan Secretary of Treasury, 20 ]LM, p. 
897. 
Dames and Moore v Iran (Iran-US Tribunal), 20 Sept. 1983,4 
Iran-USCTR. p. 212; 17 April 1985,8 Iran-USCTR. p. 107. 
David Mikhael, Inc. v Iran, (Case No. 926), 3 Iran-USCTR. p. 
84. 
Diverted Cargoes Case, 22 ILR., p. 820. 
DOW Chemical Company v Iran, 8 May 1984,6 Iran-USCTR. 
p. 38. 
Dresser Industries, Inc. v Iran, 5 Nov. 1982,1 Iran-USCTR. p. 
281. 
xl 
Economy Forms Corp v Iran, 13 June 1983,3 Iran-USCTR. p. 
42; and 5 Iran-USCTR. p. 1. 
Electronic Data System Inc v Social Security Organization of 
the Government of Iran, 651 F. 2d, p. 1007 and 508 F. Supp. p. 
1350. 
Esphahanian v Bank Tejarat, 2 Iran-USCTR. p. 157. 
Fisheries Jurisdiction Case, (U. K. v Iceland), ICJ Rep. 1974, p. 
3. 
Flexi-Van Leasing Inc. v Iran, 15 December 1982,1 Iran- 
USCTR. p. 455; 11 October 1986,12 Iran-USCTR. p. 335. 
Ford Aerospace v the Air Force of Iran, 5 Nov. 1982,1 Iran- 
USCTR. p. 268. 
Formost Tehran Inc. v Iran, 4 Iran-USCTR. p. 62. 
Franco-Tunisian Arbitration Tribunal, April 2,1957,24 ILR 
(1957), p. 767. 
Futura Trading Inc. v NIOC, 13 Iran-USCTR. p. 99. 
General Motors Corp v Iran, 3 Iran-USCTR. p. 1; and 
Decision of 28 August 1984,7 Iran-USCTR. p. 220. 
George W. Drucker, JR. v Foreign Transaction Co., 5 Nov. 
1982,1 Iran-USCTR. p. 252. 
Gibbs and Hill, Inc., v Tavanir, 5 Nov. 1982,1 Iran-USCTR. 
p. 236. 
Gold Looted by Germany from France Case, 20 ILR, p. 441. 
Golpira v Iran, 2 Iran-USCTR. p. 171. 
Gottaverken Case, 20 ILM, (1981), p. 883. 
Granger Associates v Iran, 20 October 1987,16 Iran-USCTR. 
p. 317. 
Granite State Machine Co, v Iran, 15 December 1982,1 Iran- 
USCTR. p. 442. 
GRIMM v Iran, 2 Iran-USCTR. p. 78. 
Gruen Associates, Inc. v Iran Housing Co., 27 July 1983,3 
Iran-USCTR. p. 97. 
xii 
Halliburton Co Doreen/IMCO, 5 Nov. 1982,1 Iran-USCTR. p. 
242. 
Harnischefger Corp v MORT, 4 Iran-USCTR. p. 76; Partial 
Award of 13 July 1984,7 Iran-USCTR. p. 90; Final Award of 
26 April 1985,8 Iran-USCTR. p. 119. 
Haya de la Torre Case, ICJ Rep. 1951, p. 71. 
HNTB v Iran, 5 Nov. 1982,1 Iran-USCTR. P. 248. 
Hungarian Optants Case, Francis Deak, "The Hungarian- 
Rumanian Land Dispute", pp. 61-154. 
INA Corporation v Iran, 12 August 1985,8 Iran-USCTR. p. 
373. 
International Schools Services Inc. v NICIC, Award of 10 
October 1985,9 Iran-USCTR. p. 187; 5 Iran-USCTR. p. 338. 
International Systems and Control Corp v Iran, 12 Iran- 
USCTR. p. 239. 
International Technical Products Corp v Iran, Partial Award of 
19 August 1985,9 Iran-USCTR. p. 10; Final Award of 24 
October 1985,9 Iran-USCTR. p. 206. 
Intrend International Inc. v Iranian Air Force, 27 July 1983,3 
Iran-USCTR. p. 110. 
Islamic Republic of Iran v Cementation International Ltd, 
Cour de Justice Civile, Geneva, Int'l Commercial Arbitration, 
Loose Leaf, Nov. 1986, p. 60. 
Island of Palmas Case, 1928,2 R. I. A. A., p. 829. 
ITT Industries, Inc v Iran, May 1983,2 Iran-USCTR. p. 348. 
Jay Treaty Arbitration, Moore, International Adjudications, 
Vols 3-4. 
John Carl Warnecke & Associates v bank Mellat, 3 Iran- 
USCTR. p. 256. 
Mocker Industrieanlagen GmbH v United Republic of 
Cameron, 11 YB. Comm. Arb. (1986), p. 162. 
KMW International v Chase Manhattan N. A. 606 F. 2d. p. 10. 
Kochler v Iran, 3 July 1986,11 Iran-USCTR. p. 285. 
xiii 
Lake Lonoux Arbitration, 24 ILR. P. 101. 
Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of 
South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding 
Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), [Namibia Case], 
Advisory Opinion, ICJ Rep. 1971, p. 16. 
Lena Goldfields Arbitration, 5 A. D. p. 426. 
LIAMCO Arbitration, 12 April 1977,62 ILR. p. 141. 
Lotus Case, PCIJ Rep. Series A, No. 10, (1927), p. 4; 
reproduced in Hudson 2 World Court Rep., p. 23. 
Mahmoud v Iran, 9 Iran-USCTR. p. 280. 
Mc Collough and Company, Inc, v the Ministry of Post, NIOC 
and Bank Markazi, 22 April 1986,11 Iran-USCTR. p. 3; 7 
July 1986,11 Iran-USCTR. p. 287. 
Mexican Claims Commission Arbitration, 5 A. D. p. 424. 
Moms v Iran, 3 Iran-USCTR. p. 364. 
Narenji v Civiletti, 617 F. 2d. p. 745. 
National Airomotive Corp v Iran, 14 July 1983,3 Iran- 
USCTR. p. 91. 
Naulilaa Case, 4 ILR. pp. 274,526. 
New England Merchants National Bank v Iran Power 
Generation and Transmission Co, 502 F. Supp. p. 120. 
Norsolor Case, 20 ILM, (1981), p. 887. 
North Atlantic Fisheries Case, Scott, Hague Court Reports, 1st 
Series, (1916), p. 141. 
North Sea Continental Self Cases, ICJ Rep. 1969, p. 3. 
Norwegian Shipowners Claims Arbitration, 17 AJIL (1923), 
pp. 287,362. 
Nottebohm Case, ICJ Rep., 1953, p. 110. 
Orinoco Steamship Company Case, 5 AJIL (1911), p. 35. 
OTIS Elevator Co. v Iran, 14 Iran-USCTR. p. 283. 
Panacaviar, S. A. v Iran, 10 Feb. 1987,14 Iran-USCTR. p. 100. 
xiv 
Payne v Iran, 8 August 1986,12 Iran-USCTR. p. 3. 
Pepsico Inc. v Zamzam Bottling Co. 1 Iran-USCTR. p. 173; 19 
Dec. 1986,13 Iran-USCTR. p. 328. 
Phillips Petroleum Co., Iran v Iran, (Case No. 39), 3 Iran- 
USCTR. p. 297. 
Postal Administration of Portugal-Postal Administration of 
Yugoslavia Arbitration, March 1956,23 ILR. p. 591. 
Queens Office Tower Associates v Iran, 15 April 1983,2 Iran- 
USCTR. p. 247. 
Questech Inc v Iran, Award of 20 September 1985,9 Iran- 
USCTR. p. 107. 
R. N. Pomeroy v Iran, 8 June 1983,2 Iran-USCTR. p. 372; and 
4 Iran-USCTR. p. 237. 
Railway Traffic between Lithuania and Poland, PCIJ Rep. 
1931, Series. A/B No. 42, p. 108; reproduced in Hudson, 2 
World Court Rep. (1927-1932), p. 750. 
Rann of Kutch Arbitration, 7 ILM, p. 633; 50 ILR, p. 2. 
Raygo Wagner Equipment Co., v Star Line Iran Co., 15 
December 1982,1 Iran-USCTR. p. 411. 
Reading and Bates Corp v National Iranian Oil Co, 478 F. 
Supp. p. 724. 
"Re Judge Mangard", Decision of 15 January 1982,1 Iran- 
USCTR. p. 111; and Decision of Dr J. Moons (Appointing 
Authority), Chief Justice of The Netherlands, 5 March 1982,1 
Iran-USCTR. p. 509. 
Republic of Columbia v Cauca Co, 106 Fed. p. 337; 190 U. S. 
p. 524; 47 U. S. Sup. Crt. Rep. p. 1159. 
Re Raymond International (U. K) Ltd. 1 Iran-USCTR. p. 394. 
Reynolds Metal Co. v Iran, 27 July 1983,3 Iran-USCTR. p. 
119. 
Rexnord Inc. v Iran, 10 January 1983,2 Iran-USCTR. p. 6. 
R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v Iran, Order of 10 June 1983,3 
Iran-USCTR. p. 39; 7 Iran-USCTR. p. 181. 
xv 
Sabotage Cases (Black Tom Explosion Case), 33 AJIL (1939), 
p. 737. 
Sapphire Arbitration, (Sapphire Int'l Petroleum Ltd. v NIOC), 
13 ICLQ, (1964), p. 1011; 35 ILR, p. 136. 
Schering Corporation v Iran, 5 Iran-USCTR. p. 361. 
Sea-Land Service, Inc. v Iran, (Case No. 33), 4 Iran-USCTR. 
p. 65. 
Sedco v NIOC, 10 Iran-USCTR. p. 180; and Award of 2 July 
1987,15 Iran-USCTR. p. 23. 
Serbian Loans Issued in France Case, PCIJ Rep. Series A, No. 
20/21, Judgement No. 14,12 July 1929; reproduced in 
Hudson, 2 World Court Rep. p. 340. 
South West Africa Cases, First Phase, ICJ Rep. 1962, p. 319; 
Second Phase, ICJ Rep. 1966, p. 6. 
SPA v the Government of Congo, Nov. 1979,67 ILR. p. 319. 
Spaans v the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, AR 83/84, 
Annex VI, p. 1; Appeal Process, AR 85/86, p. 74. 
SPP v Arab Republic of Egypt, 22 ILM, p. 752. 
Starret Housing Corp v Iran, 4 Iran-USCTR. p. 122 and 7 Iran- 
USCTR. p. 119. 
Stone and Webster v National Petrochemical Co., 5 Nov. 
1982,1 Iran-USCTR. 274. 
Stromberg-Carlson Corp v Bank Melli Iran, 467 F. Supp. p. 
530. 
ST. Regis Co. v Iran, 14 Iran-USCTR. p. 86. 
Sylvania Technical Systems, Inc. v Iran, 5 Iran-USCTR. 141; 
and Award of 27 June 1985,8 Iran-USCTR. p. 298. 
Tacna Arica Arbitration, 19 AJIL (1925), p. 393. 
T. C. S. B., Inc. v Iran, 5 Nov. 1982,1 Iran-USCTR. p. 261. 
Terrapin International, Ltd. v Inland Revenue Commissioners, 
[1976] 2 All E. R. p. 461. 
Texaco v Libya, 1977,53 ILR, p. 389. 
xvi 
Tinoco Arbitration, 1923,1 R. I. A. A., p. 369. 
Tippetts, Abbett, Mccarthy, Stratton, v TAMS-AFFA, 6 Iran- 
USCTR. p. 219. 
Touche Ross and Co v Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co, 107 
Misc. 2d p. 438,434 N. Y. S. 2d p. 575. 
Training Systems Corp v bank Tejarat, 19 December 1986,13 
Iran-USCTR. P. 331. 
Transamerica ICS, Inc. v Iran, (Case No. 452), 3 Iran-USCTR. 
p. 84. 
Trustees of Columbia University v Iran, 1 July 1986,11 Iran- 
USCTR. p. 283. 
Tunisia/Libya Continental Shelf Case, ICJ Rep. 1982, p. 18. 
Turriff Construction Company Ltd. v the Government of 
Sudan, 1969,17 Neth. I. L. R., (1970), p. 200. 
Ultrasystems Inc. v Iran, Award of 4 March 1983,2 Iran- 
USCTR. p. 100; Award of 7 Dec. 1983,4 Iran-USCTR. p. 77. 
United Technologies Corp v Citibank N. A. 469 F. Supp. p. 
473. 
Upper Silesian Arbitral Tribunal Case, Georges 
Kaeckenbeeck, "The International Experiment of Upper 
Silesia", 1942. 
Venezuela-Guyana Boundary Dispute, Wetter, Vol III, p. 3. 
Westinghouse Electric Corp v Iran, 17 Oct. 1986,13 Iran- 
USCTR. p. 93. 
Whittaker Corp. v Iran, 14 Iran-USCTR. 263. 
William L. Pereira Associates, Iran v Iran, 17 March 1984,5 
Iran-USCTR. pp. 198,230. 
Woodward-Clyde Consultants v Iran, September 1983,3 Iran- 
USCTR. p. 239; 5 Iran-USCTR. p. 73. 
World farmers Trading Inc v Govt. Trading Corp, 16 August 
1983,3 Iran-USCTR. p. 197. 
Zokor International, Inc. v Iran, 5 Nov. 1982,1 Iran-USCTR. 
p. 271. 
xvii 
TABLE OF STATUTES 
Arbitration Rules of the Inter-American Arbitration 
Commission, 1982, Published by the IAAC. 
Arbitration Rules of the LCIA, in force from January 1985, 
Published by the LCIA. 
Arbitration Rules of the Court of Arbitration of the 
International Chamber of Commerce, in force from January 
1988, Published by the ICC. 
Belgian Statute on Arbitration (1985), 24 ILM, p. 725. 
Bill of 19 June 1979. Iranian Official Gazette, No. 10012- 
8/07/1979. 
Bill of February 27,1979. Iranian Official Gazette, No. 16- 
10207- 6/03/1979. 
Florida International Commercial Arbitration Act of 1986,26 
ILM, p. 949. 
Commercial Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration 
Association, 1977, Wetter, Vol 5, p. 65. 
Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes 
Established by the ABA and AAA, 1977, Wetter, Vol 3, p. 
429. 
Draft Convention of the International Law Commission on 
Arbitral Procedure, 1953, Wetter, Vol 5, p. 228. 
Escrow Agreement, 20 ILM, p. 234. 
French International Arbitration Provisions of the Decree 
Amending the Code of Civil Procedure, 1981,20 ILM, p. 917. 
Iranian Code of Civil Procedure. 
Law Relating to the Establishment of a Special Commission 
with Regard to Oil Agreements, Iranian Official Gazette, No. 
20-1018- 10/02/1979. 
Law of Nationalization of Banks, Iranian Official Gazette, No. 
10012- 7/07/1979. 
xviii 
Law of Nationalization of Insurance Companies, Iranian 
Official Gazette, No. 1-10264- 21/05/1979. 
Law for the Protection and Development of Iranian Industry, 
Iranian Official Gazette, No. 10031- 31/07/1979. 
Lebanese International Arbitration Provisions of the Code of 
Civil Procedure of 1983,27 ILM, p. 1022. 
Model Rules on Arbitral Procedure of the International Law 
Commission, 1958, Wetter, Vol 5, p. 232. 
Netherlands New Statute on Arbitration (1986), 26 ILM, 
(1987), p. 921; and Arbitration Provisions of the Netherlands 
Code of Civil Procedure in force prior to the 1986 
Amendment, 4 Iran-USCTR. p. 299. 
Permanent Court of Arbitration Rules of Arbitration and 
Conciliation for Settlement of International Disputes Between 
Two Parties of Which Only One Is a State (1962), Wetter, Vol 
5, p. 53. 
Proposed Dutch Bill on the Applicability of Dutch Law to the 
Awards of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, 1983,4 
Iran-US CTR. p. 306. 
Rules of Procedure of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, 
2 Iran-US CTR. p. 405. 
Swiss Statute of 1987 on International Arbitration, 27 ILM, p. 
37. 
Technical Agreement of 17 August 1981 Among Banque 
Centrale d'Algerie, Bank Markazi Iran, The Federal Reserve 
bank of New York and N. V. Settlement Bank of the 
Netherlands, 1 Iran-USCTR. p. 38. 
United Kingdom Arbitration Act of 1979,18 ILM, p. 1248. 
United States Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976.15 
ILM (1976), p. 1388. 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules of 1976,15 ILM (1976), p. 
701. 
UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial 
Arbitration of 1985,24 ILM, p. 1302. 
XIX 
TABLE OF TREATIES 
Agreement to Arbitrate the Boundary Dispute Concerning the 
Taba Beachfront of 11 September 1986, Between Egypt and 
Israel, 26 ILM, (1987), p. 1. 
Agreement on Safeguards Under the Non-Proliferation Treaty, 
5 April 1973,12 ILM, p. 469. 
Air Transport Agreement Between Malawi and Ghana, 4 May 
1965,541 LINTS, p. 163. 
American Treaty of Pacific Settlement (Pact of Bogota), 1948, 
30 UNTS. p. 55. 
Arbitration Agreement Between the United Kingdom and 
Saudi Arabia Concerning the Buraimi Oasis Case, July 1954, 
Wetter, Vol 3, p. 357. 
Articles of the Agreement of the International Monetary Fund 
as Amended April 30,1976,15 ILM (1976), p. 546. 
Cease-Fire Agreement Between India and Pakistan, 30 June 
1965, Wetter, Vol 1, p. 250. 
Charter of Arbitral Commission on Property Rights and 
Interests in Germany, 49 AJIL Supplement (1955), p. 113. 
Charter of the United Nations. 
Convention on the Establishment of the European Space 
Agency, 30 May 1975,14 ILM (1975), p. 885. 
Convention on the International Hydrographic Organization, 3 
May 1967,751 UNTS, p. 41. 
Convention on Relations Between the Three Powers and the 
Federal Republic of Germany and the Charter of Arbitration 
Tribunal on Relations Between the Three Powers and the 
F. R. G., as Amended in 1954, Supplement to 49 AJIL (1955), 
pp. 57,62. 
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between 
States and Nationals of Other States of 1965,575 UNTS, p. 
160. 
xx 
Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular 
Republic of Algeria, 20 ILM, 1981, p. 224. 
Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular 
Republic of Algeria Concerning the Settlement of Claims by 
the Government of the United States of America and the 
Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran. 20 ILM, p. 230. 
European Agreement Concerning an Aeronautical Satellite 
Programme, 9 December 1971,906 UNTS, p. 3. 
European Convention for the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, 
April 29,1957,320 UNTS, p. 243. 
European Convention on International Commercial Arbitration 
of 1961.484 UNTS, p. 349. 
European Fisheries Convention, 29 March 1964,581 UNTS, 
p. 57. 
Geneva General Act for the Pacific Settlement of International 
Disputes, 1928,93 L. N. T. S., p. 345; revised 28 April 1949,71 
UNTS, p. 101. 
Germany-Switzerland Arbitration Treaty of 1921, Habicht, p. 
20. 
Germany-Switzerland, Treaty of 3 December 1921, Habicht, 
p. 20. 
Germany-Sweden, Treaty of 29 August 1924, Habicht, p. 456. 
Germany-United States Claims Agreement, 10 August 1922, 
33 AJIL (1939), p. 737. 
Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International 
Disputes of 1899,1 AJIL (1907), p. 107. Also in U. K. T. S. 9 
(1901) Cmmd. 798. 
Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International 
Disputes of 1907,2 AJIL (1908), p. 43. Also in U. K. T. S. 6 
(1971), Cmmd, 4575. 
Inter-American Convention on International Commercial 
Arbitration, 1975,14 ILM (1975), p. 336. 
International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties 
of Plants, 2 December 1961,815 UNTS, p. 89. 
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from 
Ships, 2 Nov. 1973, Protocol II, 12 ILM, p. 1441. 
x xi 
International Convention Relating to Intervention on the High 
Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties, 29 Nov. 1969,9 
ILM, p. 25. 
Iran-Belgium, Treaty of 23 May 1929, UN Systematic Survey, 
p. 581. 
Iran-the Netherlands, Treaty of 12 March 1930, UN 
Systematic Survey, p. 770. 
Iran-Switzerland, Treaty of 25 April 1934, UN Systematic 
Survey, p. 1069. 
Protocol to the Charter of the Organization of African Unity, 
1964,3 ILM, (1964), p. 1116. 
Statute of the International Court of Justice. 
Treaty of Alabama Claims Arbitration, 8 May 1871,143 CTS, 
p. 145. 
Treaty Establishing the Caribbean Community, 4 July 1973, 
946 LINTS, p. 17. 
Treaty of Friendship Between Greece and Persia, 1931, UN 
Systematic Survey, p. 95. 
Treaty of Jay, 19 November 1794, Between the U. K. and the 
U. S., 52 CTS, p. 243. 
Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Rights 
Between the United States of America and Iran, 284 U. N. T. S. 
p. 93. 
Undertakings of the Government of the United States of 
America and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran 
with Respect to the Declaration of the Government of the 
Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria, 20 ILM, p. 229. 
UN Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Foreign Arbitral Awards, 1958,330 UNTS, p. 38. 
UN Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982,21 ILM, p. 
1261. 
United Kingdom-Netherlands Agreement Relating to the 
Delimitation of the Continental Shelf Under the North Sea, 6 
Oct. 1965,595 UNTS, p. 105. 
United States-Norway Arbitration Agreement of 1921,17 
AJIL (1923), p. 362. 
xxii 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 8 ILM (1969), p. 
679. 
xxiii 
TABLE OF OTHER DOCUMENTS 
Report by the Special Rapporteur on Preparatory Work of the 
UNCITRAL on International Commercial Arbitration, 3 
YB. UNCITRAL, (1972), p. 193. 
Report of the Secretary-General on the Revised Draft Set of 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (Addendum): Commentary on 
the Draft UNCITRAL Rules, 12 December 1975,7 
YB. UNCITRAL, (1976), p. 166. 
Report of the International Law Commission Covering the 
Work of Its First Session, YBILC, (1949), p. 277. 
Report of the International Law Commission Covering the 
Work of Its Fifth Session, YBILC, (1953), Vol II, p. 200. 
Report by the Special Rapporteur of the ILC on Arbitral 
Procedure, 24 April 1957, YBILC, (1957), Vol II, p. 1. 
Report of the International law Commission Covering the 
Work of Its 9th Session, 1957, G. A. O. R., Doc. A/3623; also in 
YBILC, (1957), Vol II, p. 131. 
Report by the Special Rapporteur of the ILC on Arbitral 
Procedure, 6 March 1958, YBILC (1958), Vol II, p. 2. 
Report of the International Law Commission Covering the 
Work of Its 10th Session, 1958, G. A. O. R., Doc. A/3859; also 
reproduced in YBILC (1958), Vol II, p. 78. 
U. S. Executive Order No 12170,18 ILM, p. 1549. 
U. S. Executive Order No 12294,20 ILM, p. 412. 
U. S. Iranian Assets Control Regulations,. as adopted and 
published through March 25,1980,19 ILM, p. 514. 
UN General Assembly Resolution 1803 (XVII), 1962, UN 
Resolutions, Vol IX, p. 107. 
UN General Assembly Resolution 797 (VIII), UN Resolutions, 
Vol IV, p. 223. 
UN General Assembly Resolution 3171 (XVIII), 1973,13 
ILM (1974), p. 238. 
xxiv 
UN General Assembly Resolution 1262 (XIII), 1958, 
G. A. O. R. 13 Session, Suppl. No. 18 (A/4090), p. 53. 
UN General Assembly Resolution 898 (X), 1955, G. A. O. R., 
10 Session, Suppl. No. 19 (A/1316), p. 46. 
UN General Assembly Resolution 3281 (XXIX), 1974,14 
ILM (1975), p. 251. 
UN Security Council Resolution 457.18 ELM, p. 1644. 
UN Security Council Resolution 461,19 ILM, p. 250. 
Working Paper Prepared by the Secretariat on the UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules, 7 YB. UNCITRAL, (1976), p. 181. 
xxv 
TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS 
AAA 
ABA 
A. D. 
AJIL 
All E. R. 
AR 
Arb. Int'1. 
Arb. J. 
Bos. C. I. C. L. R. 
Bus. Lawyer 
BYIL 
Cd., Cmmd. 
C. J. Q. 
Col. J. T. L. 
Col. L. R. 
CSD, Claims Settlement 
Declaration 
CTS 
C. W. R. J. I. L. 
Ed. 
Eds. 
F. 2d. 
G. A. O. R. 
GD, General Declaration 
G. Wash. J. I. L. Econ. 
Habicht 
Hague Y. B. I. L. 
Harv. I. L. J. 
Harv. L. R. 
IBA 
Icc 
ICJ 
ICJ Rep. 
ICLQ 
ICSID 
ILC 
ILC's Draft Convention 
American Arbitration Association. 
American Bar Association. 
Annual Digest of Public International Law 
Cases. 
American Journal of International Law. 
All England Law Reports. 
Annual Reports of the Iran-United States 
Claims Tribunal. 
Arbitration International. 
The Arbitration Journal. 
Boston College International and 
Comparative Law Review. 
The Business Lawyer. 
British Yearbook of International Law. 
U. K. Command Papers. 
Civil Justice Quarterly. 
Columbia Journal of Transnational Law. 
Columbia Law Review. 
Declaration of the Government of Algeria 
Concerning the Settlement of Claims 
Between Iran and the United States, 19 
January 1981. 
Consolidated Treaty Series. 
Case Western Reserve Journal of 
International Law. 
Editor, Edition. 
Editors. 
Federal Reporter (U. S. A. ), 2nd. 
General Assembly Official Records. 
Declaration of the Government of Algeria, 
19 January 1981. 
George Washington Journal of 
International Law & Economics. 
Habicht, Post-War Treaties. 
The Hague Yearbook of International 
Law. 
Harvard International Law Journal. 
Harvard Law Review. 
International Bar Association. 
International Chamber of Commerce. 
International Court of Justice. 
International Court of Justice Reports. 
International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly. 
International Centre for the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes Between States and 
Nationals of Other States. 
International Law Commission. 
International Law Commission's Draft 
Convention on Arbitral Procedure, 1953. 
xxvi 
ILC's Model Rules International Law Commission's Model 
Rules on Arbitral Procedure 1958 
ILR , . International Law Reports. 
ILM International Legal Materials. 
Ind. J. I. L. Indian Journal of International Law. Int'l., Int. International. 
Intl Lawyer International Lawyer. 
Int'l. Bus. Lawyer International Business Lawyer. 
Int'l. Fin. L. R. International Financial Law Review. 
Iran-USCTR Iran-United States Claims Tribunal 
Reports, Grotius Publications, Volumes 1- 
16. 
J. Int'l. Arb. Journal of International Arbitration. 
LCIA London Court of International Arbitration. 
L. N. T. S. League of Nations Treaty Series. 
L. P. I. B. Law & Policy in International Business. 
Midd. E. J. Middle East Journal. 
Misc. Miscellaneous Reports, New York, 
(U. S. A. ). 
Moore, Int. Adj. Moore, International Adjudications. 
Neth. I. L. R. Netherlands International Law Review. 
Neth. Y. B. I. L. Netherlands Yearbook of International 
Law. 
NW. J. I. B. L. Northwestern Journal of International 
Business and Law. 
N. Y. S. New York Supplement (U. S. A. ). 
PCA Permanent Court of Arbitration. 
PCIJ Permanent Court of International Justice. 
Proc. A. S. I. L. Proceedings of the American Society of 
International Law. 
Recueil des Cours Recueil des Cours de l'Academie de droit 
international. 
R. I. A. A., RIAA United Nations Reports of International 
Arbitral Awards. 
Stan. J. I. L. Stanford Journal of International Law. 
Syracuse J. I. L. C. Syracuse Journal of International Law & 
Commerce. 
Texas I. L. J. Texas International Law Journal. 
U. C. C. L. J. Uniform Commercial Code Law Journal. 
U. K. T. S. U. K. Treaty Series. 
UNCITRAL United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law. 
UNCITRAL Rules UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules of 1976. 
UNCITRAL Model Law UNCITRAL Model Law on International 
Commercial Arbitration of 1985. 
Undertakings The Undertakings of the Government of 
the United States of America and the 
Government of the Islamic Republic of 
Iran with Respect to the Declaration of the 
Government of the Democratic and 
Popular Republic of Algeria. 
UN Resolutions Djonovich, UN Resolutions. 
UN Systematic Survey United Nations, Systematic Survey of 
Treaties for the Pacific Settlement of 
International Disputes 1928-1948. 
UNTS, U. N. T. S. United Nations Treaty Series. 
U. S. U. S. Supreme Court Reports. 
xxvii 
U. S. Sup. Crt. Rep. U. S. Supreme Court Reports, Lawyers' 
Edition. 2nd. 
Virg. J. I. L. Virginia Journal of International Law. 
Van. J. I. L. Vanderbilt Journal of International Law. 
Van. J. T. L. Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational law. 
Wash. L. R. Washington Law Review. 
W. L. R. Weekly Law Reports. 
Wetter Wetter, International Arbitral Process, 5 
Volumes. 
YB. Comm. Arb. Yearbook Commercial Arbitration. 
YBILC Yearbook of the International Law 
Commission. 
YB. UNCITRAL Yearbook of the United Nations 
Commission on International Trade Law 
(UNCITRAL). 
Y. B. W. A. Yearbook of World Affairs. 
xxviii 
INTRODUCTION 
I. Purpose of the Study 
The recourse to arbitration in the context of the hostage crisis in 
relations between Iran and the United States represents one of the most recent 
submissions, and a unique one, in the modem history of international 
arbitration. Interestingly, the reference to arbitration was not directly aimed at 
resolving the hostage crisis itself. It was, rather, to remove a major obstacle in 
the way of settlement of another crisis which had become intertwined with it, 
namely hundreds of financial claims between the two Governments and 
between each Government and nationals of the other. 
International arbitration has been a mechanism well known throughout 
the history of the law of nations. Essentially, it has given birth to the modern 
concept of international judicial law. Along with the development of 
international arbitration in accordance with the changing circumstances of the 
international community, other forms of international judicial settlement have 
emerged. The most obvious example of the latter concept has been the 
introduction of the notion of judicial settlement as distinguished from 
international arbitration, and embodied in the establishment of the PCIJ and its 
successor the ICJ. 
It is interesting that despite all these developments, international 
arbitration has retained its own identity and characteristic features, making it 
distinguishable from other forms of international judicial settlement. Essential 
aspects of these features inhere principally in the structure of international 
arbitration as a system established by the parties themselves and composed of 
judges of their own choice. In its mission and objectives, international 
arbitration does not differ fundamentally from other forms of judicial 
settlement; it is a judicial form of dispute settlement and is expected to act on 
the basis of respect for law. 
Nevertheless, in view of the special structure of international 
arbitration, the question has remained unresolved as to whether these 
characteristics may have, or are even intended by the arbitrating parties to 
have, implications for the conduct of the arbitration and its outcome. It is 
therefore very significant to establish the role and the extent of the role of 
structural issues in the international arbitral process. 
This should lead us to understand the importance of organizational and 
structural issues in the process of international arbitration. There is no doubt 
that the effective organization and structuring of the arbitral tribunal can 
significantly influence the whole judicial process of arbitration, thereby 
contributing to the effectiveness and popularity of the arbitration device in 
settling international disputes. Moreover, the judicial value of arbitration 
awards, or any judicial decision indeed, cannot be assessed in isolation from 
the fundamental structural factors which significantly influence the process of 
its making. Among the structural issues are the questions of organization, time 
and cost-effectiveness of the arbitration process. Most important of all these 
issues are the fundamental questions relating to the composition of the arbitral 
tribunal, such as the method of selection, nationality, qualifications, cultural- 
legal training and independence and impartiality of the arbitrators. What is 
needed is, therefore, to illuminate the operation of these factors within the 
arbitral process. No doubt such an analysis can also highlight characteristic 
features of international arbitration by identifying the structural issues as a 
reflection of the expectations of the arbitrating parties. 
A further feature, characteristic of international arbitration, is that 
arbitral tribunals, even in the form of institutional arbitration, are created by the 
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will of the parties. Therefore the successful conduct of the arbitration depends 
largely on the co-operation of both parties in setting up and continuing that 
process. This is particularly obvious in arbitration tribunals composed of three 
elements, arbitrators appointed by each of the two parties and a jointly 
appointed arbitrator, or arbitrators. The system as a whole represents a 
carefully balanced structure reflecting the interests of both parties to the 
arbitration. Major problems may arise when co-operation is withheld by one of 
the parties, particularly in the form of withdrawal of its arbitrator during the 
proceedings. Two important questions arise in this respect: first, the legality of 
either party withholding the required co-operation; second, the nature and 
extent of remedies developed in international arbitration, in accordance with its 
special structure and characteristics, against any such withholding of co- 
operation. 
The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal offers one of the most recent 
developments, and a unique one, for a study in relation to the foregoing 
questions. Therefore the primary aim of this study is to conduct an analysis of 
the issues in the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal in relation to the role and 
effectiveness of arbitration in the settlement of disputes, particularly in respect 
of the foregoing structural questions. In applying these questions to the case of 
the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal we have attempted to : (a)- identify the 
problems associated with this type of tribunal in general, and with the Iran-US 
Tribunal in particular; and (b)- analyse the problems arising from the manner 
of practical application of the system. It is hoped that all these will indicate 
how fruitful the lessons can be for future development of international 
arbitration. 
As already mentioned, the Iran-US Claims Tribunal has its own unique 
characteristics, mainly in relation to the nature of the Tribunal itself and the 
existence of the Security Account for the payment of awards rendered against 
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Iran. A question therefore arises as to the extent to which these new concepts 
have altered the traditional features of international arbitration. We will attempt 
to analyse the effects of these issues, in particular in relation to the judicial 
review of the Tribunal awards. We shall also examine the accompanying 
questions in the field of public international law regarding the theory of nullity 
or invalidity of arbitral awards and in general in relation to their effect in 
altering the traditional features of international arbitration. 
H. Scope of the Study 
This study is divided into seven chapters. Chapter One is a discussion 
of the historical background and reasons for the establishment of the Iran- 
United States Claims Tribunal. The nature of the claims involved and the 
circumstances in which the Algiers Declarations were concluded can explain 
the structure and function of the Tribunal and the nature of its decisions. 
Moreover, the historical review can help us understand how the need for the 
peaceful settlement of this international dispute emerged as a desirable option, 
despite the high tension between the two countries. It also explains the special 
features in the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal system, such as the 
establishment of the Security Account. 
Without an understanding of the general principles governing 
international arbitration and the special characteristics thereof, it would be 
difficult to appreciate the problems associated with the arbitration process. 
Therefore, Chapter Two attempts to explain the relevant topics of international 
arbitration in relation to its forms, nature, distinguishing features and role, as a 
means of elucidating the problems discussed in this study. 
Chapter Three discusses, very briefly, the organizational and 
administrative aspects of establishing an arbitration tribunal on the scale of the 
Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, the expenses incurred by the two 
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Governments in this respect, the number of claims decided by the Tribunal and 
the work remaining to be done by it. 
Chapter Four attempts to analyse in detail the basic structural issues 
relating to the composition of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal in three 
separate Sections. Section A discusses the problems inherent in the tripartite 1 
structure of the membership of arbitral tribunals in relation to the judicial 
nature of the process and in relation to the common and special characteristics 
of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal in their bearing on the foregoing 
questions. Section B of this Chapter discusses the role of national/party- 
appointed arbitrators in relation to their appointment, resignation and in general 
their independence and impartiality. Section C analyses the questions 
surrounding the appointment of neutral arbitrators in relation to their 
nationality and cultural-legal training and the latter factors' influence on the 
outcome of these arbitrators' decisions. 
In Chapter Five, we analyse the problems concerning the frustration of 
arbitration, particularly in relation to the withdrawal, resignation or non- 
participation of party-appointed arbitrators on the instructions of the State party 
concerned. The aim is to consider the relevant developments in the Iran-United 
States Claims Tribunal in the light of general principles applicable in 
international arbitration and the remedies permissible against the frustration of 
arbitration. 
Chapter Six examines the procedural possibilities within and outside 
the Tribunal system for the judicial review of the Tribunal's decisions in 
particular connection with the character of the Tribunal awards and the 
existence of the Security Account. The primary aim is to demonstrate how the 
confusion created regarding the character of the Tribunal and the existence of 
The term "tripartite" used throughout this study signifies the presence of three elements in 
the composition of the arbitral tribunal adjudicating between two parties, not the number 
of the parties to the arbitration, as it is occasionally used. 
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the Security Account have influenced the practical and traditional 
circumstances regarding the claims of nullity and invalidity of arbitral awards. 
In addition, the role and function of the Full Tribunal in relation to the 
decisions made by the Chambers are analysed. 
Although most of the above chapters and their sections are 
accompanied by a conclusion, we have found it useful to provide a brief 
general recapitulation and conclusion with respect to the questions discussed in 
this study. This has been done in Chapter Seven. 
III. Method of the Study 
This research is a case study with fundamental theoretical dimensions. 
The basic methodology employed has been to analyse the questions which we 
have pursued in this study in the light of the theoretical principles and 
comparative practices in international arbitration vis-a-vis the decisions, 
awards and other practices of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal. 
For obvious reasons this study has been principally conducted from the 
point of view of public international (inter-State) arbitration. In discussing the 
problems, however, relevant topics of commercial international arbitration 
have not been neglected for the following reasons: (a)- The link between public 
international arbitration and commercial international arbitration, as described 
in Chapter Two of this study, is becoming increasingly inextricable. Therefore 
an attempt to limit the study within the framework of only one of these two 
types of international arbitration may ignore unnecessarily the wider field of 
comparison for the purpose of analysis. (b)- What is more important is that the 
Iran-United States Claims Tribunal is entrusted with deciding claims of a 
commercial as well as an inter-State nature. Accordingly, issues from both 
commercial international arbitration and public international arbitration are 
involved in the process. In other words, the Tribunal in practice exercises a 
dual function of both commercial and inter-State nature. This makes a sharp 
6 
distinction between these two types of arbitration, at least in this study, 
unnecessary. 
The primary source material used for the purpose of analysing the 
practice of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal has been the published 
reports of the Tribunal's awards and decisions and other reports on the 
organizational and structural aspects of the Tribunal's work, such as the Annual 
Reports published by the Secretary-General of the Tribunal. 
In view of the continuous functioning of the Tribunal and the 
development of its practice, the reports and other literature on the work of the 
Tribunal have been developing continuously during our study. Attempts have 
been made to keep the study up dated with such reports2 and literature on the 
Tribunal, or any general literature on international arbitration made available 
during the conduct of our research. 3 
2 For instance, the Annual Reports published by the Tribunal which cover the period 
between Ist July and 30 June of the following year become available after some six 
months of the end of the period under review. These Reports usually contain update 
information on the developments in the organization, membership and other activities of 
the Tribunal. For the foregoing reasons we had not been able to obtain a copy of the 
Annual Report covering the period between 1st July 1988 to 30 June 1989 by the time the 
draft of this study was finalized. 
3 One such item of literature is the recent treatise written by Judge Schwebet, the 
(American) Judge of the International Court of Justice, referred to in our discussion in 
Chapter Five. One Chapter of Judge Schwebel's work has been devoted to an analysis of 
the authority of truncated tribunals in international arbitration. Obviously, Judge 
Schwebel's treatise has enriched the literature for international lawyers and scholars 
researching on international arbitration. However, there are certain areas over which we do 
not completely agree with Judge Schwebel's conclusion. These areas of disagreement have 
been represented in Chapter Five of this study. Nevertheless, this is not intended to be a 
rebuttal of his views, for which a separate thesis might need to be written. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
BACKGROUND AND REASONS FOR THE 
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE IRAN-UNITED STATES 
CLAIMS TRIBUNAL 
Introduction 
The extent and the nature of recent disputes between Iran and the 
United States, and the circumstances in which the Algiers Declarations was 
concluded explain the structure and the function of the arbitral Tribunal agreed 
upon by the parties. 
To demonstrate how the claims issue came to dominate the relationship 
between the two countries and subsequently led to the establishment of a 
claims settlement Tribunal, it is necessary to provide a measure of insight into 
the extent of the recent political and economic relationships between the two 
countries, the circumstances specifically giving rise to the disputes, the hostage 
crisis, the nature and category of the claims involved and the negotiating 
history of the Algiers Accords. 
However, it has to be noted that many of the issues referred to in this 
chapter are only touched in outline, and in so far as they satisfy the purpose of 
this chapter. A detailed analysis of these issues is neither necessary nor 
possible within this limited scope and space. 
I- The Recent Political and Economic Relationships in 
Retrospect :A Brief Glance 
A- Political Issues 
Although a tradition of bilateral relations between Iran and the United 
States existed before World War II, the United States' active involvement in 
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Iran is a matter of the post World War II era, which was particularly marked in 
the political events of the early 1950s. 
Between April 1951 and August 1953 the Iranian Government headed 
by Dr Muhammad Mossadegh led a popular movement for the nationalization 
of the oil industry and the establishment of a political-economic foundation and 
social structure. To put an end to the forty years of exploitation of Iranian oil, 
Iran nationalized the oil industry and the interests of the Anglo-Iranian Oil 
Company, effective May 1,1951, and declared its readiness to enter into 
negotiations with the company regarding compensation. As a consequence, 
severe disputes arose between the British and Iranian governments which 
continued during the whole period of Mossadegh's office, and the oil 
nationalization became a major source of foreign conspiracy against the Iranian 
popular movement and its government. I 
The United States government which had started its role as a conciliator 
in this process, ultimately became identified as essentially hostile to the Iranian 
popular movement, and therefore concluded its conciliatory efforts by deciding 
on a coup d'etat as a final solution - no doubt persuaded in this by its British 
allies and their Iranian clientele. In an operation code named "Ajax" designed 
by the CIA, executed by a section of the Iranian Army and a group of "paid 
rioters led by well-known mobsters and racketeers", the United States 
succeeded in overthrowing Mossadegh and halting the Iranian popular 
movement. 2 
For a brief discussion of these events see, 1- Homa Katouzian, the Political Economy 
of Modern Iran, 1981, Macmillan Press Ltd, pp. 164-179; and 2- Barry Rubin, Paved 
With Good Intentions. The American Experience and Iran, 1980, Oxford 
University Press, pp. 54-90. 
2 Katouzian, op. cit. p. 179. See also, Kermit Roosevelt, Countercoup. The Struggle 
for the Control of Iran, New York, 1979, generally and in particular pp. 1-19; 
Roosevelt was in charge of the CIA operation in 1953. His memoirs, although they do not 
provide an accurate analysis of the events, clearly demonstrate the United States' 
involvement in the 1953 coup. 
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Details of the United States-Iranian relations in the period from 1953 to 
1979 need not be recalled here ; what suffices to be said is that at the time 
when the 1979 revolution took place, the United States' presence in Iran, in the 
eyes of many Iranians, represented: 
More than 25 years of continual interference by the United 
States in the internal affairs of Iran, the shameless exploitation 
of our country and numerous crimes perpetrated against the 
Iranian people, contrary to and in conflict with all international 
and humanitarian norms. 3 
As a consequence, the United States ultimately became identified by 
many Iranians as an imperialist force behind the country's difficulties. In fact, it 
is this background which explains the main rationale behind the seizure of the 
American Embassy in 1979, in Tehran ; that is to say, the political events 
leading to and following this incident cannot be understood in abstract and 
without an understanding of this earlier era, but only in conjunction with the 
political events of the early 1950s, especially the 1953 coup d'etat, and the 
whole series of events following therefrom. 
B- Economic Relationships 
The extent to which the United States role in the political events of the 
early 1950s was influenced by the American oil companies which were hoping 
to benefit from Iranian oil concessions is not known ; nevertheless it is clear 
that under the Consortium Oil Agreement of 1954 (concluded after the coup) 
the American oil companies received a considerable share. This agreement, 
which in effect destroyed the spirit of the oil nationalization, set up a 
consortium of oil companies to produce and market Iranian oil for 25 years and 
to pay 50% of the net proceeds to the Iranian Government. The Consortium 
was a combination of British companies with a 40% share, American 
3 Memorandum of the Government of Iran submitted to the International Court of Justice in 
the Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, ICJ Reports, 
1980, Judgement of 24 May, 1980, p. 8. 
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companies with a 40% share, and French and Dutch companies with a total of 
20%. 4 This arrangement was so important for the Americans that the United 
States Justice Department was forced to retreat from its complaint that such a 
combination violated U. S. antitrust laws. 5 
As early as 1955 the Treaty of Amity was concluded between the two 
countries. 6 The Treaty is a typical American commercial treaty of the 1948- 
1958 decade, generally known as "treaties of friendship, commerce and 
navigation"(FCN), though the Treaty with Iran did not adopt that name and 
certain provisions of the model treaty were omitted from the Iranian Treaty.? 
This type of treaty provides a body of assurances for the support of private 
enterprises of the signatories engaged in business on each other's territory. 
There are three notable features found in this kind of treaty. Firstly, it 
makes considerable use of the national-treatment and most favoured nation 
treatment idea for commercial enterprises as well as natural persons. 8 Secondly 
it seeks to assure, when the state nationalizes the property of nationals and 
companies of the other contracting party, that just compensation will be paid. 9 
Thirdly, it seeks to establish governing standards with regard to state 
4 Katouzian, op. cit. p. 202. 
5 Rubin, op. cit. p. 95. 
6 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Rights, Between the United States of 
America and Iran, August 1955,284 U. N. T. S. p. 93. 
7 See generally, Vernon Setser, "The Immunity Waiver for State-Controlled Business 
Enterprises in United States Commercial Treaties", 55 Proc. A. S. I. L. (1961), pp. 89-104; 
and Robert R. Wilson, "A Decade of New Commercial Treaties", 50 AJIL, (1956), pp. 
927-933. 
8 See for instance, Articles 2 to 11 of the Treaty of Amity. 
9 Article 4(2) of the Treaty of Amity provides: 
"Property of nationals and companies of either High 
Contracting Party, including interests in property, shall receive 
the most constant protection and security within the territories 
of the other High Contracting Party, in no case less than that 
required by international law. Such property shall not be taken 
except for a public purpose, nor shall it be taken without the 
prompt payment of just compensation. " 
11 
enterprises when operating in competition with private enterprises. Therefore it 
adopts the "restrictive theory" of sovereign immunity with regard to state 
enterprises engaged in commercial activities ; that is, the immunity of 
sovereign is recognized with respect to sovereign or public acts (jure imperii) 
of states, but not with respect to private acts (jure gestionis). 10 
The series of circumstances noted above indicated the beginning of a 
new era of extensive commercial relationships between the two countries. 
Indeed, American investment in Iran began to increase rapidly after American 
participation in the Iranian oil industry and the protection accorded to them 
under the Treaty of Amity. For instance, by 1975 American investment in Iran 
had reached a level of over $1 billion. A March 1975 Iranian-United States 
trade agreement called for $15 billion in commerce over the next five years. 
The economic activities in the agreement included the provision of eight 
nuclear power stations and their fuel, prefabricated housing, hospitals, ports, 
farm machinery, pesticides, superhighways and vocational training centres. $5 
billion of the total was the estimated value of American military sales to Iran. 11 
10 Setser, op. cit. pp. 91-92. For instance, Article 11(4) of the Treaty of Amity provides: 
"No enterprise of the either High Contracting Party, 
including corporations, associations, and government agencies 
and instrumentalities, which is publicly owned or controlled 
shall, if it engages in commercial, industrial, shipping or other 
business activities within the territories of the other High 
Contracting Party, claim or enjoy, either for itself or for its 
property, immunity therein from taxation, suit, execution of 
judgements or other liability to which privately owned and 
controlled enterprises are not subject. " 
The question of validity of the Treaty of Amity was raised before the International 
Court of Justice in the Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in 
Tehran. The Court said that certain countermeasures taken by the United States vis-a-vis 
Iran in response to Iran's violation of that Treaty did not preclude the United States from 
invoking that Treaty, and "in any case any alleged violation of the treaty by either party 
could not have the effect of precluding that party from invoking the provision of the treaty 
concerning pacific settlement of disputes". (ICJ Reports, 1980, pp. 27-28. ) 
ii King's Contemporary Archives, 1975, p. 27190. See also R. K. Ramazani, "Iran and the 
United States: An Experiment in Enduring Friendship", 30 Midd. E. J. (1976), 322, pp. 327- 
329. 
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These programmes were funded by increased oil revenue which was 
largely recycled through the international banking system to finance imports 
and capital projects. Iran held multi-billion dollar balances in accounts with 
U. S. banks and their branches abroad. This financial link also included 
substantial amounts of money loaned to the Government of Iran and its public 
and private enterprises by U. S. banks, either alone or acting in syndicates of 
international banks. The other aspect of this relationship included standby 
letters of credit and performance or payment bonds issued in favour of Iranian 
Government enterprises by U. S. banks and involved large amounts of money. 
In short, the extensive commercial ties was an important facet of 
relationship between the two countries, and in turn indicated that a disruption 
of the kind which occurred following the revolution would inevitably create a 
flood of claims involving large amounts of money. 
II- The 1979 Revolution : Origins of the Existing Claims 
Against the above noted political-economic background it would be 
very hard to imagine that the Government established as a result of the 
revolution in Iran would be able to continue the relationship on the same scale 
and in the same direction as it was before. Even the last government appointed 
by the Shah was compelled to take a series of actions in this respect in order to 
satisfy the prevailing public opinion in Iran. The Government cancelled about 
$7,000 million of an $11,560 million order which had been placed with 
companies in the United States. Iran's nuclear power programme, which was to 
have involved the building of 20 reactors, was scaled down to four reactors. A 
series of non-nuclear projects such as housing developments and steel 
complexes were cancelled. 12 
12 Kcesing's Archives, 1979, p. 29746. 
13 
On the other hand in the last months of the former regime's life due to 
the disruption of economic activities by strikes and other causes, the situation 
in Iran Precipitated the departure of thousands of American workers and 
companies. This meant that many projects were left uncompleted. For instance, 
on December 27,1978 the Bell Corporation suspended a $575 million contract 
to build a helicopter plant in Isfahan, in view of the Iranian Government's 
failure to meet payments. 13 
Following the assumption of power by the Islamic Republic in February 
1979, the Provisional Government made it clear that it would continue the 
policy initiated by the last government of reviewing all foreign contracts, with 
a view to cancelling or reducing most of the large-scale projects embarked on 
by the Shah. The Provisional Government officially rescinded its armament 
contracts with the United States (except for the supply of spare parts and 
specified equipment). All contracts with Bell, Gruman and Boeing were 
cancelled. 14 
Beginning in June 1979, the Provisional Government of the Islamic 
Republic started a systematic programme of nationalization. The programme 
intended; 1- to reorganize Iranian industry, which was in disorder due to 
extraordinary circumstances such as strikes, flight of managers, etc; 2- to 
remove Iran's dependence upon foreign capital; 3- to redistribute wealth. 
Pursuant to this policy the Government introduced the Law of Nationalization 
of Banks15, the Law of Nationalization of Insurance Companies16, and the 
Law for the Protection and Development of Iranian Industry. 17 
13 Ibid, pp. 29733-29746. 
14 Keesing's Archives, 1980, p. 30148. 
15 The Law of Nationalization of Banks, 11 June 1979 provided: 
"Article 1- To protect the national rights and capital, to 
utilize the country's economic (production) machinery, and to 
guarantee people's deposits and savings in the banks, with 
acceptance of the conditioned legitimate principle of possession, 
14 
and with regard to; - the manner in which banks acquire their 
income, and illegitimate transfer of capital abroad; - the 
principal role of banks in the Country's economy, and the 
natural connection of the Country's economy with banking 
institutions; - the banks' indebtedness to the Government and 
their need of Government supervision; - the need to harmonize 
the banks' activities with the other institutions of the Country; - 
the need to lead banking activities in the direction of Islamic 
administration and profit-making. From this date of ratification 
of this Law, all banks are declared nationalized, and the 
Government should immediately take action for the 
appointment of managers for the banks.... (unofficial translation, 
Iranian Official Gazette, No 10012 - 7July, 1979). 
16 The Law of Nationalization of Insurance Companies provided: 
"Article 1- To protect the rights of insurer, to expand 
the insurance industry over the entire State, and to direct it 
toward the service of the people, from the date of ratification of 
this Law all insurance companies of the State are proclaimed 
nationalized, with acceptance of the conditioned legitimate 
principle of possession... " (Iranian Official Gazette, No 1-10264 
- May 21,1980). 
The reference to the conditioned legitimate principle of possession probably indicated the 
Government's willingness to compensate, but the Laws did not provide any specific 
mechanism for the payment of compensation. 
17 The Law for the Protection and Development of Iranian Industry, July 15,1979 (Iranian 
Official Gazette, No 10031 - July 31,1979). 
The Law intended, as declared in its preamble, to re- 
organize Iranian industry and to remove Iran's dependence on 
the oil industry by acquiring self-sufficiency and the expansion 
of exports ; to provide employment; to oust the agents of 
despotism and exploiters.... It divided the Iranian industry into 
four groups. Group A included the oil, gas, electricity, railway 
and fishing industries, which were already nationalized, and 
added metal production, shipbuilding, and the car and aircraft 
industries to the nationalized industries. Group B included a list 
of 51 undesirable people who were owners of large industries 
and according to the Law, had acquired their massive wealth 
through illegal connections with the former regime and by 
means of illegitimate usage and waste of public facilities and 
rights. The property of these people was nationalized by this 
Law. Group C included those institutions which had borrowed 
massive amounts of money from banks, the Government taking 
control of their property acted to set-off their debts. All these 
categories of people and institutions happened to be captains of 
industry in Iran and had close dealings with U. S. banks and 
companies. 
15 
On January 15,1979 a Single Act provided that all oil contracts had to 
be reviewed by a special Commission appointed by the Minister of Petroleum. 
Those contracts which were incompatible with the Law of Nationalization of 
the Oil Industry would be regarded as null and void, and all claims arising from 
the conclusion and performance of these contracts had to be settled by the 
Commission's judgement. 18 
Furthermore, as early as February 1979, the Islamic Revolutionary 
Tribunals had initiated a series of unsystematic but extensive orders which 
involved the property of those regarded as connected to the former Regime 
who were either arrested or had left the country. These orders included a 
variety of actions ranging from confiscations and attachments of property to 
dismissal and appointment of managers for the factories and companies all or 
some of whose owners or managers were regarded as connected to the former 
Regime. Various councils of workers, labour unions and revolutionary 
committees were also involved in taking over the companies and factories and 
appointing managers for these companies. These measures naturally involved 
the property of foreign companies, including American interests. 
The actions taken by the revolutionary Tribunals, workers' councils and 
Islamic Committees were not necessarily compatible with the Government's 
policy. Neither were they in its control. To control the situation, at the same 
time partially complying with the popular demand for the public control of 
large companies and removal of Iran's dependence upon foreign capital, as well 
as keeping those factories operating, the Government had to intervene and to 
adopt necessary policies. For instance, on February 27,1979 a Single Act 
provided that the Revolutionary Tribunals should not interfere in the 
appointment or dismissal of managers of the factories and mines. 19 To keep the 
18 The Law Relating to the Establishment of a Special Commission with regard to Oil 
Agreements, January 15,1979 (Iranian Official Gazette, No 20-1018, February 10,1979). 
19 Iranian Official Gazette, No 16-10207, March 6,1979. 
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operation of these companies within the Government's control Article 1 of the 
Bill of 19 June, 1979 provided: 
With regard to manufacturing, industrial... units belonging to 
either the public or private sector... whose managers or owners 
have left the said units or worksites, stopped work or cannot be 
reached for any reason ; and at the request of owners or 
managers of the said units, each of the Government Ministries, 
institutions or companies who have entered in some way into 
dealings with, or have some connections with and/or are related 
to the activities of the said units, are permitted to appoint... one 
or more managers, members of board of directors or observers 
for management and/or observation over affairs in order to 
prevent closure of same. 20 
On the other hand, there were a series of contracts and projects which 
were partially performed and of which certain reasons the Government wished 
to continue their performance, but in the circumstances existing at the time the 
American contractors and companies refused to fulfil their obligations. 
The above-mentioned circumstances which involved nationalization or 
de facto control of the American nationals' or companies' property or 
cancellation of their contractual rights, had originally created claims of the 
American nationals and companies against Iranian Government. For instance, 
the American International Group Corporation owned 35% of the equity of the 
Iran American International Insurance Company; The INA Corporation owned 
20% of the equity of Bimeh Shargh, an Iranian insurance company; the 
Continental Corporation owned 10% of the Hafez Insurance Co; and by 
nationalizing insurance companies Iran had necessarily nationalized the 
American corporations' interests therein. 21 
However, in the circumstances existing at the time, prior to the hostage- 
taking of American Embassy personnel in Iran, many American corporations, 
hoping to normalize the situation, had not initiated legal actions against the 
20 Ibid, No 10012, July 8,1979. 
21 Sec American International Group Inc v Islamic Republic of Iran, 493 Fed Supp, 522 
(D. D. C. July 10,1980), pp. 522-523. 
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Government of Iran, and only few of them had attempted to obtain court orders 
for the prejudgement attachments of the Iranian Government's or its agencies' 
assets in the United States. Even these limited numbers of claimants were 
relatively successful in this period. 22 
On the other hand, what is evident from the claims of U. S. contractors 
to obtain injunction orders to prevent payments of the standby letters of credit, 
is that the American contractors' refusal to fulfil their obligations had given rise 
to the claims of the Iranian Government or its entities against these 
corporations. However, the Iranian Government, having enjoyed the privilege 
of the letters of credit, did not need to bring any legal action but simply to 
claim the payment of the credit from the bank which had guarantied the 
contractor's performance. 
Attempts to obtain injunctions against the payment of the standby 
letters of credit, in the period prior to the hostage crisis, were also marginally 
successful. 23 
22 See Michael F. Hertz, "The Hostage Crisis and Domestic Litigation an Overview" in R. 
Lillich, The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal 1981-1983, Seventh Sokol 
Colloquime, 1984, Virginia University Press, 136, at pp. 137-138. See also the following 
Cases: 
1- Behring International v Iranian Air Force, 475 F. Supp. p. 383, (D. N. J. 1979). Behring 
had provided freight forwarding services for the Iranian Air Force, and alleged that 
beginning in early 1979 it stopped getting paid for the services provided. THe Court held 
that the property of the Iranian Air Force was not immune from the attachment. (Ibid, pp. 
393-396); 2- Reading and Bates Corporation v National Iranian Oil Company, 478 F. 
Supp. p. 724 (S. D. N. Y. 1979). Reading and Bates Corp sued the NIOC allegedly for the 
unlawful taking of an oil drilling rig. The Court held that the defendant was immune from 
the attachment. (Ibid, pp. 727-728); 3- Electronic Data System Inc v Social Security 
Organization of the Government of Iran, 651 F. 2d, p. 1007 (5th Cir, 1981). EDS brought 
an action against Iran for breach of contract. The plaintiff was successful in obtaining an 
injunction prohibiting transfer of some $20 million of Iranian funds from a New York 
bank. The Court also rendered a judgement in favour of plaintiff to the amount of $19 
million. (Ibid, pp. 1007-1008. For the appellate proceedings of the Case, see Ibid, pp. 
1007-1011). 
23 Sec Mark P. Zimmett, "Standby Letters of Credit in the Iran Litigation: Two Hundred 
Problems in Search of a Solution", 16 L. P. I. B., 927, (1984) pp. 935-940. See also the 
following Cases: 
1- KMW Int'l v Chase Manhattan, N. A. 606 F. 2d, p. 10. The Court of Appeal vacated the 
preliminary injunction granted to the plaintiff by U. S. District Court. (Ibid, p. 17); 2- 
American Bell International Inc v Islamic Republic of Iran, 474 F. Supp, p. 420. The Court 
denied the injunction relief. (Ibid, pp. 426-427); 3- United Technologies Corp v Citibank 
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III- Hostage Crisis : Legal Implications 
After the revolution the relations between Iran and the United States 
remained seriously strained. The United States had reduced its Embassy staff 
considerably and kept a comparatively small number of personnel in its 
Embassy in Tehran. However, this did not remove the suspicion among the 
Iranians that the United States was trying to influence the process of events 
within the revolution and the political power struggle for the control of Iranian 
politics. The suspicion was intensified following the United States' granting of 
a visa to the Shah, and his hospitalization in New York. 24 
On November 4,1979, several hundred Iranian students seized the 
United States Embassy compound and 63 Americans inside, and demanded 
extradition of the Shah. In addition, three American diplomats who happened 
to be in the Iranian Foreign Ministry at the time were placed under restraint 
there. 25 By 20 November, 13 of the Americans had been released. One other 
was released later when he fell ill. 26 The remaining 52 were held in Iran until 
January 20,1981, when they were released as part of the agreement concluded 
between Iran and the United States. 27 
N. A. 469 F. Supp, p. 473. The Court denied the preliminary injunction. (Ibid, p. 481); 4- 
Stromberg-Carson Corp v Bank Melli Iran, 467 F. Supp. p. 530. The Court granted the 
injunction. (Ibid, p. 533) In this Case the relief sought involved about $2 million under two 
letters of guarantee. The Court's decision was based on the ground that under the 
circumstances existing in Iran at the time there was a risk that a fraudulent or nonauthentic 
demand of payment could be made. (Ibid, pp. 532-533. ) 
24 In Iran the United States action in granting a visa to the Shah was regarded as an attempt 
against the revolution. 
For a further reading regarding the political events leading to the Shah's acceptance to the 
United States and the issues resulting from this, see generally: 1- Cyrus Vance Hard 
Choices, New York, Simon and Shuster, 1983, pp. 368-384; 2- Zbigniew Brzezinski, 
Power and Princi lie, New York, 1983, pp. 470-509; and Jimmy Carter Keeping 
Faith, Collins, London, 1982, pp. 431-596. 
25 Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1980, pp. 30149-30150, and 30205-30206. 
26 Ibid, pp. 30205-30206. 
27 See Infra, Numbers 143-145. 
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The full story of the hostage crisis is beyond the scope of this study, 
and has been discussed elsewhere. 28 Nevertheless, the events following the 
crisis constitute a major backdrop to the transaction which led to the 
establishment of the existing arbitral Tribunal, as well as the release of the 
hostages. In fact, the need to establish a claims adjudication tribunal did 
emerge in the aftermath of the hostage crisis and as a consequence of a series 
of complicated financial and legal issues which came to dominate the hostage 
issue. Thus, it is necessary to outline the course of these events and how the 
claims issue came to dominate the situation and led to the establishment of the 
existing claims Tribunal. 
In Iran, the crisis led to the resignation of the Provisional Government, 
and the take over by the Revolutionary Council of the governmental activities. 
It also resulted in the boycott of negotiations with the United States pending 
the extradition of the Shah and his wealth, and an American confession to 
complicity in various human rights violations by the Shah's Government as 
well as apologies for interference in Iranian internal politics. 29 
The closure of the direct channel of negotiations accompanied by 
internationally unprecedented demands represented the lack of a harmonized 
policy on the part of Iran which was due to the extraordinary circumstances 
existing at the time. This in turn indicated that the prospect for an immediate 
solution of the problem was ostensibly dim. But what made the crisis even 
more complicated was a variety of unilateral actions taken by the United States 
against the Iranian Government. As a result of these measures, the crisis was 
28 See generally: 1- Warren Christopher, American Hostages 
in Iran. The Conduct 
of a Crisis, Yale University Press, 1985, pp. 1-71. The whole book also provides 
discussions regarding various dimensions of the crisis.; 2- D. R. Hinton, "Legal Response 
to Afghan/Iranian Crisis". 74 Proc. A. S. I. L., 248, pp. 248-273; 3- J. P. Terry, The Iranian 
Hostage Crisis: International Law and United States Policy", 32 JAG Journal, 31, (1982), 
pp. 31-79; and 4- Alfred P. Rubin, "The Hostage Incident : The United States and Iran", 36 
Y. B. W. A., 213, (1982), pp. 213-240. 
29 Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1980, pp. 30205-30206. 
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no longer merely a hostage issue, but a complexity of legal and financial 
issues, and thus not an easy problem to be solved immediately. The United 
States' reaction to the incident can be divided into acts of recourse to 
international organizations and unilateral retaliatory actions. 
A- Recourse to International Organizations 
A(1)- The Question Before the United Nations 
At the request of the United States, the UN Security Council met in 
closed session on November 9,1979 and the President of the Security Council 
issued a statement, supported by all members, emphasising the inviolability of 
diplomats and urging the Iranian Government in "strongest terms" to release 
the U. S. hostages without delay. 30 The response from Iran was not 
encouraging. In a letter dated 13 November 1979 the Foreign Minister of Iran 
restated Iran's grievances. 31 On December 4,1979 the Security Council passed 
a resolution calling on the Government of Iran "to release immediately the 
personnel of the Embassy of the United States of America being held in 
Tehran, and to provide them protection and allow them to leave the country". 32 
Having found its resolution ineffective33, the Security Council met 
again on December 31,1979 and passed another resolution expressing its grave 
concern, reaffirming its resolution 457 in all its aspects, and calling for the 
immediate release of the hostages. 34 Following the continuation of the crisis35, 
the Security Council in its last attempt met on January 13,1980 and voted on a 
draft resolution providing for economic measures under Articles 39 and 41 of 
30 Keesing's Archives, 1980, p. 30206. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Resolution No 457, Dec 4,1979,18 ILM, (1979), pp. 1644-1645. 
33 See Report of the Secretary -General of the UN Concerning Implementation of Security 
Council Resolution 457,19 ILM (1980), pp. 248-250. 
34 Resolution No 461,31 December, 1979,19 ILM (1980), pp. 250-251. 
35 See Report of the Secretary -General In Pursuance of Security Council Resolution 457 and 
461,19 ILM (1980), pp. 251-254. 
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the Charter of the United Nations. The resolution was vetoed by a permanent 
member of the Council and the Council's efforts ended thereafter36 
A(2)- The Hostage Issue Before the International Court of Justice 
On November 29,1979 the United States instituted proceedings against 
Iran before the International Court of Justice. The case was considered by the 
Court in two stages. First, the Court in its Provisional Measures unanimously 
made an order which provided that "the Government of the Islamic Republic of 
Iran should ensure the immediate release, without exception of all persons of 
United States nationality who are or have been held in the Embassy of the 
United States of America or in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Tehran, or 
have been held as hostages elsewhere..., ' 37 
Following its provisional order, the Court held hearings, and on May 
24,1980 rendered its Judgement on the merits. The Court unanimously 
affirmed the legal obligation of Iran immediately to take all steps necessary to 
release the hostages, and decided by a majority vote that the Iranian 
Government had breached its obligations under international law, and should 
make reparation to the United States. 38 However, the Court left it open to the 
36 See draft resolution dated January 13,1980,19 ILM (1980), p. 256. 
37 Case Concerning U. S. Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, Provisional Measures, 
December 15,1979, ICJ Reports, 1979, pp. 20-21. 
38 Case Concerning U. S. Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, Judgement of 24, May 
1980, ICJ Reports, 1980, pp. 41-44. For a discussion of the International Court of Justice's 
decision in this Case, see generally: H. C. Dillard and others, "the ICJ Decisions and Other 
Public International Law Issues", in Robert Steele, "The Iran Crisis and 
International Law", Proceedings of the John Bassett Moore Society of International 
Law, 1981, pp. 6-32; also Oscar Schachter, "International Law and the Hostage Crisis: 
Implications for Future Cases", in Warren Christopher, op. cit. 325, pp. 345-354. 
It should be noted that the law and facts in the Hostages Case enjoyed a considerable 
degree of clarity. Furthermore, the comprehensive examination of the issues by the Court 
makes any further comment unnecessary. (See ICJ Reports, 1980, pp. 27-43) What has to 
be noted here is, although the Court briefly touched on the issue of abuse of diplomatic 
immunity (Ibid, pp. 38-41), the question of the gross abuses of diplomatic immunity 
publicly raised by Iran has generally been left unnoticed. Though such a consideration 
could not have justified acts of coercion of the kind in question, it could recognize the 
seriousness of the issue and provide a reliable stand-point for the contemplation of better 
and collective remedies against such abuses. 
1) 1) 
parties to agree on the form and amount of such reparations ; failing to do so 
the form and the amount of such reparations could be settled by the Court. 39 
B- United States Unilateral Measures Against Iran 
Parallel to its international efforts the United States took a series of 
unilateral retaliatory measures against Iran. 
On November 8,1979 the United States Government ordered a halt to 
the shipment of $300 million worth of military spare parts (already paid for) to 
Iran. 40 On November 10,1979 President Carter ordered the expulsion from 
the United States of all Iranian students who had overstayed beyond the expiry 
of their visas. 41 On November 12,1979 President Carter ordered an end to 
U. S. oil imports from Iran, and a day later U. S. and British warships began 
manoeuvres in the Arabian Sea south of Iran. 42 
The most consequential of these measures, was a November 14,1979 
Presidential Order blocking "all property and interests in property of the 
Government of Iran, its instrumentalities and controlled entities and the Central 
Bank of Iran which are or become within the possession or control of persons 
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States". 43 The Order was issued, inter 
alia, under an International Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977, and 
asserted that "the situation in Iran constituted an unusual and extraordinary 
threat to the national security, foreign policy and economy of the United 
39 Case Concerning U. S. Diplomatic Staff in Tehran, op. cit. p. 45. 
40 Keesing's Archives, 1980, p. 30206. 
41 Ibid. The decision was overturned on December 11,1979 by a U. S. Federal Judge, as 
being unconstitutional and contrary to the rules of fair play and equality. This ruling was 
in turn reversed on December 27 by a Federal Appeals Court which ruled that the U. S. 
Administration was within its constitutional powers. (See Narenji v Civiletti, 617 F. 2d, p. 
754, D. C. Cir. 1979). By the end of 1979 more than 54,000 Iranian students had been 
interviewed by U. S. Immigration Officials but only 11 had been deported. (Keesing's 
Archives, 1980, p. 30206. ) 
42 Kecsing's Archives, 1980, pp. 30206-30207. 
43 Executive Order No 12170 - November 1979,18 ILM (1979), p. 1549. 
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States". 44 It had also been preceded by reports that Iran intended to withdraw 
all its funds from U. S. banks and to transfer them to banks in friendlier 
countries. 45 
The Executive Order was legally implemented by Iranian Assets 
Control Regulations issued by the Department of Treasury. 46 The Regulations 
provided : 
No property subject to the jurisdiction of the United States or 
which is in the possession or control of persons subject to the 
jurisdiction of the United States in which or after the effective 
date (14 November 1979) Iran has any interest of any nature 
whatsoever may be transferred, paid, exported, withdrawn or 
otherwise dealt in except authorized. 47 
Under the Iranian Assets Control Regulations, the terms "Iran" and 
"property" were defined in broadest of terms. 48 The term "person subject to the 
jurisdiction of the United States" was defined to include : 
(a)- Any person wheresoever located who is a citizen or resident 
of the United States ; (b)- Any person actually within the United 
States ; (c)- Any corporation organized under the laws of the 
United States...; (d)- Any partnership, association, corporation, 
or other organization wheresoever organized or doing business 
which is owned or controlled by persons specified in Paragraphs 
49 (a), (b), or (c) of this Section. 
An April 7,1980 Presidential Order announced further measures 
against Iran which involved : 
(i)-The breaking of diplomatic and consular relations, the 
expulsion of all diplomats and the closing of diplomatic and 
consular offices ; (ii)- the prohibition of all exports to Iran, 
except for food and medicine ; (iii)- the drawing up of an 
inventory of assets of the Iranian Government frozen since the 
previous November, with a view to their possible confiscation ; 
44 Ibid. 
45 Keesing's Archives, 1980, p. 30207. 
46 Iranian Assets Control Regulations, November 14-23,1979,18 ILM, 1979, pp. 1549- 
1556. 
47 Ibid, Section. 535.201(a). 
48 Ibid, Sections. 535.301,535.311. 
49 Ibid, Section. 535.329. 
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and (iv)- the invalidation of all visas issued to Iranians for future 
entry to the United States. 50 
The Presidential Order also envisaged that legislation would be passed 
to allow the seizure of the frozen Iranian assets in the United States to pay for 
private and governmental claims against Iran. 51 
The last of the United States' unilateral measures was a failed military 
operation inside Iranian territory allegedly for the rescue of the hostages, 
attempted on April 24,1980.52 In reporting the measures taken to the United 
Nations Security Council, the United States stated that the mission had been 
carried out as an act of self-defence under Article 51 of the United Nations 
Charter. 53 
The attempted operation was clearly in violation of the International 
Court of Justice's Provisional Order. The Court in its Provisional Order had 
expressed that no action was to be taken which might aggravate the tension. 54 
The effect of the action also in prolonging the hostage crisis cannot be 
neglected, and despite the United States' claim of self-defence its legality as a 
legitimate self-defence is seriously questionable, both under the Charter of the 
55 United Nations and general international law. 
50 Keesing's Archives, 1980, p. 30529. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Ibid, p. 30531, and pp. 30531-30534. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Case Concerning U. S. Diplomatic Staff in Tehran, ICJ Reports, 1979, Provisional 
Measures, p. 21. 
55 This is not the place to discuss the legality of the rescue mission. But it needs to be noted 
that the International Court of Justice in its Judgement of May 24,1980, did not find it 
necessary to consider the propriety of the action under international law, since it said that 
this was not the question before it. Nevertheless the Court said that the operation 
undermined the respect for the judicial process in international relations, and it recalled the 
Court's Order of 15 December 1979 calling on both parties not to take any action which 
might aggravate the tension. (ICJ Reports, 1980, p. 43) However, Judges Tarazi and 
Morozov in their dissenting opinion regarded the operation as an act violating 
international law. (Ibid, pp. 64,56-57. ) 
For discussions regarding the legality of the United States rescue mission see generally: 1- 
Natalino Rozintti, Rescuing Nationals Abroad Through Military Coercion and 
Intervention on Grounds of Humanity, 1985, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
Dordrecht, pp. 41-49.57,61-68; 2- Anetha Jeffery, "The American Hostages in Tehran : 
Umim*y 
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C- The Blocking of Iranian Assets : Legal Implications 
The freeze which involved about $12 billion of Iranian assets56, by its 
apparent connection with the financial disputes, was indeed consequential in 
rendering the hostage issue a complexity of legal, political and financial 
problems. The freeze certainly raised a host of questions and problems. Each of 
these questions constitutes a broad area of discussion in international law and 
cannot be placed within the limited scope of this study. However, it is possible 
to provide a very brief insight into the issues involved. 
The Presidential Order generally referred to the situation in Iran as an 
unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy and 
economy of the United States. It did not specify whether it was taken in 
retaliation to the hostage-taking in Iran, or was solely based on Iran's intention 
to withdraw its assets from U. S. banks. To provide a safeguard in favour of 
U. S. nationals' claims against Iran, as was declared later, could have been 
another ground for the action. 57 Thus, it left the international legal basis of the 
action ambiguous and unclear. However, it is possibly right to say that the 
action was in reaction to all the three questions. 
As regards to the legality of the freeze as a reaction to the hostage- 
taking in Tehran , 
it is hard to imagine that it was in self-defence, since it is 
56 
57 
The ICJ and the Legality of Rescue Mission", 30 ICLQ, 717, (1981), pp. 717-729; 3- John 
R. D'Angelo, "Resort to Force by States to Protect Nationals: the U. S. Rescue Mission to 
Iran and its Legality under International Law", 21(3) Virg. J. I. L., 485, (1981), pp. 485-519; 
and 4- Oscar Schachter, op. cit. pp. 325-345. 
Robert Carswell and Richard J. Davis, "Crafting the Financial Settlement", in Warren 
Christopher, op. cit. 201, p. 205. 
Though early Treasury Regulations provided that without a licence from the Secretary of 
State of the Treasury, any attachment of such property occurring after the blocking order 
was invalid, (Iranian Assets Control Regulations, op. cit. Supra 46, Sections: 535.201, 
535.203(a), 535.310,535.502) and permitted the banks to pay their standby letters into the 
blocked accounts of Iranian beneficiaries, these regulations were soon changed and a 
general licence was granted authorizing certain judicial proceedings against Iran [Iranian 
Assets Control Regulations as Amended and Published Through March 25,1980, in 19 
ILM (1980), pp. 514-523, Section 535.504(a), (b)(1), ]; The new regulations also blocked 
all standby letters of credit payments. (Ibid, Section 535.568), (for this purpose see also, 
Michael Hertz, op. cit. p. 139, and Mark Zimmett, op. cit. pp. 940-942). 
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hard to accept that it bore any degree of proportionality to, and necessity 
resulting from the act of hostage-taking. Thus, the question falls into the 
category of economic reprisal and is subject to the general controversy over the 
legality of economic reprisal. 58 
As regards the second ground for the United States' action, namely 
Iran's intention to withdraw its assets from U. S. banks, the action is 
fundamentally questionable. The express reference of the Presidential Order to 
the "threat to .... economy of the United States", and the adoption of the Order 
under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, indicate that the 
United States assumed that Iran's action would destabilize the dollar in 
international monetary system. 59 
This is a question which may arise in any case of action by a major 
depositor (e. g. an oil rich state) to withdraw its deposits from U. S. or other 
banks. That is a question of whether the probable consequences of the 
58 The Court in the Case Concerning United States Diplomatic Staff in Tehran did not find it 
necessary to consider the propriety of the freeze and other U. S. economic measures. (ICJ 
Reports, 1980, pp. 16-18) Nevertheless, in considering the question whether it was open 
for the United States to rely on the Treaty of Amity following its economic measures 
against Iran, the Court said: 
"However, all the measures in question were taken by 
the United States after the seizure of its Embassy by an armed 
group and subsequent detention of its diplomatic and consular 
staff as hostages. They were measures taken in response to what 
the United States believed to be grave and manifest violations of 
international law by Iran.. ". (Ibid, p. 28. ) 
However, Judge Morozov in his dissenting opinion said that the freeze action was 
taken in violation of international law. (Ibid, p. 54) Judge Tarazi also in his dissenting 
opinion regarded the action as incompatible with the judicial process. (Ibid, p. 64) With 
regard to the United States' intention to use the frozen assets for payments of claims 
against Iran, the dissenting judges regarded the action as the unilateral interpretation by 
the United States of its rights, and acting as a judge of its own cause. (Ibid, respectively, 
pp. 54,64) See also Oscar Schachter, op. cit. pp. 354-364. For economic reprisals in 
international law, see generally, Derek W. Bowett, "Economic Coercion and Reprisals by 
States", in R. B. Lillich, Economic Coercion and New International Economic 
Order, the Michie Company, Virginia, 1976,7, pp. 7-18. 
59 In fact, the United States in the hearings before the ICJ argued that the threat of 
withdrawal constituted "nothing less than an attack on the stability of the world economy 
and the international monetary system". (Oscar Schachter, op. Cit. p. 357. ) 
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withdrawal of deposits on the economy of the depository state entitles the latter 
to block the assets. Regardless of the retaliatory aspect of the U. S. action, it is 
hard to accept that there is a reasonable ground to this effect. 
The other controversial issue was the extraterritorial effect of the 
freeze. Under the express provisions of the Presidential Order and Section 
535.329 of the Treasury Regulations, the freeze applied to Iranian dollar 
deposits in foreign branches of U. S. banks, which in effect blocked billions of 
dollars of Iranian deposits in London and Paris branches of U. S. banks. The 
extraterritorial application of the freeze was in effect an intrusion into the 
sovereignty of the states involved. It meant that the United States extended its 
legislation to transactions in those countries, and attempted to enforce that 
legislation against banks in those countries. 
For Americans, the action was essentially justified on the basis of 
nationality jurisdiction, upon which branches and subsidiaries of U. S. banks 
abroad could be subjected to U. S. requirements. Moreover, in their view the 
gravity of the situation additionally supported the action. 60 
They also argued that the implied approval of the freeze by the 
International Monetary Fund was another ground to support the validity of the 
U. S. action and its extraterritorial effect. The argument was that the United 
States had formally notified the Fund of the freeze as an exchange control 
regulation imposed under Article VIII, Section 2(b) of the Fund Agreement, 
and had received no objection from the Executive Board of the IMF. 61 
To challenge the extraterritorial reach of the freeze, Bank Markazi Iran, 
the Central bank of Iran, brought actions in Paris and London against branches 
60 Ibid, p. 365. 
61 Articles of the Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, as amended April 30,1976, 
15 ILM, (1976), p. 546. For details of the above issue see: 1- Richard W. Edwards, 
"Extraterritorial Application of the U. S. Iranian Assets Control Regulations", 75 AJIL, 
870, (1981), pp. 881-889; and 2- Edward Gordon, "The Blocking of Iranian Assets", 14 
Int'l Lawyer, 656, (1980), pp. 673-676. 
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of U. S. banks in these countries. 62 The defendants, however, argued that 
though the deposits in London and Paris were Eurodollar deposits they were 
necessarily operated by transactions in the United States, and were subject to 
U. S. jurisdiction. 63 Bank Markazi replied that the customary practice invoked 
by the defendants was a matter of convenience and was not an integral part of 
Bank Markazi's deposit contracts with the defendants. M 
The issue was not solved, probably as a result of diplomatic efforts by 
the United States, and the compliance of the courts in prolonging the 
proceedings, and the cases were finally mooted by the Algiers Accords. 
Although, as a result of the closure of the cases there is no judicial opinion on 
the issue, it is hard to accept that the national basis of jurisdiction claimed by 
the United States could override the territorial sovereignty of the States 
involved which in any case requires priority under international law. With 
regard to the Americans' argument on the implied approval of the IMF, one 
does not need to refer to details of the Fund Agreement to conclude that the 
U. S. freeze action was not merely an exchange control regulation, but an action 
which was taken on different grounds and completely blocked any kind of 
access to the assets. Moreover, the legalizing effect of the IMF decisions is 
itself a matter of controversy-65 
62 In Paris the suits were filed against the Paris branch of Citibank, and the Paris branch of 
the Bank of America National Trust and Savings Association. In London they were against 
the London branches of six American commercial banks, including the Chase Manhattan 
Bank. The amounts sought were over $3 billion. (For details, see Edwards, op. cit. pp. 
876-881; and Robert Mc Greevey, "The Iranian Crisis and U. S. Law", 2(2) NWJ. I. B. L., 
384, (1980), pp. 398-400. 
63 Edwards, op. cit. pp. 877-878. 
64 Ibid, pp. 879-881. 
65 Note that the Executive Board of the IMF is generally regarded by authorities on 
international law as being a politically oriented institution and lacking a judicial status. 
This is particularly due to the method of selection and composition of the IMF Executive 
Board members. Due to this fact, the structure of the Board does not guarantee a necessary 
degree of independence needed to qualify as an international judicial body. (See Christian 
Tomuschat, "International Courts and Tribunals with Regionally Restricted and/or 
Specialized Jurisdiction", in H. Mosler and R. Bernhardt, Judicial Settlement of 
International Disputes, Springer Verleg, Berlin, 1974,285, pp. 295-296, also 
generally, pp. 294-299. 
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In short, by the freeze of Iranian assets, the crisis was no longer merely 
the question of the hostages held in Tehran. It was a circular dilemma : Iran 
held hostage the U. S. diplomatic and consular staff and the United States held 
hostage $12 billion in Iranian assets. 
IV- A Survey of the Claims Involved 
If prior to the hostage crisis American companies were hoping to 
normalize the situation, following that incident this was no longer a possibility. 
The hysteria created following the incident and the thinking promoted by the 
United States Governments' freeze action and its subsequent statements of 
intention to meet the claims from the frozen assets, led to an explosion of 
claims against the Iranian Government and its agencies and entities in the 
United States courts. In some cases the American claimants obtained 
attachment orders of Iranian assets by litigation in the United Kingdom, West 
Germany and France. 66 
After the freeze order was issued approximately 400 cases were 
instituted against the Government of Iran and its various government 
corporations and instrumentalities. 67 The claimants varied from banks, 
insurance companies, petroleum service contractors, electronics companies to 
an airline, an aircraft manufacturer, a university, a tobacco company and an 
accounting firm. 68 The damages sought included some $3-4 billion. 69 
66 Mc Greevey, op. cit. p. 388. For instance, Morgan Guaranty Trust Co sued Iran in West 
German courts and attached Iran's interests in Krupp Fried. (Ibid) The attachment involved 
Iran's 25% interests in Krupp, reportedly worth about $435 million. (Gordon, op. cit. p. 
676. ) 
67 Mc Greevey, op. cit. p. 387, and Hertz, op. cit. p. 140. 
68 Mc Greevey, op. cit. pp. 387-388. 
69 Stephen Howard, "Implications of Iranian Assets Case for American Business", 16 Int'l 
Lawyer, 128, (1982), p. 129. 
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These claims invoked causes of action within different categories. 
Generally speaking, some were claims of United States banks against the 
Iranian Government or its entities based on alleged default on the loan 
obligations. Some were based on the nationalization by Iran of the claimants' 
interests. Another category included various claims under the breach of 
contractual obligations. A considerable number of claims also sought to obtain 
preliminary injunctions against the payments of standby letters of credit. The 
array of issues involved in these cases was in part common to all the cases 
brought against Iran, and in part peculiar to each category. 
Iran had also many claims against U. S. corporations. In fact, one of the 
major issues was that almost a billion dollars in performance bonds and letters 
of credit were being called by Iran claiming that projects or sales contracts had 
not been completed. 70 
The dilemma of claims ultimately became closely linked to the hostage 
crisis, and was the main reason which forced the two countries to establish a 
claims arbitration Tribunal under the Algiers Accords. Although these claims 
were terminated (in fact suspended) pursuant to the settlement reached, they 
were subsequently submitted to the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal in the 
Hague. The importance of the claims issue as a main backdrop to the 
establishment of the Tribunal and their subsequent consideration by the 
Tribunal makes it necessary to outline, briefly, the categories of claims 
involved, the causes of action in these claims and the issues raised in them. 
A- Bank Claims 
As it was noted earlier, the financial link between Iran and the United 
States included substantial amounts of loaned money to the pre-revolutionary 
government of Iran and various Iranian public or private entities by U. S. banks, 
70 Robert Carswell and Richard Davis, op. cit. pp. 202,204. 
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either alone or acting in syndicates of international banks. The U. S. banks 
claims were mainly for loans which were estimated to be about $1.2 billion in 
syndicate loans (or about one third of the $3.6 billion of the international 
syndicate loans to Iran) and about $1 billion in direct loans to Iranian 
entities. 7' These claims were directed against the Government of Iran, Iranian 
governmental agencies, Iranian banks and Iranian companies and arose 
principally out of loans against these entities. There were also claims arising 
originally out of loans to Iranian private companies, for which the American 
banks tended to hold the Iranian Government responsible by virtue of the 
nationalization of these entities by the Iranian Government. 72 
The principal cause of claims invoked by the U. S. banks was the 
alleged default by Iran to meet its obligations on the loans. 73 Upon the premise 
of default, they claimed that the loans had become due and the banks were 
entitled to grasp the available remedies to them. 74 
These remedies fell into two categories : litigation and set-offs. Set-off 
is a traditional banker's remedy under which the banker is allowed to pay off 
the loans from the debtor's deposits. However, in the Iranian situation this was 
71 Ibid, p. 204. For discussions regarding bank claims against Iran see generally: 1- Ibid, pp. 
204-205; 2- Robert Carswell and Richard Davis, "Economic and Financial Pressures", in 
Warren Christopher, op. cit. 173, pp. 189-194; 3- John Hoffman, "The Bankers' Channel", 
in Warren Christopher, op. cit. 235, pp. 235-245; 4- Edward Gordon, op. cit. pp. 676-678; 
5- Robert Mc Greevey, op. cit. pp. 389-400; and 6- John Pritchard, in "The Commercial 
Aspects of the Iran Crisis : The Assets Freeze", in Robert Steele, op. cit. 51, pp. 55-63. 
72 John Pritchard, op. cit. p. 55. 
73 An isolated statement by Bani-Sadr, the then Iranian Minister, that Iran was repudiating 
the debts incurred during the Shah's reign was another reason which was invoked by U. S. 
banks in declaring defaults. Although Iran immediately repudiated the statement by Bani- 
Sadr and never sought to repudiate the debts, the Americans kept relying on Bani-Sadr's 
statement. (Carswell- Economic and Financial Pressures, op. cit. p. 193. ) 
74 It is not disputed that "until the freeze order, and despite the fact that the revolution was 
well under way, the Iranian Government, its agencies and instrumentalities, and Iranian 
banks and companies were generally meeting their obligations on their loans to U. S. 
banks". (John Pritchard, op. cit. p. 57) Thus, one of the essential issues which was 
generally ignored by the Americans was that Iran's failure to meet its obligations after the 
freeze was basically due to the freeze of its assets in the same banks by the United States 
Government. In fact, there was a circular logic in the relationship between the freeze order 
and the default by Iran on loans. 
32 
very complicated. First, the early Treasury Regulations foreclosed banks from 
setting off against the blocked assets, and prevented them from instituting 
litigation with respect to the blocked assets in the United States. However, as 
early as November 15,1979 the prohibition on set-offs against assets held 
outside the United States were removed. Thus, so far as assets held in foreign 
branches of U. S. banks were concerned, both litigation and set-offs were 
permitted. A further amendment to the Treasury Regulations permitted the 
attachment of assets blocked in the United States through litigation. 75 The 
second problem in the way of set-offs was that few of the Iranian overseas 
deposits were in the name of an Iranian debtor. That is, in many cases, the 
banks tended to have claims against Iranian companies and Iranian banks, and 
in some cases the Iranian Government, while they tended to be holding assets 
of the Iranian Central bank, Bank Markazi. This did not correspond with the 
principle of mutuality of the obligations required for a proper set-off. 76 In 
order to overcome this problem the Americans invented and invoked the 
fallacious theory called by the Americans "the Big Mullah Theory" or in other 
words the "alter ago" theory. By this theory it was argued that as a result of the 
Iranian revolution and its subsequent nationalization programmes, all elements 
of Iranian economy were all parts of the same single entity, Iran. 77 In response 
to this argument we do not need to provide any analysis here, but simply to 
quote an American lawyer who said : "The extreme notion that any Iranian 
entity with money should be liable for the debts of any and all other Iranian 
entities would be no less than a random rape of the corporate veil". 78 
The other issue concerned the syndicate loans. A common provision in 
all syndicate loan agreements provided that any recoveries by a member of a 
75 John Pritchard, op. cit. p. 57; and Robert Carswell - "the Economic and Financial 
Pressures", op. cit. p. 183. See also No 57 Supra. 
76 John Pritchard, op. cit. pp. 57-58; and John Hoffman, op. cit. p. 239. 
77 Ibid; and Mc Greevey, op. cit. pp. 393-396. 
78 Mc Greevey, op. cit. p. 394. 
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syndicate had to be shared on pro rata among all members. This led to the 
invoking by the Americans of a theory which came to be called by them the 
black hole set-off. This in fact meant, as claimed by the Americans, a set-off 
not only on behalf of the bank's own participation in the loan, but on behalf of 
all syndicate members as well. The assertion of this theory led to the set-off by 
a bank of not only its own loan but the whole syndicate loan. 79 
The default idea was not essentially appreciated by non-U. S. banks. 
Nevertheless, default was declared on a $500 million loan to the Government 
of Iran where a majority of the participants were U. S. banks. 
In seizing upon the other remedy, litigation, U. S. banks instituted many 
claims against the Government of Iran and its entities. Of the total cases 
brought in U. S. courts against Iran, 96 were filed by banks. 81 One of the largest 
of these claims was a suit by the Chase Manhattan Bank in which the amount 
sought exceeded $355 million. 82 The Chase's claim was based on the alleged 
defaulted loan obligations, and like the set-off issue Chase raised the alter ago 
theory upon which it had named more than twenty Iranian entities as 
defendants, including the NIOC and Bank Markazi, claiming joint and separate 
liability among all defendants and the "right to combine and offset the funds of 
Bank Markazi and the NIOC against the indebtedness of the other 
defendants- . 
83 
79 John Hoffman, op. cit. pp. 240-241; and John Pritchard, op. cit, pp. 58-59. 
80 Robert Carswell- "Economic and Financial Pressures", op. cit. P. 193. 
81 Mc Greevey, op. cit. p. 390. 
82 Chase Manhattan v Iran, 79 Cir (TPG)(S. D. N. Y. filed Dec 4,1979), as quoted in Mc 
Greevey, op. cit. pp. 389-398. 
83 For details see Ibid. In this Case, Chase's motion was mainly in connection with the 
London Cases (Supra No 62) denied and Chase counterclaimed against Bank Markazi in 
the London suit. (Mc Greevey, op. cit. p. 392) The writer rightly points out that: "United 
States banking regulations impose limits on the amount of money that a United States 
bank may lend to any one entity. If the (alter ago) theory were accepted, then the Chase 
loans to over twenty Iranian borrowers may have been in violation of the banking 
regulations.... " (Ibid, p. 394) The other issues raised in these cases were validity of those 
loan agreements totalling $1.3 billion which were made in violation of Article 25 of the 
1906 Constitution of Iran; and the question of availability of a force majeure defence, and 
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B- Claims Arising from the Nationalization Programme in Iran 
In many of the cases before the United States courts, plaintiffs asserted 
that the nationalization of their interests in Iranian companies constituted a 
cause of action under the Treaty of Amity and general international law, 
because Iran allegedly had failed to compensate. Accepting the plaintiffs' 
motion, several United States courts asserting jurisdiction in these cases 
ordered prejudgement attachments and preliminary injunctions against Iran. 84 
We do not intend here to repeat what has already been discussed elsewhere85 
but in order to provide a measure of insight into the nature of the issues raised 
in these cases, it is necessary to outline them briefly. 
B(1)- Sovereign Immunity 
a- Having adopted the modern restrictive theory of sovereign immunity, 
the United States Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 197686 recognizes a 
number of exceptions to the jurisdictional immunity of a foreign State under 
Section 1605 and to the immunity from attachment or execution under Section 
1610. Common to the both sections above is a situation in which a foreign 
State has waived its immunity either explicitly or by implication. 87 In the 
sovereign immunity defence asserted by the NIOC, Bank Markazi and the Government of 
Iran. (For details see fbid, pp. 396-398) The writer also points out that "a fair degree of 
duplication was involved since some plaintiffs filed identical complaints in two or more 
districts for attachments". (Ibid, p. 390. ) 
84 E. g. American International Group Inc v Islamic Republic of Iran, 493 F. Supp. 522 
(D. D. C. 1980); New England Merchants National Bank v Iran Power Generation and 
Transmission Co, 502 F. Supp. 120 (the Case included several nationalization cases 
among 96 consolidated actions. For details and for other cases see William N. Eskridge, 
op. cit. Infra, No 84. ) 
85 See generally a highly analytical examination of the issue by William N. Eskridge, "The 
Iranian Nationalization Cases: Toward a General Theory of Jurisdiction over Foreign 
States", 22(3) Harv. I. L. J., 525, (1981), pp. 525-591. The writer's discussions clearly 
demonstrate the erroneous and partial decisions of the majority of U. S. courts against Iran. 
See also a useful article by David D. Dowd, "Sovereign Immunity-Act of State Doctrine- 
Claims lies for Iran's Failure to Compensate Following Nationalization", 14 VanJ. T. L., 
909, (1981), pp. 909-930. 
86 United States Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of October 21,1976,15 ILM (1976), p. 
1388. 
87 Ibid, respectively, Section 1605(a)(1) and Section 1610(a)(1). 
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Iranian nationalization cases the plaintiffs argued that Iran had waived its 
sovereign immunity under Article XI of the Treaty of Amity. 88 In a leading 
decision a U. S. court asserted jurisdiction based on this argument, granted the 
attachment and moreover entered partial summary judgement against Iran. 89 
The decision was due to an apparent misconception and 
misinterpretation of the immunity waiver clause of the Treaty of Amity. 90 The 
express terms of the immunity waiver clause of the Treaty of Amity and the 
negotiating history of the American commercial treaties, including the Treaty 
in question suggest that the immunity waiver clause of the "Treaty of Amity is 
restricted to an enterprise of either High Contracting Party that engages in 
commercial, industrial, shipping or other business activities within the 
territory of the other High Contracting Party". 91 This, in turn explicitly means 
that ; "First Iran waived no immunity, because the immunity waiver clause 
covers only enterprises and not the contracting parties themselves. -92; Second, 
"Iran waived immunity only for enterprises when they compete in the United 
States markets. "93 
b- Under Section 1605(a)(2) of the United States Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act, a foreign State shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of 
the courts of the United States in any case, "in which the action is based upon a 
commercial activity carried on in the United States by the foreign State.... or 
upon an act outside the territory of the United States in connection with a 
commercial activity of the foreign State elsewhere and that act causes a direct 
88 For this part of Article XI of the Treaty of Amity see, Supra No 10. 
89 American Int'l Group Inc v Islamic Republic of Iran, 493 F. Supp. 522, pp. 525-526. 
90 For details of the issue and of the negotiating history of the American commercial treaties, 
see Eskridge, op. cit. pp. 532-533. 
91 Ibid, p. 533. 
92 Ibid, pp. 533-534. 
93 Ibid, p. 534. The writer rightly points out that this interpretation of the Treaty is in accord 
with its terms and with the context of the waiver clause to provide competitive equality 
within territories thereof. (Ibid, pp. 534,535-536. ) 
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effect in the United States. " In the cases above the United States claimants 
argued that Iran's nationalizations were a commercial activity that had direct 
effect in the United States. In the above mentioned leading Case, the Court 
accepting this argument said : 
Clearly, the failure of defendants to make provision of 
compensation to plaintiffs at the time of the taking of property 
has had a "direct effect" within the meaning of Section 
1605(a)(2). Further, the failure of the defendants to provide 
compensation to plaintiffs, resulting in an increase of the State 
insurance monopoly from 25% or 50% to 100%, is an act "in 
connection with a commercial activity" within the meaning of 
Section 1605(a)(2). 94 
This erroneous and misconceived interpretation of an act uniquely 
sovereign in nature, the power to nationalize, as a commercial activity, is 
sufficiently evident in itself to make further discussion of the issue 
unnecessary, and simply serves to demonstrate here, that, in view of the 
prevailing sentiments, the United States judiciary could no longer offer a fair 
forum for Iranian cases. 
B(2)- Causes of Action 
The other important issue arising from Iranian nationalization cases was 
the causes of action upon which the claimants claimed compensation. They 
argued that the violation by Iran of the Treaty of Amity and international law 
constituted causes of action for compensation. 95 In the said leading Case, the 
U. S. District Court ruled that the plaintiffs were entitled to judgement on the 
basis of the defendant's violations of the Treaty of Amity and international 
law. 96 
94 American International Group Inc v Islamic Republic of Iran, 493 F. Supp, 522, p. 526 
(D. D. C. 1980). For a discussion of the issue see, Eskridge, op. cit. pp. 537-542. See also 
the same writer's discussion regarding Section 1605(a)(3) of the United States Foreign 
Sovereign Immunities Act. (Ibid, pp. 542-544. ) 
95 Esdge, op. cit. pp. 526 and 545. 
96 American Intl Group Inc v Islamic Republic of Iran, op. cit. p. 526. 
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This, in fact, was nothing less than a unilateral interpretation by the 
U. S. courts of their own rights. Because, it is not disputed that the primary 
claims for relief, under international law, do not create causes of action 
cognizable in municipal courts. 97 The principle of exhaustion of local remedies 
is a generally accepted rule of international law. 98 In the absence of such 
forum, or after an unsuccessful action in that forum, the case can only be 
pursued through diplomatic channels. 99 
B(3)- Act of State Doctrine 
"Act of state doctrine is a rule that municipal courts will not pass on the 
validity of acts of foreign governments performed in their capacities as 
sovereigns within their own territories. " 100 It is also accepted that one of the 
clearest examples of the application of the rule by courts in various countries is 
foreign expropriation measures. 101 In fact one of the leading rulings in this 
respect has been made by the United States Supreme Court in the well-known 
Sabatino Case. 102 
In the Iranian nationalization cases, the act of state doctrine was 
considered an irrelevant issue, since the Iranian nationalization did not provide 
a mechanism for adequate compensation, and "where failure to compensate 
plaintiffs occurred in connection with commercial activity of defendants. " 103 
97 See generally, Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, oxford, 1979, 
pp. 478-494. See also, Eskridge, op. cit. pp. 528, and 545-546. 
98 Brownlie, op. cit. pp. 495-504. 
99 In the American Int'l Group v Iran, op. cit. the Court considered the local remedies as 
being ineffective. (Ibid, p. 522) Even assuming so, this does not provide a basis for U. S. 
courts jurisdiction, since diplomatic channels are the only and further alternative means 
under international law. 
100 Brownlie, op. cit. pp. 507-508. 
101 Ibid, p. 508. 
102 Banco National dc Cuba v Sabatino, 376 U. S. 398 (1964), in 11 U. S. Sup. Crt. Rep. p. 804. 
103 American Int'l Group Inc v Iran, op. Cit. p. 522. 
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With respect to this ruling what needs to be added in short, is that it 
clearly was in conflict with the Sabatino principle without proper grounds to be 
excepted from that. 104 
The last point which has to be noted here, is the assertion of the "alter 
ago" theory in the Iranian nationalization cases. The argument which was put 
forward by several U. S. claimants against Bank Markazi Iran, was accepted by 
the courts and led to the prejudgement attachments and preliminary injunctions 
restricting movements of the Bank's assets, 105 which in fact is an independent 
institution responsible for the conduct of Iran's monetary policy. 106 
C- Claims Concerning Standby Letters of Credit 
In its simplest meaning a letter of credit is "an instrument by which a 
bank, on behalf of its customer, evidences to a third party its commitment to 
honour a demand for payment upon presentation by the third party of certain 
documents described in the instrument. " 107 Though it was used traditionally to 
pay for the purchase of goods, in recent transactions, including Iranian cases, 
letters of credit have been used to secure performance of contracts. 108 The 
104 See generally, Eskridge, op. cit. pp. 547-552. 
105 Ibid, pp. 575-580. 
106 See Affidavit of Bank Markazi, as quoted in Ibid, p. 575. 
107 Herbert A. Getz, "Enjoining the International Letter of Credit: The Iranian Letter of Credit 
Cases", 21 Harv. I. LJ., 189, (1980), p. 190. For discussions concerning the Iranian Letter 
of Credit cases see generally: 1- Ibid, pp. 189-252; 2- George Kimball and Barry A. 
Sanders, "Preventing Wrongful Payment of Guaranty Letters of Credit- Lessons from 
Iran", 39 Bus. Lawyer, 417, (1984), pp. 417-440; 3- Joseph D. Becker, "Standby Letters of 
Credit and the Iranian Cases: Will the Independence of the Credit Survive? ", 13 
U. C. C. L. J., 335, (1981), pp. 335-346; 4- "Note", "Fraud in Transaction: Enjoining Letters 
of Credit During the Iranian Revolution", 93 Harv. L. R., 992, (1980), pp. 992-1013 ; and 5- 
M. Zimmett, op. cit. pp. 927-962. 
108 M. Zimmett, op. cit. p. 928. 
The Iranian letters of credit involved some technical complexity in that they involved a 
four-party arrangement, consisting of an Iranian government enterprise and a U. S. 
contractor, and two banks. Two standby letters of credit were normally issued. The first 
was issued by a bank in Iran in favour of the government enterprise. The second letter was 
issued by the contractor's bank in favour of the Iranian bank which had issued the first 
letter. The other point is that the letter of credit guarantied payments with regard to two 
issues. First, it was a performance guarantee which would likely range from five to ten per 
cent of the face value of the contract. Second, it guarantied the return of the advance 
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most important feature of the standby letter of credit is that it represents an 
irrevocable and independent commitment of the issuer to make payment in 
accordance with the terms of the credit without regard to any dispute between 
the contractor and the developer over the underlying contract. The 
independence of the banker's obligation is an essential aspect of the letter of 
credit and has generally been recognized in international trade. 109 It follows 
that the bank must pay the credit upon the submission of the documents 
required, without any factual investigation into the performance of the 
underlying contract, and the only acceptable ground to enjoin the payment is to 
prove that the documents are forged or fraudulent or there is fraud in 
transaction. 110 
After the Iranian revolution, due to the departure of American 
companies many industrial projects or sales contracts were left uncompleted. 
Consequently the Government attempted to ask for the performance of these 
contracts or otherwise payment of the letters of credit from U. S. banks. The 
claim for payment of the letters of credit involved more than two hundred cases 
totalling several hundred million dollars. 111 
On the other hand, as the Iranian revolution developed, U. S. contractors 
could find no prospect in continuing business relationships with Iran. Therefore 
U. S. contractors sought to prevent payments of the letters of credit. 
Accordingly, they attempted to obtain preliminary injunctions to block their 
banks' letter of credit payments. Details of the issues raised in these cases are 
irrelevant to the purpose of this chapter. It only needs to be said that the 
Americans' reaction was consequential in undermining the credibility of the 
payment made by the government enterprises in case of a dispute. (Herbert A. Getz, op. 
cit. pp. 196-200. ) 
109 Zimmett, op. cit. pp. 928-929. 
110 George Kimball, op. cit. pp. 419-421. 
11 These numbers are understandable from the subsequent letters of credit claims submitted 
by Iran to the Iran-U. S. Claims Tribunal. (Zimmett, op. cit. p. 932. ) 
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letter of credit in international transactions and also their obligations vis-a-vis 
the Iranian beneficiaries. The early Treasury Regulations permitting the 
payments of the credits to a blocked account were subsequently amended to 
prohibit all payments of the letters of credit. 112 United States courts which 
prior to the seizure of the hostages in many cases had reasonably denied 
requests by U. S. claimants for preliminary injunctions against payments of the 
credit by U. S. banks 113, after that incident shifted to a different policy without 
any reasonable legal explanation. 114 
D- Related Issues 
The flood of claims against Iran in the United States courts went even 
beyond the United States Government's control. Several hundred million 
dollars of Iranian assets were attached under the court orders. 115 Some U. S. 
courts also entered judgements in favour of U. S. claimants notwithstanding the 
Treasury Regulations prohibiting the entry of judgement. 116 
Iran felt that U. S. courts were extremely hostile forum for impartial 
consideration of her claims and defences. In addition, she could not in principle 
accept the jurisdiction of U. S. courts on the issues which would be matters of 
sovereign immunity and acts of state. 
The United States Government, despite its early encouragement of its 
nationals became gradually concerned about the negative effect of the 
112 See Supra No 57. 
113 See Supra No 23. 
114 See generally, Zimmett, op. cit. pp. 934-947; and George Kimball, op. cit. pp. 432-436. 
For instance, Touche Ross and Co v Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co, (107 Misc. 2nd 
438,434 NY. S 2d 575 (N. Y. Sup CL 1980) as quoted in Zimmett, op. cit. p. 944) the 
Court affirmed a preliminary injunction without opinion, despite having previously 
affirmed an order denying an injunction in a pre-hostage case. (Ibid, p. 944. ) 
115 M. Hertz, op. cit. pp. 143-144. 
116 See, Electronic Data System Corp Iran v Social Security Organization of the Government 
of Iran, 508 F. Supp (N. D. Tex, May 2,1980), p. 1350; also American Int'l Group Inc v 
Iran, op. cit. Supra No 84. 
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attachments on the release of the hostages. 117 Though the assets, as well as the 
claims were bargaining chips in the negotiations for the release of the hostages, 
it could hardly ignore claims of U. S. claimants without providing an alternative 
forum to this effect. 
In short, the claims issue turned out to be closely linked to the whole 
dilemma surrounding the hostage crisis and thus an important issue in the heart 
of attempts for the release of the hostages. 
V- Negotiating History and the Terms of the Algiers Accords 
A- Negotiating History 
A(1)- efforts to secure the release of the American hostages held in 
Tehran, proved unsuccessful in the first half of 1980. Resolutions of the 
Security Council, and the Judgement of the International Court of Justice 
proved to be ineffective in ending the crisis. Various mediation efforts initiated 
by the UN Secretary General, Pope John Paul II, and many other countries 
proved unsuccessful. 118 A United Nations Commission of inquiry which was 
formed after consultations with the parties involved, to investigate the 
grievances of the Iranian people against the Shah with a view to resolving the 
crisis, cut short of its visit to Iran and refused to publish its reports. 119 
The prolongation of the crisis may be attributed to : 1- the impossibility 
of direct negotiations between the two parties which was due to an order by 
Ayatollah Khomeini forbidding Iranian officials from meeting U. S. officials; 2- 
117 The United States through its Justice Department filed statements of interest in Iranian 
cases arguing in favour of Iran's defence for the consolidation of all case in one panel, and 
of Iran's defence of sovereign immunity; and the Justice Department requested stays of 
proceedings. However, the requests for stays had mixed results. (For details see, Hertz, op. 
cit. pp. 140-143); and Mc Greevey, op. cit. pp. 411-416) For instance, in New England 
Merchants National Bank v Iran Power Generation and Transmission Co, (502 F. Supp, 
120, pp. 133-134), which consisted of 96 consolidated actions, the Court denied the Justice 
Department's request for stay of proceedings. 
118 Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1980, pp. 30205-30206,30211. 
119 Ibid, p. 30525. 
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domestic political requirements in Iran which made the immediate solution of 
the crisis not a first priority on the Iranian political agenda120; 3- the refusal by 
the United States to meet the students' demands, namely, extradition of the 
Shah and a U. S. apology, which were considered by the United States as non- 
negotiable demands ; and 4- complication of the crisis because of United States 
retaliatory actions against Iran. 
However, as time passed many obstacles were removed gradually. 
Completion of the parliamentary elections in Iran was a positive signal in the 
Iranian domestic political requirements for negotiation. In fact, a February 28, 
1980 declaration by Ayatollah Khomeini had already made it clear that the fate 
of the hostages was to be decided by the new Iranian Majlis which held its first 
session on May 28,1980.121 The death of the Shah, on July 27,1980 also 
removed the other obstacle regarding his extradition. 122 
The surrounding circumstances were, however, affected by the outbreak 
of the war between Iran and Iraq, following the latter's invasion of Iran, and the 
deadline created by the impending inauguration of President Reagan on 
January 20,1981.123 
A(2)- Channels of Negotiations 
Since early May, 1980 confidential negotiations had begun between 
U. S. banks and Iranian representatives. This channel which came to be known 
as the "bankers' channel" worked out many details in the disputes involved and 
provided and important structure for the two countries when it merged with the 
intermediary efforts initiated by the Algerian Government. 124 
120 See generally, Jonatan Greenberg, "Algerian Intervention in the Iranian Hostage Crisis", 
20 Stan. J. I. L., 259, (1984), pp. 262-273. 
121 King's Archives, 1980, p. 30525. 
122 Ibid, p. 30537. 
123 Ib id, 1981, p. 31082. 
124 Sec John Hoffman, op. cit. pp. 243-251. 
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On the political side, the first contacts started in mid September, 1980. 
Through the intermediary of the West German Government confidential 
meetings were arranged between Sadegh Tabatabai, (a close relative of 
Ayatollah Khomeini and a former Deputy Prime Minister in the Provisional 
Government, though not an office holder at the time) and Warren Christopher, 
the United States chief negotiator for the hostage crisis. 125 The meetings 
helped the parties to outline general terms for resolving the crisis, but did not 
continue afterwards. 12 
A statement on September 12,1980 by Ayatollah Khomeini outlined 
the Iranians' conditions for resolving the crisis. 127 This statement, which came 
to be known as Iranians' "four conditions", was subsequently adopted by the 
Majlis as a basis for its position with regard to the resolution of the crisis. 128 
Upon the ratification of the four conditions by the Majlis on November 2,1980 
the Algerian Government was requested by both parties to mediate. 129 The 
Algerian mediation, which enjoyed the trust of the disputing parties, embodied 
a desire by both Iran and the United States to end the crisis before the deadline 
created by the impending inauguration of President Reagan on January 20, 
1981. the effort was successful and led to the conclusion of agreements 
encompassing the various terms for the release of the hostages as well as for 
other disputes, which were signed on January 19,1981.130 
125 Robert B. Owen, "Final Negotiation and Release in Algiers", in Warren Christopher, op. 
cit. 297, pp. 305-306; see also Carswell, op. cit. pp. 208-209. 
126 Ibid. 
127 Keesing's Archives, 1981, p. 31082. 
128 Ibid. 
129 Ibid. 
130 Ibid, pp. 31081-31088. For the Agreements see Infra, Numbers 143-145. The Iranian 
negotiating team was headed by Behzad Nabavi, the then Minister for Executive Affairs. 
The United States negotiating team was headed by Warren Christopher, the then Deputy 
Foreign Secretary. (Ibid. ) 
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A(3)- Underlying Issues 
Having what was described in the preceding pages in mind, it is now 
clear that the disposition of various claims between Iran and the United States 
and U. S. companies was an essential part of the dilemma to be negotiated. In 
fact two main elements in the Iranian four conditions concerned this question. 
The conditions provided that the United States should; 
1- pledge not to interfere in the affairs of Iran; 2- unfreeze all 
Iranian assets and return them to the Iranian Government; 3- to 
abrogate all claims by U. S. companies and the U. S. 
Government, and all economic and financial measures against 
Iran; 4- to return the assets of the Shah. 131 
On the other hand, the United States wanted not only to use the assets 
to obtain the release of the hostages, but at the same time to avoid nullifying 
claims of U. S. claimants, and moreover to secure payment of their claims. 132 
In addition, the United States asserted that those parts of the assets which were 
attached in the United States by court orders were legally impossible to return 
by executive order. With regard to the assets held in overseas branches of U. S. 
banks, the United States argued that they could be returned but subject to the 
consent of U. S. banks which had claimed the right of set-off over those assets, 
or otherwise some sort of settlement be reached between Iran and U. S. banks 
over the assets held overseas. 133 
It was estimated that between 11 to 12 billion dollars of Iranian assets 
were blocked under the freeze order. From this total, $2,358 million were held 
at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York in gold and deposits; $5,579 million 
at overseas branches of U. S. banks; $2,050 million at domestic branches of 
131 Keesing's Archives, 1981, p. 31082. For the negotiating history of the Algiers Accords see 
generally; "Transcript of a Conference on the Settlement with Iran", 13 Lawyers of the 
Americas, 1, (1981), pp. 1-46; John Hoffman, op. cit. pp. 235-280; Robert Carswell, op. 
cit. pp. 201-23 1; and Robert Owen, op. cit. pp. 297-324. 
132 Carswell, op. cii pp. 205-206. 
133 Ibid, pp. 206-207. 
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U. S. banks; and between $1,000 to $2,100 million were held in the United 
States or overseas by U. S. individuals. 134 
In reality the United States' proposal meant that they could guarantee 
the return of about $2.3 billion held in the Federal Reserve Bank, and if 
consent was given by U. S. banks about $5 billion held at overseas branches of 
U. S. banks could also be returned to Iran. This meant that from the total, the 
United States was ready to return about $7.5 billion immediately, and the 
remainder should be settled after the release of the hostages upon a satisfactory 
settlement of the claims issue. 135 
The return of the assets held in Europe was itself a controversial matter, 
since the U. S. banks proposal- which came to be known as Plan "C" provided 
that, the debt claims of the U. S. banks holding foreign deposits would be 
satisfied out of these and the remainder would be returned to Iran. 136 
The U. S. proposal embodying Plan "C", with regard to bank claims, 
was rejected by Iran both as regards the whole proposal and the context of Plan 
"C". Iran did not want to pay off the bank loans and demanded about $9.5 
billion be returned to Iran. 137 
Subsequently, with regard to the assets held overseas, another proposal 
called by the Americans Plan "D" was developed. It proposed that Iran would 
bring all its bank loans current and pay the amounts necessary to put the loans 
in good standing, and provide some measures to provide security for future 
payments. 138 At the same time, an understanding was reached between the 
parties that the United States could not abrogate non-bank commercial claims, 
but there was a possibility of the abrogation of the claims that the United States 
134 Ibid, p. 205. 
13 5 Ibid, pp. 206-207,209-211. 
136 John Hoffman, op. cit. pp. 249-256. 
137 Ibid, p. 257, and Carswell, op. cit. p. 217. 
138 John Hoffman, op. cit. pp. 256-257. 
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Government or the hostages themselves might want to assert against Iran, as a 
result of the Embassy seizure. It was also felt that the United States courts were 
not a desirable forum for Iran. In addition, the United States knew that in a 
normal situation many claims in U. S. courts might be denied as a result of 
Iran's sovereign immunity. Therefore the idea of an international arbitration 
was developed. 139 
In short, the final understanding was, that; 
the United States would pledge not to interfere in Iran's affairs; 
claims arising from the Embassy seizure could be waived; Iran's 
deposits in the overseas branches of U. S. banks would be 
unblocked when Iran's loans had been brought current; an 
international claims arbitration process would be used provided 
that Iran would establish an escrow deposit of $1 billion, which 
would be replenished by Iran when it fell below $500 
million. 140 
On January 14,1981 a Bill providing for Iranian acceptance of 
international arbitration of claims was passed by the Majlis. However, the Bill 
provided that "all contracts which specified the settling of disputes in Iranian 
courts were excluded from arbitration". 141 
Despite a general understanding between the parties, some questions 
regarding the bank claims remained unsolved. Doubts were removed in this 
respect when on January 15,1981 Iran announced that it had decided ; 1- to 
pay off all its bank loans. Iran agreed to pay $3.4 billion of bank loans and to 
deposit $1.4 billion in an escrow account which would be paid after 
verification; 2- "to return the hostages upon the receipt of $8.1 billion; to 
accept in principle the U. S. proposal that $2.2 billion in deposits in the United 
139 R. Owen, op. ciL pp. 303-305. 
140 Cowell, op. cit. pp. 214-215. Serious complications arose when on December 19,1980 
Iran demanded a $24 billion guarantee for return of its assets and the Shah's wealth, but 
this demand was never seriously followed. (Keesing's Archives, 1981, pp. 31082-31083. ) 
141 Cowell, op. cit. p. 220; and Keesing's Archives, 1981, p. 31083. 
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States be returned later, with a $1 billion replenishable escrow account 
providing security for claims programme". 142 
This proposal despite minor questions over the interest rates demanded 
by Iran, subsequently became the structure of the Algiers Accords, which were 
signed on January 19,1981. 
B- The Terms of the Algiers Accords 
The settlement comprised two Declarations by the Government of 
Algeria of the Parties' commitments. In the first Declaration 143, Iran and the 
United States made commitments regarding their future political relations, the 
release of United States nationals in Iran and the return of Iranian assets. This 
agreement was accompanied by a separate instruments' comprising 
undertakings by Iran and the United States with respect to the General 
Declaration. The second Declaration145 provided for the establishment of an 
international arbitral Tribunal for the settlement of specified outstanding claims 
between the parties. A technical agreement, named the Escrow Agreement 146, 
was signed which involved the Parties and the Escrow agent. 
The General Declaration and the Undertakings provided for the 
following: 
142 Carswell, op. Cit. p. 220. 
143 Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria 
(hereinafter, the General Declaration, the GD), 20 ILM, (1981), p. 224. 
144 Undertakings of the Governments of the United States of America and the Islamic 
Republic of Iran with respect to the Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and 
Popular Republic of Algeria (hereinafter, the Undertakings), Ibid, p. 229. 
145 Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria 
Concerning the Settlement of Claims by the Government of the United States of America 
and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran. (hereinafter, the Claims Settlement 
Declaration, the CSD), 20 ILM (1981), p. 230. 
146 The Escrow Agreement, 20 ILM, 1981, p. 234. 
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1- Release of the 52 U. S. nationals detained in Iran. 147 
2- A pledge by the United States not to intervene in Iran's internal 
affairs. 148 
3- Immediate return of $7.955 billion of Iranian assets. 149 This amount 
apparently included Iranian assets held at the Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York and deposits in foreign branches of U. S. banks. Form this amount Iran, 
however, directly received only $2.870 billion, since Iran agreed to repay 
$3.667 billion, its debts to U. S. banks and other syndicate members. 150, and to 
retain $1.418 billion in an escrow account pending the resolution of bank 
claims. 151 
4- With regard to the assets in U. S. branches of U. S. banks, it was 
agreed that they should be returned within six months from the date of the 
technical arrangement which had to be concluded within 30 days from the date 
of the General Declaration. 152 $1 billion of all such funds was to be placed in a 
special interest-bearing Security Account for the purpose of securing the 
payment of, and paying, claims against Iran in accordance with the Claims 
Settlement Agreement. Iran has agreed to replenish this account up to a 
minimum of $500 million whenever it falls below this figure until all claims 
are satisfied. 153 
147 Para 3 of the General Declaration and Para 1 of the Undertakings. 
148 Para 1 of the General Declaration. 
149 Para 1 of the Undertakings, and Para's 4 and 5 of the General Declaration. 
150 Para 2(a) of the Undertakings. 
151 Para 2(B) of the Undertakings. This Paragraph also provides that "in the event that within 
30 days any U. S. banking institution and the Bank Markazi are unable to agree upon the 
amounts owed, either party may refer such dispute to binding arbitration by such 
international arbitration panel as the parties may agree, or failing such agreement within 
30 additional days after such reference by the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal. " 
152 Para 6 of the General Declaration. 
153 Para 7 of the General Declaration. 
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5- With regard to the other assets in the United States and abroad, it 
was agreed that the United States should return them to Iran. 154 
6- The United States agreed "to terminate all legal proceedings in the 
United States courts involving claims of United States persons and institutions 
against Iran and its state enterprises, to nullify all attachments and judgements 
obtained therein, to prohibit all further litigation based on such claims and to 
bring about the termination of such claims through binding arbitration". 155 
7- The United States agreed to withdraw all U. S. claims against Iran 
before the International Court of Justice and thereafter bar their prosecution 156; 
8- to bar all claims against Iran by the hostages and certain claimants 157; 9- to 
revoke all U. S. trade sanctions against Iran 158; 10- to freeze all of the Shah's 
and his close relatives' U. S. assets. 159 
The Claims Settlement Declaration provided for the establishment of an 
international arbitral Tribunal (Iran-United States Claims Tribunal). 160 The 
Parties agreed to submit to arbitration any claims not settled voluntarily within 
six months of the effective date of the Agreement. 161 The Tribunal has: 1- 
Jurisdiction over claims by nationals of either State against the government of 
the other State outstanding as of the date of the agreement, and arising out of 
debts, contracts, and expropriations. 162; 2- jurisdiction over claims arising out 
of contracts between the two signatory governments. 163; 3- the power to 
arbitrate in disputes regarding United States commitments to assist Iran in 
154 Para's 8 and 9 of the General Declaration. No specific deadline is provided under these 
Paragraphs. 
155 Para B of the General Principles of the General Declaration. 
156 Para 11 of the General Declaration. 
157 Ibid. 
158 Ibid, Para 10. 
159 Ibid, Para 12. 
160 Article 2(1) of the Claims Settlement Declaration. 
161 Ibid, Article 1. 
162 Ibid, Article 2(1). 
163 Ibid, Article 2(2). 
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locating and recovering the Shah's assets. 164 The Tribunal is also to decide any 
dispute regarding interpretation or performance of the General Declaration and 
any question concerning interpretation of the Claims Settlement 
Declaration. 165 The Claims Tribunal's jurisdiction is expressly limited in two 
respects: It is not authorized to hear claims arising out of the Iranian revolution 
and the seizure of the United States nationals 166, or claims based on contracts 
which provided that Iranian courts were to have sole jurisdiction over 
disputes. 167 
The Tribunal is to be composed of nine members or such larger 
multiples of three as the two Countries may agree, a third of whom are to be 
selected by the United States, a third by Iran, and the members so appointed 
should select the remainder by mutual agreement. 168 The Tribunal is to 
"decide all cases on the basis of respect for law, applying such choice of law 
rules and principles of commercial and international law as the Tribunal 
determines to be applicable, taking into account relevant usages of trade, 
contract provisions and changed circumstances. "169 The Tribunal is to follow 
the procedural rules for arbitration established by the United Nations 
Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules). 170 
After the conclusion and entry into force of the Algiers Declarations 171, 
the question of their validity under international law172, and the U. S. 
164 Ibid, Article 2(3), and Para 16 of the General Declaration. 
165 Ibid, and Para 17 of the General Declaration. 
166 Ibid, Article 2(1), and Para 11 of the General Declaration. 
167 Ibid. 
168 Ibid, Article 3(1). 
169 Ibid, Article 5. 
170 Ibid, Article 3(2). 
171 In accordance with the terms of Article VIII of the Claims Settlement Declaration the 
Agreement entered into force on 19 January 1981. 
172 The question was whether the issue of hostage-taking in Iran amounted to the threat or use 
of force within the meaning of Article 52 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties. (For this purpose see generally: James M. Redwine, "The Effect of Duress on the 
Iranian Hostage Settlement Agreement", 14 Van. J. T. L., 874, (1981), pp. 847-890; Shlomo 
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Constitution 173, was raised in the United States. However, the new 
Administration declared that it would honour the agreement. 174 
Conclusion 
The settlement reached is a natural consequence of the extraordinary 
circumstances in which the negotiations were carried out. Extraordinary, both 
by way of the timing of negotiations and the way in which a very complicated 
set of legal-financial issues had to be settled. While a great many opportunities 
and time were lost between November 1979 and November 1980, the parties' 
desire to settle the issue within the very limited amount of time left before the 
January 20,1981 deadline, was extraordinarily effective in the specific shaping 
of the settlement reached. This in fact represented an effort by the parties to 
assemble all the pieces of the problem which had multiplied during the 
preceding months. 
The decision to establish an arbitration process for the settlement of 
claims was an inevitable and necessary consequence of the background 
described in the preceding pages. Arbitration in itself poses no problem. 
Although a lump sum agreement could have been another solution, in the 
circumstances existing at the time it was unlikely to satisfy the two States, 
especially from the political point of view. The questions are basically in 
Cohen and others, "The Iranian Hostage Agreement Under International Law and United 
States Law", 81 Col. L. R., 822, (1981), pp. 823-837, See also Transcript of A Conference 
on the Settlement with Iran, op. cit. pp. 46-71; and Oscar Schachter, op. pp. 369-373. 
173 The question was whether the U. S. Administration was constitutionally authorized to 
nullify and bar suits and attachments against Iranian assets and to bar any further such 
claims. In Dames & Moore v Reagan, Secretary of Treasury, (20 ILM, 1981, p. 897) the 
U. S. Supreme Court ruled that in acting under the Algiers Accords, the U. S. President was 
within his constitutional powers. (Ibid, p. 915) For further details see also; Alan C. Swan, 
"Reflections on Dames & Moore v Reagan and the Maiami Conference", 13 Lawyer of the 
Americas, i, (1981), pp. i-xiii; also Transcript of a Conference on the Settlement with Iran 
(Maiami Conference), op. cit. pp. 71-137; and Sholomo Cohen, op. cit. pp. 857-892. 
174 See Executive Order 12294 of February 24,1981, (20 ILM, 1981, pp. 412-413). It is to be 
noted that despite the Accords' express provision for the termination of claims in the U. S. 
courts, the Presidential Order only suspended these litigations. The Order also did not 
apply to claims concerning the validity or payment of standby letters of credit, 
performance or payment bonds or other similar instruments. (Ibid, Section 5. ) 
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connection with the issues which could necessarily effect the desirable 
functioning of the arbitral process. 
It was clear from the outset that the two countries had different 
administrative and economic structures. That is, the United States Government 
did not exercise such wide commercial activities as assumed by the Iranian 
Government. As a result of this fact, the Iranian government entities were the 
counter-parts in the contracts and in the subsequent disputes with American 
corporations. Due to this fact the Iranian government entities were likely to 
have, and in fact had, many claims against American corporations. In other 
words, despite the desire declared in the General Principles of the General 
Declaration by both parties to terminate all litigation as between the 
Government of each party and the nationals of the other, the agreement failed 
to take notice of the Iranian government entities' claims. Therefore the question 
was left unclear as to whether the Iranian Government and its commercial 
enterprises were entitled to bring claims against their American contractual 
counter-parts. This is not merely a theoretical matter; in fact the submission 
and the subsequent withdrawal of 1400 claims by Iranian government entities 
against U. S. companies is a natural consequence of the parties' failure to take 
notice of this fact. 
Iran's commitment to provide a bottomless account in favour of the 
American claimants is an apparent consequence of the American freeze action, 
which was unlikely to be adopted in a normal situation. However, this leaves 
the parties in an unequal position, since the United States has not provided any 
such security. 
175 See D. P. Stewart and Laura B. Sherman, "Developments at the Iran-United States Claims 
Tribunal: 1981-1983", 24(1) VirgJ. I. L., 1, (1983), p. 9. Iran's decision to withdraw its 
claims was following the Tribunal's decision that it lacked jurisdiction over this category 
of claims. (See Case A/2, I Iran-USCTR. p. 101). 
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Moreover, the agreement failed to provide an express provision with 
regard to the standby letters of credit. General references to the applicable law 
and the choice of law issues, without a detailed provision regarding these 
issues and the Tribunal's function, are a potential source of controversial 
questions which may arise with regard to the Tribunal's function and the nature 
of its decisions. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION : AN OVERVIEW OF 
SOME SELECTED TOPICS 
Introduction 
International arbitration is a frequently used institution for the 
settlement of disputes of varying nature. It is, however, a complex subject and 
the term "international arbitration" is used to accommodate different concepts. 
The aim of this study is to provide a survey of different systems of 
international arbitration and to touch upon the areas where they differ form one 
another. However, this is only an overview of these complex subjects, further 
restricted by the limitations imposed by the space and scope of this study. 
I. The Concept of Arbitration 
In terms of a definition, arbitration has been described as 
a reference of a dispute or difference between not less than two 
persons for determination after hearing both sides in a judicial 
manner by another person or persons, other than a court of 
competent jurisdiction. I 
or 
Arbitration is a device whereby the settlement of a question 
which is of interest for two or more persons, is entrusted to one 
or more persons- the arbitrator or arbitrators- who derive their 
powers from a private agreement, not from the authorities of a 
state, and who are to proceed and decide the case on the basis of 
such an agreement. 2 
1 W. H. Gill, The Law of Arbitration, 2nd edition, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1975, p. 
1. 
2 Rcnc David, Arbitration in International Trade, Kluwer Law & Taxation 
Publications, London, 1985, p. 5. 
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To avoid the shortcomings of a definition some writers have tried to 
identify the major characteristics of arbitration common to all types of 
arbitration; 
1- Arbitration is a method by which any dispute can be 
resolved; 2- The dispute is resolved by a third and neutral 
person; 3- The arbitrators are empowered to act by virtue of the 
authority vested in them by the parties...; 4- Arbitrators are 
expected to determine the dispute in a judicial way; 5- 
Arbitration is a private system of adjudication; 6- The award is 
final and conclusive and puts an end to the parties dispute; 7- 
The award binds the parties by virtue of their implied 
undertaking and they voluntarily give effect to the arbitrator's 
decision; 8- The arbitration proceedings and awards are 
independent of the state. 3 
Not all aspects of this characterization of arbitration are free from 
controversy. Indeed, some elements of the above definition may bear directly 
upon the debate surrounding the juridical nature of arbitration. That is, whether 
arbitration derives its power from the agreement of the parties and has a 
contractual character, or on the contrary, from a specific legal system and is of 
a jurisdictional nature. 4 A hybrid character, combining elements from the 
contractual and jurisdictional theories, is the third suggestion which has been 
discussed in this context. 5 There are some indications to suggest that there 
exists a fourth theory regarding the juridical nature of arbitration. The 
proponents of this theory reject the above three theories and argue that 
arbitration has an autonomous character. 6 
It is notable that the purpose of determining the legal nature of 
arbitration is to establish the position of arbitration within the two distinctive 
legal systems of national law and international law and to determine the extent 
3 Julian Lew, Applicable Law in International Commercial Arbitration, Oceana 
Publications, New York, 1978, p. 12. 
4 See generally, Ibid, pp. 51-56. Also, T. Gebrehana, Arbitration an Element of 
International Law, 1984, Almqvist and Wiksell International, Stockholm, pp. 25-41. 
5 Julian Lew, op. cit. pp. 57-61. 
6 Ibid. 
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to which the arbitration process is governed by the system concerned. Further, 
it is to appraise the weight of the argument in favour of the autonomous status 
of arbitration. That is to say, whether arbitration can truly be regarded as 
operating in a different legal system divorced from the two systems of national 
and international law. We will elaborate on this and its relationships to the 
nationality and different systems of arbitration in Section IV below. 
II. Arbitration in International Law 
Historically, the arbitration mechanism has been recognized by various 
nations from the earliest times. The Laws of Manu, the Code of Hammurabi, 
Roman Law, Christian and Islamic traditions have all acknowledged arbitration 
as a peaceful and flexible means of dispute settlement.? The essential factor 
behind the development of arbitration has been attributed to the role of 
"consensus" in approaching the disputes arising in the practical life. 8 
In the history of international law the idea of setting up some form of 
arbitral tribunal is traceable to the early publicists. Within the contemporary 
notion of international law arbitration symbolizes a logical form of 
coordination in international relations. This is significant particularly because 
of the special structure of the international legal system based on mutual 
consent of states making up the international community. Within this sphere 
arbitration offers a better chance to resolve disputes through the consensual 
control of the parties over the whole process of arbitration. 9 
In international law arbitration is defined as "the settlement of disputes 
between states by judges of their own choice and on the basis of respect for 
law. "10 In the words of the International Law Commission it is: 
7 For a historical review see, Gebrehana, op. cit. pp. 11-16. 
8 Ibid, p. 13. 
9 Ibid, see generally, pp. 16-24. 
10 Articles 15 and 37 of the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 for the Pacific Settlement 
of International Disputes respectively. (The texts of the Conventions in 1 AJIL (1907), p. 
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a procedure for the settlement of disputes between states by a 
binding award on the basis of law and as a result of an 
undertaking voluntarily accepted . 
11 
It is not disputed that the 1794 Treaty of Jay12 and the 1872 Alabama 
Claims Arbitration13 constitute a starting point in the development of 
contemporary international adjudication. Because of the success of the 
Alabama Arbitration, the Alabama Claims model was applied to other cases 
which in turn were effective in the evolution of international arbitration. 14 An 
important aspect of the Alabama Arbitration is accepted to be its evolving of 
international arbitration as a "process of decision-making according to law and 
supported by appropriate procedural standards". 15 
The second historical phase of international arbitration is without doubt 
the Hague Conventions for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes of 
1899 and 1907. The Hague Conventions recognized arbitration as "the most 
effective, and at the same time the most equitable, means of settling 
disputes"16, and established the arbitral machinery of the Permanent Court of 
Arbitration17 and a set of procedural rules for the conduct of arbitration. 18 It 
107 and 2 AJIL (1908), p. 43 respectively; also in J. Gillis Wetter, The International 
Arbitral Process. Public and Private, Oceana Publications Inc. New York, 1979, 
Vol 5, p. 187) The definition of international arbitration in the Hague Conventions has 
been adopted by many other multilateral conventions. (For details see Hans von Mangoldt, 
"Arbitration and Conciliation", in H. Mosler and R. Bernhardt, Judicial Settlement of 
International Disputes, Springer Verlag, Berlin, 1974, p. 423. ) 
11 YBILC, (1953), Vol II, p. 202. 
12 Treaty of 19 November 1794, between the U. K. and the U. S., 52 CTS, p. 243. The Treaty 
provided for adjudication of claims arising out of injury to aliens by mixed commissions. 
(For an appraisal of the Jay Treaty see George Schwarzenberger, International Law as 
Applied by International Courts and Tribunals, Vol 4 International Judicial 
Law, London, 1986, Stevens and Sons Ltd, pp. 21-48. See also generally, Moore, 
International Adjudications, (hereinafter Moore, Int. Adj. ) Oxford University Press, 
London, 1931, Vols. 3 and 4. 
13 The Treaty for the Arbitration of Alabama Claims, between the U. K. and the U. S., signed 
at Washington, 8 May 1871,143 CTS, p. 145. For an analysis of the Alabama Claims 
Arbitration see generally, Schwarzenberger, op. cit. Vol 4, pp. 49-80. For useful official 
documents of the Alabama Claims Arbitration see G. Wetter, op. Cit. Vol 1, pp. 27-56. 
14 For the review of these cases see Schwarzenberger, op. cit. Vol 4, pp. 81-94. 
15 Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, op. cit., p. 707. 
16 Article 16 of the 1899 Convention and Article 38 of the 1907 Convention. 
17 Articles 20 and 41 of the 1899 and 1907 Conventions respectively. 
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must be noted that the Permanent Court of Arbitration has no real permanent 
status. It is not composed of permanent judges, nor is there a court, but simply 
a machinery from which an arbitration tribunal may be assembled to deal with 
a particular dispute. The only permanent feature of the PCA is its 
Administrative Council and the International Bureau which acts as a secretariat 
or registry for the tribunals set up. 19 Except in the early decades of its 
establishment the PCA has not had an active role, nevertheless, it continues to 
exist. 
In modem international law arbitration has been regarded as one of the 
means for the peaceful settlement of disputes. Article 33 of the Charter of the 
United Nations refers to various peaceful means including "negotiation, 
enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement,... " by which 
the parties to any dispute are to seek a solution. It is certain that the Charter by 
its express reference to arbitration and "judicial settlement" next to each other 
regards them as two separate institutions. 20 The same reasoning applies with 
regard to Article 95 of the Charter which in effect makes clear that the function 
of the International Court of Justice as the judicial organ of the United Nations 
does not preclude the establishment of other tribunals. 21 
In reality , however, the 
distinction between arbitration and judicial 
settlement is much less definite. They are both legal means of settling disputes 
on the basis of law and, in contrast to diplomatic means, the awards or 
judgements rendered by arbitration or judicial settlement are binding upon the 
18 Generally Articles 21-57 of the 1899 Convention and Articles 42-90 of the 1907 
Convention. 
19 See Schwarzenberger, op. cit. pp. 112-117; Hazel Fox, "Arbitration", in H. Waldock, 
International Disputes ; The Legal Aspects, Europa Publications, London, 1972, 
101, pp. 108-113, and Brownlie, op. cit. pp. 707-708. 
20 D. H. N. Johnson, "International Arbitration Back in Favour, 34 Y. B. W. A. (1980), 305, p. 
306. 
21 Ibid. 
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parties. 22 The main important difference between arbitration and judicial 
settlement has been accepted to be in the influence and choice of the parties 
over the composition of the arbitral tribunal and procedure of the arbitration. 23 
In contrast to the parties' freedom in arbitration, in judicial settlement , such as 
the International Court of Justice's system, the composition and the rules of 
procedure are basically fixed and the parties' influence over these issues is only 
possible in very exceptional circumstances and to a minor extent. 24 Another 
distinguishing feature in this context, though not a decisive criterion, is 
regarded to be the permanency of the judicial settlement system as recognized 
from the usually ad hoc and temporary structure of public international 
arbitration. 25 
A further point is whether the difference between arbitration and 
judicial settlement as regards the influence of the arbitrating parties on 
competence, structure and procedure can lead to a distinction between the 
judicial nature of the arbitration process on the one hand and of "judicial 
settlement" on the other. 
The question is whether international arbitration is as strictly a judicial 
procedure as "judicial settlement", or it is a quasi-judicial system of dispute 
settlement. Modem international law tends to answer this question in the 
negative. The idea of quasi-judicial arbitration is regarded to be an "utterly 
inadequate" criterion for distinguishing arbitration from "judicial settlement". 
26 
H. Lauterpacht points out that "there exists in any case the very strongest 
objection to a view that decisions of an adjudicating body can be partly legal 
22 Ibid, also Mangoldt, op. cit. p. 424, and Schwarzenberger, op. cit. Vol 4, pp. 145-146. 
23 H. Mangoldt, op. cit. pp. 424-427. 
24 In this regard note Article 31(2), (3) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice 
which provides for the appointment of ad hoc judges on certain occasions, and Article 
38(2) of the same Statute for decisions ex aequo et bono. See also Article 26(2) of the 
same Statute. 
25 For details see Mangoldt, op. cit. pp. 424-428. 
26 Ibid, p. 426. 
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and partly non-legal". 27 He further argues that "such a view fails to take into 
account the provisions of treaties creating arbitral tribunals and prescribing the 
sources of law applicable by them. Neither does it find support in the activities 
of international arbitral tribunals..., ' 28 
This is a generally accepted view in contemporary international law 
which is based on sound theoretical grounds. The question, however, remains 
whether in reality the parties' exercise of influence would not attenuate the 
judicial nature of arbitration. 
III. The Effectiveness of International Arbitration 
A. Public International Arbitration 
Many writers are of the view that the current picture of public 
international arbitration practice does not live up to the earlier expectations 
placed upon arbitration in the settlement of disputes in the field of inter-State 
relations. For instance, a review of the arbitration practice reveals that, in 
contrast to the earlier popularity of inter-State arbitration, since the First World 
War the practice of arbitration has followed a sharp decline. 29 Eventhough 
during the 1980s public international arbitration has regained a certain degree 
of acceptance30, it has never been able to establish itself as a major method of 
inter-State dispute settlement. 
However, the establishment of two major international arbitration 
tribunals in the 1980s are examples of some recent notable developments in 
27 H. Lauterpacht, The Function of Law in the International Community, 1933, p. 
380. 
28 Ibid, p. 381. 
29 Ibid, p. 464; and Louis B. Sohn, "The Function of International Arbitration Today", 108 
Recueil des Cours, (1963), I, p. 1. 
30 See generally, D. H. N. Johnson, op. cit. p. 305; Louis B. Sohn, "The Role of Arbitration in 
Recent Multilateral Treaties", in T. E. Carbonneau (Ed. ), Resolving Transnational 
Disputes Through International Arbitration, University Press of Virginia, 
Charlottesville, 1984,21, pp. 22-27. 
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this respect. The first is the Iran-US Claims Tribunal established pursuant to 
the resolution of the hostage crisis between Iran and the United States. 31 The 
Tribunal is entrusted to decide thousands of claims and after more than seven 
years of work it still has a heavy case load to deal with. The second is the 
establishment and successful completion of the work of the Egypt-Israeli 
Arbitration Tribunal concerning the Taba Dispute. 32 
The problems affecting the effectiveness of inter-State arbitration may 
be seen in relation to two broad areas. First, the general problems of judicial 
settlement in international law in relation to the political and psychological 
aspects of the international legal system. That is, the problems arising from the 
reluctance of sovereign States to submit disputes, which have necessarily some 
political dimensions, to any system of judicial settlement, e. g. arbitration. As a 
result of this factor, the initial ideas developed in the course of the twentieth 
century to replace the use of force by arbitration is out of the question. 33 
The second factor, which is closely tied to and cannot completely be 
divorced from the first one, is the failure on the part of public international 
arbitration to reach a practical and a generally acceptable level of 
institutionalization. This is evident from the fact that the arbitration provisions 
in many multilateral treaties for the pacific settlement of international disputes 
have failed to be utilized in an institutional manner or in any other manner at 
all. 34 The attempts, principally sponsored by the UN International Law 
31 Declaration of the Government of Algeria Concerning the Settlement of Claims between 
Iran and the United States of 19 January 1981 [The Claims Settlement Declaration], 20 
ILM, 230. 
32 The Agreement to Arbitrate the Boundary Dispute Concerning the Taba Beachfront of 
September 11,1986, between Egypt and Israel, 26 ILM, (1987), p. 1; and the Arbitral 
Award in the Taba Dispute, 27 ILM, p. 1421. 
33 Mangoldt, op. cit. pp. 440, and particularly 487. 
34 For example, the Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes of 
1907 (Articles 51-90); Geneva General Act for the Pacific Settlement of International 
Disputes of 1928,93 L. N. T. S. 345, revised April 28 1949,71 U. N. T. S. 101; the American 
Treaty of Pacific Settlement (Pact of Bogota) of 1948,30 U. N. T. S. 55; the European 
Convention on the Pacific Settlement of Disputes of April 29,1957(Articles 1,19)(the text 
in 320 U. N. T. S. p. 243, also in 5 European Yearbook, p. 347); and the Protocol to the 
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Commission, to encourage States to adopt a modem and universal system of 
arbitration procedure has also failed to bear fruit. The idea behind the work of 
the International Law Commission was to develop a set of arbitration rules 
which would provide practical safeguards to secure the functioning of the 
tribunal against the attempts by a party to frustrate the arbitration35 -a 
common problem in many public international arbitration practices. 36 
The underlying principle behind this approach by the II. C was that 
"States having once entered into an undertaking to arbitrate are legally bound 
to refrain from any action which would frustrate their undertaking". 37 Upon 
this premise the Draft Convention of the International Law Commission on 
International Arbitration (1953)38 provided a number of rules which 
emphasised on the binding nature of the undertaking to arbitrate39 and 
provided for: power by the International Court of Justice to settle disputes as to 
the scope of the obligation to arbitrate40; appointment by the International 
Court of Justice of arbitrators not designated by a party to the dispute in 
Charter of the Organization of African Unity (Article 30)(3 ILM, p. 1116). In relation to 
the general arbitration provisions of the above treaties it is to be noted that the legal effect 
of such undertakings of general nature has been questioned by some writers who believe 
that the existence of a compromis is necessary for the engagement of obligation to submit 
to arbitration. (F. A. Mann, Studies in International Law, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 
1973, pp. 256-257. In reality also very few cases "have been brought before an arbitration 
tribunal as a result of a general treaty or compromissory clause and that- almost without 
exception- a dispute has only been submitted to an arbitral tribunal after the parties have 
reached a basic agreement to that effect. "(Mangoldt, op. cit. p. 470. ) 
35 Ibid, pp. 439-440. 
36 Ibid, pp. 491-492. For instance, in the Franco-Tunisian Arbitration Tribunal the national 
arbitrators were withdrawn before the completion of the arbitration proceedings. (24 ILR 
(1957), pp. 767-770); also, Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania refused to appoint their 
representatives to the arbitral commission which was to be established under the Peace 
Treaties. (Interpretation of the Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, 
Advisory Opinion, First Phase, ICJ Reports (1950), p. 65, Second Phase, ICJ Reports, 
(1950), p. 221. 
37 H. Fox, op. cit. p. 101. 
38 Text in Wetter, op. cit. Vol 5, p. 228. 
39 Ibid, Article 1(3). 
40 Ibid, Article 2(1). 
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contravention of its obligations41; and certain other safeguards to secure the 
functioning of the tribunal until the award has been rendered. 42 
The opponents of the ILC's proposals argued that: 
The Commission's draft would distort traditional arbitration 
practice, making it into a quasi-compulsory jurisdictional 
procedure, instead of preserving its classical diplomatic 
character, in which it admittedly produces a legally binding, but 
final, solution, while leaving Governments considerable 
freedom as regards the conduct and even the outcome of the 
procedure, both wholly dependent on the form of the 
compromis. 43 
Some prominent authorities on international arbitration were also 
critical of the ILC's approach. Professor Carlston questioned "whether the 
larger interests of the international community will be served by transforming 
the existing conception of arbitration into the conception of judicial arbitration 
as envisaged by the Commission". 44 He argued that "the strength of the 
existing system of international arbitration as a means for pacific settlement of 
disputes lies in its flexibility and responsiveness to the will of the parties-. 45 
Judge De Visscher also voiced similar views on the ILC's draft convention. 46 
The ILC's attempts to introduce a quasi-compulsory arbitration with 
stricter judicial aspects were not accepted by majority of States. As a result, the 
International Law Commission had to limit itself to the adoption of the Model 
Rules on Arbitral Procedure (1958)47 which, according to some observers, has 
not yet been applied in a single case. 48 
41 fbid, Article 3(2). 
42 Ibid, Articles 4 to 10 and 21(1). See also Mangoldt, op. Cit. pp. 440-441. 
43 Report by the Special Rapporteur of the ILC on Arbitral Procedure, 24 April 1957, YBILC 
(1957), Vol II, p. 2, Para 7. 
44 Carlston, "Codification of International Arbitral Procedure", 47 AJIL, (1953), 203, p. 218. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Charles De Visscher, "Reflections on the Present Prospects of International Adjudication", 
50 AJIL (1956), 467, pp. 470-471. 
47 Report of the International Law Commission Covering the Work of its 10th Session, 
G. A. O. R., 13th Session, Supplement No 9, Document A/3859; also reproduced in YBILC 
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We already touched upon the notion of quasi-judicial arbitration in 
Section II above. It is notable that State practice is a major source of 
international law. Given the reluctance of the majority of States to submit to 
the ideas of judicial arbitration promulgated by the ILC, the question 
concerning the degree of strictness of international arbitration from the judicial 
point of view may yet to be resolved. 
The question of popularity of the inter-State arbitration practice should, 
however, be tested in conjunction with the development of institutions of 
judicial settlement, such as the Permanent Court of International Justice and its 
successor the International Court of Justice. Moreover, as a result of the greater 
participation of States and State enterprises in international trade, States are 
increasingly participating in another form of international arbitration, namely 
arbitration in the field of international commerce. For instance, one third of the 
many cases submitted each year to the ICC arbitration involves State parties. 49 
Furthermore, it is submitted that public international arbitration in 
certain subject areas, e. g. mixed claims commissions entrusted to decide on the 
question of injuries suffered by aliens and arbitration tribunals established to 
settle territorial disputes, has a good record. 50 In addition, recent developments 
shows that arbitration is increasingly being regarded as the most appropriate 
institution and procedure for settling disputes relating to the interpretation and 
application of codificatory treaties, and interpretation and application of 
multilateral treaties. 51 For instance, Professor Sohn points out that while there 
(1958), Vol II, p. 78; and 53 AJIL (1959), p. 239. Text of the Model Rules also in J. G. 
Wetter, op. Cit. Vol 5, p. 232. 
48 Mangoldt, op. cit. p. 441. 
49 Kar-Heinz Bockstiegel, "States in the International Arbitral Process", in Julian Lew (Ed. ), 
Contemporary Problems in International Arbitration, Centre for Commercial Law Studies, 
Queen Mary College, University of London, 1986, p. 40. 
50 For a review of arbitration treaties and arbitration practice see, Mangoldt, op. cit. pp. 463- 
466, and generally pp. 432-483; D. H. Johnson, op. cit. pp. 313-327; H. Fox, op. cit. pp. 
113-125; and K. R. Simmonds, R. Lapidoth and H. W. Baade, "Public International 
Arbitration", 22 Texas I. L. J., 149, (1987), pp. 149-155. 
51 Louis B. Sohn, ".. Multilateral Treaties", op. cit. pp. 22-27. 
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were less than twenty post-1970 multilateral agreements referring disputes to 
the International Court of Justice, more than sixty such agreements refer 
disputes concerning their interpretation and application to arbitration. 52 In this 
regard the provision of a comprehensive arbitration clause for the settlement of 
disputes in the all important Law of the Sea Convention of 1982 is the most 
notable one. 53 In fact, the acceptability and flexibility of arbitration recognized 
by the Law of the Sea Convention has opened a new era of hope for the future 
of international arbitration. As a result, some writers believe that it can be 
duplicated in other areas. 54 
B. International Commercial Arbitration 
Unlike public international arbitration, international commercial 
arbitration is growing at an increasing speed. As a result of the rapid expansion 
in international trade, international commercial arbitration has become a 
growingly popular method for the settlement of disputes in this field. This is 
because of the advantages that international commercial arbitration offers as an 
alternative to a foreign court, which makes it particularly acceptable to States 
and state enterprises party to a commercial dispute. It also offers a considerable 
degree of liberty for the parties to establish a tribunal composed of arbitrators 
from different countries and thus from different legal cultures. The parties are 
also in liberty to adjust the procedure to the circumstances of the case and to 
define the law applicable to the substance of the dispute. 55 Furthermore, 
international commercial arbitration awards, due to the existence of recent 
52 Ibid, p. 26. 
53 The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982,21 ILM, p. 1261, Part XI 
Articles 186-191 and Part XV Articles 279-299 and Annexes V, VI, VII, VIII. 
54 Sohn, ".. Multilateral Treaties", op. cit. p. 37. 
55 For a discussion on the advantages and disadvantages of international commercial 
arbitration see: Alan Redfern and Martin Hunter, Law and Practice of International 
Commercial Arbitration, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1986, pp. 16-19; Hans Smit, 
"The Future of International Commercial Arbitration :A Single Transnational Institution? " 
25 CoIJ. T. L. (1986), 9, pp. 10-12; and also Pieter Sanders, "Trends in International 
Commercial Arbitration", 145 Recueil des Cours, (1975)1I, 205, pp. 215-17. 
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international conventions particularly the UN Convention on the Recognition 
and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards56, are likely to receive a greater 
measure of recognition and enforcement in the countries parties to the UN 
Convention than are judgements of national courts. 57 
Another major factor behind the popularity and advantage of 
international commercial arbitration is the role of the institution for the 
development and application of an international lex mercatoria. The lex 
mercatoria is generally referred to as uniform law derived from international 
conventions, trade usages and custom, and ideas of business fairness. Some 
also tend to broaden the issue by referring to the concept of general principles 
of law. 58 The lex mercatoria has primarily been discussed in the context of the 
law applicable to the substance of the dispute. For instance, Article VH(1) of 
the European Convention of April 1961 on Commercial Arbitration provides 
that arbitrators should take account of trade usages. More recently, Article V of 
the Claims Settlement Declaration establishing the Iran-US Claims Tribunal 
provides that the arbitrators should take account of relevant usages of trade. 59 
Another distinguishing feature of international commercial arbitration 
is the high level of institutionalization developed in this field. Various 
institutions are actively involved in the area of international commercial 
56 Adopted on June 10,1958, (330 U. N. T. S. p. 38). Note also the Inter-American Convention 
on International Commercial Arbitration of 1975, (14 ILM, p. 336. Also in J. G. Wetter, 
op. cit. Vol 5, p. 313); and the European Convention on International Commercial 
Arbitration of 1961. (484 U. N. T. S. p. 349, also in Wetter, op. cit. Vol 5, p. 316. ) 
57 Hans Smit, op. pp. 10-11. 
58 For detailed discussions concerning the lex mercatoria see generally: Berthold Goldman, 
"The Applicable Law: General Principles of Law- The Lex Mercatoria", in Julian Lew, 
Contemporary Problems in International Arbitration, op. cit. p. 113; A. Redfern, op. cit. 
pp. 89-92; Ole Lando, "The Lex Mercatoria in International Commercial Arbitration", 34 
ICLQ, (1985), 747, pp. 747-768; and W. Lawrence Craig, William W. Park and Jan 
Paulson, International Commercial Arbitration, Loose Leaf, Oceana Publications, 
June 1984, Part VI, Chapter 35, "Lex Mercatoria", pp. 1-15. Some writers have also 
discussed the concept of a commercial law of nations. This is distinct from the lex 
mercatoria in that the first is regarded as part of public international law applicable in 
relations between states. (F. A. Mann, Studies in International Law, op. cit. p. 140). 
59 For a review of the role of the lex mercatoria in international conventions and arbitral 
awards see generally, Goldman op. cit. pp. 116-122. 
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arbitration. Among the most significant of these institutions is the Court of 
Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) which is a 
leading organization. Under the auspices of the ICC the largest number of 
international commercial arbitrations have been conducted. 0 The London 
Court of International Arbitration61 and the American Arbitration 
Association62 are also actively involved in the field of international 
commercial arbitration. There are also major arbitration institutions in 
Stockholm, the Soviet Union, Austria, Switzerland, the Federal Republic of 
Germany, the German Democratic Republic, Poland and India. 63 
Moreover, two sets of rules, the UNCITRAL Arbitration Ru1es64 and 
the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration65, both 
adopted by the United Nations Commission on International Trade law 
(UNCITRAL), are available for use in ad hoc arbitration in international 
commerce. These rules can easily be referred to in a contract without the need 
for lengthy negotiations over procedural matters. For instance, the two 
countries in the Iran-US Arbitration Tribunal adopted the UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules as the rules of procedure of the Tribunal. 66 The other 
advantage of these rules is that they are designed for world-wide use by parties 
from different legal, social and economic systems and provide international 
uniformity. 67 
60 Hans Smit, op. cit. p. 12. It is not possible to provide a description of these institutions 
within the scope of this study. For a discussion of the ICC arbitration and other arbitration 
institutions see generally, J. G. Wetter, op. cit. Vol 2, pp. 120-230; and Ernest J. Cohn, 
Martin Domke, and Frederic Eisemann, Handbook of Institutional Arbitration in 
International Trade, North-Holland Publishing Co, Oxford, 1977. 
61 See generally, Wetter, op. cit. Vol 2, pp. 131-138. 
62 Ibid, generally, pp. 120-130. 
63 For a description of these institutions see generally, Ernest Cohn, op. cit. 
64 Adopted in 1976,15 ILM, p. 701; also in Wetter, op. Cit. Vol 4, p. 413. 
65 Adopted in 1985,24 ILM, p. 1302. 
66 Article 3(2) of the Claims Settlement Declaration. 
67 See generally, Pieter Sanders, "Commentary on UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules", 2 YB. 
Comm. Arb. (1977), p. 172; Terence W. Thompson, "The UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules", 
17 Harv. I. LJ. (1976), p. 141; and Andrew Glenn Weiss, "The Status of the UNCITRAL 
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It is also notable the Permanent Court of Arbitration, in addition to its 
role as a public international arbitration institution, has formulated a set of 
arbitration and conciliation rules for settlement of international disputes 
between two parties of which only one is a State. 68 Under these Rules the 
International Bureau of the PCA is authorized to arrange facilities for the 
conduct of arbitrations which are not strictly international. Like the PCA's 
current activity in the field of public international arbitration, its record in the 
commercial field is also poor. 
IV. Forms of International Arbitration 
Generally speaking, two main categories of international arbitration are 
identifiable: public international arbitration and international commercial 
arbitration. Of these two the first takes place within the domain of public 
international law and is properly international. International commercial 
arbitration, on the other hand, despite a growing degree of autonomy accorded 
to it under the national laws of the countries where major institutional 
arbitrations take place may at some stage fall within the domain of national law 
in two respects: the law of the country of the arbitral proceedings, as well as 
the country where the enforcement of the award is sought. Nevertheless, some 
recent developments have not only made the line dividing these two classes of 
arbitration rather flexible but also a degree of confusion has emerged in 
relation to the proper criteria of the internationality of arbitration. 69 This 
situation may be attributable to the following factors. 
Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration Vis-a-Vis the ICC, LCIA and 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules: Conflict or Complement? ", 13 Syracuse J. I. L. C. (1986), p. 
367. 
68 The Permanent Court of Arbitration Rules of Arbitration and Conciliation for Settlement 
of International Disputes Between Two Parties of Which Only One Is a State (1962), (text 
of the Rules in Wetter, op. cit. Vol 5, p. 53). 
69 For instance, Dr Gillis Wetter has expressed the view that public and private arbitration 
"form a unity, just as the past and the present are inextricably linked with one 
another", (Gillis Wetter, op. cit. Vol 1, p. xxiv) This statement seems to suggest the 
69 
A. Public International Arbitration 
In principle, public international arbitration involves only States as 
parties to the arbitration. Public international arbitration is entirely divorced 
from any system of municipal law. Eventhough it has to have its seat in 
national territory, the arbitration proceedings are outside the jurisdiction of the 
territorial sovereign. That is, the law governing the arbitration is international 
law not a national legal system. 70 It is, therefore, accepted that under such 
circumstances all aspects of arbitration are outside the control of any system of 
national law. As a consequence, arbitrators enjoy immunity from judicial 
process in the country of arbitral proceedings and the question of public policy, 
"ordre public", with regard to the local law is irrelevant. 7' As regards to the 
law applicable to the substance of the dispute the same reasoning applies. In 
other words, in the absence of the parties' agreement to the contrary 
international law is applicable. 72 However, the application of municipal law to 
the substance of the dispute is not entirely unprecedented in international law. 
On occasion an international tribunal may be faced with the task of deciding 
issues on the basis of the municipal law of a particular State. For instance, in 
the Serbian Loans Issued in France Case73 the Permanent Court of 
International Justice applied the Serbian law to the substance of the dispute. 
This is not regarded as depriving the tribunal of its international character. 
Moreover, a peculiar feature of the awards rendered by public 
international tribunals is that they are enforceable only by the methods 
relationships between these two categories of arbitration not disregarding the different 
legal systems in which they operate. 
It is submitted that the general criteria in identifying these two categories is the 
concern of both organization and jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal. (Brownlie, op. cit. p. 
710. ) 
70 F. A. Mann, Studies in International Law, op. cit. pp. 257-258. 
71 Ibid, p. 258. 
72 Ibid. 
73 PCIJ Rep., series A, No. 20/21 Judgement NO 14, July 12,1929, reproduced in Hudson 2 
World Court Reports, pp. 370-374. 
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available under international law. Therefore, unlike national (international 
commercial) arbitral awards, the possibility of their enforcement by national 
courts is at best remote and at worst non-existent. 74 In other words, the 
strongest assumption is that the existing international arrangements for the 
recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards, e. g. the above-mentioned UN 
(New York) Convention of 1958, cover only awards rendered in an arbitral 
process governed by national arbitral procedure laws75 and do not extend to 
public international, a-national, awards. For instance, counterclaim awards 
rendered by the Iran-US Claims Tribunal in favour of Iran against private US 
claimants are facing a problem of enforcement even in United states courts 
which is a party to the compromis and arbitration. 76 
Even the most recent positive development regarding the recognition by 
the court of a third country of a public international award, Dallal v. Bank 
Mellat77, can at most be interpreted as being based on the grounds of 
international comity rather than strict legal principles. 78 Thus, in the absence 
of an agreement between the arbitrating States and the third State, the power of 
the arbitrating States to enforce the award does not extend beyond their own 
courts. 79 
In some instances, however, the existence of certain elements in a 
public international arbitration makes a clear-cut identification of the 
74 F. A. Mann, Studies in International Law, op. cit. pp. 258-259. 
75 See Article I(1) of the New York Convention which applies to the recognition and 
enforcement of awards "made in the territory of a State other than the State where the 
recognition and enforcement of such awards are sought". See also Albert J. Van Den Berg, 
The New York Convention of 1958 : Towards a Uniform Judicial 
Interpretation, London, Kluwer Law & Taxation, 1981, pp. 28-40. 
76 For a commentary on this see generally, Robert P. Lewis, "What Goes Around Comes 
Around : Can Iran Enforce Awards of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal in the United 
States? ", 26 Col. J. T. L. (1988), p. 515. 
77 [ 1986] 2 W. L. R. 745. 
78 Ibid, 761. 
79 For an analysis of the implications of the Dallal Case see, Hazel Fox, "States and 
Undertaking to Arbitrate", 37 ICLQ, (1988), 1, pp. 24-29. 
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arbitration's character rather difficult. The appearance of nationals of States to 
present their claims before public international arbitral tribunals in certain 
areas such as diplomatic protection of nationals is not unprecedented. This is, 
however, believed to be a procedural capacity for the individual concerned and 
does not render him as party to the arbitration. 8° Nevertheless, with the recent 
developments the situation has become rather complicated. For instance, the 
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and 
Nationals of other States81 provides for the arbitration between a State party to 
the Convention and a National of another contracting State arising directly out 
of an investment. 82 The overwhelming public international features of the 
ICSID arbitration, such as the treaty under which it is established and the 
recognition of its full international personality under the treaty83, is beyond 
any doubt. However, the presence of "nationals" in the ICSID arbitration can 
hardly be regarded as merely a procedural matter. 
In a more recent public international arbitration, the Iran-United States 
Claims Tribunal, the nature of participation of "nationals" in the proceedings is 
equally complicated. Surprisingly, despite the fact that the Tribunal is a 
creation of an international treaty concluded between the two States, most of 
the American claims are submitted by "nationals" of the United States. In fact, 
Chamber Two of the Tribunal hinted in a case that its role and character was 
quite different from that of the traditional public international law tribunals: 
80 Brownlie, op. cit. p. 578. 
81 ICSID Convention, held at Washington, March 18,1965,575 U. N. T. S. p. 160, No 8359. 
82 Ibid, Article 25(1). For a description of the ICSID arbitration see Wetter, op. cit. Vol 2, 
pp. 139-144; also Aron Broches, "The International Centre for the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes", in Ernest J. Cohn, Martin Domke, and Frederic Eisemann, 
"Handbook of Institutional Arbitration... ", op. cit. pp. 1-16. 
83 See Articles 18,19-24 of the ICSID Convention. Also note the provisions for the 
application of international law to the substance of the dispute under Article 42(l) of the 
Convention. 
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... The agreement of the two Governments to create this 
Tribunal was not a typical exercise of diplomatic protection of 
nationals in which a State, seeking some form of international 
redress for its nationals, creates a tribunal to which it, rather 
than its nationals, is a party, in that typical case, the State 
espouses the claims of its nationals, and the injuries for which it 
claims redress are deemed to be injuries to itself; here, the 
Government of the United States is not a party to the arbitration 
of claims of United States nationals,... 84 
Whether it is possible to combine a hybrid function, as Chamber Two 
of the Tribunal has suggested, is difficult to absorb and its details are beyond 
the scope of this study. On the other hand, the participation of "nationals" alone 
in the framework of a public international arbitration, such as the ICSID 
arbitration and the Iran-US Claims Tribunal is unlikely to undermine the 
overwhelming public international character of the arbitration. Indeed, the 
public international character of the ICSID arbitration is generally accepted by 
different schools of thought85 and this can be assumed to be the case with the 
Iran-US Claims Tribunal. 86 
B. International Commercial Arbitration 
The term "international commercial arbitration" does not necessarily 
signify the same concept of internationality as in public international 
arbitration. It has no sharply defined context, and in the broadest of terms it is 
described as "all private adjudication of commercial disputes with international 
aspects". 87: or similarly, "arbitration is international if it implicates 
84 Esphahanian v bank Tejarat, Case No. 157,2 Iran-USCTR, 157, p. 165. 
For a discussion of the character of the Tribunal see generally; David Lloyd Jones, 
"The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal : Private Rights and State Responsibility", 24(2) 
Virg. J. I. L. (1984), 259; and William T. Lake & Jane Tucker Dana, "Judicial Review of 
Awards of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal : Are the Tribunal's Awards Dutch", 16 
L. P. I. B. (1984), 755. 
85 Julian Lew, "Applicable law... ", op. cit. pp. 20-21; F. A. Mann, Studies in International 
Law, op. cit. p. 300. 
86 E. g. in Dallal v Bank Mellat the public international character of the Iran-US Tribunal 
awards was clearly recognized by the Court. [1986] 2 W. L. R. 745,761. 
87 Hans Smit, op. cit. P. 9. 
73 
international commercial interests". 88 In a more elaborate characterization it is 
said that: 
by virtue of the structure and procedure chosen, the arbitration 
may have no real connection with any national jurisdiction. Or 
simply, by virtue of a diversity of facts, the arbitration may have 
important and substantial connections with several States but no 
preponderant connection with any one State. 89 
The main ambiguity associated with the above descriptions of 
international commercial arbitration is that they do not address the issue of the 
law governing the arbitration process. This ambiguity occurs because of some 
major developments in the field of international commercial arbitration in 
connection with the notion of delocalized arbitration. That is, some writers 
seem to rely on the lex mercatoria as a uniform system of law and as a premise 
for the notion of stateless or denationalized arbitration. 90 
On the basis of this theory it is argued that the arbitration of 
international commercial disputes which takes place in a neutral country has no 
real allegiance to any country and therefore is not bound by public policy of 
any one country. 91 The underlying question, however, remains whether these 
developments have been able to accord the institution a separate legal 
identity92 from the legal system which should in principle govern the 
arbitration process. 
88 Article 1492 of the Amended French Code of Civil Procedure, The French International 
Arbitration Provisions of the Decree Amending the Code of Civil Procedure, 1981,20 
ILM, p. 917. 
89 Julian Lew, Applicable Law..., op. cit. p. 14. See also Article 1(3) of the UNCITRAL 
Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration for a similar description. For a 
discussion on this, see Alan Redfern and Martin Hunter, op. cit. pp. 9-16. 
90 Goldman, op. cit. p. 125; W. Lawrence Craig, op. cit. p. 2; Ole Lando, op. Cit. pp. 762- 
768; and Pieter Sanders, Trends in International Commercial Arbitration, op. cit. pp. 255- 
256. 
91 Ole Lando, op. cit. p. 762. 
92 E. g. Dr. F. A. Mann is of the view that "no such body of law exists". (Mann, "Private 
Arbitration and Public Policy", 4 C. J. Q. (July 1985), 257, p. 264. ) 
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The fact is that the present-day international commercial arbitration, in 
many respects enjoys a large degree of autonomy and independence from the 
control of national law. The laws of many countries in which major arbitration 
institutions are situated have recently amended their relevant regulations to 
allow more autonomy and freedom for international commercial arbitration. 
The 1979 United Kingdom arbitration Act93, for instance, abolishes the special 
case procedure and replaces it by a limited right of appeal to the High Court on 
a question of law, provided that all the parties agree to the reference or, if 
appeal is made by one party only, with the leave of the Court. 94 The other 
major feature of the Act is the option given to the parties to contract out the 
new judicial review system by means of "exclusion agreements", subject to 
certain restrictions and exceptions regarding domestic transactions and "special 
categories" of international transactions. 95 
The French International Arbitration Provisions of the 1981 Decree 
Amending the Code of Civil Procedure96 provides a wider base for recognition 
of international commercial arbitral awards. The only exception to that 
recognition can be made in cases of "manifest violation of international public 
policy"97 The grounds for challenge of international commercial arbitral 
awards made in France are also restricted considerably to five fundamental 
points under the Amendment to the Code. 98 
93 18 ILM, (1979), p. 1248. 
94 Ibid, Section 1. 
95 Ibid, Sections 3 and 4. 
96 20 ILM, (1981), p. 917. 
97 Ibid, Article 1498. 
98 Ibid, Article 1502. Also note that under Article 1504 of the Code domestic arbitral awards 
can be challenged on the same grounds as Article 1502. 
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The 1985 Belgian Statute on Setting Aside of Arbitral Awards" 
precludes challenge before Belgian courts of arbitral awards rendered in 
Belgium in cases where none of the parties is a Belgian national or resident. 100 
The 1986 Netherlands New Statute on Arbitration 101 follows the same 
pattern of modernization and grants more freedom for arbitrations taking place 
in the Netherlands. Although, unlike the three above-mentioned Statutes, it 
does not technically distinguish between domestic and international arbitration, 
the Dutch Statute has considerably departed from the restrictions under its 
previous law. Under the new Statute the award can be set aside only for a 
limited number of exceptional grounds. 102 
In the most recent development of this kind the Swiss Statute of 1987 
on International Arbitration103 follows the general trend in granting large 
freedom of choice to the parties. 104 The Statute reduces to a minimum the 
intervention by the Swiss courts in the process of arbitration. 105 A similar 
pattern of trend in according more flexibility and freedom to international 
commercial arbitration has been followed in the 1986 Florida International 
Commercial Arbitration Act. ice, the 1986 Canadian Statute on International 
Commercial Arbitration107 and the 1983 Lebanese International Arbitration 
Provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. 108 
It has to be noted, however, that this relatively large, but not absolute, 
degree of freedom has been granted upon international commercial arbitration 
99 24 ILM, (1985), p. 725. 
100 Ibid, Article 1. 
101 26 ILM, (1987), p. 921. 
102 Ibid, Article 1065. 
103 27 ILM, (1988), p. 37. 
104 See Introductory Note to the Swiss Statute on International Commercial Arbitration, Ibid, 
p. 39 
105 Ibid, p. 40. 
106 26 ILM, (1987), p. 949. 
107 Ibid, p. 714. See also the Introductory Note to the Statute, Ibid, pp. 714-717. 
108 27 ILM, (1988), p. 1022. See also the Introductory Note, Ibid, pp. 1022- 1027. 
76 
by the national legal system. Thus, the existence of this freedom is dependent 
upon national law and is relative in scope and application according to where 
and when this freedom has been granted. None of these national legal systems- 
possibly with the exception of the Belgian Statute- has abandoned the right of 
judicial review of international commercial arbitral awards in absolute terms. 
They have only restricted the scope of this review. Therefore, the essential 
nexuses between international commercial arbitration and the national legal 
system, namely the relationships between arbitration and the laws of the 
country where the award is made and of the country where recognition and 
enforcement is sought, remain intact. Indeed, the 1981 French Decree on 
International Commercial Arbitration by granting to French courts a power of 
review of all awards rendered in France, though on limited grounds, was 
enacted in reversal of the earlier trends towards the absolute delocalization of 
arbitration. It is notable that the above-mentioned Law clearly overrides the 
1980 Paris Court of Appeals' refusal in the Gottaverken Casel09 to declare 
jurisdiction to set aside an award rendered in France on the ground of the lack 
of attachment to the French legal order. Moreover, the French courts in 
principle, though on few occasions, have asserted the right of judicial review of 
international commercial arbitral awards. 110 
It is also notable that the UNCITRAL Model Law on International 
Commercial Arbitration, unlike the earlier silence under the UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules, clearly acknowledges the role of national courts in relation 
to the granting of assistance to international commercial arbitration 111, and in 
109 20 ILM, (1981), p. 883; see also the NORSOLOR Case, 20 ILM, (1981), p. 887. 
110 E. g., Arab Republic of Egypt v SPP, Paris Court of Appeal, 23 ILM, (1984), p. 1048. The 
Court in this Case ruled to set aside the ICC Arbitral Award (SPP v Egypt, 22 ILM, p. 
752) rendered against Egypt. 
111 See Article 6 of the UNCITRAL Model Law in conjunction with Articles 11(3), 11(4), 
13(3), 14, and 16(3) of the same Rules. 
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relation to the judicial reviewl12, recognition, and enforcement of such 
awards. 113 
Another feature of international commercial arbitration is the growing 
participation of States and State enterprises in this field. An important aspect of 
this category of arbitration is the development of recent theoretical and 
practical trends to detach arbitration from the municipal legal system and to 
delocalize, denationalize, or supranationalize it. The same trends have also 
been developed in relation to arbitration between two private parties which 
implicates international commercial interests. 
The question is associated with a high degree of controversy. 
Theoretically, the notion of delocalization relies on the party autonomy to 
detach arbitration from every municipal system of law. 114 In addition, it is 
argued that the arbitration detached from the municipal legal system can either 
be submitted to public international law or to a new system of law which is 
generally referred to as general principles of law or the lex mercatoria. 115 
Details of the proposition developed regarding the delocalization of 
commercial arbitration and the availability of a new system of law regarded as 
the lex mercatoria or general principles of law which is advocated by a number 
of writers are beyond the scope of this study. It is useful to point out, however, 
that the theory of delocalization refers to "removing the functioning of the 
arbitral tribunal from the supervisory authority of local courts". 116 As a 
consequence, it is argued, that the courts at the place of arbitration have no 
power to make an "internationally effective declaration of the award's 
112 Ibid, Article 6 in conjunction with Article 34(2). 
113 Ibid, Articles 35 and 36. 
114 Ole Lando, op. cit. pp. 762-768; Goldman, op. cit. pp. 123-125; and Jan Paulson, "The 
Extent of Independence of International Arbitration from the law of the Situs", in Julian 
Lew, Contemporary Problems..., op. cit. pp. 141-148. 
115 Ibid. 
116 Jan Paulson, "The Extent of Independence.. ", op. cit. p. 14 1. 
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nullity". 117 The theory assumes that there exists an autonomous system of law, 
the lex mercatoria, or international business law with mandatory international 
public policy rules which can govern all aspects of the arbitration. 118 The 
proponents of the notion claim that the evidence of the existence of such a 
legal system can be found in clauses in international contracts, international 
awards, municipal legislation, municipal case law, international conventions 
and rules of arbitration established by international bodies. 119 
In terms of arbitral practice, the debate over the theory of delocalization 
has been fuelled by a number of controversial awards. This begins with the 
decision in the arbitration in 1958 between Saudi Arabia and the Arabian 
American Oil Company (Aramco)120, in which the Tribunal held that the 
arbitration was governed by international law. The Tribunal's reasoning was 
that because of the jurisdictional immunity of foreign States the arbitral 
proceedings to which a "sovereign State is a party" could not be subject to the 
laws of another State. The Tribunal also noted that the parties had expressly 
excluded that it should not be governed by the laws of Saudi Arabia. Therefore, 
it concluded that international law governed the arbitration. 121 
In a similar circumstance, the arbitral Tribunal in the BP v. Libya 
Arbitration122 expressly rejected the Aramco doctrine. The Tribunal held that 
the sovereign immunity of States was not absolute and that the 
denationalization could deprive the arbitration of an effective enforcement 
mechanism existing under national law. The Tribunal's conclusion was that 
117 Ibid. 
118 Ole Lando, op. cit. p. 765. 
119 Goldman, op. cit. pp. 113-123; and Ole lando, op. cit. pp. 747-768. For a critical analysis 
of the notion of delocalization of arbitration see generally; Wetter, op. cit. Vol 2, pp. 403- 
411; and F. A. Mann, Studies in International law, op. cit. pp. 260-270. See also, Alan 
Redfern and Martin Hunter, op. cit. pp. 55-61. 
120 27 ILR., p. 117. 
121 Ibid, pp. 155-156. 
122 53 ILR., p. 297. 
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having fixed Copenhagen as its seat the procedural law of the arbitration was 
Danish. 123 
Nevertheless, the Aramco doctrine was later reinforced in another 
important arbitral award in the Texaco v. Libya Arbitration. 124 Again the 
Tribunal, as in the Aramco Case, relied on the sovereign immunity theory and 
further on the intention of the parties to remove their differences from the 
jurisdiction of the local courts as the basic premises of delocalization. 125 
It is also notable that in the Aminoil Arbitration126 the Arbitration 
Agreement provided that "any mandatory provisions of the procedural law of 
the place where the arbitration is held", in this case the French legal system, 
was the law governing the arbitral procedure. 127 Nevertheless, the Tribunal, 
without rejecting the role of the French law, by referring to the liberal approach 
of the French law concerning the procedural law of arbitral tribunals, held that 
it had a transnational character. 128 
Developed in the context of the arbitration between States and aliens, 
the delocalization theory is now claimed to be applicable to the arbitration 
between two private parties in the field of international commerce. 129 
The delocalization theory is based on a desire to provide uniformity and 
flexibility to international commercial arbitration. However, the theory has 
been strongly challenged on grounds of principle and practicality. Professor 
Wetter points out that the delocalization theory runs the "risk of not resulting in 
awards recognized under the New York Convention". 130 He also rightly argues 
123 Ibid, pp. 327-329. See also, Sapphire Arbitration (Sapphire Int'l Petroleum Ltd. v National 
Iranian Oil Company, 13 ICLQ, (1964), p. 1011; 35 ILR, p. 136) fora similar decision. 
124 53 ILR, p. 389. 
125 Ibid, pp. 452-454. 
126 21 ILM, (1982), p. 976. 
127 Ibid, p. 999. 
128 Ibid. 
129 See Alan Redfern and Martin Hunter, op. cit. pp. 60-61. 
130 Wetter, op. cit_ Vol 2, p. 409. 
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that "unless an award is so attached to a specific jurisdiction, claims of nullity 
or challenge procedures cannot be instituted, nor is it clear by which law the 
liability of the arbitrators is governed". 131 
Dr. F. A. Mann believes that in both cases of arbitration - arbitration 
between a state and an alien and arbitration between two private parties- the 
arbitration is governed by national law regardless of the parties' wishes. 132 He 
also believes that there is no legal basis for public international law to govern 
these categories of arbitration and there is no independent system of law as 
general principles of law to be applicable to the arbitration. 133 The basis of Dr 
Mann's argument is that the jurisdiction of the courts of the country where 
arbitration takes place could not be taken away or limited by the parties or the 
arbitrators and the arbitral tribunal could not help being subject to the laws of 
that country. This, he believes, is a matter for decision by the courts of the 
place of arbitration. 134 
In short, the theory of delocalization represents a desire for uniformity 
of the international commercial arbitration practice. However, the legal basis 
for an absolute delocalization of arbitration in the field of international 
commerce involving private parties, remains unclear. Nevertheless, the notion 
of delocalization appears to be gaining some support as it develops. The idea of 
application of general principles of law to the substance of the dispute, but not 
as the governing law of arbitration, seems to have a wider acceptance. Yet, as 
the law stands now, the most acceptable method for a true internationalization 
of arbitration involving private parties is through international conventions 
such as the ICSID Convention. 
131 Ibid, pp. 409-410. 
132 F. A. Mann, Studies in International law, op. cit. pp. 261-270. 
133 Ibid. 
134 Ibid, pp. 265-266. 
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V. Essential Issues in International Arbitration 
V(1)- Terms of Reference : Basis of Jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal 
It must again be emphasised that it is for the parties to determine the 
procedure for the conduct of arbitration and the nature and scope of the dispute 
to be arbitrated. 135 However, in practical application of the arbitration 
agreement, and/or according to the circumstances of whether the arbitration 
agreement provides a well-detailed plan of action or fails to do so, a series of 
questions are likely to arise. 
The first question to arise may concern the existence or non-existence 
of an obligation to submit to arbitration with regard to the validity of the 
arbitration agreement, or with regard to the scope of its application. Despite 
some disputes on the logic of reasoning, legally and practically it is well 
established that an arbitral tribunal whether public or private is empowered to 
decide whether the arbitration agreement is valid and in effect to rule upon the 
existence of the arbitration tribunal de jure. 136 
This authority is itself covered by the undisputed principle of 
"competence de la competence", that an arbitral tribunal is competent to decide 
questions of its own jurisdiction. For instance, Article 73 of the Hague 
Convention of 1907 provides that "the tribunal is authorized to declare its 
competence in interpreting the compromis... " Article 36(6) of the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice in affirming that principle reads ; "in the event of 
135 Merrills, International Dispute Settlement, 1984, London, Sweet & Maxwell, p. 76. 
See also Kenneth Carlston, The Process of International Arbitration, 1949, 
reprinted 1972, Greenwoods Press, Westport, pp. 62-64. 
136 This question has been discussed mainly in regard to the compromissory arbitral clause in 
respect of both the validity of the agreement and practical problems concerning the refusal 
by a party to cooperate on such occasions. In the case of arbitration based on compromis 
the question may be less complicated, but it still theoretically exists. In this respect H. 
Mangoldt points out that a unilateral application by one party entails "the obligation of the 
other party to cooperate in the constitution of the tribunal" but "the definitive constitution 
of the tribunal depends upon its own decision on any objections the respondent might raise 
with regard to the existence of an undertaking to arbitrate". (Mangoldt, op. cit. p. 498) A 
similar principle has been accepted in international commercial arbitration. See for 
instance, Article 21(1) of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. 
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a dispute as to whether the Court has jurisdiction, the matter shall be settled by 
decision of the Court". Also in the Nottebohm Case the International Court of 
Justice pointed out that; 
Since the Alabama Case, it has been generally recognized, 
following the earlier precedents, that in the absence of any 
agreement to the contrary, an international tribunal has the right 
to decide as to its own jurisdiction and has the power to interpret 
for this purpose the instruments which govern that 
jurisdiction. 137 
The principle "competence de la competence" may raise the question of 
an award rendered in excess of jurisdiction and award based on an invalid 
compromis. In public international law there is no solution for such questions 
unless the arbitrating parties prior to or after the announcement of the award 
agree to submit the validity of the arbitral award to the judgement of the 
International Court of Justice or another international body. 138 
In the case of international commercial arbitration the question follows 
a different path. In national courts the validity of the award can be checked on 
the ground that it is based on an invalid compromis or it has been rendered in 
excess of jurisdiction. 139 
Objection to the jurisdiction of the tribunal should be made in a timely 
manner; otherwise the arbitrating parties' conduct may constitute a tacit 
conferral of jurisdiction to decide a question not included in the compromis. 140 
For instance, in the Case of the Arbitral Award rendered by the King of Spain, 
the International Court of Justice held that it was no longer open to Nicaragua 
which by express declaration and express conduct had recognized the award as 
valid to challenge its validity. 141 
137 ICJ Reports, 1953,110, p. 119. 
138 E . g. in the Arbitral 
Award Made by the King of Spain on December 23,1906 Case the ICJ 
was asked to decide on the validity of the Award. (ICJ Reports, 1960, p. 192. ) 
139 Ibid, pp. 5,11-12. 
140 See generally Carlston, op. cit. pp. 169-173. 
141 ICJ Reports, 1960,192, p. 213. 
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A similar principle is applicable in international commercial arbitration. 
For instance, Article 21(3) of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules provides that 
"a plea that the arbitral tribunal does not have jurisdiction shall be raised not 
later than in the statement of defence or, with respect to a counter-claim, in the 
reply to counter-claim". 
V(2)- Composition of the Arbitral Tribunal 
The composition of the arbitral tribunal regarding the parties' choice of 
arbitrators and the system by which they are selected is an essential question. 
Historically, arbitration has been entrusted to the head of a third state, or the 
Pope was called upon to act as a single arbitrator. 142 In recent times, as 
international arbitration has developed, the role of arbitrator has required more 
legal-technical expertise. Therefore in cases where the parties have preferred to 
select a single arbitrator, they have appointed an eminent judge or international 
lawyer. 143 The other method has been the reference of the dispute or disputes 
to a mixed commission composed of equal numbers of nationals of the parties, 
with further reference to a disinterested third member in the event of 
disagreement. 144 The most common method in present-day arbitrations is the 
reference of dispute to a tribunal composed of an uneven number of persons, 
generally three or five, which decides disputes by a majority vote. 145 The 
common method of selection in the latter category is that each party appoints 
one or two arbitrators, depending upon the whole number of arbitrators 
required or the provisions of the compromis, and the other or others are 
142 See, L. Sohn, op. cit. p. 60. 
143 Ibid, p. 61. See also for instance, the Tinoco Arbitration of 1923 (1 R. I. A. A. p. 369) and 
the Island of Palmas Case of 1928 (2 R. I. A. A. p. 829). 
144 For details see, Mangoldt, op. cit. pp. 524-526, and Merrills, op. cit. p. 71. 
145 Ibid. 
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appointed by joint agreement of the parties or the party appointed 
arbitrators. 146 
For instance, the Alabama Claims Arbitration consisted of "five 
members each to be appointed by a head of state : one each by those of Brazil, 
Italy, and Switzerland, and one each by the heads of state of the two 
parties". 147 Another example is to be found in Article 24 of the Hague 
Convention of 1899, which provides that "each party appoints two arbitrators 
and these together choose an umpire". 148 
With regard to the composition of the arbitral tribunal the compromis 
may require certain qualifications as regards the nationality and personal 
qualifications of the arbitrators. 149 A question of particular importance is the 
possibility of the challenge of an arbitrator and the award on the basis of the 
lack of qualifications required in the compromis or generally the lack of 
impartiality. It is accepted that the lack of qualifications required is a ground 
for the challenge of an arbitrator. 150 The lack of impartiality such as corruption 
on the part of an arbitrator is also a ground for the challenge of arbitrator and 
146 " he agreement may simply define the composition of the tribunal and leave the identity of 
the members to be settled later (e. g. Article 3(1) of the Claims Settlement Declaration 
between Iran and the United States); or it may name the members in the compromis. (e. g. 
the Arbitration Agreement between Egypt and Israel, Supra no 32). 
147 Schwarzenberger, op. Cit. Vol 4, pp. 56-, 74-75. 
148 For a review of relevant instruments in respect of the composition of arbitral tribunals see 
generally, L. Sohn, op. cit. pp. 61-81. 
149 E. g. Article 45 of the Hague Convention of 1907 restricts the parties' choice of national 
arbitrators to only one. The same Convention requires that arbitrators should have known 
competency in questions of international law, and be of high moral reputation. (Article 44) 
On this question in international commercial arbitration see A. Redfern, op. Cit. pp. 165- 
174. 
150 E. g. Article 6 of the Model Rules of the International Law Commission on Arbitral 
Procedure provides certain provisions in this respect. See also Article 10(l) of the 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules concerning the challenge of arbitrator on the basis of lack 
of impartiality and independence. 
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the validity of the award. 151 However, the question of the personal liability of 
an arbitrator on those grounds has received less attention and is less clear. 152 
With regard to the composition of the arbitral tribunal the following 
points are important : 
a- In an arbitral tribunal which is composed of national and neutral 
arbitrators, due to the fact that the national arbitrators have certain affinity with 
the view of "his" party, the result of the arbitration is in effect determined by 
neutral arbitrator or neutral arbitrators. This structure of decision-making may 
effect strict adherence of the neutral arbitrator to law and render him as a 
mediator between the views of national arbitrators. 153 
Another important point is the cultural-legal background of the neutral 
arbitrators. That is to say, many issues in present-day international law are 
subject to doctrinal disputes which are in many respects attributable to the 
differing social-cultural backgrounds in which they have developed. 
Consequently, the position that a neutral arbitrator may take in such areas of 
law will essentially be based on his own background. This may become more 
important when the social-cultural backgrounds of the neutral arbitrator 
coincides with either of the national arbitrators, and effects the position taken 
by the tribunal. 154 
b- For obvious reasons a party to arbitration may refuse to cooperate in 
the appointment of the national or neutral arbitrators, or the party appointed 
arbitrator may at the instruction of his party or for any other reason withdraw 
from the proceedings. To prevent frustration of the arbitration, the notion of the 
151 E. g. Article 35(b) of the Model Rules of the ILC on Arbitral Procedure. 
152 In international commercial arbitration the question of personal liability of the arbitrator as 
regards his lack of due care has been discussed. The conclusion is generally in favour of 
immunity from personal liability. (A. Redfern, op. cit. pp. 205-206. ) 
153 Mangoldt, op. cit. p. 528, and generally, pp. 528-532. 
154 This is in practice an important issue and in fact the essence and great advantage of 
arbitration is that arbitrators can be selected from different environments and backgrounds. 
(H. Smit, op. cit. P. 10. ) 
86 
third party appointment of the neutral or national arbitrators has been 
developed and well established, which is of course subject to the prior consent 
of the parties. Present-day arbitration agreements and treaties almost all 
provide provisions for such occasions. 155 
The provision of the third party appointment of the arbitrators may 
concern the appointment of the neutral arbitrator or the party appointed 
arbitrator as well. Practical necessity demands that it should cover both of the 
questions. 
Examples of the third party appointment of the arbitrators may be found 
in many instruments ; for instance, Article 3(2) of the Model Rules of the ILC 
on Arbitral Procedure provides that in the event of the tribunal not being 
constituted within a certain period, "the President of the International Court of 
Justice shall, at the request of either party, appoint the arbitrators not yet 
appointed-. 156 It is noteworthy that in almost all institutional commercial 
arbitrations the rules of procedure of the institution concerned provide for an 
automatic action for the appointment of the arbitrators in case the parties fail to 
do so. It is also accepted that in ad hoc international commercial arbitrations 
the national court concerned has the authority to appoint the arbitrator in case 
of failure by a party to do so. 157 
c- A question exists with regard to the authority of an international 
tribunal to retain power to proceed and to render a binding award from which a 
nationally or otherwise appointed arbitrator has withdrawn or abstained from 
participation in the tribunal's proceedings. 
155 For a review of these instruments see L. Sohn, op. cit. pp. 62-81. 
156 See also Article 6(2) of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, and Article 21 of the European 
Convention on the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes. 
157 A. Redfern, op. cit. pp. 162-163,166. 
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V(3)- Rules of Procedure 
a- Another important subject upon which the successful conduct of an 
arbitration will often depend is the question of procedural rules, both as regards 
its function in general, its adequacy for the specific type of the arbitration 
chosen, and its capability in providing the fundamental procedural rights 
necessary for a just and judicial system of dispute settlement. 
The need for a system of procedural rules for a successful conduct of 
arbitration is obvious. What is expected of their function, in short, is to 
facilitate a prompt and at the same time a just disposition of the claims to be 
arbitrated. 158 In the first instance, it is for the parties to define the rules of 
procedure in detail or incorporate a system of model rules in the 
compromis. 159 However, the factors affecting the conduct of arbitration are 
very variable, and unless careful attention has been given to the procedural 
rules a successful outcome may not be possible. 
b- As international arbitrations take place in many different types and 
for different purposes, an important point with regard to the procedural rules is 
whether they are suitable for the function of the particular arbitration chosen. 
Some factors are important in this respect: 
In international arbitration the parties are usually of different legal- 
cultural background. It is important for the procedural rules to recognize these 
differences and to direct the arbitration along the commonly understandable 
channels. It is also important for the procedural rules to provide an adequate 
mechanism with regard to the differences in language and similar issues. 160 
The procedural rules should take account of the special characteristics 
of the arbitral tribunal as to whether it is a multi-case arbitration or is only to 
158 Carlston, op. cit. p. 3 and generally pp. 3-35. See also A. Redfern, op. cit. pp. 223-231. 
159 In international commercial arbitration the freedom of the parties with regard to 
procedural rules may be restricted by the mandatory rules and public policy requirements 
of the law of the place of arbitration. (A. Redfern, op. cit. p. 223. ) 
160 Carlston, op. cit. pp. 4-7. 
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decide a single case ; whether the arbitration has a public international or 
commercial nature. 161 The flexibility and possibility of modification of the 
rules; their precision on questions to be decided, the scope of the pleadings, the 
time and manner of introduction of evidence - all these are among the 
necessary points which need to be foreseen in the rules of procedure. 162 
It is equally important for the procedural rules to safeguard certain 
fundamental procedural rights, such as the right to be heard, the right to obtain 
a reasoned award by the arbitral tribunal, etc. 163 
V(4)- Basis of Decision : Applicable Substantive Law 
In referring to the question of applicable law a distinction should be 
made between the law governing the arbitration proceedings and the law 
applicable to the merits of the dispute. The distinction, however, in public 
international arbitration is less important where the whole process of 
arbitration is governed by international law. 
An important issue is to define as much as possible the arbitral 
tribunal's function with regard to the applicable law in order to prevent 
unpredictable decisions. In reality, however, the arbitration agreements either 
make no provision in respect of the applicable law or they make general 
references such as "the tribunal will decide on the basis of international 
law". 164 In public international arbitrations both of the above situations may 
lead to a similar result, i. e. that the tribunal as an "international body will have 
161 Ibid, generally, pp. 7-2 1. 
162 Ibid, generally, pp. 29-35. 
163 Ibid, generally, pp. 36-61. It is noteworthy that a material departure from established 
procedural rules by the arbitral tribunal may render the award as null and void. (Ibid, p. 
38) On this question in international commercial arbitration see A. Redfern, op. Cit. pp. 
330-331. 
164 See Mangolds, op. cit. pp. 533-536. 
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to base its decisions on international law, as the law governing the legal 
relationship between the parties". 165 
Another issue with regard to the applicable law is arbitration "ex aequo 
et bono" generally and in relation to an arbitration which is acting on the basis 
of respect for law. In the circumstances where the tribunal is to decide on the 
basis of respect for law the question exists, whether it should decide cases 
submitted to it on the "basis of strict law, or ex aequo et bono, mitigating its 
decisions by the application of equity and justice". 166 It is accepted that an 
arbitral tribunal is authorised to decide in accordance with equity, ex aequo et 
bono, when international law does not contain an answer to the problem, and 
the dispute is of non-legal nature. 167 
On the other hand, states may, regardless of the nature of a dispute and 
the state of law, agree that the dispute should be decided ex aequo et bono. The 
most obvious example of this authority is provided in Article 38(2) of the 
Statute of the International Court of Justice. However, what is certain is that 
the decision of ex aequo ex bono has an exceptional or supplementary role to 
that of a decision on the basis of law. That is, unless the parties have expressly 
agreed, or the dispute is of a non-legal nature, the arbitration tribunal should 
decide the case according to law. 168 
Some final points should be made with regard to the effect of the 
arbitral award in international arbitration. The question of the legal status of the 
award depends on both general international law and the terms of the 
165 Ibid, p. 533. See also Merrills, op. cit. pp. 78-82. 
166 L. Sohn, op. cit. p. 41. 
167 For details and the review of the law and practice on the issue see generally, Ibid, pp. 41- 
59. Note also Article 26 of the European Convention on the Peaceful Settlement of 
Disputes of 1957 concerning disputes of non-legal nature. 
168 It must be noted that some writers have recognized a degree of distinction between 
decisions in which equity has been used as a general principle of law (embodied in Article 
38(1)(c) of the Statute of the ICJ) and decisions in ex aequo et Bono as a friendly and 
conciliatory form of arbitration (embodied in Article 38(2) of the Statute of the ICJ). (See 
Brownlie, op. cit. pp. 27-29. ) 
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arbitration agreement. The first point is that by signing the arbitration 
agreement and participating in the proceedings, the parties are under an 
obligation to execute the award. 169 However, the award rendered by an 
international arbitral tribunal need not necessarily be final for two reasons ; 1- 
The arbitration agreement itself provides certain appeal mechanisms from the 
award. 170 2- Under international law on certain occasions such as the existence 
of essential constitutive, or procedural and jurisdictional errors, the award may 
be regarded as null and void. Therefore it is possible for a party to claim the 
doctrine of nullity and refuse to execute the award. 171 Moreover, at certain 
stages such as the clarification of the award, the arbitral tribunal has an 
inherent power to correct it. 172 
Conclusion 
As this study has merely touched upon some selected topics of 
international arbitration in general terms, a straightforward conclusion is not 
feasible. What can be said however, is that international commercial arbitration 
is growingly becoming a widely popular method of dispute settlement and is 
developing in scope. There are some signs that public international arbitration 
has regained some degree of favour recently. Nevertheless, the earlier utopian 
expectations placed upon public international arbitration as a substitute to war 
have not materialized and can hardly be expected to do so in the foreseeable 
future. The current detente in international relations, however, offers a good 
deal of chance for the development of the judicial methods of international 
dispute settlement, including arbitration. 
169 Carlston, op. cit. p. 205. Also Merrills, op. cit. p. 83. 
170 Ibid. 
171 Ibid, see also Carlston, op. cit. generally, pp. 185-204. 
172 Ibid, p. 224. 
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Public international arbitration on the one hand and international 
commercial arbitration on the other remain two distinct systems of arbitration 
operating within two distinct legal systems. Nevertheless, with the recent 
developments the line dividing these two systems of arbitration are becoming 
more flexible. A possible option for a true internationalization of arbitration in 
the field of international commerce and for its unification is the adoption of an 
international convention similar to the ICSID Convention but much broader in 
scope and application. This would not only offer a possibility for the 
uniformity of international commercial arbitral practice but would also accord 
it with adequate mechanisms for the recognition and enforcement of awards in 
the courts of the contracting States. Whether there is enough political desire on 
the part of States to submit to such a mechanism is another matter. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
ORGANIZATIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE ASPECTS 
OF ARBITRATION IN THE IRAN-UNITED STATES 
CLAIMS TRIBUNAL 
Introduction 
Most often, the smooth running of international arbitration depends on 
a number of "behind the scenes" organizational and administrative factors. The 
effective utilization of these factors can contribute to the efficacy, cost- 
effectiveness, expediency and ultimately the judicial effectiveness of the 
arbitral process. In arbitrations conducted under the auspices of one of the 
major arbitration institutions these facilities are provided by the institute 
concerned. I In ad hoc, single-case arbitrations, not conducted by one of the 
arbitration institutions, organizational and administrative matters may not be 
the primary problem. However, there may be a need for a secretary or registrar 
to arrange for meetings, exchange of documents submitted by the parties, and 
hearings, and to keep minutes and attend to other relevant matters. 2 
In circumstances such as the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, 
organizational and administrative tasks are very much greater, in view of the 
huge number of claims submitted. In this Chapter we will discuss briefly the 
For a review of organizational and administrative aspects of major international 
commercial arbitration institutions see generally, J. Gillis Wetter, International Arbitral 
Process..., op. cit. Vol 2, pp. 120-254. 
2 Sec generally, A. Redfern and Martin Hunter, Int'l Commercial Arbitration, op. cit. pp. 
181-196; J. L. Simpson and H. Fox, International Arbitration, Stevens & Sons Ltd., 
London, 1959, pp. 289-294. For a review of administrative and organizational issues in the 
ICJ see generally, Shabtai Rosenne, The Law and Practice of the International 
Court of Justice, Sijthoff, Leyden, 1965, Vol 1, Chapters VI, and VII, pp. 221-263. 
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matters pertaining to the administration and organization of arbitration in the 
Iran-United States Claims Tribunal. 
I. Place of Arbitration 
Article VI(l) of the Claims Settlement Declaration provided that "the 
seat of the Tribunal shall be The Hague, The Netherlands, or any other place 
agreed by Iran and the United States". In accordance with Article VI(1), the 
Tribunal was established in The Hague and will probably continue to work 
there until the end of its mission. 
The members initially appointed by Iran and the United States met for 
the first time at the Peace Palace on 18 May 1981.3 After the selection of three 
neutral members, the Tribunal's first meeting was held in the Small Court 
Room at the Peace Palace on 1 July 1981.4 The Tribunal held a number of 
meetings on preliminary organizational matters in the Bol Zaal of the Peace 
Palace, which served as the centre of its activities until 15 March 1982. During 
this period Mr Varekamp, Secretary-General of the Permanent Court of 
Arbitration, acted as Secretary-General and Registrar of the Tribunal. Since 15 
March 1982 the Tribunal has worked in its present offices. 5 
Geographically, The Hague has offered a place between Iran and the 
United States acceptable to the Parties. Moreover, the traditional situation of 
3 Annual Report Period Ending 30 June 1983, (AR 81/83), p. 2. 
The administrative and organizational aspects of the Tribunal's work have been 
generally detailed in the Annual Reports published by the Secretary-General since 1983. 
On administrative and organizational aspects of the Tribunal's work see also, Jamison 
M. Selby and David P. Stewart, "Practical Aspects of Arbitrating Claims Before the Iran- 
United States Claims Tribunal", 18 Int'l Lawyer, (1984), 211, pp. 212-216; Gunnar 
Lagergren, "Iran-United States Claims Tribunal", in A. Bos and H. Siblesz, (eds. ), 
Realism in Law Making. Essays on International Law in Honour of Willem 
Riphagen, 1986, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht, 113, pp. 121-123; and Willem 
A. Hamel and others (a joint contribution), "The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal", 1 
Hague Y. B. I. L. (1988), 358, pp. 362-370. 
4 AR 81/83, p. 3. 
5 Ibid. The Tribunal's present offices are at Parkweg 13,2585 JH, The Hague. 
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major international judicial organizations such as the PCA and the ICJ in The 
Hague makes it an ideal place for international arbitration in view of both the 
host country's supportive services needed for organizing the arbitration, and the 
research facilities available, especially at the library of the Peace Palace to 
which the Tribunal members have had access. 
Indeed, the Dutch Government has extended considerable assistance in 
facilitating the work of the Tribunal. For instance, the character and scope of 
the Tribunal's work required the rental of separate premises, the recruitment of 
personnel and the purchase and hire of equipment. These activities would be 
expected to involve the Tribunal in a variety of legal transactions and 
commitments. Therefore, all these matters required the clarification of the legal 
personality of the Tribunal and its immunities and privileges. In principle, all 
these would normally require one or more inter-governmental agreements to be 
concluded. Apparently such agreements have not been concluded so far. 
However, the Dutch Government has itself recognized the legal personality of 
the Tribunal and granted fiscal privileges and immunities to the Tribunal, its 
members and its staff. 6 
Four principal statements have been made on these issues by the Dutch 
Government, in which it has recognized the legal personality of the Tribunal as 
established under international law. 7 Accordingly, it was accepted that the 
Tribunal would have the legal capacity accorded to legal persons under the 
Netherlands law and in particular, that it shall have the capacity to contract for, 
to acquire and to dispose of movable and immovable property and to be a party 
to legal proceedings. 8 
6 AR 81/83, p. 9. See also: (a)- Statement on Legal Personality of the Tribunal; (b)- 
Statement on Fiscal Privileges of the Tribunal, its Members and its Staff; (c)- Statement on 
Fiscal Privileges of Staff Members who are Netherlends nationals; and (d)- the Statement 
on the Tribunal's Immunity. (Ibid, respectively Annexes VI, VII, VIII and IX). 
7 Letter of 28 January 1982 from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, Ibid, 
Annex VI, pp. 1-2. 
8 Ibid, p. I. 
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A statement on the Tribunal's immunity issued by the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands also confirmed that the Tribunal enjoyed 
certain immunities in the Netherlands. The statement accepted that the 
Tribunal, within the scope of the performance of its tasks, shall enjoy in the 
Netherlands immunity from jurisdiction. These immunities exempted the 
Tribunal from (a)- requisition or attachment of its property and assets; and (b)- 
administrative or judicial constraints. 9 It is notable that these provisions were 
first intended to be included in a proposed Host State Agreement, and although 
it failed to conclude such Agreement, the Dutch Government accepted that the 
provisions were based on established international usage. 10 In fact, the Dutch 
Government pointed out that "the rule that the Tribunal in its capacity as a 
body established under public international law enjoys certain immunities and 
privileges in the country where it has its seat is, in general terms, derived 
directly from the generally accepted principles of international law. 11 
Furthermore, fiscal privileges were granted to the Tribunal, its 
Members, and its staff. It was pointed out, for instance, that the Members of the 
Tribunal, the Secretary-General and the Registrars would enjoy all fiscal 
privileges accorded to diplomatic agents of comparable ranks assigned to the 
Kingdom of the Netherlands. 12 
Indeed, the assistance given by the Government of the Netherlands has 
been very significant. For instance, recently the Netherlands Government in a 
change of its earlier position on the matter, decided to place the Parkweg 
Premises at the Tribunal's disposal rent free with effect from 1 January 1989, 
on condition that the Tribunal accepted the obligation to shoulder the entire 
9 Letter of 2 Feb. 1983 from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, Ibid, Annex 
IX, pp. 1-2. 
10 Ibid, p. 2. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid, Annex VII, p. 5, and generally, pp. 1-7. 
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upkeep of the building and its furnishings. 13 It is understood that the Tribunal 
was paying around $200,000 annually for the rent of its premises. 14 Therefore 
this grant of facility can help alleviate some of the financial problems the 
Tribunal is facing. 
In general, the selection of The Hague as the place of arbitration 
between Iran and the United States has been significant for the expedition of 
the work of the Tribunal. By way of tradition as well, The Hague has offered a 
neutral place for many international judicial organizations, which is very 
important for the conduct of international arbitration. However, through the 
introduction of the Proposed Bill on the Applicability of Dutch Law to the 
Awards of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal15, this tradition of neutrality 
of the host country has been somewhat damaged in general, and in particular 
because of its apparent prejudice against Iran. 16 
II. Secretariat of The Tribunal 
Due to the enormity of its task, the Tribunal has employed a large 
number of staff. During the past years the staff of the Tribunal has generally 
numbered over seventy, from some 13 nationalities. They are generally divided 
among five departments or divisions: Registry, Legal Services, Language 
Services, Administration and General Services. They are directly managed by 
the Secretary-General, Mr Christopher Pinto of Sri Lanka, under the general 
supervision of the president of the Tribunal. 17 
13 AR 87/88, p. 46. See also Letter from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands 
dated 10 August 1988, Ibid, p. 163. 
14 See, for instance, Summary of Statements of Account- Financial Year 1987-1988, Ibid, p. 
171. 
15 On this see Infra Chapter Six, p. 344. 
16 For details of this argument see Ibid, pp. 344-348. 
17 See generally AR 81/83, pp. 11-36; and AR 1987/88, pp. 22-50. See also organizational 
chart of the Tribunal, Ibid, Annex XIV, p. 87. 
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11(1). The Registry 
The registry is responsible for receiving, serving and distributing all 
Tribunal documentation as well as for maintaining the Tribunal's case file, and 
accordingly, its functions are of central importance to the Tribunal's work. The 
Registry has usually employed about five staff. The main aspects of the 
Registry's function involve the filing, scrutiny, processing, and numbering and 
distribution of claims, and maintenance of records and delivery of documents. 
Article 11(4) of the CSD provided that "no claim may be filed with the 
Tribunal more than one year after the entry into force of this Agreement or six 
months after the date the President is appointed, whichever is later. Those 
deadlines do not apply to the procedures contemplated by Paragraphs 16 and 
17 of the Declaration of the Government of Algeria... ". Accordingly, filing of 
all claims presented up to and during 19 January 1982 were completed by the 
Registry by late 1982.18 
By way of Administrative Directives issued prior to the adoption of the 
Rules of the Tribunal and later by adoption of the Rules of the Tribunal, the 
Registry's function with regard to filing of claims has involved scrutiny of 
documents for compliance with Administrative Directives and the Rules of the 
Tribunal, especially regarding such matters as : use of both the official 
languages of the Tribunal, number of copies required, signatures etc. 19 The 
Registrar may refuse to accept any document which is not received within the 
required period, or which does not comply with the Algiers Declarations or 
with the Tribunal Rules. Any such refusal by the Registrar is, upon objection 
by an arbitrating Party concerned, within thirty days of notification of refusal, 
subject to review by the arbitral Tribunal. 20 
18 AR 81/83, p. 15. 
19 Paragraph 5 of the Modification to Article 2 of the Tribunal's Rules. See also AR 81/83, p. 
14. 
20 Paragraph 5 of the Modifications to Article 2 of the Tribunal Rules. 
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As regards the numbering and classification of claims, the Registry 
applied the following codes: 
- Claims based on Article II, paragraph 1 of the Claims 
Settlement Declaration (claims of nationals) and claims of 
banking institutions based on paragraph 2(B) of the 
Undertakings of the two Governments were given a serial 
number starting with 1 ("cases"). 
- Claims based on Article II, paragraph 2 of CSD (official 
claims of one Government against the other) were given a serial 
number starting with 1, with a pre-fix B, ("B" cases). 
- Disputes referred to in Article H, paragraph 3 of the Claims 
Settlement Declaration as to the interpretation or performance 
of the general Declaration as specified in paragraph 16-17 of the 
General Declaration; as well as questions concerning the 
interpretation or application of the Claims Settlement 
Declaration referred to in Article VI, paragraph 4 of that 
Declaration were given a serial number starting with 1, with a 
pre-fix A ("A" cases). 
- Claims of nationals of less than $250,000 were given a serial 
number starting with 10.001. 
"A" cases were assigned to the Full Tribunal. The other categories of 
claims were assigned to Chambers by lot. It is notable that "B" cases were first 
assigned to the Full Tribunal but pursuant to Presidential Order No. 8 were re- 
assigned to Chambers. 21 
Another function of the Registry has been to keep records of the claims 
and documents filed. Therefore for each claim a Master File has been 
maintained containing the original documents in the Tribunal's two official 
languages and a docket sheet in those languages. The Registry has also been 
responsible for the reproduction and delivery of awards and other decisions, 
including orders, of the Tribunal. All outgoing documents were served through 
the Agents. 22 
21 AR 87/88, p. 22-23. 
22 Ibid, p. 23. 
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11(2). Legal Services 
The legal Services Division of the Tribunal has allocated to itself a 
large bulk of the Tribunal staff. The Division consists of legal assistants to the 
arbitrators, Chambers clerks, and secretaries. Indeed, at some point the number 
of this Division's staff has amounted to 19 legal assistants, 14 secretaries and 3 
clerks. 23 The legal assistants have usually been in direct co-operation with the 
arbitrators rather than with the Secretariat of the Tribunal. These assistants 
have apparently comprised Iranian Legal Assistants, US Legal Assistants and 
third country legal assistants. The presence of a large number of legal assistants 
demonstrates the complexity of the legal issues involved and the growing need 
for continuous legal research in international arbitration, which is mainly 
performed by these assistants. 
11(3). Language Services 
One of the biggest practical difficulties which the Tribunal appears to 
have overcome, though at a considerable financial cost, is the conduct of its 
arbitral processes in two official languages. In accordance with paragraph 2 of 
the Notes to Article 17 of the Tribunal Rules, English and Persian are the 
official languages to be used in the arbitration proceedings, and these 
languages "shall be used for all oral hearings, decisions and awards". In 
addition, any documents filed with the Tribunal, such as statement of claim, 
statement of defence and their annexes, etc., should be submitted in both 
English and Persian. 24 As a consequence, this provision has had implications 
for the size of the staff. In particular, it required the employment of a large 
number of translators and simultaneous interpreters and other bilingual staff. 25 
However, the Tribunal Division of Language Services is mainly concerned 
23 See e. g., Organizational Chart of 1987/1988, AR 87/88, p. 87. 
24 Paragraph 3 of the Notes to Article 17 of the Tribunal Rules. 
25 AR 87/88, pp. 34-42; see also Lagcrgren, op. cit. p. 121. 
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with the translation of documents emanating from the Tribunal itself, including 
awards, decisions, opinions and orders and minutes of the Full Tribunal 
meetings. 26 
The Language Services Division has generally consisted of about 15 
staff members. This Division has, in addition to the translation of documents, 
provided simultaneous interpretation at all hearings, pre-hearing conferences 
and meetings of the Tribunal and the Committee on Administrative and 
Financial Questions27, as well as in settlement negotiations. 
Moreover, the work of the Tribunal as a whole has required certain 
other administrative and financial staff and general services personnel which, 
in general, have numbered about 15 staff members. 
III. Financial Aspects of the Organization of the Iran-United 
States Claims Tribunal 
Financially, the establishment of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal 
has taken place at a considerable cost for the parties. It is notable that in 
accordance with Article VI(3) of the CSD the "expenses of the Tribunal shall 
be borne equally by the two governments". It is also notable that in accordance 
with Paragraph 2 of Modifications to Article 38 of the Tribunal Rules, the fees 
and expenses of the Tribunal are to be fixed by the Full Tribunal. 29 
The Tribunal's expenses for the Financial year 1982/83 were over four 
million US dollars. 30 With gradual increases due to inflation and other factors 
26 AR 87/88, pp. 34-37. 
27 The Committee on Administrative and Financial Questions (CAFQ) was established at the 
eighth meeting of the Tribunal. It is composed of one Iranian arbitrator, one American 
Arbitrator and One neutral Arbitrator designated by the Tribunal to propose 
administrative, financial and staff Rules and other related policies for the adoption by the 
Tribunal. (Ibid, p. 79). 
28 Ibid, pp. 42-50. 
29 On the financial matters see Ibid, pp. 51-55. 
30 See AR 81/83, p. 38. 
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the Tribunal's expenses currently amount to about six million US dollars. For 
instance, the expenditure for 1987/88 was $6,160,332, equally borne by the 
two governments. 31 Generally speaking, if the average annual expenses of the 
Tribunal between the financial year 82-83 and 89-90 is assumed at around 5 to 
5.5 million US dollars, the total amount incurred by the two governments 
during these years is something between 40 to 44 million US dollars. 
It has to be noted that this amount exclusively covers only the costs of 
running the Tribunal- costs such as fees, rents, purchases etc. In other words, 
the expenses that the arbitrating parties in individual cases or generally the two 
governments have incurred, in the course of bringing their claims before the 
Tribunal and during the proceedings, are separate matters. Notably, the two 
Governments have appointed Agents to the Tribunal who have their own 
offices and staff at their disposal. It is significant that almost all of the claims 
submitted by the American claimants are directed against the Government of 
Iran, or its controlled entities, while most of the counter-claims and claims 
submitted against the American nationals and the American Government are 
claims of the Government of Iran or its controlled entities. As a consequence, 
the Government of Iran has established the Bureau for International Legal 
Services for coordinating its claims or defences. The Hague Branch of this 
Bureau is run under the supervision of the Agent of Iran to the Tribunal with a 
staff number almost the same size as that of the Tribunal. Moreover, the parent 
office of this Bureau is situated in Tehran, with a similar number of personnel 
devoted to the Iran-US Tribunal affairs. 32. All this is to say that the two 
governments have, in addition to the expenses of running the Tribunal, 
31 AR 87/88, p. 51. 
The Annual Reports of the Tribunal also include analyses of expenditure, final 
statement of account and audit report. On these see, e. g., the Financial Year 1987-88 (AR 
87/88, pp. 164-195). 
32 The Bureau for International Legal Services has mainly relied on Iranian lawyers. It has, 
however, occasionally used the services of some international and commercial lawyers, 
especially in the cases involving the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC). 
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incurred costs at least equal to those of running the Tribunal, for bringing their 
claims before the Tribunal or defending the claims against them. 
The American Government, for its part, has been responsible for 
submitting more than 2800 claims of less than US $250,000 and coordinating 
all the cases at some level through its Agent. Nevertheless, in claims over 
$250,000 the American claimants appear to have employed their own lawyers 
and incurred the relevant expenses. Apparently, the US Government has also 
charged its nationals for the services it has provided on their behalf. 33 In 
general it may be safe to say that the two Governments have incurred expenses 
at least equal to the costs of running the Tribunal, for the running of their 
offices and coordinating their claims and defences, in addition to the expenses 
of the Tribunal 
IV. Statistics of Claims Before The Tribunal 
IV(1). Claims Filed 
By 30 June 1988,3946 Cases had been filed with the Tribunal. 23 of 
these were "A" Cases which were filed between 20 October 1981 and 30 June 
1988. The rest were submitted for filing within the time-limit provided under 
the CSD, between 20 October 1981 and 19 January 1982. It is to be noted that 
the above total number does not include 1330 claims submitted by the 
Government of Iran against U. S. nationals and withdrawn subsequent to the 
33 It is worth noting that the Tribunal is not charging the arbitrating parties in individual 
cases for what may be called the cost of arbitration, since the Tribunal's expenses are 
borne by the two Governments. However, in certain cases the Tribunal may ask the 
arbitrating parties to deposit the costs of expert advice and of other special assistance 
required for a particular case. (Paragraph 1(a) of Modification to Article 38 of the Tribunal 
Rules, and Paragraph 2 of Modification to Article 41 of the same Rules). The question of 
awarding of the costs of arbitration as provided for under Articles 38 to 41 of the Tribunal 
Rules regarding the costs of legal representation etc., as to which party should bear them is 
a different matter and unrelated to our discussion here. Nevertheless, it has to be noted that 
the Tribunal does not include the cost of running the arbitration in calculating and 
awarding such costs, since these are borne by the two Governments. 
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Decision of the Tribunal in Case (A/2)34, that the Tribunal did not have 
jurisdiction over claims of the two Governments against nationals of the 
other. 35 
With the reclassifications made by June 1988, the Cases on the 
Tribunal's files at that time included: 23 "A" Cases; 74 "B" Cases; 962 "Cases"; 
and 2887 claims of less than $ 250,000.36 585 of these Cases had been brought 
by the Government of Iran or by Iranian nationals. These included: 20 "A" 
Cases; 53"B" Cases; 402 "Cases"; and 110 claims of less than $ 250,000.37 
Also by current reclassification and category, the Cases that had been 
brought by the United States or its nationals included: 3 "A" Cases; 21 "B" 
Cases; 560 "Cases"; and 2777 claims of less than $250,000. In other words, the 
total number of cases brought by the US Government or by its nationals stood 
at 3361.38 
IV(2). Claims Finalized 
By 30 June 1988,1051 Cases had been finalized by the Tribunal. These 
included 11 "A" Cases, 45 "B" Cases, 755 "Cases" and 240 claims of less than 
$250,000.39 
The Tribunal has been working for about eight years since its 
establishment. Moreover, in practice it has been working with more than 9 
arbitrators, because the resigning members, in accordance with Article 13(5) of 
the Tribunal Rules, have continued to work on the Cases they had participated 
in a hearing on the merits. For instance, there are cases in which an original 
member of the Tribunal, resigning in 1984 or 1985, has participated in their 
34 Decision of 13 January 1982,1 Iran-USCTR. p. 101. 
35 See AR 87/88, pp. 24-26 and generally, pp. 24-33. 
36 Ibid, p. 25. 
37 Ibid, pp. 25-26. 
38 Ibid, p. 26. 
39 Ibid, p. 29. 
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decision in 1987. Given the time spent by the Tribunal and the number of 
arbitrators involved, the number of Cases decided quantitatively is still less 
than one- third of the total number of claims submitted. 
However, it must be noted that among the Cases finalized there have 
been many important ones, and the majority of those pending are claims of less 
than $250,000. In June 1988 the Cases pending were 12 "A" Cases, 29 "B" 
Cases, 207 "Cases", and 2647 claims of less than $250,000.40 As an 
improvement in practical terms, the Tribunal has been able to adopt a more 
effective procedure regarding the latter category of cases and has made 
considerable progress on the matter. For instance, during 1987-88 each of the 
three Chambers rendered an award in an "expulsion Case" of which some 1500 
are pending. Consequently, a number of claims presenting similar issues were 
withdrawn and terminated. 41 However, given the number of all categories of 
Cases pending, the Tribunal may have some years of work ahead of it, if the 
rest of the claims are not settled by negotiations. 
IV(3). Amounts Awarded 
Up to 30 June 1988, the total amount awarded to American parties and 
paid out of the Security Account was over US $870 million. Of this amount 
$533 million was by awards on agreed terms. 42 
In relation to Iran, in addition to the Partial Award of the Tribunal in 
Case A/15, which included about half a billion US dollars43, a total amount of 
around $64 million was awarded in favour of Iran. Again, about $42 million of 
the latter figure was by awards on agreed terms. 44 
40 Ibid, p. 30. 
41 Ibid, p. 14. 
42 AR 87/88, p. 27. 
43 See Infra, Chapter 4, Section A, p. 139. 
44 AR 87/88, p. 27. 
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The magnitude of the share of the amounts awarded on agreed terms, 
shows the significant role of the settlement negotiations taking place alongside 
the arbitration at the Iran-US Claims Tribunal. In fact, more than 50 percent of 
the Cases finalized by the Tribunal have been by awards on agreed terms. 45 
This demonstrates that the Tribunal's work would take even longer in the 
absence of settlement negotiations. In this regard, however, two points should 
be borne in mind. First, the settlement negotiations should not be seen in 
isolation from the arbitration before the Tribunal. They are actually closely 
connected. In fact, during the arbitral proceedings, by making deductions from 
the Tribunal's practice, the parties have been able to reach a settlement. 
Without the proceedings before the Tribunal, the parties could find it difficult 
to find proper criteria for the settlement of their claims by negotiations. 
Second, the Secretariat of the Tribunal has actually encouraged settlement 
negotiations. The Tribunal has placed its premises at the disposal of the parties 
for the purpose of settlement negotiations and provided interpreters and other 
facilities for that purpose. 46 
45 Ibid, p. 26. 
46 Ibid. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
COMPOSITION OF THE IRAN-UNITED STATES CLAIMS 
TRIBUNAL 
1. Generally 
The ground rule for the composition of the Iran-United States Claims 
Tribunal has been laid down in Article 3(1) of the Claims Settlement 
Declaration. Article 3(1) provides: 
The Tribunal shall consist of nine members or such larger 
multiple of three as Iran and the United States may agree are 
necessary to conduct its business expeditiously. Within ninety 
days after the entry into force of this Agreement, each 
government shall appoint one-third of the members. Within 
thirty days after their appointment, the members so appointed 
shall by mutual agreement select the remaining third of the 
members and appoint one of the remaining third President of the 
Tribunal. Claims may be decided by the Full Tribunal or by a 
panel of three members of the Tribunal as the President shall 
determine. Each such panel shall be composed by the President 
and shall consist of one member appointed by each of the three 
methods set forth above. 
Except from a second reference in Article 3(2) of the CSD, no more 
details on the composition of the Tribunal have been provided in the arbitration 
agreement. Article 3(2) in effect relinquishes this and many other likely 
questions concerning the conduct of arbitration to the UNCITRAL Arbitration 
Rules. It reads: 
Members of the Tribunal shall be appointed and the Tribunal 
shall conduct its business in accordance with the arbitration 
rules of the United Nations Commission on International Trade 
Law (UNCITRAL) except to the extent modified by the parties 
or by the Tribunal to ensure that this Agreement can be carried 
out. The UNCITRAL rules for appointing members of the three- 
member tribunals shall apply mutatis mutandis to the 
appointment of the Tribunal. 
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2. Forms of Composition of Arbitral Tribunals 
The composition adopted under the CSD is partly unique and partly a 
commonly used model in present-day international arbitrations. As regards the 
number of arbitrators making up the Full Tribunal it represents a rare option. 
Arbitral tribunals with over 5 arbitrators are rare 1, but not entirely 
unprecedented. For instance, the Arbitral Tribunal under the Convention on 
Relations between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic of Germany2 
consists of nine members, three of whom are appointed by the Federal 
Republic of Germany, three by France, Britain and the United States (one by 
each), and the remaining three, who are neutral, jointly by the Federal Republic 
of Germany and the Three Powers. 3 
The composition of the three-member chambers of the Tribunal, on the 
other hand, represents the most frequently used model in present-day 
international arbitrations. Indeed, practically, it is the chambers which are 
principally entrusted with the role of deciding various claims submitted to the 
Tribunal. In other words, the Tribunal generally conducts its work in chambers 
of three, and only interpretative disputes and certain other cases are decided by 
the full panel of nine. 4 
The establishment of three chambers is a necessary and useful action in 
the composition of the Tribunal. Given the great number of claims, it saves a 
I For a review see, Hans Mangoldt, "Arbitration and Conciliation", op. cit. p. 525 ; also 
Louis B. Sohn, "The Role of Arbitration in Recent Multilateral Treaties", op. cit. pp. 28- 
30. 
2 The 1952 Convention on Relations Between the Three Powers and the F. R. G., as amended 
in 1954, in Supplement to 49 AJIL (1955), p. 57. 
3 The Charter of Arbitration under the Convention on Relations Between the Three Powers 
and the F. R. G., Article 1, Ibid, p. 62. 
It is notable that this Arbitral Tribunal has been introduced in the context of a 
multilateral arbitration and from this point of view it is distinct from the Iran-US Tribunal. 
Indeed, as a survey of arbitration treaties reveals the arbitral tribunals with more than five 
arbitrators have usually been provided for when more than two States are parties to a 
dispute. (Sec Max Habicht, Post-War Treaties for the Pacific Settlement of 
International Disputes, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1931, p. 1037. 
4 Sec AR 86/87, pp. 21-22. See also Supra Chapter 3, p. 99. 
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considerable amount of time and expense for a tribunal which has already 
lasted more than seven years and is expected to exist for some years more. 
In the three-member arbitral tribunal system usually each party appoints 
one arbitrator and the third arbitrator is appointed by joint agreement of both 
parties or by joint agreement of the parties or the party appointed arbitrators. 
Modem arbitration treaties, both in terms of general arbitration treaties 
referring to this system and in terms of arbitral tribunals actually constituted, 
and rules of procedure adopted by many international law organizations and 
arbitral institutions provide examples of the frequent application of this 
system. 5 
Article 5 of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules6 provides for the 
appointment of three arbitrators in the absence of any agreement to the 
contrary. Article 7 of the same Rules provides that " if three arbitrators are to 
be appointed, each party shall appoint one arbitrator. The two arbitrators thus 
appointed shall choose the third arbitrator who will act as the presiding 
5 For a review on this see generally: Habicht, op. cit. p. 1037; United Nations, Systematic 
Survey of Treaties for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes. 
1928-1948, UN Publication, (Sales No.: 49. V. 3), 1949, pp. 89 ff and United Nations, A 
Survey of Treaties for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes 
1949-1962, UN Publication (Sales No.: 66. V. 5), New York 1966, pp. 5-85; also Sohn, 
Arbitration and Multilateral Treaties, op. cit. p. 29. Also note the following: 
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, London, Nov. 2, 
1973, Protocol II, Article 3,12 ILM, p. 1441; Convention for the Establishment of the 
European Space Agency, Paris, May 30,1975, Article 17,14 ILM, (1975), p. 885; 
International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants, Paris December 2, 
1961, Article 38,815 UNTS, p. 89; Treaty Establishing the Caribbean Community, 
Chaguaramas (Trinidad), July 4,1973, Annex, Article 12 (Where there are only two 
parties), 946 UNTS, p. 17; and International Convention Relating to Intervention on the 
High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties, Brussels, Nov. 29,1969, Annex, Article 
14,9 ILM, (1970), p. 25; also note Article 3(iii) of the Cease-Fire Agreement Between 
India and Pakistan of 30 June 1965 which established a three-member Arbitral Tribunal to 
arbitrate the Parties' dispute over the Rann of Kutch sector. It is notable that the Arbitral 
Tribunal was chaired by Judge Gunnar Lagergren, who later became the first President of 
the Iran-United States Tribunal, and consisted of two other members of Iranian and 
Yugoslav nationalities appointed by Pakistan and India. Article 3(iii) required that none of 
the arbitrators should be a national of either India or Pakistan. (Wetter, International 
Arbitral Process, op. cit. Vol 1, pp. 250-53). For the text of the arbitration award see 7 
ILM, p. 633; 50 ILR, p. 2. 
6 The UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules of 1976,15 ELM (1976), p. 701. 
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arbitrator... " The UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial 
Arbitration7, and the Convention for the Settlement of Investment Disputes8 
provide for the appointment of three arbitrators, unless the parties have agreed 
otherwise. The 1982 Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Arbitration 
Commission9, and the PCA Rules of Arbitration and Conciliation for 
Settlement of International Disputes Between Two Parties of which only One 
is a Statei0, adopted in 1962, provide similar provisions. 
Other types of arbitral tribunals are also commonly used in present-day 
arbitrations. For instance, the Arbitration Rules of the London Court of 
International Arbitration 11, the ICC Rules of Arbitration 12, and the 
Commercial Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association13 
7 Article 10(2) of the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration of 
1985,24 ILM, p. 1302. Note also Article 11 (3)(a) of the same Model Law. 
8 Articles 37(2)(b) of the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between 
States and Nationals of other States of 1965,575 UNTS, p. 160. 
For a further review on the composition of arbitral tribunals in international 
commercial arbitration, see generally: Alan Redfern and Martin Hunter, International 
Commercial Arbitration, op. cit., pp. 152-160; and Rene David, Arbitration in 
International Trade, op. cit., pp. 223-229. 
9 Articles 5 and 7 of the Rules, as amended and in effect April 1,1982, published by the 
Inter-American Arbitration Commission. 
10 Article 5, Wetter, op. cit. Vol 5, p. 53. 
11 Article 3(2) of the LCIA Rules, in force from 1 January 1985, text published and provided 
by the LCIA. 
For the sole arbitrator system examples see also; the United Kingdom-Netherlands 
Agreement Relating to the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf Under the North Sea of 
October 6,1965, Article 2,595 LINTS, p. 105; The Convention on the International 
Hydrographic Organization, Monaco, May 3,1967, Article 17,751 UNTS, p. 41; 
European Agreement Concerning an Aeronautical Satellite Programme, Neuilly-sur-Seine, 
December 9,1971, Article 13,906 UNTS, p. 3; and Treaty Establishing the Caribbean 
Community, Chaguaramas (Trinidad), July 4,1973, Annex, Article 12(5) (when there are 
more than two parties to the dispute), 946 UNTS, p. 17. Also note the following Cases; 
Tinoco Arbitration of 1923,1 RIAA, p. 369; the Island of Palmas Case of 1928,2 RIAA, 
p. 829; Gold Looted by Germany from France Case, 20 ILR, p. 441; and Diverted Cargoes 
Case, 22 ILR, p. 820. 
12 Article 2(5) of the Arbitration Rules of the Court of Arbitration of the International 
Chamber of Commerce, in force from 1 June 1975, (Wetter, op. cit. Vol 5, p. 89), and as 
amended and in force from 1 January 1988, (text published and provided by the ICC). 
13 Section 16 of the Rules as amended and in effect on October 1,1977, Wetter, op. cit. Vol 
5, p. 65. 
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require that a sole arbitrator will be appointed if the parties have not agreed 
otherwise. 
The benefit of the sole arbitrator system is that it saves a considerable 
amount of time and expense, but naturally it is more suitable for a single case 
arbitration than arbitrations with many claims. This system, by way of joint 
appointment of a neutral person, embodies a good deal of independence and 
freedom for the arbitrator and as a consequence a reasonable degree of 
adherence to the law can be expected from him in deciding the dispute. 
Another type of arbitration tribunal which is used in contemporary 
arbitration practice is the arbitral tribunal consisting of five members. It may be 
composed of one arbitrator selected by each side and three neutral members 14, 
or two arbitrators selected by each side and only one neutral member. 15 This is, 
obviously, a more expensive method and depending upon whether there are 
three neutral members or only one, it may produce important differences in the 
conduct of the proceedings and the nature of the result reached. In the first 
14 See Article 22 of the Geneva General Act for the Pacific Settlement of International 
Disputes, September 26,1928, Habicht, Post-War Treaties, op. Cit. p. 936, (also 93 
L. N. T. S., p. 345), revised April 28,1949,71 UNTS, p. 101; also the German-Swiss 
Arbitration Treaty of 1921, Article 6, Habicht, op. cit. p. 20; the European Fisheries 
Convention, London, March 9,1964, Article 13 and Annex II, Article 2(2), 581 UNTS, p. 
57; The Arbitration Agreement between the United Kingdom and Saudi Arabia 
Concerning the Buraimi Oasis Case, Article 1, July 1954, text in Wetter, op. cit. Vol 3, p. 
357. For a review on treaty practice see UN Systematic Survey, op. cit. p. 89 ff and 
Habicht, op. cit. p. 1037. Five member arbitral tribunals were, for instance, constituted in 
the Ambatielos Arbitration, 23 ILR (1956), p. 306; Lake Lonoux Arbitration, 24 ILR 
(1957), p. 101; the Naulilaa Case, 4 ILR, pp. 274,526. See also the 1986 Egypt-Israeli 
Agreement to Arbitrate Boundary Dispute Concerning the Taba Beachfront, Article 1,26 
ILM, (1987), p. 1, and the text of the Taba Dispute Arbitration Award, in 27 ILM (1988), 
p. 1421. 
15 Article 32 of the Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, 
1899,1 AJIL (1907), p. 107; Article 45 of the Hague Convention for the Pacific 
Settlement of International Disputes, 1907,2 AJIL, (1908), p. 43. It is notable that Article 
45 of the 1907 Convention requires that only one of the two members appointed by each 
party can be its national. The preferred number under Article 3(3) of the Model Rules on 
Arbitral Procedure of the International Law Commission is also five, however, the formula 
of selection is left to the parties. (G. A. O. R., 13th Session, Suppl. No. 9, Doc. A/3859; also 
reproduced in YBILC, (1958), Vol II, p. 78; and 53 AJIL (1959), p. 239. Text of the 
Model Rules also in Wetter, op. cit. Vol 5, p. 232. ); see also Agreement on safeguards 
under the Non-Proliferation Treaty, Brussels, April 5,1973, Article 22,12 ILM (1973), p. 
469. 
case, there is good reason to expect independence in the conduct of the 
proceedings and a decision on the basis of law, since the neutral arbitrators are 
able to decide without the agreement of the party-appointed arbitrators. In the 
latter case a similar result is, comparatively, less likely and the process may be 
influenced by the sentimental views of the party appointed members who 
usually have a certain affinity with the views of their respective parties and 
whose adversary positions are particularly stronger when they are nationals of 
the appointing parties. 16 
Another type of arbitral tribunal is the kind in which each party initially 
appoints only its own arbitrator or arbitrators and failing to achieve unanimity 
in a two-man tribunal and majority in a four-man tribunal the provision is made 
for the appointment of an umpire who will preside over the tribunal in order to 
settle the dispute by a majority vote. A series of Iranian general arbitration 
treaties provided for a two-man tribunal of this kind. 17 
3. Forms of Composition of the Iran-US Tribunal 
Returning to the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, although the 
composition of chambers resembles typical three-man tribunals, there is a 
slight difference. That is that the composition of each individual chamber is 
determined by the President of the Tribunal. The Tribunal Rules provide that 
"The composition of the chambers, the assignment of cases to various 
chambers, the transfer of cases among chambers and relinquishement by 
chambers of certain cases to the Full Tribunal will be provided for in orders 
issued by the President pursuant to his powers under Article III, Paragraph 1 of 
the Claims Settlement Declaration. " 18 Theoretically, this may make no 
16 See Sohn, Arbitration and Multilateral Treaties, op. cit. pp. 29-30. 
17 See, for instance, Article 5 of the Treaty of Friendship Between Greece and Persia (Iran) 
of 1931, entered into force 1949, in UN Survey of Treaties 1949-1962, op. cit. pp. 9-10 
and generally UN Systematic Survey 1928-1948, op. Cit. p. 95. For more details on this 
type of tribunal see Mangoldt, op. cit. pp. 526-527. 
18 Article 5 of the Tribunal Rules which in fact reflects Article 3(1) of the CSD. 
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difference, since it is the parties which ultimately choose all members of the 
Tribunal and each chamber must consist of one member appointed by each of 
the three methods set forth in the CSD. Practically it may prove to be of some 
significance as regards the working relations between the members of a 
chamber. On the other hand, the power conferred upon the President in this 
respect has a useful implication for the expeditious conduct of the process of 
arbitration. For instance, by virtue of this authority the President was able to 
form a special chamber following the episode of 3 September 1984.19 The 
incident disrupted the continuance of the Tribunal's function. However, by 
establishing this chamber, consisting of the President, one American Arbitrator 
from Chamber Two and the Iranian member from Chamber Three, the process 
was able to continue. 20 On some occasions, however, some members of the 
Tribunal have voiced their concern about the possibility of abuse of this 
authority by the President. 21 
It is also notable that under the Tribunal Rules a provision is made for 
the advance appointment of substitute members whose main aim is to prevent 
the possible disruption of the proceedings and to fill the vacancy arising as a 
result of the absence of a member of the Tribunal. 22 
19 For the documents concerning details of the episode see generally 7 Iran-USCTR, pp. 281- 
316. 
20 The mandate of the special Chamber was limited to deal only with requests for awards on 
agreed terms and requests for termination of proceedings. (Presidential Order No. 29, 
September 19,1984, Ibid, pp. 301-302. ) 
21 In this regard see, Presidential Order No. 31,21 September 1984, appointing Professor 
Bockstiegel by Judge Lagergren as Chairman of Chamber One, while the latter as 
President was himself the chairman of chamber one and his resignation and the former 's 
appointment as members of the Tribunal had to take place as from Ist October 1984. (6 
Iran-USCTR, pp. 302-303. ) See also Dissenting Opinion of Judge Kashani in this respect 
which is critical of the above shortcoming in the Presidential Order No 31. (Ibid, pp. 303- 
304. ) 
22 "Note" to Article 13 of the Tribunal Rules Provides: 
"Iran may, in advance, appoint up to three persons, to be 
available to act as a substitute member for a temporary period 
for a specific member, or members, of the Tribunal appointed 
by Iran; the United States may, in advance, appoint up to three 
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Despite the above mentioned difference in the method of allocation of 
arbitrators to the chambers, which is a negligible point, the chambers can be 
identified as a standard three-man tribunal with all the inherent advantages or 
weaknesses that associate this type of tribunal. This conclusion may, in many 
respects, be applicable to the Full Tribunal which is simply a multiple of the 
three-member tribunal with no particular structural difference, at least as far as 
the method of appointment is concerned. 
It is accepted that the differences in the composition of arbitral tribunals 
regarding the model applied may produce important differences in the conduct 
of the proceedings and in the nature of the result reached. 23 There are certain 
problems, or one may say consequences, associated with the three-man arbitral 
tribunals. However, that is not to say that any and every problem is a natural 
consequence of the system chosen and therefore an expected result of the 
parties' option in selecting this particular system. Many problems may also 
arise due to the manner of practical application of the system. There might also 
persons, to be available to act as a substitute member for a 
temporary period for a specified member, or members, of the 
Tribunal appointed by the United States. The members of the 
Tribunal appointed by Iran and the United States may select, in 
advance, by mutual agreement, a person to act as substitute for a 
temporary period for any of remaining one third of the members 
of the Tribunal. " 
Iran has not made any advance appointment regarding substitute members, however, it has 
appointed them on ad hoc basis whenever necessary. (See Annex V to AR 86/87 of the 
Tribunal, p. 64, also Ibid, pp. 56-59. The United States has appointed three substitute 
members who have substituted American Arbitrators occasionally. (Ibid, pp. 64,70-76) 
No neutral substitute member has been appointed so far. 
It is also notable that under Paragraph 5 of Article 13 of the Tribunal Rules it is 
provided that: 
"After the effective date of a member's resignation he 
shall continue to serve as a member of the Tribunal with respect 
to all cases in which he had participated in a hearing on the 
merits, and for that purpose shall be considered a member of the 
Tribunal instead of the person who replaces him. " 
Also note Paragraph 4 of the same Article for a similar provision regarding the 
substitute members. 
23 Sohn, Arbitration and Multilateral Treaties, op. cit. p. 29 ; Mangoldt, op. cit. pp. 527-532. 
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be other factors, such as the factor notable in the Iran-US Tribunal24, which 
may complicate or influence the situation. 
In applying these problems to the case of Iran-US Tribunal the aim is to 
identify the problems associated with this type of tribunal in general and within 
the Iran-US Tribunal in particular ; to analyse the problems arising from the 
manner of practical application of the system ; to conclude how fruitful the 
lessons can be for future development of international arbitration. 
In pursuit of this aim the following problems seem to merit primary 
consideration: 
A- What kind of influence the composition of the Tribunal has exerted 
on the basic terms of the Tribunal's mission? 
B- What is the role of national arbitrators in the composition of the 
Tribunal and to what extent have they acted as independent judges? 
C- To what extent has the principle on diversity of cultural-legal 
backgrounds of international arbitrators been observed in the selection of the 
neutral members of the Tribunal, and to what extent can such a question be 
identified as a factor influencing the policies of the Tribunal? 
24 This factor essentially is the existence of the Security Account (Para 7 of the GD) in 
favour of only one party against the other. It not only has serious effects on the 
enforcement of the awards against Iran, something that it was intended for, but also on the 
structure, psychology and conduct of the proceedings which may alter traditional 
expectations placed upon a three-member arbitral tribunal. Details will be analysed later. 
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SECTION A 
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION : JUDICIAL OR QUASI- 
JUDICIAL 
I. Generally 
The basic criticism levelled at the tribunal composed of one neutral 
member and two national members, or any other formation in which the neutral 
arbitrators consist of only one-third of the members, is that the neutral 
arbitrator has to reach a decision in an atmosphere in which the nationally 
motivated irreconcileable views of national arbitrators usually clash with each 
other. This has two implications. First the neutral member may have to decide 
wholly in favour of one of the parties since he must obtain the affirmative vote 
of one of the national members in order to reach a decision. 25 Second, the 
neutral member may have to adopt a mediatory role between the views of 
national members in order to reach a compromise solution. 26 In both 
circumstances the role of law may be diminished as a result. 
It is submitted that the underlying factor behind this trend is the 
practical reality that the neutral arbitrator will probably try to avoid the 
embarrassing position of bringing about a decision wholly based on adoption 
of the position of one of the parties. That is why, they explain, dissenting 
opinions of national arbitrators are relatively rarely expressed in this type of 
tribunals, and then only when the tribunal's decision completely rejected the 
submissions of the "arbitrator's" party. 27 
However, part of the problem may be attributable to the process of 
decision making. The fact which is very common in arbitration practice; that 
the decision should be reached by a majority vote, instead of giving the 
25 Sohn, Arbitration and Multilateral Treaties, op. cit. p. 30. 
26 Mangoldt, op. cit. p. 528. 
27 Ibid, p. 529. 
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presiding arbitrator the right to make the award alone if no majority could be 
reached. 28 In the first situation, as Professor Sanders points out, "the arbitrators 
are therefore forced to continue their deliberations until a majority, and 
probably a compromise solution has been reached". 29 
In this connection it is notable that according to Article 5 of the CSD 
and Article 33 of the Tribunal Rules, the Tribunal should decide all cases on 
the basis of respect for law. Article 32(3) of the tribunal rules requires that the 
Tribunal should state the reasons upon which the award is based. Moreover, 
under Article 33(2) of the same rules the Tribunal is authorized to decide ex 
aequo et bono only if the arbitrating parties expressly and in writing have 
authorized it to do so. 
Some have also tried to justify the presence of national arbitrators by 
the argument that international arbitration unlike the compulsory judicial 
settlement is not a strictly judicial procedure and a limited conciliatory role of 
the arbitral tribunal is discernible. This view has been rejected on two grounds. 
H. Lauterpacht points out: 
But there exists in any case the very strongest objection to a 
view that decisions of an adjudicating body can be partly legal 
and partly non-legal. A body wielding such powers is not a legal 
body at all. A body which applies legal rules only when it 
deems it fit to do so and disregards them on other occasions, 
applies law only as it were by accident; it applies law because 
legal rules happen to coincide with what the arbitrator believes 
the law ought to be... Such a view fails to take into account the 
provisions of treaties creating arbitral tribunals and prescribing 
the sources of law applicable by them. 30 
28 It is notable that under Article 31 of the Tribunal Rules "any award or other decision of the 
Tribunal shall be made by a majority vote of the arbitrators". Only in procedural matters 
the presiding member is authorized to decide on his own where there is no majority which 
is also subject to revision by the Tribunal. 
29 Pieter Sanders, "Commentary on UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules", 2 YB. Comm. Arb. 
(1977), 172, p. 208. 
30 H. Lauterpacht, The Function of Law in the International Community, op. cit., pp. 380- 
381. 
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Two categories of safeguards against the shortcomings in the three-man 
tribunals have been suggested. These are the appointment of foreign nationals 
as party arbitrators31; or the provision of the power for the neutral member to 
decide freely, if the two other members disagree. 32 The first suggestion does 
not remove the problem completely but is likely to reduce the tension in the 
conduct of the proceedings. The latter suggestion is less likely to be adopted by 
many States. 
On the other hand, the three-man tribunal model remains the most 
popular system because of the nervousness of the disputing parties towards 
entrusting the matter fully to the neutral arbitrators. In addition it has been 
argued that the national or ad hoc member has a useful function. That is, to 
ensure that the contentions and arguments of the party which appointed him are 
fully understood by the tribunal as a whole. 33 
Moreover, it is submitted that the parties are probably aware of the 
shortcomings in the system and by choosing this type of tribunal they therefore 
have not ruled out the possibility of a mediatory solution. 
II. Compromise Decisions 
There are no explicit provisions or restrictions regarding the nationality 
of arbitrators in either the CSD or the Tribunal Rules. However, the arbitrators 
appointed by Iran and the United States have all been their respective 
nationals. 35 
31 See, e. g. Article 3(iii) of the Cease -Fire Agreement Between India and Pakistan of 1965, 
Wetter, op. cit. Vol 1, p. 250; also note a series of Iranian arbitration treaties which 
provided similar provisions, in UN Systematic Survey 1948, op. cit. p. 95. 
32 For this category, see, e. g. Article 8(3) of the Air Transport Agreement of May 4,1965, 
between Malawi and Ghana, 541 UNTS, p. 163. (See also generally, Mangoldt, op. cit. pp. 
529-530. ) 
33 J. L. Simpson and Hazel Fox, International Arbitration, op. cit., p. 88. 
34 Mangoldt, op. cit. pp. 529-530. 
35 See Infra, Section C, pp. 201-203. 
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Having noted that point and applying the problem pursued in this sub- 
section to the case of Iran-US Tribunal it is not surprising to declare that the 
practice of the Tribunal lends substantial support to the theory in question in 
both respects. Some examples merit closer consideration. 
Many manifest instances of compromise can simply be found in the 
views expressed by the arbitrators. In a recent important Case36 Arbitrator 
Bahrami of Iran in his concurring opinion said : "... I concurred in the Award 
issued in the present case in order to obtain a majority... "37 
In American International Group Inc. v Iran38, arbitrator Mosk of the 
United States is more clear about the compromise solution reached in that 
Case. He said: 
I concur in the Tribunal's Award in order that a majority can be 
formed... This Award represents a "compromise solution" in 
which I have joined so that some award could be issued. 
Otherwise, this case, heard almost a year ago, would remain 
undecided. 39 
In Starret Housing Corp v Iran40, Arbitrator Holtzman regarded the 
award as erroneous, however he gave his affirmative vote to it. In his 
concurring opinion he said: 
I concur with reluctance to the Interlocutory award in this Case. 
I do so in order to form a majority... In view of the many errors 
in the Interlocutory Award, it would be easier to dissent from it 
than to concur in it. the Tribunal Rules provide, however, that 
awards can be made by a majority vote. thus, in a three-member 
chamber, at least two members must join or there can be no 
36 Interlocutory Award in case No A/15 (I: G), Award No. ITL 63-A15(I: G)-FT, 20 August 
1986,12 Iran-USCTR. p. 40. 
37 Ibid, Concurring Opinion of Hamid Bahrami, p. 82. 
38 American International Group Inc. v Iran, Award No 93-2-3, Dec. 19,1983,4 Iran- 
USCTR, p. 96. 
39 Ibid, Concurring Opinion of Richard M. Mosk, p. 111. 
40 Sect Housing Corp v Iran, Award No ITL 32-24-1, Dec. 19,1983,4 Iran-USCTR, p. 
122. 
119 
decision. My colleague, Judge Kashani, having dissented, I am 
faced with choice of joining the President in the present 
interlocutory Award despite its faults, or accepting the prospect 
of an indefinite delay in progress toward final decision of this 
Case. 41 
In many other cases also similar statements have been made. 42 
Moreover, a closer consideration of many of these views proves that the 
concurring arbitrators have not only different views regarding the reasoning but 
also the conclusion of the awards in which a majority has been formed on the 
basis of the same concurring opinions. This clearly indicates that a majority has 
been declared in order to secure some form of solution but there is no real 
agreement over these issues. This not only is evidence of a compromise 
solution, but also gives rise to the validity of a majority reached in such 
circumstances. Because it is accepted that a concurring opinion applies when 
one member of the tribunal concurs with the other members of the tribunal in 
regard to the conclusion arrived at, but does not concur with its reasoning. 43 
However, in the Cases referred to above the contents of the concurring 
opinions reveal that there is a disagreement on both accounts. For instance, a 
closer reading of the concurring opinion of Arbitrator Bahrami in the above 
41 Ibid, Concurring, opinion of H. Holtzman, p. 159. 
42 See, Ultrasystem Inc. v Iran, Award No. 27-84-3,4 March 1983, Concurring Opinion of 
R. M. Mosk, 2 Iran-USCTR, 100, at p. 114; R. N. Pomeroy v Iran, Award No. 50-40-3,8 
June 1983, Concurring Opinion of Mosk, 2 Iran-USCTR, 372, p. 390; Economy Forms 
Corp v Iran, Award No. 55-165-1,13 June 1983,3 Iran-USCTR, 42, p. 55. In this Case 
Arbitrator Mosk said: "Why I do concur in this inadequate Award, rather than dissenting 
from it ? The answer is based in the realistic old saying that there are circumstances in 
which something is better than nothing. "; World Farmers Trading Inc v Govt. Trading 
Corp, Award No. 66-764-1,16 August 1983, Concurring Opinion Holtzman, 3 Iran- 
USCTR. 197, p. 199; Chas T Main v Mahab, Award No. 70-185-3,2 September 1983, 
Concurring Opinion Mosk, 3 Iran-USCTR. 270, p. 277; Alan Craig v Ministry of Energy, 
Award No. 71-346-3,2 September 1983, Concurring opinion Mosk, 3 Iran-USCTR. 280, 
p. 293; Continental Grain v Govt. Trading Corp, Award No. 75-112-1,5 September 1983, 
Concurring Opinion Holtzman, 3 Iran-USCTR. 319, p. 325; William L. Pereira 
Associates, Iran v Iran, Award No. 116-1-3,17 March 1984, Concurring Opinion, Mosk, 5 
Iran-USCTR. 198, p. 230; Cal-Main Foods, Inc v Iran, Award No. 133-340-3,31 May 
1984, Concurring Opinion Mosk, 6 Iran-USCTR. 52, p. 64. 
43 See, "Note by Dr. Shafeiei regarding concurring opinion of H. Aldrich", in ITT Industries, 
Inc v Iran, Award No. 47-156-2,26 May 1983,2 Iran-USCTR. 348, p. 356; see also 
generally, Jhabvala, "the Scope of Individual Opinions in the World Court", Neth. Y. B. I. L. 
(1982), pp. 33-51. 
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Case44 reveals that he has serious disagreements over the operative part of the 
Tribunal's award. 45 In American International Group v Iran, the concurring 
arbitrator does not only apply a different reasoning but also states that the 
award of damages should have been higher than that provided in this case. 46 
HI. Special Characteristics 
A peculiar feature in most of these cases is that they have not been 
adopted unanimously as the case for a typical compromise solution might be 
expected to have been. 47 On the contrary, while the views of concurring 
arbitrators indicate the adoption of some kind of compromise solution between 
the concurring and neutral arbitrators, the arbitrators appointed by the other 
party have not only voted against the award but also have, on some occasions 
strongly criticised the award in their dissenting opinions. This cannot can be 
explained fully under either of the above mentioned theories concerning the 
three-member arbitral tribunals. 48 
For instance, with the exception of three unanimous awards49, the rest 
of the cases referred to above have been decided by a majority vote, in four of 
which the national arbitrators of the Party against whose position the awards 
were rendered have issued dissenting opinions criticising the majority's 
views. 50 
44 See Concurring Opinion, Bahrami, Interlocutory Award in Case A/15(I: G), 12 Iran- 
USCTR. 40, p. 82. 
45 Ibid, pp. 82-87. 
46 4 Iran-USCTR. pp. 112, and generally, 112-121. 
47 See Supra, Section A, p. 116. 
48 Ibid. 
49 These Cases are : World Farmers Trading, Inc v Govt. Trading Corp, 3 Iran-USCTR. 197; 
Continental Grain v Govt. Trading Corp, Ibid, p. 319; Cal-Main Foods, Inc v Iran, 6 Iran- 
USCTR. 52. In the latter Case the Iranian member dissented in part and concurred in part. 
(Ibid, p. 66. ) 
50 Dissenting Opinion of American Arbitrators in Case A 15(I: G), (12 Iran-USCTR. p. 64- 
80); Dissenting Opinions of Arbitrator Kashani in Starret Housing Corp v Iran, (4 Iran- 
USCTR. 122), and in Economy Forms Corp v Iran, (3 Iran-USCTR. 42), have been printed 
respectively in 7 Iran-USCTR. p. 119, and 5 Iran-USCTR. p. 1. The dissenting opinion of 
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A result and at the same time clear evidence of the mediatory trends in 
the composition of the Tribunal and its chambers has been the adoption of a 
number of decisions by way of dividing the case into a number of issues and 
then deciding it piecemeal at different times with different majorities. In other 
words, a portion of the award has been taken by forming a majority with the 
Iranian arbitrator and the other portion or portions of the same case has been 
decided by forming a majority with the American member of the chamber. 
This situation clearly has weakened the weight and legal authority of 
the Tribunal's decisions and at the same time may have resulted in unnecessary 
delays until a compromise has been made in order to form a majority for the 
undecided portion of the award. For instance, in Ultrasystems Inc. v Iran, on 4 
March 1983 Chamber Three of the Tribunal has issued a Partial Award against 
the respondent with the affirmative vote of the American member of the 
Chamber with the Iranian member dissenting. 51 The Final Award, dismissing 
the remaining claims, has been rendered on 7 December 1983 by forming a 
majority with the Iranian arbitrator with the American member dissenting. 52 
Commenting upon this situation in his dissenting opinion to the Final Award 
Arbitrator Mosk writes: 
In the instant case, the Chairman, having obtained my reluctant 
compromise vote in order to form a majority for the Partial 
Award... has now taken a portion of that award away with a 
different majority. Such actions are not conducive to the 
formation of majorities. 53 
Arbitrator Ansari in William L. Pereira Associates, Iran v Iran (5 Iran-USCTR. p. 198) has 
not been made available so far. 
It is also notable that two other of these Cases have been decided in the absence of the 
Iranian member of Chamber Three despite Iran's strong objection. (Chas T. Main v 
Mahab, 3 Iran-USCTR. 270, p. 276 ; and Alan Craig v Ministry of Energy, Ibid, p. 291. ) 
51 Ultrasystems Inc. v Iran, Partial Award No 27-84-3,2 Iran-USCTR. p. 100. 
52 Ultrasystems Inc. v Iran, Award No 89-84-3,4 Iran-USCTR. p. 77. 
53 thid, p. 82. See also the following Cases: Harnischfeger Corp v MORT, Partial Award No 
14-180-3,13 July 1984,7 Iran-USCTR. p. 90 and the Final Award No 175-180-3,26 April 
1985, in the same Case, in 8 Iran-USCTR. p. 119; and International Technical Products 
Corp v Iran, Partial Award No. 186-302-3,19 August 1985,9 Iran-USCTR. p. 10 and the 
Final Award No 196-302-3,24 October 1985, in the same Case, Ibid, p. 206. 
122 
The same mediatory trends have also been manifested in the individual 
opinions entitled "concurring and Dissenting" opinions of the party-appointed 
arbitrators, which have been adopted in a situation similar to those described 
above but not necessarily at different times. In other words, these opinions are 
concurring in part and dissenting in other part or parts of the award. That is, 
different portions of a case have been decided with different majorities. The 
arbitrators of each Party have concurred in the portions which were favourable 
to their respective parties' position and dissented from the unfavourable 
decisions in the other portions of the case. As a result, the Chamber has been 
able to form a majority for all portions of the case. 54 
It may be argued that the above mentioned indications are not 
conclusive enough to establish a departure from the rule of law by the neutral 
members of the Tribunal. On the other hand, it is the award itself which should 
be the basic criterion in determining the role of law and its limits within the 
arbitral process. It is therefore essential to have a closer analysis of some 
important decisions rendered by the Tribunal. 55 
54 See for instance, "Opinion of Parvis Ansari Moin, Concurring in Part and Dissenting in 
Part", in Cal-Main Foods Inc. v Iran, 6 Iran-USCTR. p. 66; "Concurring and Dissenting 
Opinion of Charles N. Brower", in International Technical Products Corp v Iran, 9 Iran- 
USCTR. p. 243. Also note in the same Case Arbitrator Ansari of Iran has appended the 
following words to his signature: "dissenting opinion in part and concurring opinion in 
part in order to form majority. " (Ibid, p. 206); Questech Inc v Iran, Award No 191-59-1, 
20 September 1985,9 Iran-USCTR. p. 107. See especially the notes attached to the 
signatures of the Iranian and American members of Chamber One explaining their views 
as dissenting in part and concurring in part. (Ibid. ); Forum Selection Cases, Concurring and 
Dissenting Opinion of Holtzman, Mosk and Aldrich with Respect to Interlocutory Award 
on Jurisdiction.. ", 1 Iran-USCTR. p. 284; International Schools Services Inc. v NICIC, 
Award No 194-111-1,10 October 1985,9 Iran-USCTR. p. 187. See especially the notes 
attached to the signatures of the Iranian and American members explaining their views as 
dissenting in part and concurring in part. (Ibid, ); and Dissenting Opinion of Holtzman, 
Training Systems Corp. v Bank Tejarat, 13 Iran-USCTR. p. 345. 
55 Many of these Cases also involve controversial issues of fact and law which may be 
discussed from the other dimensions that these cases involve. Our analysis here is, 
however, limited to the questions pursued in this sub-section. 
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IV. Case A/156 
IV(1)- Issue I of this case involved the question of the disposition of 
interest earned on the Security Account. 57 In this interpretive Case the 
Tribunal was asked to announce on the basis of the Agreements concluded 
between the Parties whether the interest earned on the Security Account should 
be transferred to Iran as the owner of the funds, or whether it should be 
retained in the Security Account available, like the principal, to secure and pay 
awards against Iran by the Tribunal. 58 
Iran argued that: a)- the funds in the Security Account were "Iranian 
property"; b)- the Account had a $1 billion ceiling that would be exceeded if, 
prior to the payment of awards interest were credited to the account and it 
never agreed to allow more than $1 billion of its property to remain in the 
Account; c)- any interpretation which would result in the Account's exceeding 
the sum would place an obligation on Iran to which it had not explicitly 
consented. 59 
The United States contended that : a)- the $1 billion ceiling was on 
initial funding only and it did not cover the accrual of interest; b)- the funds in 
the Security Account were in the nature of escrow in the name of the Escrow 
56 Iran-United States, Case A/1, (Issues I, III, IV), 30 July 1982,1 Iran-USCTR. p. 189. This 
Case involves four separate issues concerning the operation of the Security Account. Only 
Issue I is dealt with in this sub-section. 
57 See Paragraphs 6 and 7 of the GD. It is notable that the Security Account is a special 
interest-bearing account with a maximum ceiling of $1 billion established from the Iranian 
funds received from the United States pursuant to the settlement reached by the Algiers 
Declarations. The Account has a minimum level of $500 million and should be 
replenished by Iran whenever it falls below that level. It is to be used for the sole purpose 
of securing the payment of, and paying, awards against Iran rendered by the Tribunal in 
accordance with the CSD. After all arbitral awards against Iran have been satisfied any 
amount remaining in the Security Account should be transferred to Iran. (Para 7 of the 
GD. ) It is notable that the Security Account is an escrow account and the Algerian Central 
Bank is acting as Escrow Agent for the Parties, and that is the Escrow Agent which upon 
receipt of a notification by the President of the Tribunal instructs the depository bank to 
make the payment of the award. None of the Agreements concluded between the parties 
addresses the question of disposition of interest earned on the Security Account. (See 
generally, the Technical Agreements of 17 August 1981,1 Iran-USCTR, pp. 29,38). 
58 Case A/1, op. cit. p. 189. 
59 Ibid, pp. 189-190. 
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Agent and the interest on an escrow account can be paid only at the direction of 
the account holder, which was not authorized by the agreements to direct 
payment of interest to Iran; c)- Iran's property right to the funds in the Security 
Account was a residual one to the funds which remain after all awards to US 
claimants had been satisfied; d)- the question of ownership of the funds should 
be placed in the context of the United States possession of the funds prior to 
the creation of the Account; by virtue of the attachments obtained by US 
claimants. 60 
By a majority of 5 to 4 the Full Tribunal rejected the contentions of the 
Parties and established, quite reasonably, that there was a gap, or at least an 
ambiguity on the question of the disposition of interest earned on the Security 
Account in the relevant agreements concluded between the parties. It also 
found that standard banking usages did not apply to so unique a situation in 
which the question was to determine the rights of the parties to the funds in an 
escrow account. 61 
The Tribunal therefore went on to find a solution in the object and 
purpose of the agreements concluded between the Parties. It said: 
The relevant governing principles established by the Parties are 
a recognition of Iran's rights in its assets, along with agreements 
to resolve disputes by binding arbitration, and the creation of a 
Security Account consisting of Iranian funds in order to satisfy 
awards against Iran. In this context, in the Declarations, the 
interests of Iran, the "owner" of the funds were set against those 
of the United States and its national claimants, who had the 
benefit of the freeze orders and, in some cases, of judicial 
attachments of Iranian assets. The balance was a careful one, 
and was premised on maintaining equilibrium between the 
Parties. 62 
Despite the Tribunal's brief attempt to explain how it has reached the 
very general concept of equilibrium and its failure to explain the latter's 
60 Ibid, p. 190. 
61 Ibid, pp. 190-191. 
62 Ibid, p. 191. 
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relevance to the problem at issue, they remain secondary to why it has resorted 
to that concept which is attributable mainly to its failure to find a legal 
solution. Yet the surprising part is the conclusion it has based upon this 
concept: 
In determining to whom the interest on the Account should be 
remitted as it accrues, the Tribunal should ensure that neither 
Party is favoured... The Tribunal therefore concludes that the 
interest must, as it has been, be credited as it accrues to a 
separate interest-bearing account in the N. V. Settlement Bank 
unless and until the two Governments agree to a different result. 
In the absence of such agreement, the funds in the separate 
account, including interest earned by them, would be finally 
remitted to Iran at the same time as any balance in the Security 
Account. 63 
Then the Tribunal added that in order to avoid any prejudice to Iran and 
to remain in harmony with the principle of equilibrium, Iran should be allowed 
to have access to the funds in the separate account in order to help satisfy its 
replenishment obligation if the need arose. 64 
IV(2)- The rationale behind the operative part of the Tribunal's decision 
in deciding to credit the interest to a separate account which is to be established 
by the Tribunal's order is very vague and can hardly be understood in legal 
terms. A possible explanation may lie in the Tribunal's tendency to implement 
its own sense of fairness rather than legal principles. 
The separate account in reality has no use except for the replenishment 
of the Security Account. The only minor difference visible between this system 
and that of the automatic transfer of the interest to the Security Account, 
63 Ibid, pp. 191-192. It is doubtful that the Tribunal by addressing the issue as "to whom the 
interest on the Account should be remitted" is giving a right impression of the question at 
issue. A proper formulation of the question would be whether the Escrow Agent, the 
account holder, was authorized to transfer the interest to the owner of the funds or it 
should be added to the principal and become available for the payment of claims against 
Iran. 
The decision also did not explain why and how the transfer of the interest to Iran 
could alter the assumed equilibrium between the Parties. 
64 Ibid, p. 192 
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advanced by the United States Government, is in the procedure and formalities 
rather than the result and substance. The question then is why the Tribunal did 
not explicitly adopt such a position? This situation strengthens two 
assumptions : First, the Tribunal has tried to avoid creating the impression of 
basing its decision on the position of the United States ; and second, to preempt 
the argument put forward by Iran regarding the $1 billion ceiling for the 
Security Account without properly addressing it. 
Even accepting the concept of equilibrium, it is doubtful that the 
establishment of the separate account serves that purpose. In searching for a 
decision based upon the premise of equilibrium, the suggestion set forth by the 
President of the Tribunal in his dissenting opinion is closer to that concept than 
that adopted by the Tribunal. The President of the Tribunal in principle agreed 
with the majority that the Tribunal's decision should observe the equilibrium 
between the Parties. However, upon the same premise he suggested that "the 
interest on the Security Account should be shared in equal parts, as it accrues, 
one half being added to the Security Account and the other returning to 
Iran... "65 
It is significant to note that the majority of five was formed because of 
the concurrence of three American Arbitrators with two neutral members of the 
Tribunal. The American members, who in fact had a different conclusion from 
that of the two neutral members, expressed their concurrence in order to form a 
majority. 66 
65 Ibid, Dissenting Opinion Lagergren, p. 199. 
66 Ibid, Separate Opinion, Aldrich, Holtzman and Mosk, p. 200, and pp. 200-202. With 
regard to the circumstances within which the American Arbitrators concurred in the 
decision of the Tribunal, the Iranian Arbitrators argued that the concurring opinion of the 
American members was in fact a dissent and opened the question whether at all a majority 
was achieved. (Ibid, Separate Opinion, Kashani, Shafeiei, 203, p. 204) The opinion of the 
Iranian members despite its title was meant to be a dissent and in fact they refused to sign 
the decision. (Ibid, pp. 197,204. ) 
The Iranian members also argued that the provision for interest in Paragraph 7 of the 
GD was made in response to the concern of Iran, as owner of the principal, and there was 
nothing to support the "presumption that the purpose of providing for the accrual of 
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This situation reveals the relativity within which decisions are usually 
reached in this type of tribunal. In such situations the minority neutral members 
are the real determining factor and the national members of the party who are 
able to work out a compromise solution with the neutral members can secure a 
decision favourable to them. 
IV(3)- Viewing the question without prejudice to the merits of the 
dispute and to the positions of the Parties, the decision of the Tribunal in Case 
A/1 fails to bring about any solution to the dispute at all. 67 Given the total 
ambiguity regarding the rationale behind the establishment of a separate 
account in general and regarding the latter's relevance to the concept of 
equilibrium assumed by the Tribunal in particular, and the Tribunal's indication 
that the dispute should be resolved by the agreement of the Parties, the decision 
to establish a separate account can only be interpreted as disguising the 
Tribunal's failure to reach a solution. 
A fact characteristic to any system of judicial settlement, including 
arbitration, is that the decision or the award should be conclusive and put an 
end to the parties dispute68, or in the words of the International Law 
Commission it should constitute a definitive settlement of the dispute. 69 The 
Tribunal's decision in this Case leaves the dispute exactly where it was before. 
interest was to afford an indirect means of increasing the amounts of the guarantee, 
especially when the amount and its limits had been precisely laid down by the same 
Paragraph 7. " They also added that; the ownership right of Iran to the funds in the Security 
Account and therefore its right to the interest on it was not disputed by the Parties; and no 
obligation on the part of Iran could be presumed in the absence of any provision on the 
contrary and the burden of proof was on the US to prove the existence of an obligation. 
(Ibid, pp. 210-212. ) 
67 The Iranian Arbitrators argued that the Tribunal in fact had not discharged its obligations 
at all and the Parties never demanded the Tribunal to fill the alleged gap or on the basis of 
that gap rewrite the contract for them. (Ibid, pp. 205-206. ) 
68 Julian Lew, "Applicable Law... ", op. cit. p. 12. 
69 Article 32 of the Model Law on Arbitral Procedure of the International Law Commission 
of 1958. See also Articles 54 and 81 of the Hague Conventions for the Pacific Settlement 
of International Disputes of 1899 and 1907 respectively. 
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Looking from a different angle it may be argued that given the unique 
factual and legal situation existing in the Case the Tribunal was facing a 
situation amounting to a lacuna juris. Indeed, one may find some support for 
this view both within the merits of the Case itself and within the lines of 
reasoning that the Tribunal adopted. 
In a reasoning with which the President of the Tribunal in his dissenting 
view also agreed, the Tribunal after declaring that it could find no solution in 
the common intention of the parties, or in banking usages, decided that a 
solution should be found in the object and purpose of the agreements 
concluded between the parties. 7° Given the Tribunal's acknowledgement that 
there was a gap or at least an ambiguity in the law, the concept of equilibrium 
may have been adopted by the Tribunal in response to the existence of that gap, 
regardless of whether such a meaning could be inferred from the object and 
purpose of the Parties' agreements. That is to say, the Tribunal's assertion of the 
concept of equilibrium may be regarded as an attempt to avoid the danger of 
bringing about a finding of non-liquet on the ground of the silence of the law. 
Many arbitration rules expressly provide that "the tribunal may not 
bring a finding of non-liquet on the ground of the silence or obscurity of 
international law or of the compromis. "71 It is notable, for instance, that the 
decision of the International Court of Justice in the Haya de la Torre Case has 
been widely criticised as being tantamount to a finding of non-liquet. In this 
Case the Court expressed that it was unable to give any practical advice on 
various courses that might be open to the Parties for the purpose of terminating 
the Asylum, since it would amount to "departure from its judicial function". 
72 
70 Case A/ 1, op. cit. pp. 190-191,198. 
71 Article 12 of the Draft Convention of the International Law Commission on Arbitral 
Procedure of 1953, reproduced in Wetter, op. cit. Vol 5, p. 228 ; see also Article 11 of the 
Model Rules on Arbitral Procedure of the International Law Commission of 1958; Article 
42(2) of the ICSID Convention. 
72 ICJ Rep, 1951, pp. 79,83. 
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Some writers' interpretation of the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases73 and the 
Barcelona Traction Case74 present the argument that the Court in these Cases 
came close to recognizing that certain issues were not covered by existing rules 
of international law, in the absence of any particular agreement by the 
parties. 75 
It is generally accepted that where the tribunal is authorized to decide 
on the basis of respect for law, a finding of non-liquet should be excluded and 
the tribunal's duty is to find the answer in general principles. 76 The very 
explicit references and discretion given under Article 38(1) of the Statute of the 
ICJ and specifically sections (c) and (d) of the same Article has enabled the 
International Court of Justice and other international tribunals alike to avoid, 
theoretically and practically as well, the question of gaps in international law in 
a less formal manner. 77 
It is also understood and permitted that the prohibition of non-liquet 
would lead the international judicial system to adopt a wider method of judicial 
interpretation and to consider equitable solutions in judicial process. 78 
However, the application of equity as a general principle of law is to be 
distinguished from a decision ex aequo et bono. The first as a legal concept is a 
"general principle directly applicable as law...; while a decision ex aequo et 
bono can only be taken if the parties agree and the court is then freed from the 
strict application of legal rules in order to bring about an appropriate 
settlement... "79 
73 ICJ Rep. 1969, p. 3. 
74 ICJ Rep. 1970, p. 3. 
75 See D. W. Greig, International Law, London, Butterworths, 1976, pp. 31,51. 
76 Simpson and Fox, op. cit. p. 143. Indeed many reject a finding of non-liquet generally on 
theoretical and practical grounds as well. (See generally, Lauterpacht, the Function of 
Law, op. cit. pp. 63-69. ) 
77 George Schwarzenberger, op. Cit., Vol 4, p. 663; Shabtai Rosenne, op. cit., Vol 2, p. 605. 
78 Ibid. 
79 Tunisia/Libya Continental Shelf Case, ICJ Rep. 1982, p. 60. See also Schwarzenberger, 
op. cit. Vol 4, p. 655; and the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, ICJ Rep. 1969, p. 48. 
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On the other hand, the eventual dangers ahead of the application of a 
wider method of interpretation are fully recognized. An obvious example being 
that the court or the tribunal will tend to exceed the consensual basis of its 
jurisdiction and will violate the principle of respect for law. 8° The basic test 
suggested to avoid the excess of power is that the court or the tribunal should 
refrain from rewriting contract and from legislating for the parties. 81 
In the circumstances of the Iran-US Tribunal decision in Case A/1 there 
may be grounds to argue in support of the reasoning of that decision to the 
point that it concludes that any solution should observe the equilibrium 
assumed between the Parties, no matter whether it has been applied as a 
general principle of law or whether it has been inferred from the parties' 
agreements. 
However a possible reasonable solution based upon equity or 
equilibrium would be, as the President of the Tribunal in his dissenting opinion 
suggested, that the interest be shared in equal parts. This solution is 
realistically closer to the concept of equilibrium and at the same time avoids 
the danger of legislating for the parties. 
The decision of the majority, on the other hand, is far from equilibrium 
and has two paradoxical implications. First, it in effect revises the parties' 
agreements and therefore fails the test necessary for a measured interpretation 
required in case of gaps in the law. Second, in the particular circumstances of 
this particular decision it embodies a result paradox to the first point above; the 
suggestion made for the establishment of a separate account is so meaningless 
and without a practical use which falls nothing short of a disguised finding of 
non-liquet. 
80 Shabt. ai Rosennc, op. cit. Vol 1, p. 99; Schwarzenberger, op. cit. Vol 4, pp. 719-720. 
81 Ibid. 
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V. Case A115(I: G)82 
V(1)- Following the transfer by Iran of $3.667 Billion to the Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York and the retirement of Iran's syndicated debts 
pursuant to the conclusion of the Algiers Declarations83, a balance of almost 
$400 million remained with the Federal Reserve. 84 Iran sought return of this 
balance and argued that by not transferring the balance with the Federal 
reserve, the United States had not properly fulfilled its obligations under the 
General Principle A and Paragraph 2 of the GD or Paragraph 2(A) of the 
Undertakings. 85 The United States responded that it had no specific obligations 
with respect to the balance with the Federal Reserve bank under the Algiers 
Accords and that the dispute should be settled by negotiation. 86 
By a majority of 6 to 3, in which the Iranian Arbitrators concurred with 
the neutral members, the Tribunal in principle agreed with all the arguments 
put forward by Iran. After a careful and elaborate examination of relevant 
instruments the Tribunal stated that the obligation to restore Iran's financial 
position to that which existed prior to the freeze order was so comprehensive 
that it could not be construed to mean that Iranian funds not used for the 
purposes defined in the two Declarations might be kept by the United States 
and not returned to Iran. 87 "Such an interpretation would clearly run contrary 
to the letter and spirit of General Principle A... "88 
The Tribunal also added that funds in excess in Dollar Account No. 1 
could not legally be used for any of the purposes defined by the Parties to the 
82 Case No. A/15 (I: G), Award No. ITL 63-A15(I: G)-FT, 20 August 1986,12 Iran-USCTR. 
p. 40. 
83 See Para 2(A) of the Undertakings. 
84 This balance as of the date of the issuance of the Interlocutory Award in Case A15 
amounted to $500 million because of the accrual of interest. 12 Iran-USCTR. p. 42. 
85 Ibid, pp. 43-46. 
86 Ibid, pp. 44-46. 
87 Ibid, p. 48. 
88 Ibid. 
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Accords, and in such a case it seemed difficult to understand why and on what 
basis they could be held indefinitely in this Account. 89 It further noted that 
both Parties agreed during the hearing that "indefinite retention of the excess 
could not have been contemplated. As a matter of fact, it would be absurd". 90 
In concluding its reasoning for the Award the Tribunal stated that 
pursuant to General Principle A the United States made a commitment to 
"restore the financial position of Iran, in so far as possible, to that which 
existed prior to November 14,1979. " Thus it was evident that the financial 
position of Iran would not be restored "in so far as possible" if the Iranian 
assets previously transferred in escrow pursuant to the General Declaration 
were not returned to Iran when they ceased to be usable for the purpose of 
guaranteeing the payment of, and paying, the debts that Iran promised to pay in 
Paragraph 2(A) of the Undertakings. 91 It further expressed that : "The United 
States will not have fully fulfilled its obligations as long as it has not caused 
the return of those assets. "92 
These views have been expressed as part of the reasoning adopted for 
the Award after a careful analysis by the Tribunal. However, the concluding 
part of the Tribunal's award, which should naturally remain in harmony with 
the reasoning of the award -i. e. in this Case, a ruling that the United States had 
breached its obligations under the Algiers Accords, lacks that harmony. 
That is, the conclusion arrived at by the Tribunal is rather surprising 
and somehow contradicts its own reasoning. First of all the Tribunal stopped 
short of a clear and explicit ruling on whether the United States had breached 
its obligations under the Algiers Accords. Secondly, the Tribunal found that: 
89 Ibid, p. 58. 
90 Ibid. 
91 Ibid. 
92 Ibid. 
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Taking the foregoing into account, the Tribunal finds that the 
implementation of General Principle A of the General 
Declaration requires, at this stage, that the two Parties should 
immediately enter into negotiation, and negotiate in good faith 
with a view to determine, by mutual agreement, which claims 
were pending against Dollar Account No. 1 and what amount 
should be kept in this Account in order to pay such claims In the 
same agreement, the Parties should determine what amount of 
the funds presently held in Dollar Account No. 1 is not needed 
to pay the remaining claims pending against this Account, and 
such amount should be transferred to Iran immediately upon 
conclusion of such agreement. In the same agreement, a 
reconciliation of accounts leading to a release and discharge of 
the United States in the administration of Dollar Account No. 1 
should be agreed upon by the Parties. Should the Parties be 
unable to arrive at such an agreement within a reasonable time 
after the issuance of this Award, they might apply to this 
Tribunal, individually or jointly, in order to resolve the 
remaining difficulties. 93 
V(2)- In evaluating this Award two points should primarily be borne in 
mind. First, the Award has been rendered as an interlocutory award. Therefore 
the Tribunal has reserved the option to render a final award which might be in 
line with its reasoning in this interlocutory Award. However, the question of 
why the Tribunal has decided to issue an interlocutory award instead of a final 
award raises a certain curiosity as to whether the interlocutory Award has been 
used to cover the mediatory intentions behind the Tribunal's ruling. Second, it 
is not entirely clear whether or not in the Tribunal's view the United States has 
acted in contravention of its obligations under the Accords. If the answer is in 
the affirmative, why then has the Tribunal stopped short of a clear-cut ruling in 
this respect? If the answer is in the negative, on the basis of what obligations is 
the United States obliged to negotiate with a view to returning the funds in 
excess to Iran? Perhaps it is possible to make a third assumption, that the 
obligation to negotiate is a technical prerequisite for any future rulings on the 
issue by the Tribunal. The latter could be regarded as nothing less than a mere 
justification for a mediated solution. In short, the rationale behind the 
93 Ibid, pp. 62-63. 
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imposition of negotiation is not entirely clear, the mere existence of this 
ambiguity is itself liable to criticism. 
Furthermore, what strengthens the assumption regarding the mediatory 
efforts of the Tribunal in this Case is the intention declared in the decision that 
the Parties should agree on a "reconciliation of accounts leading to a release 
and discharge (emphasis added) of the United States in the administration of 
Dollar Account No. 1. " This part of the decision has been adopted in response 
to the United States' request regarding the release, discharge and indemnity by 
Iran of the United States' conduct with regard to Dollar Account No. 1 and 
waiver of any challenge to such conduct. 94 Consequently, the main aim behind 
the adoption of the Interlocutory Award, as we will see later, is to pave the way 
for a compromise decision ; on the one hand, the funds in excess in Dollar 
Account No. I be returned to Iran and on the other the United States be 
indemnified and released from any claims of breaches of obligation regarding 
its conduct under the Algiers Accords. 
Finally, the Award has left the parties in a position that both have 
interpreted for their own cause. While the Iranian Arbitrators have expressed 
that the Award confirms that the United States is in breach of its obligations95, 
the American members, who have dissented, maintain that it is in accord with 
their view that the United States has not violated the Algiers Accords-96 They 
both also agree that this is a mediated solution rather than a decision strictly 
based on law. 97 
V(3)- Although the express indications by the arbitrators of both Parties 
are clear enough to demonstrate the effects of meta-legal and mediatory 
94 Ibid, p. 62. 
95 Ibid, Concurring Opinions of Arbitrator Bahrami and Ansari, respectively pp. 87, and 89- 
91. 
96 Ibid, Dissenting Opinion of Arbitrators Holtzman, Aldrich, and Brower, p. 74. 
97 Ibid, Dissenting Opinion of American Arbitrators, p. 80, and Concurring Opinion of 
Bahraini, pp. 82-83. 
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considerations in the conclusion arrived at by the Tribunal, some may argue 
that the obligation placed upon the Parties to negotiate by the Interlocutory 
Award rests purely on judicial grounds. 
Having noticed the limits that the scope of this Chapter imposes upon a 
full judicial analysis of the Case, it is useful to note, briefly, the recognition in 
international law that a decision ordering the parties to negotiate can be legal in 
origin and scope. 98 The most obvious evidence of this recognition may be 
found in the Tacna Arica Arbitration99, the Case of Railway Traffic Between 
Lithuania and Poland100, the Lake Lanoux Arbitration101, and the North Sea 
Continental Shelf Cases. 102 
The scope of application of this notion, however, remains very much 
limited to special circumstances - i. e.; the duty to negotiate arises from specific 
engagements in which the issues are not covered by the existing rules of 
international law. 103 The emerging concept of cooperation or duty to negotiate 
has basically developed in the context of relations between neighbouring States 
regarding common natural resources. 104 The legal basis upon which this 
concept has been premised is explained in the following terms: 
In effect, in order to appreciate in its essence the necessity for 
prior agreement, one must envisage the hypothesis in which the 
interested States cannot reach agreement. In such case, it must 
be admitted that the State which is normally competent has lost 
its right to act alone as a result of the unconditional and 
arbitrary opposition of another State. This amounts to admitting 
a right of assent, or a right of veto, which at the discretion of 
98 See Dissenting Opinion, Judge Gros, Tunisia/Libya Continental Shelf Case, ICJ Rep. 
1982,3, p. 144. 
99 19 AJIL, 393 (1925), p. 398. 
100 PCIJ Rep. 1931, Ser A/B, No. 42,108, p. 116; reproduced in Hudson, World Court 
Reports, Vol 2 (1927-1932), 750, pp. 755-756. 
101 24 ILR (1957), 101, p. 128. 
102 ICJ Rep. 1969, pp. 47-48. Also note Paragraphs 73-79 of the Judgement of the ICJ in the 
merits of the Fisheries Jurisdiction Case, (U. K v Iceland), ICJ Rep. 1974, pp. 31-33. 
103 The North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, op. cit. pp. 47-48. 
104 See Rainer Lagoni, "Oil and Gas Deposits Across National Frontiers", 73 AJIL, (1979), 
215, pp. 233-239. 
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one State paralyses the exercise of the territorial jurisdiction of 
another. 105 
The duty to negotiate may also arise from the prior agreement of the parties to 
negotiate. 10 
It is significant to note that an undue application of this notion in a 
judicial decision would transcend the judicial function of the adjudicating body 
and may amount to an unauthorized decision of ex aequo et bono or to an 
unasked judicial recommendation. 107 For instance, the International Court of 
Justice's reference in the Haya de la Torre Case to the Latin American 
traditions of courtesy and to the hope that "the Parties would be able to find a 
practical satisfactory solution" 108 has been regarded as amounting to an 
implied recommendation to the Parties to settle the matter by negotiation. 109 
Such recommendations would clearly be in excess of power and may 
undermine the validity of the tribunal's decision. Schwarzenberger has pointed 
out that: 
To give unasked advice from the Bench in contentious 
proceedings would be more than officiousness. It would mean 
exceeding the consensual basis of the Court's jurisdiction and 
just fall short of a breach of Non ultra petita partium rule. 110 
Judging in the light of the above mentioned principles, nothing in Case 
A 15(I: G), including the Tribunal's own reasoning indicates that: a)- the 
tribunal was unable to find a breach of obligations by the United States without 
the need for prior negotiations; b)- or the existing circumstances could justify 
105 Lake Lanoux Arbitration, 24 ILR, p. 128. 
106 E. g. Tacna Arica Arbitration, op. cit. 19 AJIL, (1925), 393, p. 398. 
107 See generally, Fitzmaurice, The Law and Procedure of the International Court 
of Justice, Cambridge, Grotius Publications, 1986, Vol 2, pp. 558-563. 
108 ICJ Rep. 1951, p. 83. 
109 Fitzmaurice, op. cit. Vol 2, pp. 558-563. 
110 Schwarzenberger, op. Cit. Vol 4, p. 720. See also Kenneth Carlston, "The Process of 
International Arbitration", op. cit. pp. 155-169. 
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the decision ordering the Parties to negotiate. Nor did the Parties confer upon 
the Tribunal the power to mediate between them. 
The only possible explanation which might mitigate the criticism lies in 
the interlocutory nature of the Award. It serves the Tribunal to disguise its 
compromise solution and to evade a finding of the breach of obligations, and 
provides the United States with the opportunity to escape the retrospective 
consequences of such an action. However, if the negotiations failed within the 
four-month period prescribed in the Award111 the Tribunal would have to take 
a decision in line with its own reasoning in the Interlocutory Award. Even then 
the language adopted by the Tribunal is not very promising regarding any 
future finding of the breach of obligations and the award of damages. 112 
V(4)- Indeed, further developments proved this assumption. In fact, the 
Interlocutory Award had served the Tribunal to convey its message to the 
Parties that it was not prepared to decide wholly in favour of only one party, 
namely Iran, whose arguments were expressly or by implication accepted by 
the Tribunal. The circumstances created prior and pursuant to the issuance of 
the Interlocutory Award clearly indicate a tendency on the part of the Tribunal 
to satisfy the United States demand that it be released from the obligations 
regarding the administration of Dollar Account No. l. However, judging from 
the basis of the findings in the Interlocutory Award, this could only be 
established if Iran was brought to a situation in which it was ready to make an 
undertaking in this regard as a bargaining chip in return for the transfer of the 
excess funds. In fact, it appears that the Tribunal has carefully avoided making 
any express pronouncements as regards the breach of obligations by the United 
States in order to pave the way for a middle ground solution. 
111 Interlocutory Award in Case A15(I: G), op. cit. 12 Iran-USCTR. p. 64. 
112 Paragraph 17 of the GD gives the Tribunal competence to award damages arising from any 
such breaches of obligations. 
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Later, after the negotiations between the Parties had failed, something 
which was predictable, the Tribunal was asked by Iran to implement the 
Interlocutory Award. 113 In its Partial Award of May 4,1987, the Tribunal was 
easily able to make a decision without any technical difficulty. The Tribunal 
was easily able to establish that only $63 million of the funds in Dollar 
Account No. 1 were subject to outstanding claims and the funds in excess of 
that, which amounted to more than $450 million, were not subject to any 
claims whatsoever. 114 Therefore the Tribunal ordered that the amount in 
excess of $63 million in Dollar Account No. 1 should immediately be 
transferred to Iran. 115 However, this time Iran had already materialized its 
earlier hints 116 to give a complete release to the United States and to waive any 
challenge to the United States administration of Dollar Account No. 1.117 
Therefore it is not surprising that a considerable part of the Tribunal's Partial 
Award is devoted to a comprehensively worded decision which discharges the 
United States of its obligations in this regard, for which the only legal authority 
that the Tribunal is able to cite is Iran's undertaking to this effect. 118 No doubt, 
113 Case No. A15(I: G), Award No. 306-A15(I: G)-FT, 4 May 1987,14 Iran-USCTR. p. 311. 
114 Ibid, p. 313. 
115 Ibid, pp. 316,319. 
116 During the hearing for the Interlocutory Award Iran had hinted that it was ready to give a 
complete release to the United States, apparently in return for the transfer of the funds to 
Iran. (See the Interlocutory Award No. ITL 63-A15(I: G)-FT, 20 August 1986,12 Iran- 
USCTR. p. 62. 
117 Case No. A15(I: G), Award No. 306-A15(I: G)-FT, 4 May 1987,14 IRAN-USCTR. pp. 
316-317. 
118 Ibid, p. 317. This part of the Tribunal's Award reads: 
"Having duly considered the views of the Parties and the 
aforementioned declarations of Iran, the Tribunal declares that, 
upon transfer to Iran of the amount determined in this Award, 
the United States and the Federal Reserve Bank shall be 
released and forever discharged from any claims, counterclaims, 
setoffs, liabilities, rights, obligations, demands, and causes of 
action, whether in rem or in personem or otherwise, past or 
present or future, known or unknown, and from any other 
matters which Iran, including its agencies, entities under its 
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in such a situation the case for a decision on the breach by the United States of 
its obligations under the Algiers Accords is automatically out of the question 
for the Tribunal. 
This time, not surprisingly, the American Arbitrators have concurred in 
the decision despite their earlier dissent to the adoption of the Interlocutory 
Award. Something which they have attributed to the inappropriateness of re- 
opening issues previously decided by majority vote. 119 However, a careful 
reading of their concurring view, which is entirely devoted to the issue of the 
release, discharge and indemnity of the United States obligations stated in the 
partial Award, reveals that the inclusion of the release in the Tribunal's Award 
has been the main reason encouraging them to concur in the decision. 120 
Interestingly, they take up the issue to emphasise that Iran's declarations 
of release were publicly made to the United States and to the Tribunal "in order 
to induce the transfer of the funds and were manifestly intended to be effective 
upon transfer of funds. Nothing compelled Iran to undertake the obligations 
expressed in these declarations. " 121 
The above statement by the American Arbitrators which may legally be 
a right view, however does not reveal the realities behind the proceedings and 
the Tribunal's conduct of the Case which in effect caused Iran to undertake 
such obligations in return for the transfer of its funds. 
control, and their successors and/or assigns, or any third 
persons, has raised, or could have raised, or may in the future 
raise in connection with, related to, or arising out of payments 
from, investment of, or any other actions taken in the course of 
the administration by the Federal Reserve bank of New York of 
Dollar Account No. 1, except for payments from, investment of, 
or any other actions taken after the date of the transfer referred 
to above in the administration of the funds remaining in the 
Account. " 
119 Ibid, Concurring, Opinion of Holtzman, Aldrich and Brower, p. 320. 
120 Ibid, pp. 320-323. 
121 Ibid, p. 321. 
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VI. The Influence of Meta-Legal Factors 
The nature of the motives and meta-legal considerations which affect 
some of the decisions of the Tribunal remain unknown and possibly diverse in 
category, and only certain guesses can be made. A prime concern seems to be 
the need to avoid antagonizing the Parties over certain politically or 
economically sensitive issues and secure their cooperation in the proceedings. 
This is a factor which is more than ever visible in the Iran-US Tribunal due to 
its multi-case and semi-permanent nature which requires long term cooperation 
by the Parties. In fact, it is believed that the success of any third-party 
mechanism depends largely upon its ability to "convince the disputants to 
compromise" on as many issues as possible, thus freeing the dispute settlers to 
resolve only those questions that are remaining. 122 Upon this theory some 
writers belive that the members of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal have 
demonstrated such talents and experience in convincing the parties to 
cooperate. 123 
There can be no objection to the theory that an arbitral body should try 
to convince the parties to cooperate or to compromise. It is, however, doubtful 
whether the tribunal itself should reflect such practical and mediatory trends in 
its decisions. Moreover, the limits and criteria of the application of this notion 
are undefined and unclear and it may not necessarily be applied on an equal 
basis with regard to both parties, rather it will depend on and vary according to 
122 Gerald Aksen, "The Iran-US Claims Tribunal and the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules - An 
Early Comment", in Jan C Shultz and A. van den Berg (eds), The Art of Arbitration: 
Essays on International Arbitration, Kluwer, the Netherlands, 1982,1, p. 5. 
123 Certain administrative and procedural decisions of the Tribunal have also been regarded as 
such: 
"Directive No 1 is also important and helpful because it 
provides several subtitles that demonstrate this panel's savvy. To 
begin with, the deftness with which the Tribunal avoided 
deciding what might otherwise have been tough questions 
becomes evident... " (Ibid). 
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the extent and strength of the leverages that either party enjoys in forcing the 
Tribunal to adopt such policies. This is where the idea becomes destructive and 
contrary to the principle of the equality of the parties. For instance, since Iran's 
power of manoeuvre in this regard is very limited due to the existence of the 
Security Account, the adoption of meta-legal considerations favourable to Iran 
may happen far less usually and may be of far less significant nature than those 
applied in similar circumstances in favour of its counter-parts, the Americans. 
In addition, it should be borne in mind that international arbitration has 
gradually developed itself as primarily a judicial system of dispute settlement. 
A brief glance at the historical development of international arbitration reveals 
that the present-day international arbitration is primarily designed to be a 
process of decision-making according to law. 124 
Nevertheless, such considerations have been and to a certain degree 
remain a reality in the arbitral process. It is submitted that the tendency to 
adopt compromise solutions has long been a characteristic of international 
arbitral practice. Generally international tribunals have a tendency to avoid 
decisions wholly adopting the position of one side or the other. More generally, 
they tend to adopt mediated solutions particularly where there is factual or 
legal uncertainty. 125 
Furthermore, there are those who explain this tendency on the 
theoretical grounds as well as practical ones. The theory is based on the 
premise that "all forms of third-party dispute settlement may be viewed as 
variations of a single basic social structure, a triad in which two persons unable 
to resolve a dispute call on the assistance of some third party. " 126 The logic of 
this structure, it is argued, necessitates the effort "to prevent breakdown of the 
124 For a review see generally, Louis B. Sohn, "The Function of International Arbitration 
Today", 108 Recueil des Cours, I, (1963), 1, pp. 41-59. 
125 Ted Stein, "Jurisprudence and Jurists' Prudence : The Iranian-Forum Clause Decisions of 
the Iran-US Claims Tribunal", 78 AJIL (1984), 1, pp. 34-35. 
126 Ibid, p. 32. 
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triad by way of eliciting the consent of the loser to the decision rendered", in 
order to secure his compliance with the decision. 127 Upon this premise the 
application of the mediatory solutions becomes justified not as "an antithesis to 
judging but rather as a component in judging. " 128 
Therefore, it is claimed, an analysis which merely focuses on legal 
norms, however authoritative from the legal point of view, may be an 
incomplete assessment of a tribunal's performance. Because it fails to view the 
question from a perspective in which the "application of legal norms is only 
one of the devices" - not even the primary device - "that a tribunal may employ 
to help it accomplish its mission as a conflict resolver. " 129 In arguing in 
support of this view the question is put: 
How it is that a tribunal composed of highly competent 
individuals, further enlightened by the parties' presentations, can 
do so woeful a job? Explanations premised on temporary 
weakness of mind or lapses of scholarship are inherently 
unconvincing. Explanations premised on institutional context 
and function may have more power. " 130 
VI(1)- Thus, viewed from this perspective, some find certain decisions 
of the Tribunal "richly mediated" solutions. 131 A clear example of such 
solutions may be found in the Iranian-Forum Clause decisions of the Full 
Tribunal. 132 In these decisions, it is argued, that the overall approach of the 
majority indicates its acceptance of the basic US premise, i. e. "that no 
127 Ibid. 
128 Ibid, p. 33. 
129 Ibid, p. 35. 
130 Ibid. 
131 Ibid, p. 42. 
132 See generally, Gibbs and Hill, Inc v Tavanir, Award No. ITL-1-6-FT, 1 Iran-USCTR. p. 
236; Halliburton Co v Doreen/IMCO, Award No. ITL-2-51-FT, Ibid, p. 242; HNTB v 
Iran, Award No. ITL-3-68-FT, Ibid, p. 248; George W. Drucker, JR. v Foreign Transaction 
Co. Award No. ITL-4-121-FT, Ibid, p. 252; T. C. S. B., Inc. v Iran, Award No. ITL-5-140- 
FT, Ibid, p. 261; Ford Aerospace v The Air Force of Iran, Award No. ITL-6-159-FT, Ibid, 
p. 268; Zokor International, Inc. v Iran, Award No. ITL-7-254-FT, Ibid, p. 271; Stone and 
Webster v National Petrochemical Co., Award No. ITL-8-293-FT, Ibid, p. 274; Dresser 
Industries, Inc. v Iran, Award No. ITL-9-466-FT, [bid, p. 281. All Awards issued on 5 
November 1982. 
143 
American should be required to seek a remedy in an Iranian court". 133 
However, by rejecting certain politically sensitive US arguments and by 
adopting a line of reasoning which did not embody that sensitivity the Tribunal 
was able to achieve almost the same result, while at the same time it was able 
to elicit Iran's consent as the main loser in these decisions. 134 
The Iranian Forum-Selection decisions of the Tribunal consisted of nine 
test Cases, as referred to above, in which the Tribunal attempted to decide the 
scope of its jurisdiction under the exclusionary provision of Article 2 of the 
CSD. Article 2(1) of the CSD excludes from the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, 
inter alia, "claims arising under a binding contract between the parties 
specifically providing that any disputes thereunder shall be within the sole 
jurisdiction of the competent Iranian courts, in response to the Majlis 
position. " 135 
Details of the issue and arguments of the Parties and the decisions of 
the Tribunal are irrelevant to our study in this Section. What is relevant here is 
the point raised by the United States argument concerning the enforceability of 
the Iranian forum Clauses. After contending that the exclusionary provision of 
Article 2(1) should be narrowly interpreted in a way that the particular choice 
133 Stein, op. cit. p. 44. 
134 Ibid, pp. 42-44. 
The word "consent" does not necessarily mean the affirmative vote of the loser party's 
arbitrators to a particular decision. It rather refers to the acceptance by the losing party of 
the decision rendered against that party by the tribunal. As indeed, in the Forum Clause 
decisions the Iranian Arbitrators dissented from the majority's views rendered against Iran. 
For the judicial analysis of the Forum Selection Cases see generally, Ibid, pp. 1-52; 
Arthur L. George, "Changed Circumstances and the Iranian Claims Arbitration: 
Application of Forum Selection Clauses and Frustration of Contract", 16 Geo. Wash. J. 
Int'l L. & Econ. (1982), 335, pp. 335-376; A. F. Lownfeld, " The Iran-US Claims Tribunal. 
An Interim Appraisal", 38 Arbitration Journal, (Dec. 1983), 14, pp. 16-21; R. Hakan 
Berglin, "Treaty Interpretation and the Impact of Contractual Choice of Forum Clauses on 
the Jurisdiction of International Tribunals; The Iranian Forum Clause Decisions of the 
Iran-United States Claims Tribunal", 21 Texas Int'l L. J., (1985), 39, pp. 39-65; and Mark 
B. Feldman, "Ted L. Stein on the Iran-US Claims Tribunal - Scholarship Par Excellence", 
61 Wash. L. R. 0 986), 997, pp. 997-1005. 
135 For a background study, sec, Supra Chapter 1 pp... 
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of forum clause should meet all the specific requirements of that Article, the 
United States in addition argued that the choice of forum clause had to be 
"binding". 136 Upon this premise the United States argued that the changes that 
had taken place in Iran and its legal system were fundamental enough to 
preclude a fair and reasonable expectation of relief, and therefore none of the 
choice of forum Clauses were binding. 137 
This was certainly a sensitive question for Iran which in fact required 
the Tribunal to examine the "quality of Iranian Justice. " 138 Iran rejected this 
and other US arguments, adding that the US argument "incorporates an acute 
political issue which may not be raised before the Tribunal" and that, 
entertaining this argument by the Tribunal "would eventually be ineffective 
and inconsequential". 139 Iran also argued that the exclusionary clause of 
Article 2(1) should be interpreted broadly and upon that a contract containing a 
general reference to governance of Iranian laws or courts in one form or 
another should be excluded from the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. 140 
VI(2)- The overall approach of the Tribunal indicates its adoption of 
the US position except to the meaning of the word "binding" which it regarded 
as redundant. 14 1, and added that, "it is not generally the task of this Tribunal, 
or any arbitral tribunal, to determine the enforceability of choice of forum 
Clauses in contracts. "142 As a result, the Tribunal found that only six of the 
136 Memorial of the Government of the United States of America in Gibbs and Hill, Inc v 
Tavanir, op. cit. as quoted in Stein, op. cit. pp. 4-5. Unfortunately the Reports published by 
the Grotius (Iran-USCTR. ) do not provide any independent reference to the memorials of 
the parties. 
137 Ibid, p. 6. 
138 Thid, p. 8. 
139 Memorial of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, in Gibbs and Hills, Inc v 
Tavanir, op. cit. as quoted in Stein, op. cit. p. 8. 
140 Ibid, p. 7. 
141 Halliburton Co v Doreen/IMCO, Case No 51, Award No. ITL-2-51-FT, 1 Iran-USCTR. p. 
242; George W. Drucker, JR. v Foreign Transaction Co., Ibid, p. 256; and TCSB, Inc v 
Iran, Ibid, p. 266. 
142 Ibid, respectively, pp. 245,255,264-265. 
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nineteen Clauses considered in the above nine Cases met the specific 
requirements of Article 2(1) exclusion and the rest fell within the jurisdiction 
of the Tribunal. 143 
The Tribunal's refusal to give effect to the word "binding" and its 
decision not to examine the enforceability of the choice of forums Clauses, has 
been viewed by some writers as being based on the political considerations 
such as, avoiding Iran's sensitivity in this regard and securing its cooperation, 
than the legal principles. 1' However, this view is subject to controversy as 
some other writers find the tribunal's approach in avoiding the examination of 
the enforceability of the forum selection Clauses as being consistent with legal 
principles and the practice of international tribunals. 145 
The solution reached in the Iranian-Forum Selection Cases seems to be 
of an additional dimension, in the sense that its process of adoption seems to 
have been influenced by more general factors, i. e. political considerations and 
the need to secure the parties' cooperation, rather than the mere internal politics 
of the Tribunal as a tripartite arbitrating body. Indeed in many other cases in 
which elements of mediation are evident, including those in which there are 
indications that compromise has been a prerequisite for the formation of a 
majority, it cannot definitely be said that this has been the only reason - or the 
primary reason - forcing the Tribunal in the direction of a compromise 
solution. However it can certainly be said that it has been one of the forces 
working in this direction. 
143 See generally the decisions of the Tribunal in these nine Cases referred to above. 
144 Stein, op. cit. pp. 36-44. 
145 R. H. Berglin, op. cit. pp. 42-43, and generally, pp. 39-65; and Lownfeld, op. cit. pp. 18-19. 
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VII. Internal Politics 
The extent of the role of the internal politics of the Tribunal arising 
from its composition cannot easily be established. This is due to the fact that 
deliberations in all arbitration tribunals, or any other form of judicial settlement 
are confidential, and therefore a judicial analysis has to confine itself to the 
examination of the symptoms, that is the decisions rendered by the Tribunal in 
question. 
Furthermore, in international arbitral tribunals, and the Iran-US 
Tribunal alike, separate opinions of the neutral members are rarely expressed 
and then, unlike the indications given by the national members they do not 
express how a majority was formed. This, however, does not mean that the 
neutral members do not compromise their positions and it is only the national 
members who take bargaining positions. 
Surprisingly, in a series of statements or individual opinions from the 
members of the Tribunal which ironically have emerged as a result of the 
tension between the arbitrators, some insights of the deliberative process, and 
consequently, of the internal politics of the process of decision-making can be 
found. These instances, though few in number can provide useful samples for 
the examination of the issue. 
VII(I)- Judge Sani, the Iranian Arbitrator, in a series of statements 
which explain his dissenting view and the reasons behind his resignation, and 
his non-signing of one of the awards and non-participation in the deliberations 
of the two other awards, inter alia, gives some account of the deliberative 
process within the Tribunal. We will quote some of the relevant parts of these 
statements at length in order to provide a clear picture of the situation. 
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In Granite State Machine Co, Inc v Iran146, he writes that Judge 
Mangard who had made an earlier promise to Mr Mosk147, in order to abide by 
that promise was looking for some sort of temporary expedient exclusively 
related to Case No. 30, declared in a Chamber meeting that "he and Mr Mosk 
had agreed upon a rate of 8.50 percent damages, provided that I join the 
majority... "148 
Recording the events following his resignation which led to the 
disruption of the above mentioned proceedings and deliberations, he further 
adds that, during the meeting which transpired between Judge Mangard, Mr 
Mosk and Mr Hosseini149 following Judge Sani's resignation, Judge Mangard 
and Mr Mosk finally "agreed to issue an award on the basis of the same rate of 
8.50 percent, allowing me to write my dissenting opinion. I expressed my 
agreement with this arrangement... " 150 
In another statement issued by Judge Sani in protest to the issuance of 
the Award in Raygo Wagner151, Case No. 17, by the two members of Chamber 
Three in his absence which had been preceded by his refusal to participate in 
the deliberations due to resignation, we may find more information to serve our 
discussion. 
He writes that Dr. Kashani152 telephoned him to state that as a result of 
his efforts in concert with Mr Hosseini, Mr Mangard and Mr Mosk had : 
146 Granite State Machine Co, Inc. v Iran, Case No. 30, Award No. 18-30-3,15 December, 
1982,1 Iran-USCTR. p. 442. 
147 Mr Mangard and Mr Mosk were respectively Chairman and the American member of 
Chamber Three of the Tribunal. 
148 Sani, Opinion in Case No. 30, op. cit. p. 453. 
149 Mr Hosseini was the then "Iranian Legal assistant" to the Tribunal and to Judge Sani. 
150 Sani, Opinion, in Case No. 30, op. cit. p. 453. 
151 Raygo Wagner Equipment Co. v Star Line Iran Co. Case No. 17, Award No. 20-17-3,15 
Dec. 1982,1 Iran-USCTR. p. 411. 
152 Dr. Kashani was the then Iranian member of Chamber One of the Tribunal. 
148 
promised that if I were prepared to meet with them they would 
refrain from taking action on Cases Nos. 17 and 132, but they 
would be compelled to file Case No. 30. I considered 
discussions under such conditions to be not only inconsistent 
with legal principles but also morally improper. Yet, for much 
greater considerations and seeking the advice of Mr kashani and 
Mr Hosseini, I accepted the proposal and met Mr Mangard and 
Mr Mosk outside of the Court premises. 153 
He further adds: 
In this meeting... I expressly stated that my resignation was 
utterly unrelated to that of Mr Bellet. In order to receive 
assurances in this respect, Mr Mangard and Mr Mosk suggested 
that to avoid further confusion I withdraw my resignation. 
Following these discussions, I presented two proposals, one, 
that if Mr Mangard and Mr Mosk intended to issue an award in 
Case No. 30, they do so in keeping with the decision they last 
made, namely, to assign a damages rate of 8.50 percent. A 
consensus was finally arrived at between Mr Mangard and me to 
withdraw the decisions issued in Cases Nos. 17 and 132, and to 
review those Cases on 15 January 1983. Mr Mosk also evinced 
no opposition to this arrangement, though he did state that he 
would have to discuss it with his American colleagues. As a 
minimum condition, I endorsed the withdrawal of Awards 
issued in the two above mentioned Cases and I promised to 
return to the Hague in order to determine, at least, what was to 
be done with respect to those two Cases. 154 
VII(2)- The fact that these statements disclose the process of 
deliberations, which should in principle remain secret155, reveals the extent of 
the tension within the Tribunal which itself is important regarding the other 
structural aspects of a tripartite tribunal, for which a separate study is 
153 Sani, Reasons for Not Signing Decision in Case No. 17,1 Iran-USCTR. p. 416. A rather 
identical statement regarding the reasons for not signing the decision was also filed in 
Case No. 132 by Judge Sani. (Rexnord Inc. v Iran, Case No. 132, Award No. 21-132-3,10 
January 1983,2 Iran-USCTR. 6, p. 14. ) 
It is notable that these two Cases are not simply cases of refusal to sign the award by 
an arbitrator, unlike what the case seems to be in Case No. 30, they involve non- 
participation in parts of the deliberations and any way the question of the authority of a 
truncated tribunal has been raised as a result. This is itself an important issue in 
international arbitration. We will deal with this problem later in Chapter 5 below. 
154 Ibid. 
155 See paragraph 2 of the Note to Article 31 of the Tribunal Rules which requires that the 
Tribunal should deliberate in private and its deliberations should be and remain secret. See 
also Article 54(3) of the Statute of the ICJ for a similar provision. 
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needed. 156 However those parts relevant to our study in this subsection which 
emerge from these statements are clear enough. Even the counter-statements 
made by the American arbitrator157 and the Chairman of Chamber Three158, 
156 See Secions B and C of this Chapter. 
157 See "Comments of Richard M. Mosk with Respect to Mr Jahangir Sani's Reasons for Not 
Signing the Decision made by Mr Mangard and Mr Mosk in Case No. 17", (1 Iran- 
USCTR. p. 424), and "Concurring Opinion of R. M. Mosk in Rexnord Inc. v Iran, case No. 
132, (2 Iran-USCTR. p. 27). 
Judge Mosk argued that Judge Sani's statement violated the principle of 
confidentiality of deliberations, and added that an arbitrator should not participate in or aid 
efforts to attack Tribunal awards, because to do so may cast doubt on that arbitrator's 
impartiality. (Comments of Mosk in Case No. 17, op. cit. p. 424). Upon the principle of 
confidentiality of deliberations Judge Mosk insisted that Judge Sani's statement was not 
part of the award and should be subject to the tribunal's confidentiality standards, i. e. it 
should not be filed or circulated. If Judge Sani's document received any other treatment, 
Judge Mosk expressed, his counter-statement should receive the same treatment and 
circulation so that the record would be complete and accurate. (Ibid, p. 428. ) He also added 
that; judge Sani's representatives stated (to him) that Judge Sani might reconsider his 
purported resignation if the substance of this and the other awards was changed; late in the 
day on December 15,1982, he and Judge Mangard met with Judge Sani at a hotel because 
he refused to come to the Tribunal premises; Judge Sani "demanded revision of this and 
other awards as a condition of his not resigning", but he and judge Mangard made 
"absolutely no promises" to Judge Sani; nevertheless, he and Judge Mangard agreed to tell 
Judge Sani that the award would be held in the registry until January 5,1983, that there 
would be discussions concerning the Case on January 4,1983, and that "an award in the 
case would be issued promptly thereafter (either the one on file or a new or revised one 
resulting from any further discussions). " (Ibid, p. 429. ) Further Mr Mosk added that he did 
not feel it necessary to give a point by point rebuttal to every assertion of Judge Sani, but 
other facts and representations by him were in correct. (Ibid, p. 427. ) 
Arbitrator Mosk's comments in case No. 17 provoked a reply from Judge Sani, in 
which he argued that as a result of Mr Mosk's statements certain facts could then be said 
were established. Among them he counts that: He consented to reconsider his resignation 
if the awards in Case No. 30 and certain other cases were changed; he met with Mr 
Mangard and Mr Mosk late on 15 December at "Promenade Hotel, as I had refused to 
come to the Tribunal premises. "; he proposed in that meeting that deliberations on the 
relevant cases be continued; no objection, "particularly, from Mr Mosk was made against 
my proposal... " (Mr Jahangir Sani's Reply to Mr Mosk's Comments Concerning Case No. 
17,1 Iran-USCTR. 428, p. 434). 
Judge Sani further in rejection of Mr Mosk's contention that he made no promise to 
him writes: "If so, it seems very strange that, contrary to a legal requirement, awards 
properly signed and filed were not promptly served to the parties, and necessary 
notifications were not sent... " (Ibid. ) 
Finally, Judge Sani attached testimonies from Mr Kashani and Mr Hosseini in support 
of his original contentions and a certificate from the Co- registrar of the Tribunal 
indicating that Judge Mangard had informed the registry that the awards in Cases Nos. 17 
and 132 should be withheld until further notice, and that a memorandum by Judge 
Mangard had requested the registry to return the Award filed in Case No. 132 to him. 
(Ibid, pp. 437-438. ) 
158 Nils Mangard, "Notes on Judge Jahangir Sani's Refusal to sign the Awards Issued in cases 
Nos. 30,17, and 132", 13 June 1983, filed with the Tribunal on 14 July 1983. 
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which are intended to rebut Judge Sani's statements, are not of such primary 
relevance as to weaken the conclusion that meta-legal considerations have 
played a considerable role in the decision-makings of the Tribunal. In fact, 
Judge Mosk recalling the principle of confidentiality of deliberations in 
international arbitration expresses that such a confidentiality is particularly 
essential in arbitration proceedings such as these, in which arbitrators may be 
forced to continue deliberations until a majority, and probably a compromise 
solution has been reached. Judge Mosk also argued that Judge Sani used his 
purported or threatened resignation to attempt to extract changes in the awards 
and delays in the proceedings. 160 
Indeed, these statements not only indicate the bargaining situation in 
the decision-makings but also reveal certain peculiarities, i. e. that there can be 
a compromise and at the same time a dissent. Arbitrator Mosk is his comments 
to Arbitrator Sani's aforementioned statements writes: 
From all of Judge Sani's writings it appears that his idea of a 
compromise is an award that includes provisions he desires in 
return for his signature on the award as a dissenting 
arbitrator. - 161 
The statement made by the Chairman of Chamber Three also 
demonstrates a kind of bargaining tendencies in relation to the decision-making 
process between the members of the Tribunal. He recounts that in a meeting 
between the three members of Chamber Three on 4 January 1983, he proposed: 
"... that we should have a free and open discussion of Cases 
Nos. 17 and 132. If we should agree on different solutions of the 
disputes than those contained in the awards previously filed, 
these awards would be withdrawn and new awards would be 
filed. If not, Judge Sani could choose to sign the previous 
awards but attach a dissenting opinion. "162 
159 Comments of Mosk in Case No. 17, op. Cit. p. 424. 
160 [bid, p. 427. 
161 Concurring Opinion of Mosk, in Rexnord Inc. v Iran, Case No. 132,2 Iran-USCTR. p. 28. 
162 "Notes" by Judge Mangard, op. cit. p. 7. Judge Mangard further recounts that a discussion 
then ensued between him and Judge Sani on issues of substance in Cases Nos. 17 and 132, 
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These statements clearly lend support to the idea of the tendency of 
tribunals, and particularly of arbitral tribunals, to legitimize their decisions by 
seeking to elicit the consent of the losing party. 163 The fact that in the 
particular circumstances of these and some other cases, the Tribunal has not 
been able to achieve that goal does not necessarily weaken the creation of a 
presumption that this tendency may have been applied in many other cases. On 
the contrary, one may even conclude that only in the above Cases has this 
tendency failed and that that goal has not been achieved because of what Judge 
Sani calls "repeated breaches of promise. " 164 
Conclusion 
An attempt to categorize the factors driving the tribunal in the direction 
of meta-legal considerations faces a great difficulty and is virtually impossible. 
Neither is it possible to assess the extent and limits of these factors in an 
overall appraisal of the Tribunal's practice. This is due to an inherent 
shortcoming in any legal analysis of judicial decisions as being virtually 
limited to the factual-legal information reflected in the decisions themselves. 
Second, even when certain indications of meta-legal tendencies can be 
established from the observation of the symptoms of a judicial conduct, 
meaning decisions, one can hardly define their exact nature with certainty, 
since, to do so may ignore the interrelation between various factors which are 
and he specifically asked Mr Sani "if it would be correct to say that unless I changed my 
mind regarding the control issue he found further deliberations useless. He answered that 
this was a correct interpretation of his position. " (Ibid, p. 8. ) 
163 Not all the efforts mentioned in these Cases may be interpreted as a direct indication of the 
tendency to legitimize the decisions in the psychological and sociological sense of the 
word, the meaning which we have intended to convey throughout this Subsection. 
Additionally, in the particular circumstances of these Cases the two arbitrators efforts to 
seek a solution by the means described above may partly be attributable to their aim in 
seeking a legal legitimization as well, and avoiding the legal uncertainty regarding the 
authority of a truncated tribunal. Even then, these two efforts appear to have overlapped 
each other in the particular circumstances mentioned above. 
164 Sani, Reasons for Not Signing Decision in Case No. 17,1 Iran-USCTR. p. 417; and, Sani, 
Reasons for Not signing Decision in Case No. 132,2 Iran-USCTR. p. 15. 
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operating in this process. However it is possible and useful to identify some of 
the major factors involved in certain given instances. 
In the light of the foregoing assessment of the Tribunal's practice the 
following factors seem to have been relevant in exerting influence on the 
Tribunal's mission and in acting as a force driving the Tribunal in the direction 
of meta-legal considerations. 
First, in some instances the existence of gaps or ambiguities in the legal 
rule governing the issue tantamount to what may be called a lacuna juris, has 
influenced the Tribunal to resort to notions such as equilibrium. An apparent 
example of this may be found in the decisions of the tribunal concerning the 
operation of the Security Account. 165 Resort to notions such as equity or 
equitable solutions may be regarded as permissiblel66, but the manner of the 
practical application of such has to be assessed on the basis of the 
circumstances of each individual case. 
Second, there are some signs that certain political considerations have 
influenced some of the Tribunal's decisions. The Tribunal's approach in the 
Forum Selection Cases has been regarded by some commentators as having 
this nature. 167 The Tribunal's decision in the Interlocutory Award in case 
A15(I: G) in avoiding a straight forward finding of a breach of obligations by 
the United States and particularly ordering negotiations between the parties 
may be categorised as such. Undoubtedly, one of the main motives behind the 
United States refusal to return the assets involved in the Case above, prior to 
the announcement of the Award by the Tribunal, has been political. The United 
States' desire to use the assets as bargaining chips for the political negotiations 
of the post-hostage settlement era, finds some reflection in the Award. In fact, 
165 Case A/1, op. cit. p. 191. See also the decisions of the Tribunal in Issues III, and IV of the 
same Case, Ibid, pp. 192-197. 
166 See generally, Louis B. Sohn, The Function of International Arbitration Today, op. cit. pp. 
41-59. 
167 Ted L. Stein, op. cit. pp. 36-44 ; and Mark B. Feldman, op. cit. pp. 1003-1005. 
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the use of the funds in excess in Dollar Account No. 1 as bargaining chips in 
the political negotiations by the United States, or perhaps by both Parties, was 
so obvious that later in its submission of 15 January 1987 the United States 
requested the Tribunal to declare that the implementation of the A 15(1: G) 
Award was not linked to the issue of hostages held in Lebanon. 168 
Third, the tribunal's practice in the instances quoted above lends some 
support to the notion that arbitral tribunals particularly have a tendency to 
legitimize their decisions by attempting to elicit the loser party's consent to 
their decisions. 
Fourth, quite clearly the politics dictated by the structure and 
composition of the Tribunal has played a considerable role in influencing the 
Tribunal's mission. The need to achieve a majority has influenced the outcome 
of many cases as we have seen. The mechanics of the necessity for cooperation 
between the members, threats of resignation and non-participation in the 
proceedings can be categorized as such. 
Fifth, the Tribunal's heavy workload has been another justification in 
this regard. Due to this fact in many cases the Tribunal has adopted a flexible 
approach in choosing and citing the law applicable and awarding damages. 169 
Referring to this point Judge Sani writes: 
If, as we are told, the decisions of this Tribunal are destined to 
be studied carefully in the future and will likely influence the 
course of international law, then I cannot but wonder how 
awards like the present one will stand up to scrutiny. I am of 
course aware of the arguments, repeatedly advanced, that the 
Tribunal's heavy workload must be disposed of expeditiously. 
Yet, in this haste all recognized legal principles are sacrificed, 
the resulting decisions, such as the present one, will necessarily 
168 Case A/15, Award No. 306-A15(I: G)-FT, 4 May 1987,14 Iran-USCTR. 311, pp. 313-314. 
169 See Christine D. Gray, Judicial Remedies in International Law, Clarendon Press, 
Oxford, 1987, pp. 181-185. 
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be so flawed and insupportable as to damage the reputation and 
standing of a tribunal enjoying a certain international status. 170 
It therefore becomes clear that various metalegal factors have 
influenced the Tribunal's decisions, among which the specific composition of 
the Tribunal has played a significant role. It is obvious that the decisions 
rendered under such circumstances are of undoubted interest for the history of 
international law, but the significance of their authority as a source of 
international law remains a matter of doubt. 
170 Dissenting Opinion of Sani, Case No. 40, (R. N. Pomeroy v Iran, Award in 2 Iran-USCTR. 
p. 372), 4 Iran-USCTR. p. 237. 
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SECTION B 
NATIONAL/PARTY-APPOINTED ARBITRATORS : 
IMPARTIALITY AND INDEPENDENCE 
I. Elaboration 
The proposition national/party-appointed arbitrator, or ad hoc judge, 
embodies two contradictory elements which, appraised within the context of 
realities, may prove to be in conflict with one another. The first element is the 
fact that the arbitrators, regardless of their nationality and/or of the party which 
appointed them, are expected to act independently and impartially. The second 
is the thesis developed out of the long lessons of reality that, the arbitrators 
with the nationality of the party which appointed them and the arbitrators 
appointed by a party, regardless of their nationality, do usually tend to have a 
certain affinity with the views of the appointing party, and base their decisions 
on the position of that party. Obviously, the elements of nationality and the 
partiality of the appointment may act independently or in combination, 
according to whether one or both exist in the process. The resultant effect of 
this contradiction is generally to undermine the effectiveness and judicial 
nature of the arbitral process. 
The institution of the party-appointed adjudicator operates in the 
judicial settlement in its strictest meaning, i. e. the ICJ adjudication system as 
well as in international arbitration. I However, the notion faces different 
Note, Article 31(2) of the Statute of the ICJ which provides that, "if the Court includes 
upon the Bench a judge of the nationality of one of the parties any other party may choose 
a person to sit as judge. " See also Paragraph 3 of the Same Article for a similar effect. 
Also note, Article 26(2) of the Same Statute which provides for the formation of a special 
chamber for dealing with a particular case in whose composition the court should seek the 
approval of the parties. (emphasis added. ) For further developments regarding Article 
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degrees of seriousness and application in these two systems of adjudication. 
This is because the application of this system in judicial settlement is 
something of an exceptional nature and then of a limited role. This is not to 
minimize the seriousness of the institution in the ICJ composition and its 
eventual consequentiality. Indeed, on some occasions in the International Court 
the vote of a judge ad hoc has proved to be decisive. 2 Rather it is to 
differentiate between the eventual implications of the institution for the 
effectiveness of the legal nature of judicial settlement on the one hand and 
international arbitration on the other. 
In contrast to judicial settlement, in international arbitration the 
institution of party arbitrators is the cornerstone in the composition of the 
arbitral tribunals, it is very frequently used and its role is very extensive. As is 
usual in a tripartite tribunal of the kind, such as the Iran-US Tribunal, the 
party-appointed arbitrators make up two-thirds of all the tribunal members. 
The fact that despite the above-mentioned contradiction in the role of 
the party-appointed adjudicator, the institution remains the corner-stone in the 
composition of international arbitral tribunals and is the most frequently used 
model in that context is very significant. It serves as an important criterion in 
determining the basic nature of expectations placed upon this system and 
therefore the effectiveness of the legal nature of international arbitration. This 
is a point which may demonstrate the degree of legal effectiveness expected of 
26(2) which have taken place by way of the revision of the Rules of the Court, see 
generally, Schwarzenberger, op. cit. Vol 4, pp. 391-398. 
On the institution of national/party-appointed, or ad hoc judges, see generally, Ibid, 
pp. 374-390; Shabtai Rosenne, op. cxit. Vol 1, pp. 202-208; I. R. Suh, "Voting Behaviour 
of National Judges in International Courts", 63 AJIL (1969), 224, pp. 224-236; Daniel D. 
Nsereko, "The International Court, Impartiality and Judges Ad Hoc", 13 Ind. J. I. L., (1973), 
207, pp. 207-230; Rene David, op. cit. pp. 253-255; Alan Redfern and Martin Hunter, 
"International Commercial Arbitration", pp. 170-174; and more generally, J. Gillis. Wetter, 
"The International Arbitral Process" op. cit. Vol 3, Chapter 9, p. 355. 
2 E. g. in the South West Africa Case [(1966) ICJ Rep. 61] there was a tie of 7 to 7 votes. In 
the Lotus Case [PCIJ Rep. Series A, No. 10, (1927), 33, reproduced in Hudson, 2 World 
Court Reports, 23, p. 46] there was a tie of 6 to 6 votes. In both Cases the stalemate was 
ended by the President's casting vote. 
157 
international arbitration and may identify one of the characteristic differences 
between international arbitration on the one hand and the judicial settlement in 
its strictest meaning on the other. 
The principal function expected of the party-appointed adjudicator is 
subject to controversy. Varying interpretations have been given in this respect. 
On the one hand, it is believed that the fundamental conceptual basis for the 
institution of national/party-appointed arbitrators, or judges ad hoc, is the 
incohesiveness of the international community and distrust in the international 
judicial system. 3 Therefore, it is argued, the basic aim of the system is to 
ensure that a person knowledgeable in the national legal systems and 
philosophies of the parties will be available to acquaint the court or the tribunal 
with them, explain their positions in the case and help in drawing up awards in 
a way understandable to them, and ultimately obtain the parties' confidence in 
the proceedings. 4 
On the other hand, it is stated that a national or ad hoc member is a 
judge-advocate in the literal sense and he combines contradictory functions 
manifested in a tendency to press his party's or his government's contentions to 
the "point of dissenting from the decision of the tribunal if needs be". 5 
From the historical perspective, however, it is certain that the institution 
has developed in the context of mixed commissions, bodies composed 
exclusively or predominantly of the nationals of the disputant States and 
combining the functions of negotiators, advocates, and judges. In the words of 
Lauterpacht, these claims commissions were "frequently little short of bodies 
of negotiators putting forward their claims in the form of legal arguments". 6 
3 Daniel Nsereko, op. cit. p. 222, and generally, pp. 217-222. 
4 Ibid, p. 222. See also J. L. Simpson and Hazel Fox, International Arbitration, op. cit. p. 88. 
The problem is equally applicable in international commercial arbitration. (See, Rene 
David, op. cit. pp. 253-255 ; and A. Redfern and martin Hunter, op. cit. pp. 171-173. ) 
5 Simpson and Fox, op. cit. p. 88. 
6 H. Lautcrpacht, "Tile Function of Law... " op. cit. p. 221. 
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This fact is clearly confirmed by the long historical experience of international 
arbitration since the Jay Treaty of 1794 to the early 20th century during which 
the national/party-appointed arbitrators have usually acted as representatives of 
the interests of their States.? The doubts, therefore, refer to the question of 
whether subsequent developments in the machinery of arbitral settlement have 
brought about any improvements so as to transform arbitration to a more 
advanced stage of legal organization. This is the question which we will study 
in the case of Iran-United States Claims Tribunal. 
As regards the reasons behind the partisan tendencies of the 
national/party-appointed arbitrators, this is not the place to engage in 
philosophical arguments on the subject. This has been discussed elsewhere. 8 A 
simple quotation of some clear facts, however, will suffice for our purpose. For 
instance, a survey of the work of both the Permanent Court of International 
Justice and its successor, the International Court of Justice, proves the reality 
that in overwhelming majority, or perhaps in almost all, of occasions ad hoc 
judges have regarded it as their duty to base their decisions on the positions of 
their governments. It is submitted, for instance, that the record of the ICJ shows 
that no ad hoc judge has ever dissented against an opinion favourable to his 
own government. On many occasions they have dissented against the majority 
opinion unfavourable to their governments, and on many occasions they were 
the sole dissenters from the otherwise unanimous opinions of the Court. 9 The 
record of the Permanent Court of International Justice also shows a similar 
result. 10 In short, it is established that their voting behaviour tends to tip the 
scale towards their partiality rather than impartiality. Il 
7 See generally, Ibid, pp. 220-224. 
8 On this see, Ibid, pp. 228-232, and generally, pp. 232-241; and Nsereko, op. cit. pp. 222- 
230. 
9 Nsereko, op. cit. p. 226. 
10 Lauterpacht points out that a survey of the judgements given by the PCIJ shows that, in 
sixteen cases, the parties have availed themselves of the right to appoint a national judge. 
In three of these cases the national judge voted with the majority in favour of the 
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II. Theoretical Framework of the National/Party-Appointed 
Arbitrators' Independence and Impartiality 
The terms independence and impartiality, as used in many international 
arbitration rules, are considered to be interchangeable. Nevertheless, partiality 
is believed to arise where an arbitrator "favours one of the parties, or where he 
is prejudiced in relation to the subject-matter of the dispute. " 12 Dependence, on 
the, on the other hand, "arises from relationships between an arbitrator and one 
of the parties, or with someone closely connected with one of the parties. " 13 
Provisions regarding the requirement of independence and impartiality 
in international arbitration rules are usually drafted in general terms. That is: 
first, no detailed provisions are made in relation to ethics of international 
arbitrators; second, nothing explicitly indicates that standards of behaviour 
expected of party appointed arbitrators are different from those of non-party 
arbitrators. For instance, The UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules 14, the 
UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration 15, the ICSID 
Rules16, the LCIA Rules17 and the ICC Rules all require that arbitrators must 
exercise their function independently and impartially. 
Indeed, the ICC Rules and the LCIA Rules have expressly emphasized 
that the arbitrators appointed by the parties should remain independent of the 
contention advanced by his State. In one case the record does not disclose the names of all 
the dissenting judges. In the remaining twelve cases the national judges regarded it as their 
duty to disagree with the decision of the majority and to uphold in dissenting opinions the 
defeated views of their governments. (Lauterpacht, the Function of Law, op. cit. p. 230. ) 
11 Nsereko, op. cit. p. 226. 
12 Rule 3.1 of the International Bar Association's Ethics for International Arbitrators, 26 
ILM, p. 583; also in David J. Branson, "Ethics for International Arbitrators", 1 Arb. Int'l. 
(1987), 72, p. 75. See also Martin Hunter, "Ethics of the International Arbitrator", 53 
Arbitration (1987), 219, p. 222. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Articles 9 and 10 of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules of 1976,15 ILM (1976), p. 701. 
See also, Pieter Sanders, "Commentary on UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules", op. cit. p. 187. 
15 Article 12 of the UNCITRAL Model Law of 1985,24 ILM, p. 1302. 
16 Article 6 of the ICSID Rules of Arbitration, (text in Wetter, op. cit. Vol 4, p. 496. 
17 Article 3(1) of the LCIA Rules of 1985, published by the LCIA. 
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parties appointing them and impartial at all times. 18 In the Iran-United States 
Tribunal Rules Articles 9 and 10 of the UNCITRAL Rules have been 
maintained unchanged. An addition has been made to Article 9 which widens 
the scope of that Article with regard to any single case before the Tribunal. 
This addition in effect harmonizes the provisions of Article 9 with the multi- 
case nature of the Tribunal's proceedings. 19 
Despite these, however, there are some indications in the general theory 
which might be regarded as a different treatment of the impartiality required of 
the party-appointed arbitrators from that of the neutral members. For instance, 
the Code of Ethics drawn up jointly by the ABA/AAA accepts that non-neutral 
arbitrators may be "predisposed toward the party who appointed them. "20 They 
are also permitted to be "predisposed toward deciding in favour" of the party 
which appointed them. 21 As regards the requirements of disclosure, 
communications with and payments by the appointing party, similar 
flexibilities have been recognized by the above Code of Ethics22, which in turn 
emphasise on the unsettled foundation of the non-neutral arbitrators' 
independence from the appointing parties. The Code, however, emphasises that 
non-neutral arbitrators in all other respects are obliged to act in good faith and 
with integrity and fairness. They should not engage in delaying tactics or 
harassment of any party or witness and should not knowingly make untrue or 
misleading statements to the other arbitrators. 23 
The fact that some of these rules have chosen to remain silent on the 
topic, added to the explicit recognition in the AAA/ABA Code of Ethics of 
18 Articles 3(1) of the LCIA and 2(4) of the ICC Rules. 
19 See Modification to Article 9 of the (UNCITRAL) Tribunal Rules. Also, Note to Articles 
9-12 of the same Rules. 
20 Canon VII-A(1) of the Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes Established 
by the ABA and AAA (1977), [text reproduced in Wetter, op. cit. Vol 3, p. 429]. 
21 Ibid, Canon VII-E. 
22 Ibid, Canon VII, Paragraphs B. C and F. 
23 Ibid, Canon VII-A(I). 
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different standards of behaviour for party-appointed arbitrators, illustrates "the 
great dichotomy that pervades the international arbitral process"24 in this 
regard. 
Whether the flexibilities described in the AAA Code of Ethics find a 
universal recognition is seriously doubted. Dr Gillis Wetter points out that even 
where the existence of "the rule of absolute independence is not recognized, the 
correctness of the principle is not questioned". 25 and it is doubtful that these 
rules could receive official sanction outside the United States. 26 
Moreover, the recent guide-lines drafted by the International Bar 
Association on Ethics of International Arbitrators which reflect internationally 
accepted guide-lines make no distinction between standards of behaviour 
expected of the party appointed arbitrators and those of non-party members. 27 
The IBA Guide-lines, inter alia, put a particular emphasis on the nature of 
relationships between an arbitrator and a party; the rules of disclosure and 
prohibit any unilateral communications with a party or its representatives. 28 
It has to be said that in international commercial arbitration it ultimately 
falls to the domestic law concerned, the lex arbitri and the law of the country 
where enforcement of the award is sought, to determine the degree of 
impartiality expected of party-appointed arbitrators. The practice in this respect 
is not completely uniform. It is submitted that in the Common Law system, 
particularly in the United States, party-appointed arbitrators are permitted to be 
sympathetic to the party who appointed them. 29 The principle of absolute 
24 G. Wetter, op. Cit. Vol 2, p. 364. 
25 Ibid, p. 365. 
26 Ibid, p. 368. 
27 David Branson, op. Cit. p. 73, see also Introductory Note to the IBA Guide-lines Para 1. 
28 IBA Guide-lines, op. cit. Sections 3.3-3.5,4.1-4.4 and 5.1, and 5.3. 
29 Rene David quotes that the courts of England and the United States have recognized that 
the party-appointed arbitrators are permitted to perform a form of judge-advocate and 
partisan function, while in some other countries the award of an arbitral tribunal was 
objectionable when it appeared that the party appointed arbitrators had behaved in the 
course of the proceedings as partisan arbitrators. (R. David, op. cit. pp. 254-255). For a 
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independence of all arbitrators, however, prevails in most civil law systems. In 
general the American practice is regarded as an exception to that rule. 30 
A similar dichotomy between the theory and practice prevails in public 
international arbitrations. In theory, each arbitrator is independent and must be 
strictly impartial. In reality, however, it is not certain whether many States 
place a serious emphasis on this point. Besides, given the political structure of 
the international community the idea of representation of interest in the 
development and existence of the institution of party arbitrators cannot be 
taken for granted. 
The practice of international law in this regard is, to a considerable 
degree, inarticulate and few cases have emerged and as yet they are not 
conclusive enough. The most notable one is the Buraimi Oasis Arbitral 
Tribunal case, in which the British Arbitrator resigned in protest to what he 
called the lack of impartiality on the part of the Saudi Arabian Arbitrator, who 
was the Saudi Arabian deputy Foreign Minister and the Minister responsible 
for the disputed area of Buraimi. 31 The Saudi Arabian Arbitrator in response 
argued that his position and activities with regard to the disputed area were 
known to the British Government and the British Arbitrator well before the 
establishment of the Tribunal, and in fact, he had negotiated the establishment 
more detailed review on the position of the English and American and Swedish laws on 
the issue see generally, Wetter, op. cit. Vol 3, pp. 401-428 and Vol 2, pp. 364-368. See 
also Michael Tupman, "Challenge and Disqualification of Arbitrators in International 
Commercial Arbitration", 38 ICLQ (1989), 26, pp. 28-29,42-48; and Martin Hunter, 50 
Arbitration, op. cit. pp. 219-224. 
30 Ibid. 
It is generally accepted that partiality and bad faith of the arbitrators will lead to the 
nullity of an arbitral award. (See, Kenneth Carlston, "The Process of International 
Arbitration", op. cit. pp. 55,56-61. See also Article 35(b) of the Model Law of the ILC on 
Arbitral Procedure, 1958 ; and Article 52(1)(c) of the ICSID Convention. However, both 
in the field of public international arbitration and commercial arbitration there has been a 
reluctance to accept frivolous and trivial charges of partiality or even mere partisanship as 
a cause for nullity of the award. (Carlston, op. cit. pp. 55-61; and Micheal Tupman, op. cit. 
pp. 42-48. ) 
31 For the documents relating to this incident see Wetter, op. Cit. Vol 3, pp. 368-377. 
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of the Arbitral Tribunal with the British authorities. 32 However, the 
circumstances surrounding the issue and the lack of any judicial ruling on the 
problem makes a clear-cut conclusion very difficult. 
In some other cases of the international arbitral practice established 
within the frame of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, however, the element 
of representation of interests has been somehow acquiesced to or accepted by 
the parties or the tribunals concerned. For instance, in the Casablanca Case the 
parties appointed as arbitrators legal advisers of their respective Foreign 
Offices who had conducted the diplomatic correspondence in this case prior to 
its submission to arbitration. 33 
It is also submitted that according to a body of opinion, the party- 
appointed judges remain under the authority of their States, that they are bound 
to follow its instructions and that the award has no binding force if the 
arbitrators have failed to follow their instructions. 34 Nevertheless, it can 
certainly be said that the latter opinion cannot be regarded as forming part of 
the modem international law. It demonstrates the diversity of the views in this 
regard, however, and adds fuel to the existing uncertainty regarding the exact 
scope of the national/party-appointed arbitrators' impartiality and 
independence. 
In the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, on some occasions, the 
American arbitrators have referred to the Code of Ethics drawn up by the 
AAA/ABA as an instructive instrument for the conduct of the Tribunal's 
arbitrators. 35 No express reference, however, has been made to this Code by 
the other members of the Tribunal or the Tribunal as a whole. The degree of 
32 Ibid, p. 374. 
33 Lauterpacht, the Function of Law, op. cit. p. 223. For more examples in this respect see 
generally Ibid. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Concurring Opinion, Holtzman, Starrett Housing Corp v Iran, 4 Iran-USCTR. 159, p. 181; 
Mosk, Concurring Opinion, Ultrasystems Inc. v Iran, 2 Iran-USCTR. 114, p. 121; and 
Mosk, Dissent to Order, R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co v Iran, 3 Iran-USCTR, p. 40. 
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recognition of the relevant provisions of that Code in the Tribunal's practice is 
therefore unclear. 
Another point which is worth mentioning is the provisions for certain 
procedural safeguards for securing the effectiveness of the proceedings against 
possible problems which may arise as a result of the non-neutral arbitrators' 
allegiance to the party which appointed them. For instance, an advantage which 
is peculiar to the permanent arbitration institutions is that the arbitrators should 
preferably be chosen from among a list of known persons. 36 The object of this 
provision would seem to be the desire that only persons of the required 
standing and those who have undergone some international scrutiny and 
screening are appointed. Any provisions which limit the powers of the 
appointing party over the non-neutral arbitrators' conduct in the course of 
proceedings, e. g. resignation, withdrawal and payment of fees, and entrust the 
arbitral tribunal or the arbitration institution with a greater degree of 
organizational autonomy in these respects may be categorized as part of such 
safeguards. 
The purpose of these kinds of provisions is to prevent the possible 
disruption of the proceedings which may take place as a result of partisan 
efforts by the non-neutral arbitrators after the tribunal has been constituted. 
This category of provisions which is quite commonly adopted in arbitration 
rules or arbitration agreements is intended to ensure that: a)- the arbitrators, 
including the non-neutral arbitrators, cannot be removed unilaterally by either 
party after the tribunal has been constituted37; b)- if any vacancy occurs as a 
36 See Articles 23-24 and 44-45 of the Hague Conventions for the Pacific Settlement of 
International Disputes of 1899 and 1907 respectively 1 AJIL (1907), p. 107 and 2 AJIL, 
(1908), p. 43; and Section 4 of the ICSID Convention (Convention on the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of other States of 1965,575 U. N. T. S. p. 
160) regarding the establishment of the Panel of Arbitrators (and Conciliators),. It is 
notable that under Article 40(1) of the latter Convention the arbitrators may also be 
appointed from outside the Panel of Arbitrators. See also, Redfern and Martin Hunter, op. 
cit. pp. 162-163. 
37 See, for instance, Article 4 of the Model Rules on Arbitral Procedure of the ILC of 1958. 
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result of death, resignation or withdrawal..., of an arbitrator a replacement 
procedure is in place. That is, if the replacement is not made within a specified 
period, a body or a person entrusted with the power as appointing authority is 
empowered to do so according to the provisions of the parties' agreement. 38 
III. Institutional Autonomy 
Against these uncertainties in the general practice, an appraisal of the 
issue in respect of the practice of the Iran-United States Tribunal is rather 
complicated, particularly when the Tribunal Rules do not provide much 
guidance on the issue. In fact, one of the criticisms which may be brought 
against the Tribunal is that the Tribunal or the parties have failed to draw up 
detailed rules of conduct or ethics for the arbitrators, neutral and non-neutral 
alike. The Tribunal Rules are of a relatively general nature and do not provide 
much detailed guidance on these issues which is needed for a tribunal which 
has a semi-permanent nature, and in effect operates within an institutional 
framework. In the absence of such provisions in the Tribunal Rules or the 
general theory, it follows that the practice of the Tribunal and of the Parties 
regarding these issues are to be given the primary importance for drawing out 
the applicable principles to the situation. 
a- appointment 
Quite clearly under the CSD and the Tribunal Rules the initial selection 
and appointment of non-neutral members is left to the unfettered discretion of 
the appointing-party concerned. 39 This fact can be confirmed by more than 
seven years practice of the Tribunal and the Parties, in the course of which 
38 Ibid, Article 5 in conjunction with Article 3. Also note Article 13 of the Tribunal Rules to 
a similar effect. 
39 However, the parties have no power to delay or withhold such appointment. If either 
Government fails to appoint its respective arbitrators, the appointing authority under 
Article 7 of the Tribunal Rules is entrusted with the power to make such appointment. 
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several appointments of party arbitrators have been made by the Parties. There 
is no evidence that in the course of appointment of a party arbitrator his 
impartiality and independence has been a prime concern for either Party. No 
challenge or objection, in the course of "initial" appointment, has been made 
against a party arbitrator in this regard. Nor is there evidence that there has 
been given any consideration at all to the independence and impartiality of a 
party arbitrator by the Party which appointed him. Arguably, the overall 
indications suggest the contrary ; that the party-appointed arbitrators have been 
expected to represent the interests of the Party which appointed them. 
The principal concern for the United States as regards the Iranian 
Arbitrators has been to have the Tribunal legally constituted, since the Iranian 
Arbitrators' participation is needed to this end, and to keep it operating. That is 
to say, it is Iran which is usually a respondent in the majority of the cases. As 
possible obstructive attempts may naturally be expected from the Iranian side, 
the principal concern for the United States regarding the Iranian Arbitrators has 
been to legalize the constitution of the Chambers and of the Tribunal and to 
keep it operating. Nor has Iran ever taken the question of the impartiality of the 
American Arbitrators seriously. A question which has been of principal 
concern to Iran, and to the United States, as regards the neutral members. It is 
obvious that in such a situation the Parties have only been looking forward to 
securing the affirmative vote of the neutral member, or members, in order to 
achieve a decision favourable to them. For instance, in a recent letter 
exchanged between the American and Iranian Agents concerning the vacancy 
arising from the resignation of the Iranian member of Chamber One, the 
American Agent, expressing his anxiety to fill the vacancy as soon as possible, 
suggested: 
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I note that there are several highly skilled attorneys on the staff 
of the Iranian delegation in the Hague who are experienced in 
international arbitration. The attorney for the claimant in Case 
Number 430 has informed me that the claimant would interpose 
no objections under Articles 9-12 of the Tribunal's Rules to such 
an appointment. 40 
The Iranian delegation to which the American Agent referred happened 
to be the body responsible for the defence and pursuit of the cases for Iran 
before the Tribunal, a fact which was undoubtedly known to the American 
Agent. Yet his remarks do not imply that he has confidence in the 
independence and impartiality of Iranian Arbitrators. On the contrary, they 
clearly demonstrate the minimal degree of seriousness with which the Parties 
view the independence and impartiality of each other's arbitrators. 
Quite clearly, one of the classes of activity or circumstance which are 
treated as incompatible with the exercise of judicial function in a particular 
case is a situation in which a judge has previously taken part as agent, counsel, 
or advocate for one of the parties. 41 That is, advisory governmental work for 
one of the parties, after a dispute had arisen, has long been established by the 
practice of the Permanent Court of International Justice and of the International 
Court of Justice to constitute a judicial incompatibility. For instance, Judge 
Jessup did not sit in the Temple of Preah Vihear Case, having taken part as 
counsel in the preparation of the case. Judge Khan for a similar reason, did not 
participate in the Barcelona Traction Case, and Judge Lauterpacht, having 
advised one of the parties, withdrew from the Nottebohm Case. 42 
It is notwithstanding the possibility of this kind of incompatibility that 
the American Agent expresses his readiness to waive, in advance, any 
objection to such incompatibility should a member of staff of the Iranian 
40 Letter from John Crook, Agent of the United States, to M. K. Eshragh, Agent of the I. R. of 
Iran, dated 2 April 1987, in AR 86/87 of the Tribunal, 58, p. 59. 
41 See Article 17(2) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. 
42 See Jeremy D. Morley, "Relative Incompatibility of Functions in the International Court", 
19 ICLQ, (1970), 316, p. 319; see also, Schwarzenberger, op. cit. Vol 4, pp. 347 and 
generally, pp. 348-365, and Shabtai Rosenne, op. cit. Vol 1, pp. 196-197. 
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delegation had been appointed as arbitrator. This is where a marked departure 
from the strict rules of incompatibility can be seen in the practice of the Iran- 
US Tribunal. A feature which quite possibly marks a characteristic difference 
between international arbitration as a whole on the one hand and international 
judicial settlement in its strictest meaning on the other. 
In fact, the person who was later appointed by Iran to replace the 
resigning member of Chamber One appears to have acted as legal adviser for 
the Agent of Iran in a number of cases before the same Chamber. 43 However, it 
is not yet clear whether he has or will participate in the decision of the Cases in 
which he has previously acted as legal adviser to Iran. This would not seem to 
be the case, since the letter concerning his appointment appears to be mindful 
of the possible incompatibility of this kind and acknowledges that a disclosure 
concerning cases with which he has been possibly involved will be made to the 
Tribunal. 44 
Indeed, Mr Nouri has later disqualified himself in Cases Nos. 20 and 21 
on the ground of his previous work on them while a member of the Bureau for 
International Legal Services of Iran. 45 The irony is, however, that Iran refused 
to appoint a substitute for Mr Nouri for some time and the two other Iranian 
Members initially refused to serve on these Cases on the same grounds of 
incompatibility. 46 The President of the Tribunal requested the Agent of Iran to 
43 See Letter of MK. Eshragh, Agent of Iran, dated 5 July 1987, concerning the appointment 
of Mr A. Nouri as Iran's arbitrator in Chamber One. (AR 86/87 of the Tribunal, p. 60) Also 
note, for instance, that Mr Nouri has acted as legal adviser to the Agent of Iran in the 
following cases : Queens Office Tower Associates v Iran, Case No. 172, Award No. 37- 
172-1,15 April 1983,2 Iran-USCTR. p. 247 ; Sylvania Technical Systems, Inc. v Iran, 
Case No. 64, Award No. 180-64-1,27 June 1985,8 Iran-USCTR. p. 298 ; Flexi-Van 
Leasing Inc. v Iran, Case No. 36, Award No. 259-36-1,11 October, 1986,12 Iran-USCTR. 
p. 335 ; and INA Corporation v Iran, Case No. 161, Award No. 184-161-1,12 August 
1985,8 Iran-USCTR, p. 373. It is notable that these Cases have been terminated prior to 
the appointment of Mr Nouri as arbitrator, however, they demonstrate his general 
governmental advisory work for Iran. 
44 Letter of Eshragh, dated 5 July 1987, op. cit. p. 60. 
45 See, AR 87/88, pp. 2-3. 
46 Ibid. 
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appoint an arbitrator for these Cases within thirty days. 47 After the expiry of 
that period, the Agent of the United States requested the Appointing Authority 
to appoint an arbitrator for these Cases. 48 However, following an 
accommodation of different points of view, Arbitrator Ansari agreed to act 
instead of Mr Nouri in those Cases. 49 Ironically, the above-mentioned 
circumstances surrounding the disqualification by Mr Nouri of himself raises 
some curiosity as to the true intention behind the issue. 
Despite all the foregoing, however, given the particular circumstances 
of the Iran-US Tribunal's case there still seems to exist a question of general 
nature in this regard. First, Section 1 of the Notes to Articles 9-12 of the 
Tribunal Rules indicates that : 
As used in Articles 9,10,11 and 12 of the UNCITRAL Rules, 
with respect to the initial appointment of a member the terms 
"party" and "parties" mean one or both of the two Governments, 
as the case may be. After the initial appointment, the terms 
"party" and "parties" mean the arbitrating party or parties, as the 
case may be. Arbitrating parties may challenge a member only 
on the basis of the existence of circumstances which give rise to 
justifiable doubts as to the member's impartiality or 
independence with respect to the particular case involved, and 
not upon any general grounds which also relate to other cases. 
Challenges on such grounds may only be made by one of the 
two Governments. 
Second, given the distinction made between the terms "party" and 
"arbitrating party" and the obvious fact that under the terms of the Tribunal's 
jurisdiction, except in case of a counterclaim, there is no private respondent in 
any case before the Tribunal and it is only either of the two Governments or 
their controlled entities against which a claim may be brought before the 
Tribunal -a fact as a result of which all awards against any controlled entities 
47 Ibid. See also letter from Bockstiegel to the Agent of Iran, 15 Feb. 1988, Ibid, Annex 111, 
pp. 61-62. 
48 Ibid, p. 3. Sec also Letter from T. A. Ramish, the Agent of the US, to the AA, 5 April 1988, 
Ibid, Annex IV, pp. 63-64. 
49 Ibid, p. 3. 
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of the Iranian Government are paid from the Security Account which is the 
property of the Iranian Government - theoretically, instances such as the one 
described above may well constitute grounds for incompatibility of a general 
nature which may be made by anyone of the two Governments. However, as it 
appears from the letter from the American Agent, while the Parties have been 
ready to ignore the question of incompatibility, in respect of the party 
arbitrators, in its most obvious form, it is therefore not surprising if they have 
taken a relaxed approach towards a lesser important question of that kind. 
One may possibly categorize the temporary leave and appointment of 
Charles Brower, the American member of the Tribunal, to a governmental 
position and his further return to the Tribunal as constituting one of such 
general grounds. Although he takes every care to explain that his appointment 
as Deputy Special Counsellor to the President of the United States responsible 
for coordinating responses to all requests to the White House in connection 
with inquiries into the sale of American arms to Iran during his leave from the 
Tribunal, is not incompatible with his duties as arbitrator, this remains 
controversial and at best shows the parties' very liberal approach to the issue. 50 
b- Resignation and Disqualification 
There are some indications in both the Tribunal Rules and the 
Tribunal's practice which may generally be regarded as mechanisms intended 
to limit the control of the appointing party over the non-neutral arbitrator's 
conduct after he has been appointed and after the tribunal has been constituted. 
Article 10(2) of the Tribunal Rules provides that "a party may challenge the 
arbitrator appointed by him only for reasons of which he becomes aware after 
the appointment has been made. " As Professor Sanders in his "Commentary on 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules" points out, this provision is primarily designed 
50 See Letter of Charles N. Brower to the President of the Tribunal dated January 8,1987, 
AR 86/87 of the Tribunal, p. 70. 
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in response to an obvious situation; that a party should not be entitled to start 
the challenge proceedings based on the same circumstances as were already 
known to him when making the appointment. 51 However, a natural implication 
of such a provision is to prevent the creation of a situation in which the 
appointing party by assuming an unlimited right of control over its arbitrator 
may withdraw him in an arbitrary manner. Moreover, the essence of the 
provision of the challenge proceedings in arbitration rules is a confirmation of 
a widely accepted principle, that the only method by which an arbitrator may 
be removed from office is through the challenge procedure. This principle is a 
commonly accepted precondition for the integrity of the arbitration process and 
many arbitration rules do not find it necessary to put an express provision to 
this effect. In fact when a challenge procedure has been foreseen in the 
arbitration rule or agreement and/or in the absence of any express provision 
derogating from that principle a presumption should be made in favour of the 
applicability of this principle. For instance, Article 4(1-3) of the Model Law of 
the ILC on Arbitral Procedure expressly emphasises the existence of this 
principle. 
In fact, the Tribunal had the opportunity to declare on the importance 
and inviolability of this principle. Although the Case before the Tribunal 
primarily concerned the removal of a neutral arbitrator, the Tribunal's ruling 
quite clearly has a general application. The Tribunal clearly expressed that 
"any right of a State Party to an arbitration agreement to remove an arbitrator 
from office by a unilateral decision would seriously impair the integrity of the 
arbitration process and would be contrary to all general principles of justice. "52 
Obviously this ruling is declaratory of a general principle without any 
distinction between the neutral and non-neutral arbitrators. 
51 Pieter Sanders, "Commentary on UNCITRAL Rules", op. Cit. p. 189. 
52 "Re Judge Mangard", Decision of 15 January 1982 of the Full Tribunal, 1 Iran-USCTR. 
Il1, p. 114. 
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On other occasions which directly concerned the party-appointed 
arbitrators, more emphasis has been put on the integrity of the composition of 
the Tribunal. In the episode concerning the resignation of Judge Sani, the 
Iranian arbitrator, the position adopted by Judge Sani implied that it is the 
appointing government that accepts his resignation rather the Tribunal or its 
President. He submitted his resignation to the Government of Iran, and the 
Government of Iran accepted his resignation and set the effective date of his 
resignation. 53 However, the Tribunal's approach to the problem would seem to 
have been that there could be no legally effective resignation by any member 
of the Tribunal without submission of such resignation to, and its acceptance 
by the Tribunal. This presumption is confirmed by the statement attributed to 
the President of the Tribunal in the Full Tribunal meeting that the Tribunal had 
received no valid reasons for Judge Sani's absence and had not authorized that 
absence. 54 The fact that Chamber Three has proceeded to render awards in the 
absence of Judge Sani may be seen as another confirmation of the above 
mentioned presumption that the Tribunal has treated Judge Sani's resignation 
as not being legally effective unless endorsed by the Tribunal. 55 Chamber 
Two's issuance of Awards in the absence of Judge Shafeiei who had taken an 
unauthorized leave may be regarded as another example. 56 However, the 
53 See the text of documents concerning Judge Sani's resignation attached to his reply to 
Judge Mosk's Comments in Case No. 17. (1 Iran-USCTR. 428, p. 440. ) Further, Iran 
informed the Tribunal that it had accepted Judge Sani's resignation and set the date upon 
which it became effective. In fact, on the basis of this process Judge Sani argued that he 
"considered his resignation to the Islamic Republic of Iran to be effective upon the 
Tribunal... " (See Explanation for Failure of Judge Sani to Sign Awards", Woodward-Clyde 
Consultants v Iran, Case No. 67, Award No. 73-67-3,2 September 1983,3 Iran-USCTR. 
239, pp. 254-255. Identical explanations have been attached to four other Cases in which 
Judge Sani failed to sign the Awards: Chas T. Main v Mahab, Ibid, 270, p. 276; Alan 
Craig v Ministry of Energy, Ibid, 280, p. 291; John Carl Warnecke & Associates v Bank 
Mellat, Ibid, 256, p. 268; and Blount Brothers Corp v Ministry of Housing, Ibid, 225, p. 
237. ) 
54 See, e. g. Woodward-Clyde Consultants v Iran, Ibid, p. 255. 
55 E. g. Ibid. 
56 Sec Intrend International Inc., v Iranian Air Force, Case No. 220, Award No. 59-220-2,27 
July 1983,3 Iran-USCTR. p. 110; Gruen Associates, Inc., v Iran Housing Co, Case No. 
188, Award No. 61-188-2,27 July 1983, Ibid, p. 97 ; Reynolds Metal Co v Iran, Case No. 
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question of whether an unauthorized or illegal absence of an arbitrator is strong 
enough authority for the remaining two-third members of an arbitral tribunal to 
proceed and to render valid awards in the absence of the arbitrator, or 
arbitrators, appointed by one of the parties, is a separate issue and will be 
discussed in the following Chapter. 
These instances clearly demonstrate the degree of detachment and 
independence that the party-appointed arbitrators should observe from the 
party which appointed them in the course of their conduct, if not specifically in 
the course of making judgements. Indeed, further evidence shows the 
acceptance of this principle in some areas of conduct by some of the party- 
appointed arbitrators. For instance, Judge Mostafavi of Iran did recently submit 
his resignation to the Tribunal. 57 
However, despite the implicit acceptance in Judge Mostafavi's letter of 
resignation of the authority of the Tribunal to decide on and determine the 
effective date of a party-appointed arbitrator's resignation, in general the 
Iranian arbitrators have maintained an opposite position. For instance, Judge 
Bahrami-Ahmadi only notified the Tribunal of the submission to and 
acceptance of his resignation by the Government of Iran. 58 
Moreover, the Iranian arbitrators have expressly taken the position that: 
1- the resignation of a party-appointed member should be addressed to the 
Government appointing him; 2- that the resignation of a third-country member 
should be addressed to both Governments; 3- that resignation was a matter 
solely within the discretion of the member concerned, the Tribunal having no 
power or role in the process; 4- that any decision by the Tribunal purporting to 
83, Award No. 60-83-2,27 July 1983, Ibid, p. 119; and National Airmotive Corp v Iran, 
case No. 449, Award No. 58-449-3,14 July 1983, Ibid, p. 91. See also "Shafeiei Reasons 
for not Signing Awards in Cases Nos. 83,188,220 and 449", Ibid, p. 124. Judge Shafeiei 
in his statement, among other things, argued that his annual leave had been completely 
justifiable and natural. (Ibid, p. 139. ) 
57 Dated 17 March 1987, AR 86/87 of the Tribunal, p. 55. 
58 AR 87/88, p. 2, and Ibid, Annex II, p. 60. 
174 
"accept" a member's resignation was outside the competence conferred on the 
Tribunal by the Algiers Declarations; 5- that Article 13, paragraph 5 of the 
Tribunal Rules did not impose, and should not be interpreted as imposing on a 
member, after his resignation, any obligation to continue to serve as a member 
with respect to all cases in which he had participated in a hearing on the 
merits. 59 
The Tribunal, however, has taken a different view. Notably, the 
Tribunal decided on 9 December 1987, to treat Mr Bahrami-Ahmadi's 
communication as notification to it of the latter's intention to resign; and, in 
view of the availability of his substitute, to set the effective date of his 
resignation from 31 December 1987.60 
c- Financial Independence 
Another point which needs to be noted briefly is that the party- 
appointed arbitrators are paid by the Tribunal administration and not directly 
by the appointing parties, although in the early days of the Tribunal's 
constitution, the period before January 1982, the Parties had agreed that certain 
parts of these arbitrators' fees had to be paid by the respective appointing 
Parties. 61 The financial aspect of the party-appointed arbitrators' independence 
from the party which appointed them is a useful and a well-recognized 
principle, however, in the particular circumstances of the Iran-US Tribunal, 
and possibly most public international arbitrations, it cannot be expected to 
have any serious effect on the inherent shortcomings of the party-appointed 
arbitrators' performance. The principle, however, is as a whole useful and can, 
especially in commercial arbitrations, ensure a greater degree of independence 
for the non-neutral arbitrators. 
59 Ibid, p. 4. 
60 Ibid, p. 2. 
61 Sec Annex III to AR 82/83 of the Tribunal, p. 3. 
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IV. Assessment 
Despite some occasional indications in the Tribunal's practice 
emphasising the independent status of the party-appointed arbitrator, their 
overall performance in the main area of function, namely decision-making, 
remains highly suspect. This fact is clearly evident in the voting behaviour of 
these arbitrators and in the inconsistency of reasoning employed by them in 
various cases. 
For the arbitrators appointed by Iran and the United States the function 
entrusted to them has principally been the accomplishment of a national duty 
vis-a-vis their respective countries. This has been particularly intensive in the 
case of the Iran-US Tribunal because the arbitration has been functioning 
against an unusual background of continued intergovernmental tension. In fact, 
the party appointed arbitrators have not made any attempt to hide this sense of 
national duty, rather they have, on occasions, expressed sympathetic and 
sentimental views. The background of continued intergovernmental tension has 
also reflected itself in their performance and voting behaviour in one way or 
another. Although one may recognize some distinction between the Iranian and 
American Arbitrators in regard to the latter's more cautious approach to making 
their national sentiments public, no real difference can be found in the 
outcome. It is notable that the Government of Iran has been the respondent in 
the majority of cases and a Party which has very often been ordered by the 
Tribunal to pay large sums of money to American claimants. In contrast to that, 
on the American side it has usually been private corporations which have their 
claims before the Tribunal. Given the above fact, the Iranian Arbitrators, 
imbued with a revolutionary commitment and a feeling that the arbitral 
machinery of the Tribunal was mostly working to the advantage of the 
Americans, have quite often made their sentiments public. 
176 
Nevertheless, a general improvement and a more cautious approach in 
expressing such inclinations is visible in the performance of the Iranian 
Arbitrators in the post September 3,1984 phase of the Tribunal's work. This 
may be as a consequence of several factors, including: the changes in the 
composition of the Iranian and neutral members; the lessons learnt from the 
pre-September 84 phase of the Tribunal's work; the recognition to a certain 
degree by the Iranian members of the institutional integrity and authority of the 
Tribunal; and the settlement of the major controversial jurisdictional problems 
and politically sensitive issues in the pre-September 84 phase of the Tribunal's 
life, etc. This does not, however, imply a change of attitude by the party- 
appointed arbitrators, as regards their assumption of their role as judges- 
advocate as reflected on their voting behaviour. 
a- Individual Opinions 
The individual opinions expressed by the non-neutral members 
constitute a useful instrument by which the degree of independence and 
impartiality of these arbitrators can be tested. That is not to say that the 
expression of dissenting view by a national/party-appointed judge is 
necessarily evidence of his bias and lack of impartiality. Many differences of 
opinion are the result of a mere difference of opinion and/or a reflection of the 
heterogeneous and divided nature of the world society, consisting of different 
cultures and legal systems. This division of cultural-legal understandings is 
necessarily reflected in the conduct and performance of the national/party- 
appointed arbitrators. Indeed some argue that the individual opinions act as 
valuable supplements to the views of the majority and help in the development 
of international law. 62 Nevertheless, the circumstances in which a dissenting 
view has been expressed, the style and the reasoning behind the opinion may 
62 R. P. Anand, "The Role of Individual and Dissenting Opinions in International 
Adjudication", 14 ICLQ, (1965), 788, pp. 800-801. 
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expose the extent to which a dissent constitutes a partisan pleading or a 
conviction based on strong legal arguments. 
It is therefore submitted, for instance, that the use of discourteous 
speech is a sign of poor style and suggests that the judge's own argumentation 
is suspect. 63 Moreover, a dissenting opinion must have its own independent 
reasoning and should not simply become a criticism of the majority 
judgement. M It should express reason, not emotion. 65 
In many instances the dissenting or even concurring opinions of the 
arbitrators of both Iran and the United States do amount to a criticism or an 
attack on the majority judgements. Sometimes they are merely a criticism of 
the Tribunal awards and it appears that the lengthy arguments put forth in some 
of these individual views are simply designed to criticise the majority 
judgement. In other words, the opinions of these arbitrators, although couched 
in legal language, read very much like the arguments of a party to the dispute. 
However, the extent to which these differences have been motivated by the 
sheer lack of impartiality or the diversity of cultural-legal understandings 
between the arbitrators is unclear. The latter justification can hardly be 
applicable to the case of American Arbitrators who usually have enjoyed a 
relatively common cultural-legal background with that of the neutral European 
members of the Tribunal. Nevertheless, it seems possible to attribute the 
motive behind some of these individual opinions to the very fact of 
predisposition and partisan behaviour of the non-neutral arbitrators. 
Starting with the individual views, particularly dissenting opinions of 
the American Arbitrators, the element of predisposition and partisan behaviour 
is manifest both in an overall appraisal of these views and in each individual 
63 Lyndel Prott, The latent Power of Culture and International Judge, International 
Books, 1979, p. 186. 
64 Ibid. 
65 Ibid, see also R. P. Anand, op. cii p. 807. 
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case. The fact that these views are primarily designed to criticise the majority 
judgement accompanied by a moderate criticism of the majority by calling the 
award as "erroneous", "incorrect" and "misreading" 66 is the first indication of 
such trends. If these views were merely confined within the limits of a general 
criticism of the kind described above they could be regarded as negligible, in 
view of the fact that such partisan pleadings are not rare even within the 
practice of the International Court of Justice. 67 This, however, is not the case. 
In many instances the individual views expressed, for instance, by the 
American members do clearly transcend such boundaries and in a way cast 
doubt on the impartiality of the dissenter himself. Expressions such as calling 
the Tribunal "irresolute" and its decisions a manifestation of "the prejudice to 
orderly process" are quite often repeated in these dissenting views. 68 They 
have also accused the Tribunal of not acting "fairly-69 and "manifesting a lack 
of regard to its own dignity". 7° A joint dissenting opinion by all three 
American Arbitrators states that "... this last minute capitulation by the Tribunal 
66 See, Forum Selection Cases- Holtzman, Concurring and Dissenting Opinions, 1 Iran- 
USCTR. 284, p. 293; Forum Selection cases- Mosk, Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, 
Ibid, p. 307; Holtzman, Dissenting Opinion, Grimm v Iran, 2 Iran-USCTR. 81, p. 87; 
Holtzman, Dissenting Opinion in Queens Office Tower Associates v Iran Air, Ibid, pp. 
254-255,258; Mosk, Dissenting Opinion to Final Award in Ultrasystems Inc. v Iran, 4 
Iran-USCTR. 80, p. 82; Mosk Dissenting Opinion, Behring International Inc. v Iranian Air 
Force, 4 Iran-USCTR. 93, p. 95; Mosk, Dissenting Opinion, Schering Corporation v Iran, 
5 Iran-USCTR, 374, p. 375; Mosk, Dissenting Opinion, Harnischfeger Corp. v MORT, 8 
Iran-USCTR. p. 135; Dissenting Opinion, Holtzman, Aldrich and Brower, Case A15(I: G), 
12 Iran-USCTR. 64, p. 77; Dissenting Opinion, Brower, International Systems and 
Controls Corp v Iran, Ibid, p. 265. See also, Dissenting Opinion of Holtzman, ST. Regis 
Paper Co. v Iran, 14 Iran-USCTR, 86, p. 99; Disstenting Opinion of Holtzman, Whittaker 
Corp. v Iran, 14 Iran-USCTR, 263, p. 273; Concurring Opinion of Ansari, Futura Trading 
Inc. v NIOC, 13 Iran-USCTR, 99, p. 121; and Dissenting Opinion of Aldrich, OTIS 
Elevator Co. v Iran, 14 Iran-USCTR. p. 300. 
67 See, R. P. Anand, op. cit. p. 802. 
68 Holtzman, Aldrich and Mosk, Dissent from Procedural Decisions, Forum Selection Cases, 
1 Iran-USCTR. p. 320. Identical phrases have been used in the following dissenting 
opinions : Holtzman, Dissenting Opinion, Cases Nos. 452 and 926, ( Transamerica ICS, 
Inc v Iran, and David Michael, Inc v Iran) 3 Iran-USCTR. 84, p. 85; Holtzman, Aldrich 
and Mosk Dissent from Orders in Cases Nos. A-16,582 and 591, Ibid, 380, p. 383. 
69 Mosk, Dissent to Order in case No. 180, (Harnischefger Corp. v MORT), 4 Iran-USCTR. 
p. 76. 
70 Dissenting Opinion of Holtzman to Order in case No. 33, Ibid, 65, p. 67. 
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to unreasonable, unilateral demands will impair the integrity of the orders of 
the Tribunal". 7 1 
Turning to the individual views, particularly dissenting opinions, of the 
Iranian arbitrators, the situation is by no means different from that of their 
American colleagues. Perhaps a clear difference in the views and conduct of 
the Iranian members may be seen in their clearer assertion of their role as 
judges-advocate and as representatives of interests of their appointing party. It 
is possible, for instance, to interpret some of the statements made by the 
Iranian members as an explicit recognition of that role. Judge Shafeiei, for 
instance, has asserted that in the face of the Tribunal's lack of understanding of 
Iran's problems it was for the Iranian arbitrators "to protect Iran's right to a 
defence". 72 The use of sympathetic, sentimental and patriotic language in the 
individual views of the Iranian arbitrators are also implicit in this direction. 73 
Another indication of this understanding is that the Iranian members 
have very rarely regarded their American colleagues as fully independent and 
impartial judges. This might also be true of the American arbitrators views 
concerning the Iranian members. In other words they would not seem to have 
placed such an expectation upon their role at all. This is manifest in the fact 
that despite some sharp criticisms, which they have levelled occasionally 
against some of the neutral members of the Tribunal in this respect74, no such 
71 Holtzman, Mosk and Aldrich, Dissent from the Procedural Decisions in the Forum 
Selection case, 1 Iran-USCTR. 320, p. 324. 
72 Shafeiei, reasons for not signing the Awards made by Mr Aldrich and Mr Bellet in Cases 
Nos. 83,188,220,449,3 Iran-USCTR. 124, p. 130. The fact that he has refused to 
participate in certain parts of these cases is also a confirmation of the assumption of a 
partisan role by the Iranian Judges. 
73 E. g. Ibid, pp. 127-130; Kashani, Dissenting Opinion in Economy Forms Corp v Iran, 5 
Iran-USCTR. 1, pp. 49-50 ; Declaration of the Iranian arbitrators appended to their 
signatures in case A/18,5 Iran-USCTR. pp. 266-267; Dissenting opinion of the Iranian 
arbitrators in Case A/18,5 Iran-USCTR. 275, pp. 277,328-337. 
74 See Declaration of the Iranian members in case A/18,5 Iran-USCTR. p. 266; Shafeiei 
Reasons for not signing Awards in cases Nos. 83,188,220 and 449,3 Iran-USCTR. pp. 
124-130; Shafeiei, Dissenting Opinion, Cases Nos. 39 and 55, filed 2 September 1983,3 
Iran-USCTR. 297, p. 315 ; and the Statement of the Iranian Arbitrators concerning the 
Episode of 3 September 1984,7 Iran-USCTR. 306, pp. 307-310. 
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questions have been brought upon the partisan conduct of the American 
members. 
Particularly in the pre-September 84 phase of the Tribunal's work there 
has been a sharp division of opinion between the Iranian arbitrators on the one 
hand and the remaining members on the other. This has led the Iranian 
members to attack and question seriously some neutral members' independence 
and impartiality in a full scale advocative and advesarial manner. For instance, 
in the Case A/18 the Iranian members accused the Tribunal, particularly its 
neutral members, of "bad faith interpretation" and being devoid of "all 
credibility" to adjudicate any dispute between Iran and the United States. 75 
Judge Shafeiei has also accused Chamber Two of committing "blatant 
intentional violations of the Algiers Declarations and the Tribunal Rules" and 
"breach of trust". 76 On another occasion, the Iranian members have accused 
the chairmen of Chambers Two and Three of submissiveness to the wishes of 
American corporations and bias against Iran. 77 Finally, the Episode of 3 
September 1984, in which two Iranian members were alleged to have 
physically attacked the Chairman of Chamber Three and prevented him from 
entering the Tribunal premises, was the culmination of the on-going tension 
within the Tribunal in that period. 78 In fact, it has been claimed that this was 
75 Declaration of the Iranian members, case A/18,5 Iran-USCTR. p. 266. 
76 Shafeiei, Reasons for not signing Awards in Cases Nos. 83,188,220 and 449,3 Iran- 
USCTR. p. 125. 
77 "Statement of the Iranian Arbitrators in Connection with the Recent Events at the Iran- 
United States Claims Tribunal", 7 October 1984,7 Iran-USCTR. 306, pp. 307-310, and the 
"Letter" from the Iranian Arbitrators concerning the same episode, 6 October, 1984, Ibid, 
pp. 284-288. 
The substance and the degree of accuracy of the allegations made by the Iranian 
members is irrelevant to our study in this Section. It is notable however, that they have 
usually refrained from criticising the President of the Tribunal whose record they regarded 
acceptable while setting out certain figures and facts and comparing his record with that of 
the then Chairmen of Chambers Two and especially Three. (Ibid, pp. 307-310. See also 
Ibid, pp. 284-288. ) 
78 For the documents concerning the Episode of September 3,1984, see generally, 7 Iran- 
USCTR. pp. 281-316. 
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not the first incident of this kind within the Tribunal and on another occasion 
one of the American members intended to assault the President of the Tribunal 
apparently in the presence of the Agents of Iran and the United States. 79 
The obvious conclusions which can be drawn from the observation of 
the above-mentioned facts is yet again the confirmation of the reality that the 
national/party-appointed judges have felt duty bound to act as guardians of the 
interests of their countries. 
A brief reference should be made to the fact that the post September 3 record 
of the national arbitrators is very rarely associated with the kind of tension 
experienced before and at that date. It is notable in this regard that the United 
States initiated a challenge against the two Iranian arbitrators involved in that 
Episode. 80 Apparently in response to that challenge Iran withdrew the two 
arbitrators and replaced them with two new members. 81 This may be regarded 
as a recognition of the grounds upon which the challenge was based and the 
limits within which partisan tendencies should be expressed. 
b- Method of Reasoning 
Another important characteristic and a clear evidence of the partisan 
mentality of the national/party-appointed arbitrators is reflected in the 
inconsistency of the methods of reasoning employed by them. In other words, 
these inconsistencies become evident not necessarily in a single case but rather 
in an overall assessment of an arbitrator's performance. Such an overall 
examination reveals that, in the words of Lauterpacht, the arbitrator, or 
arbitrators, in question have applied legal rules only when they have "deemed it 
fit to do so" and disregarded them on another occasions. They have applied law 
79 Letter from Eshragh, Agent of Iran, to Agent of the United States, 6 September 1984, Ibid, 
p. 283. 
80 Letter from Agent of The United States to the Appointing Authority, 17 September 1984, 
Ibid, p. 289. 
81 Annual Report of the Tribunal Period Ending 30 June 1985 (AR 84/85), pp 3-4. 
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and legal rules only when they happened to coincide with what the arbitrator 
"believed the law ought to be". 82 
For instance, Arbitrator Mosk of the United States has strongly objected 
throughout the Tribunal's life to the granting of extensions to the Iranian 
respondents to file their statements of defence, or to the postponement of 
hearing to allow more time for the preparation of defence for the Iranian 
respondents. 83 He has regarded such decisions of the Tribunal as "prejudice to 
orderly process" and against the Tribunal Rules. 84 Nevertheless, when 
American litigants have been subjected to the same orderly standards that he 
has advocated against the Iranian litigants, he has dissented from such 
decisions, calling them "exaggerated formalism" and "denial of justice". 85 ; or 
he argued that it was well established that international tribunals were not 
bound to make strict, literal interpretations when to do so was inherently unfair 
and that the Tribunal should have shown flexibility. 86 
A similar kind of selectiveness and variation of the line of reasoning 
from one case to another with regard to identical or similar issues can be seen 
in the record of the Iranian arbitrators. A notable example in this respect is the 
varying positions that they have taken in different cases with regard to the 
82 Lauterpacht, the Function of Law, op. cit. p. 380. 
83 See, for instance, Holtzman, Dissent from Order in Pepsico Inc. v Zamzam Bottling Co, 1 
Iran-USCTR. p. 174; Time Limits- Dissent to orders in 37 Case, Holtzman, Ibid, p. 178; 
Holtzman, Dissent from Orders in Cases Nos. 452, and 926,3 Iran-USCTR. p. 84; 
Holtzman, Dissent from Orders in Cases Nos. 33,87, and 174, Ibid, p. 87; Holtzman, 
Dissent from Orders in Cases 111,582, and A-16, Ibid, p. 316 and Ibid, p. 380; Holtzman, 
Dissent to Order, Foremost Tehran Inc. v Iran, 4 Iran-USCTR. p. 63; Holtzman, Dissent 
from Order in Case No. 33, Ibid, p. 65; and Holtzman, Dissent from Order, Sylvania 
Technical Systems Inc. v Iran, 5 Iran-USCTR. p. 141. 
84 E. g, Dissent to the Procedural Decisions in Forum Selection Cases, Holtzman, Mosk and 
Aldrich, 1 Iran-USCTR. p. 320. 
85 Dissent of Holtzman, Mosk and Aldrich from Final decision in Re Raymond International 
(U. K) Ltd. I Iran-USCTR. p. 396. 
86 Dissent of Holtzman in Refusal cases 1,2 and 3, Ibid, 129, p. 130. 
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method of interpretation that an arbitral tribunal should adopt in establishing its 
jurisdiction. 87 
c- Voting behaviour 
The voting record of the national/party-appointed arbitrators is yet other 
evidence of the reality of their partisan behaviour. For instance, 35 out of about 
70 total dissenting opinions which the American arbitrators have issued as of 
late 1986 are against the procedural decisions such as orders granting extension 
of time for filing a defence by the Iranian Respondents, or some decisins 
refusing the late submission of claims by the American claimants. The 
significance of these figures becomes evident when it is noticed that in the 
overwhelming majority of these cases the Americans have been claimants and 
in all of these cases the extension of time, or other decisions, were somehow 
unfavourable to the American litigants. 
In the same period the Iranian arbitrators have issued about 50 
dissenting opinions all from the decisions rendered against Iran. It should be 
noted that these figures do not include the cases in which the national judges 
have simply dissented from the decisions unfavourable to their respective 
parties without expressing a separate opinion. 
It is, however, certain that in all instances that the American or Iranian 
arbitrators have dissented from a decision, they have done so because the 
decision in question had been against or unfavourable to the respective 
arbitrator's party. In other words, they have never dissented from a decision 
favourable to their respective parties. They have, in an important majority of 
cases, dissented from the decisions against their respective parties ; and most of 
87 E. g. note generally the views of Iranian members in the Case A/2 (1 Iran-USCTR. 104, 
especially p. 105) and compare them with the dissenting opinion of the same members in 
Case A/1 (Ibid, p. 203) and with the dissenting opinion of two of these members in Case 
A/18 (5 Iran-USCTR. 279, especially, pp. 287-290); and Judge Ansari in Case A/18 (Ibid) 
compare with his dissent in Case A/I6 (9 Iran-USCTR. 97. ) 
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the decisions which have been rendered in favour of either party have been 
made so only by forming a majority between the arbitrators of the winning 
party and the neutral arbitrators. 88 
Conclusion 
The role of the party-appointed arbitrators combines two contradictory 
functions of independence and impartiality on the one hand and partisan 
tendencies on the other. The submission, particularly in public international 
law, by the parties to an arbitration system in which the party-appointed 
arbitrators make up the majority arbitrators may be interpreted as a recognition 
of that role. 
Theoretically, the prevailing view in international arbitration requires 
that the party-appointed arbitrators should be held to the same standards of 
independence as the neutral members. This, however, does hardly correspond 
to the realities in the practice of international arbitration. 
The institutional integrity and autonomy of an international arbitral 
tribunal is a useful safeguard against excessive partisan tendencies of the party- 
88 Recently, Mr Richard M. Mosk, a former American Member of the Tribunal has published 
an article entitled "The Role of Party-Appointed Arbitrators in International Arbitration : 
The Experience of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal", [ 1(1) The Transnational 
Lawyer, (1988), p. p. 253-270 ]. In fact, only the last 4 pages of this article are devoted to 
the experience of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal. (Ibid, pp. 267-270). However, 
the article does not provide as much of an inside account of the Tribunal's experience 
regarding its Party-appointed arbitrators, as one would naturally expect from a former 
Party-appointed member of the Tribunal. 
Although Mr Mosk does not strongly argue that the Party-appointed arbitrators of the 
Tribunal have acted in the same manner as one would expect from a neutral member, he 
implies that the American Arbitrators have been more independent than their Iranian 
colleagues. For instance, he points out that the American Arbitrators voted for the Partial 
Award in Case A/15, awarding Iran $500 million. (Ibid, p. 267) One may be able to accept 
that the American members have kept some appearence of independence in their conduct 
and individual opinions. However, as we have noted in this Section, no such difference 
may be found between the Iranian and American members when the latter's voting 
behaviour is examined. Moreover, as was stated in Section A of this Chapter, the 
American members dissented from the essential part of the decision of the Tribunal in 
Case A/15. Their vote for the Partial Award in this Case, though it was noticeable, was a 
somewhat superficial gesture of independence, since the Full Tribunal had already decided 
the essential part of this Case by forming a majority with the Iranian Members. (For 
details of this Case, see Supra Section A, pp. 132-140. ) 
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appointed arbitrators and for securing an orderly process of arbitration. 
However, what ultimately matters is the vote which these arbitrators are giving 
in the course of deciding a claim. This can hardly be controlled by any such 
measures. 
In the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, it is quite clear that the 
arbitrators of both countries have essentially acted as representatives of the 
interests of their countries rather than as fully and strictly independent and 
impartial judges. Their predisposition in favour of their respective parties has 
not been protested against by the other party in so far as it has not led to the 
disruption of the Tribunal proceedings. That is, neither party has entertained a 
serious expectation of the independence and impartiality of the other party's 
arbitrators. 
To overcome these shortcomings in international arbitration no new 
constructive suggestions can be made here. In fact, the recent history of 
international arbitration is full of various suggestions for the improvement of 
the legal character and organization of international arbitration. 89 These 
suggestions are based on a particular reliance on the appointment of neutral 
arbitrators to the extent of enabling them to form a majority without the need 
for the affirmative vote of the national members, i. e. a five-member tribunal 
composed of three neutral members acting on the basis of majority vote. They 
can provide a useful framework for the improvement of the shortcomings in 
international arbitration. 90 In the absence of such acceptance and recognition 
by States to grant a more independent status to international arbitration and in 
89 See generally, Hans Mangoldt, "Arbitration and Conciliation", op. cit. pp. 523-33; and 
Louis B. Sohn, "The Role of Arbitration in Recent Multilateral Treaties", op. cit. pp. 28- 
30. 
90 The most recent and successful arbitral tribunal composed of three neutral and two party 
arbitrators may be the Egypt-Israeli arbitral Tribunal concerning the Taba dispute. (See 
Article I of the Agreement to Arbitrate Boundary Dispute Concerning the Taba 
Bcachfront between Egypt and Israel, September 1986,26 ILM, (1987), p. 1; and the 
Arbitral Award in the Taba Dispute, 27 ILM, p. 1421. 
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view of the continued and frequent reliance on the three-member tribunal of 
the kind discussed here, it should be accepted that the parties, by adopting such 
a composition, are aware of the inherent implications in the system but prefer 
to have a settlement of a quasi-legal nature. 
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SECTION C 
CULTURAL-LEGAL BACKGROUND OF THE NEUTRAL 
ARBITRATORS 
I. Generally 
Perhaps it is an exaggeration to say that in international disputes there 
are "in practice no neutrals". 1 However, the suggestion that the element of 
nationality or the existence of formal alliances or common interests between 
States may become a subconscious factor and influence the decision of the 
international judge has widely been recognized in international law. H. 
Lauterpacht points out: 
The conviction that international judges in their capacity as 
members of their national communities may not always be 
capable of the required detachment, refers not only- not even 
principally- to the attitude of judges in disputes in which their 
own State is directly interested as a party. For it is not with these 
judges that the decision will rest as a rule.... The doubts refer to 
the attitude of judges nationals of States which are not direct 
parties to the dispute, i. e. of what might be described as neutral 
judges. For, ... in addition to the 
fact of the interdependence of 
nations in general, formal alliances and specific common 
interests make third States and their nationals directly interested 
in the outcome of a dispute. 2 
Furthermore, because of the absence of an international legislature the 
task of adaptation of legal rules to social change in the sphere of international 
relations is necessarily left to the judicial discretion of the international judge. 
3 
As a result, the relevance of the cultural-legal background of the international 
judge becomes even more evident. This is because an international judge's 
I Iauterpacht, The Function of Law, op. cit. p. 204 and p. 225. 
2 Ibid, p. 204. 
3 Ibid, p. 203. 
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conception of his own role has essentially been moulded by his training in a 
particular national legal-cultural system. 4 This training, it is argued, induces "a 
kind of predisposition or attitude with which a judge approaches every case. "5 
In fact it has been emphasised that an international judge "can perhaps 
overcome the influence of political and national affiliations : it is harder for 
him to be freed from the assumptions basic to the legal culture from which he 
comes, and the modes of reasoning he has internalized during his professional 
career. "6 
It is upon the recognition of this principle that Article 9 of the Statute of 
the International Court of Justice requires that the judges should represent 
different "civilizations and the principal legal systems of the world". The 
rationale behind the adoption of Article 9 would seem to lie in the need to 
internationalize the Court with a view to enabling it to balance all interests so 
as to develop a universally accepted international law. 7 Undoubtedly, it is 
inevitable that these judges will retain and reflect their legal-cultural education 
in their activities in the international Court. In fact, some ICJ judges have 
regarded this as a justified reflection of the principle embodied in Article 9 of 
the Statute. 8 
Furthermore, a review of the experience of the International Court of 
Justice clearly reveals the creation of different voting groups representing 
different legal systems, such as those from the Latin American States, the 
Socialist Countries, the Western States, etc. 9 A closer consideration of some 
4 Lyndel Prott, "The Latent Power of Culture... " op. cit. p. xix. 
5 Ibid, p. 191. 
6 Ibid, p. 193. 
7 See generally, R. P. Anand, "The Role of Individual and Dissenting Opinions in 
International Adjudication", 14 ICLQ, (1965), 788, pp. 805-806. 
8 Dissenting Opinion, Judge Levi Carneiro, Anglo-Iranian Oil Co Case, ICJ Rep. 1952, p. 
161. 
9 See generally, Lyndel Prott, op. cit. pp. 54-58. See also Anand, the Role of Individual 
Opinions, op. cit. pp. 805-806. 
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particular cases also demonstrates the existence of such voting groups and 
cultural-legal blocs and their effect on the decisions of the Court. The South 
West Africa Case is one of the best examples in this regard. The importance of 
the Case in relation to our discussion here is twofold. First, it shows how some 
changes appearing in the composition of the Court in the Second Phase of the 
Case10- in comparison with the membership in the First Phase of this Case 11- 
were decisive in causing the Court to adopt a decision against its jurisdiction in 
complete contravention of its earlier decision in the First Phase. 12 Second, the 
Case provides a good example of the effect of judicial predisposition on 
judicial reasoning. It is submitted, for instance, that in the Second Phase the 
majority came to the conclusion, by analogy with municipal law that no legal 
interest existed in the applicants. The dissenters, on the other hand, all came to 
the conclusion in the very same Case, also by analogy with private law, that 
such an interest did exist. 13 Yet the de facto revision of the 1966 South West 
Africa Judgement in the Namibia Case14 following the changes in the 
membership of the Court, in the wake of the 1966 South West Africa 
Judgement, with an increase in the number of judges from Africa and some 
other changes 15 proves the effect of judicial predisposition on the decisions of 
international judges beyond any doubt. 
10 South West Africa Cases, ICJ Rep. 1966, p. 6. 
11 South West Africa Cases, Preliminary Objections, ICJ Rep. 1962, p. 319. 
12 The voting figures in both Phases of the Case show the deep split on the issue. In the First 
Phase there was a majority of eight to seven in favour of the Court's jurisdiction. In the 
Second Phase there was also a majority of eight to seven against the Court's jurisdiction. 
(It is notable that in the Second Phase the majority was formed by the President's casting 
vote. ) The absence of Judge Bustamante Sirven and Judge Zafrulla Khan respectively due 
to illness and withdrawal and the death of Judge Badawi are considered to have been the 
main reasons for the reversal of the Court's earlier decision. (See generally, 
Schwarzenberger, Vol 4, op. cit. pp. 315-316). 
13 Lyndel Prott, op. cit. p. 195. For a further review see generally, Ibid, pp. 196-229. 
14 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia 
(South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory 
Opinion, ICJ Reports, 1971, p. 16. 
15 See Schwarzenberger, Vol 4, op. cit. pp. 316-317. 
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Furthermore, in the most recent example of the Court's activity also 
certain signs of judicial predisposition may be traced behind the negative vote 
of the British and the Japanese judges- no doubt the American Judge as well- 
against the essential parts of the Court's Judgement against the United States. 16 
In other words, in view of the above countries' close alliance with the United 
States and given the factual legal circumstances of the Case itself and the 
adoption of the essential parts of the Judgement by a majority of all members 
with the exception of the above three judges, these judges' negative vote can 
hardly be disconnected from the phenomenon of judicial predisposition. The 
dissenting views of the Soviet and the Syrian Judges to certain parts of the 
Judgement in the Hostages Case can also be categorized as such. 17 
Interestingly, the latter Case at the same time shows the limits of judicial 
predisposition. That is, in the circumstances such as this Case, where the facts 
are clear and the rules are commonly established, judicial predisposition 
becomes of minimal relevance. The unanimous vote of all 15 judges to sub- 
paragraphs 3 and 4 of the above judgement ordering Iran to release the 
hostages and to refrain from instituting any judicial proceedings against them is 
an obvious example in this respect. 18 
With regard to some older examples taken from the history of 
international arbitration it is submitted, for instance, that in the North Atlantic 
Fisheries arbitration in 1910, Judge Drago insisted on delivering a dissenting 
opinion on the meaning of the term "bay" in the British-American Treaty of 
16 See the voting figures with regard to sub-paragraphs 2,3,4,5,6,10,11,12 and 13 of the 
operative part of the Judgement of the ICJ in the Case Concerning Military and 
Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua, ICJ Rep. 1986, pp. 146-149. For a 
further reading see Dissenting Opinions of Judge Oda, Judge Schwebel and Judge 
Jennings, Ibid, respectively, pp. 212,259 and 528. 
17 Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, ICJ Rep. 1980, 
p. 3. Note the negative vote of these judges to sub-paragraphs I and 2 of the operative part 
of the Judgement, (Ibid, p. 44); and the Dissenting Opinions of Judges Morozov and 
Tarazi, Ibid, respectively, pp. 51 and 58. 
18 Ibid, pp. 44-45. 
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1818. Later it was suggested that in acting in this manner the Argentine judge 
had in mind not only the interpretation of the Treaty, but also the possibility of 
safeguarding the interests of his country in the issue of the River La Plata. 19 
In short, it is submitted that an examination of the record of judges 
trained in a particular system indicates that there are certain tendencies to be 
seen in almost all the ICJ judges from a particular legal culture. Of course, 
many attitudes depend significantly on individual personality and experience, 
but the role of the legal culture should not be underestimated. For instance, the 
European judges appear to have developed a gradual confluence of juristic 
methods and a coincidence of legal solutions. 20 Even, it is claimed, the 
difference of opinion between Common Law and Continental judges could be 
attributed not to a difference of opinion as to the solution itself but rather to the 
method of justification of this solution. 21 In contrast, judges from "Third 
World" States appear to represent different tendencies from that of the 
European judges in many respects. 22 And the fact that the socialist judges are 
set apart as a group from their colleagues on the Court, with new techniques 
and approaches to problems of social order, is also generally accepted. 23 
19 Lauterpacht, The Function of Law, op. Cit. pp. 225-226. For further examples see also 
Ibid, p. 226. 
20 Lyndel Prott, op. Cit. pp. 220-221. 
21 Ibid, p. 221. 
22 Ibid, pp. 224-226. 
23 Ibid, pp. 226-227. See also, Anand, "The Role of Individual Opinion", op. Cit. pp. 805- 
806. 
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II. International Adjudication and the Developing Countries: A 
Brief Glance 
The view is widespread that the developing countries appear convinced 
that international judicial organs such as the World Court cannot be sufficiently 
sensitive to third-world concerns. 24 The developing States also feel little 
confidence in an international legal system in whose making "they played no 
role and whose output is still largely determined by Western-dominated legal 
conceptions". 25 As a consequence, the developing States have, in recent years, 
expressed a desire to develop a new international law. Despite some progress 
which have been made in modifying and reconsidering international law, 
according to the changed circumstances of the international community and in 
order to develop a universally accepted international law, the present 
international law is still largely a legacy of Western civilization. In other 
words, there are many areas of international law over which the developing 
countries on the one hand and the industrialized countries on the other are 
sharply divided. 
Notably, a number of resolutions were passed by the General Assembly 
of the United Nations on the initiative of some Third World countries in the 
context of sovereignty over natural resources, during the 1960s and 1970s. The 
main incentive behind these attempte was to introduce new concepts in regard 
to the law governing these areas. 
24 Arthur Rovine, "The National Interest and the World Court", in Leo Gross, The Future 
of the International Court of Justice, Oceana Publications, Inc. New York, 1976, 
Vol 1,313, p. 315. 
The problem of lack of confidence shown by the developing countries extends also to 
international commercial arbitration. Many of these States fear that arbitral tribunals, 
established under the auspices of Western based arbitral institutions, will have an "inbuilt 
cultural and social bias against them, however impeccable the intellectual integrity of the 
individual arbitrators may be. " (Alan Redfern and Martin Hunter, op. cit. p. 168). 
25 Ibid, and generally, R. A. Falk, "The New States and International Law", 118 Recueil des 
Cours, II, (1966), 1, pp. 34-35; also R. P. Anand, International Law and the 
Developing Countries, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht, 1987, p. 106; and 
Anand, "Role of International Adjudication", in Leo Gross, op. cit. Vol 1,1, pp. 5-9. 
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To begin with, on 14 December 1962, the General Assembly passed 
Resolution 1803 (XVII), entitled "Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural 
Resources", by 87 votes to 2, with 12 abstentions. 26 Paragraph 4 of Resolution 
1803 clearly recognized the right of a State to take measures such as 
nationalization, expropriation or requisitioning for reasons of public utility, 
security or national interest. This Paragraph also emphasized that in such cases 
the owner "shall be paid appropriate compensation, in accordance with the 
rules in force in the State taking such measures and in accordance with 
international law. 
Further, on 17 December 1973 the General Assembly adopted 
Resolution 3171 (XXVIII), again on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural 
Resources, with 108 votes in favour, one against and 16 abstentions. 27 
Paragraph 3 of Resolution 3171 provided that "each State is entitled to 
determine the amount of possible compensation and the mode of payment" and 
that any dispute which might arise should be settled in accordance with the 
national legislation of each State carrying out such measures. 
Again, on 12 December 1974 the General Assembly adopted 
Resolution 3281 (XXIX), entitled "the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties 
of States", by 120 votes to 6, with 10 abstentions2, despite the doubts and 
objections of the industrialized countries. The Charter re-emphasised the right 
of each State to nationalize or expropriate alien property on payment of 
"appropriate compensation in accordance with its own laws and regulations"29 
26 G. A. Resolution 1803(XVII), General Assembly Official Records, 17th Session, Supp. 17, 
p. 15; as quoted in J. Djonovich (Ed. ), IX United Nations Resolutions (1962-1963), 
Oceana Publications Inc, New York , 1974, 
Series I, p. 107. For the voting record of the 
Resolution 1803, see Ibid, p. 21. 
27 13 ILM (1974), p. 238. 
28 Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States 1974, GA Resolution 3281(XXIX). 14 
ILM, (1975), p. 251. 
29 Article 2(2C) of the Charter of Economic Rights. 
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and in effect rejected the formula of "prompt, due and effective" compensation 
advanced by the industrialized States. 
The developing countries are of the view that many of the provisions 
embodied in this Charter and other relevant resolutions form part of 
international law. 30 On the hand, most of the industrialized countries reject that 
argument. Whether the standard of "appropriate compensation" laid down in 
the Charter represents general international law and whether resolutions of the 
General Assembly at all have the force of law are subject to serious 
controversies between these two groups of countries, with the developed 
countries taking a negative view in relation to the question. 31 
The deep roots of this difference of opinion are, obviously, the very 
political economic and cultural factors which divide these two groups of 
countries. It is natural that this division will manifest itself in the views of 
lawyers, jurists and academics of the countries in question, as, for instance, 
when lawyers from the industrialized countries take the view which is 
essentially based on the position of their own countries. 32 For similar reasons 
Third World lawyers have adopted a position which is more consistent with the 
Third World perspectives. 33 
As a consequence, the kind of influence that the cultural-legal 
predisposition of the membership of an international adjudicating body can 
exert on the outcome is of particular importance in such controversial 
circumstances. An obvious example would be the Iran-United States Claims 
Tribunal which is to decide various issues of such controversial nature. In the 
30 See, Anand, International Law and the Developing Countries, op. cit. p. 113-115. 
31 See DJ. Hams, Cases and Materials on International Law, Sweet & Maxwell, 
1983, p. 432. For a discussion of these differences of approach, see also generally F. V. 
Garcia-Amador, The Changing Law of International Claims, Oceana Publications, 
Inc. London, 1984, Vol 2, pp. 667-728, and particularly pp. 729-745. 
32 Ibid. 
3' Anand, International Law and the Developing Countries, op. cit. pp. 113-116. 
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following part we will examine this problem in the practice of the Iran-US 
Tribunal. Before that, however, two points require attention: 
First, international arbitration is no exception to the problems discussed 
above. It is true that in international arbitration the parties have a greater 
degree of choice for selecting such judges as they consider suitable from the 
relevant points of view, including the judges'legal culture. Indeed, the essence 
and advantage of international arbitration is considered to be the fact that 
arbitrators can be selected from different environments and backgrounds. 34 It 
is in recognition of this principle that Article 14(2) of the ICSID Convention 
emphasises that in designating persons to serve on the "Panels of Arbitrators 
and Conciliators", due regard should be paid to the "importance of assuring 
representation on the Panels of the principal legal systems of the world and the 
main forms of economic activity". 35 Moreover, in view of the fact that it is the 
neutral arbitrators with whom the decision will rest as a rule, the mechanisms 
employed in their selection and the effect of their legal culture are of primary 
importance in regard to the outcome of arbitration. 
Second, it must again be emphasised that depending upon the 
experience, training and personality of the arbitrator in question judicial 
predisposition can be controlled to a certain extent. We will also attempt to 
trace this point in this study. 
34 Hans Smith, "The Future of International Commercial Arbitration... ", op. cit. p. 10. 
35 A kind of indirect and implicit recognition of this principle may be found in Article 2(1) of 
the ICC Rules of 1988, which provides that in selection of arbitrators consideration should 
be given to "the proposed arbitrator's nationality place of residence and other relationships 
with the countries of which the parties or the other arbitrators are nationals". See also 
Article 3(3) of the LCIA Rules of 1985. 
196 
III. Qualifications and Backgrounds of the Arbitrators 
Appointed to the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal 
III(1)- The qualities required of the international arbitrator are basically 
left to the discretion of the arbitrating parties. Some arbitration agreements or 
arbitration rules do not specify such qualities, and those which provide 
provisions to this effect are necessarily of general nature. The Hague 
Conventions of 1899 and 1907, for instance, require that arbitrators should be 
of "known competency in questions of international law and of the highest 
moral reputation.. "36 More elaborated requisites can be found in Article 2 of 
the Statute of the International Court of Justice. They read in conjunction with 
Articles 16,17-20 of the same Statute and Article 4 of the Rules of the Court 
and are considered to be sevenfold: he is to be internationally-minded, 
independent, disinterested, impartial, conscientious, competent and of high 
moral character. 37 These requisites are naturally associated with a certain 
degree of subjectivity. Nevertheless, the Statute, the Rules and the practice of 
the Court and the experience of international adjudication as a whole offer 
practical guidance in those respects. 38 For instance, the element of nationality, 
i. e. which specific third State the judge or neutral arbitrator belongs, acts as an 
important criterion in determining his disinterestedness and consequently his 
impartiality. Professional qualifications also ensure that the international judge 
should have a background of legal training and knowledge, either in domestic 
law or in international law. 39 It appears that in public international 
adjudications the prevailing view is that the person in question should have a 
background of training and knowledge in international law, in order to 
36 Articles 23 and 44 of the 1899 and 1907 Conventions respectively. 
37 Schwarzenberger, Vol 4, op. cit. pp. 275-276. 
38 For details see Ibid, pp. 276-28 1. 
39 Article 2 of the Statute of the ICJ. 
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minimize conscious or unconscious resort of the judge to national legal 
tradition. 4° 
In international arbitration in the field of commerce, however, the 
principal emphasis in regard to the professional qualifications of arbitrators is 
placed on their knowledge and experience in the areas closer to that field. The 
ICSID Convention, for instance, provides that persons designated to serve on 
the "Panel of Arbitrators (and Conciliators)" should be persons of "high moral 
character and recognized competence in the fields of law, commerce, industry 
or finance, who may be relied upon to exercise independent judgement". A 
particular emphasis on competence in the field of law has also been put in the 
case of persons on the "Panels of Arbitrators". 41 Within the context of 
commercial international arbitration, therefore, knowledge and experience in 
international arbitration- by which is meant commercial international 
arbitration- and knowledge and experience in the field of international trade, 
contract law, commercial law and private international law with an outlook of 
comparative law are the most relevant. 42 
A point commonly emphasised both in public international arbitration 
and commercial international arbitration is that the arbitration must have a true 
international structure. To achieve this, it should take place in a third, neutral 
country in relation to both parties and the arbitrators should have an open mind 
towards "legal pluralism, to various cultures and various political and social 
systems". 43 In addition, it is essential that the arbitration should take place 
before a panel of arbitrators which includes arbitrators of different nationalities 
40 Lyndel Prott, op. Cit. pp. 212-216. 
41 Article 14(1) of the ICSID Convention. 
42 See Pierre Lalive, "International Arbitration-Teaching and Research", in Julian Lew, (Ed. ) 
"Contemporary Problems in International Arbitration", op. cit. p. 16; also A Redfern and 
Martin Hunter, op. cit. pp. 168-169; and R. David, op. cit. pp. 246-25 1. 
43 Pierre Lalive, op. cit. p. 16. 
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and backgrounds. 44 All these, obviously, are designed to ensure the utmost 
degree of independence, disinterestedness and impartiality on the part of the 
arbitrators. 
111(2)- There are no explicit provisions either in the CSD or the 
Tribunal Rules in relation to the qualifications and backgrounds of the 
arbitrators to be appointed to the Iran-US Claims Tribunal. In practice, 
however, members of the Tribunal have all had legal training and experience, 
including experience as international arbitrators, jurists, lawyers and law 
academics. The first President of the Tribunal and the Chairman of Chamber 
One, Judge Gunnar Lagergren, has been an eminent Swedish Judge as Marshall 
of the Realm of Sweden. He has been president of arbitration tribunals in a 
number of major public and private international law cases, a judge of the 
European Court of Human Rights and a member of the Permanent Court of 
Arbitration. 45 Among the most famous international arbitration tribunals over 
which Judge Lagergren has presided are the German-Allied Arbitration 
Tribunal, the Ran of Kutch Arbitration46, BP v Libya47 and the most recently 
established Egypt-Israeli Arbitration Tribunal. 48 Quite clearly, Judge 
Lagergren's outstanding experience in the field of international arbitration has 
been an important asset to the Tribunal. The other two originally appointed 
neutral members of the Tribunal were of French and Swedish nationalities. 
Judge Pierre Bellet, Chairman of Chamber Two, had been a former Chief 
Justice of the French Supreme Court and the President of the French 
44 Ibid. 
45 Press Release by the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, June 9,1981, provided by the 
Secretariat of the Tribunal. See also Annex II to the Annual Report of the Tribunal Period 
ending 30 June 1983 (AR 82/83), p. 3. 
46 50 ILR, p. 2; 7 ILM, p. 633. 
47 53 ILR, p. 297. 
48 Article 1 of the 1986 Egypt-Israeli Agreement to Arbitrate the Boundary Dispute 
Concerning the Taba Beachfront, 26 ILM, (1987), p. 1. 
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Committee of Private International Law. 49 Judge Nils Mangard, Chairman of 
Chamber Three, had been Judge of the Appeal Court of Stockholm and a 
member of the International Council for Commercial Arbitration. 50 Judge 
Bellet had been active in international arbitration. He was later appointed as a 
member of the Egypt-Israeli Arbitration Tribunal. Judge Mangard had been 
president of international arbitration tribunals in previous cases. 51 
The President of the Tribunal during 1984-1988 was Professor Karl- 
Heinz Bockstiegel who had held the appointment since Judge Lagergren's 
resignation on 1 October 1984. Professor Bockstiegel is a national of the 
Federal Republic of Germany. He is Professor of International Business Law 
and Director of the Institute of Air and Space Law at Koln University, as well 
as the author and editor of a wide range of publications in the field of 
international law. He is a well-known arbitrator and has been a member of, and 
presided over several international arbitral tribunals. 52 Professor Bockstiegel 
has also been active as a member, officer and rapporteur of a number of 
national and international legal and commercial institutions. 53 The other two 
original neutral members of the Tribunal have also resigned and been replaced 
by new members. Judge Bellet was replaced by Professor Willem Riphagen on 
1 August 1983.54 Professor Riphagen himself later resigned and was replaced 
by Dr Robert Briner on June 1985.55 Judge Mangard's resignation took effect 
from 1 July 1985. Professor Michel Andre Virally replaced Judge Mangard56 
and served as a member of the Tribunal until his resignation in 1988. 
49 Press Release of June 9,1981 of the Tribunal, op. cit. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Press Release, 5/12/84 , provided by the Secretariat of the Tribunal. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Annex to AR 86/87 of the Tribunal, p. 63. 
55 Ibid, p. 62. 
56 Ibid. It is notable that under Paragraph 5 of Article 13 of the Tribunal Rules the resigning 
neutral members continued to work for the Tribunal for sonne time after their resignations, 
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Professor Riphagen of the Netherlands has been Professor of 
International Law at the Erasmus University of Rotterdam, legal adviser to the 
Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs and a member of the International 
Law Commission. He has also acted as ad hoc judge in the International Court 
of Justice, and has been a member of the PCA and Chairman of the 
Netherlands delegation to the UN Conference on the Law of the Sea. 57 Dr 
Briner, a Swiss national, is a partner in a law firm in Geneva. He is an 
international arbitrator of recognized standing and experience, and the author 
of several publications on law and arbitration. 58 Professor Virally, a French 
national, has worked as Professor of International Law at the University of 
Law, Economics and Political Science of Paris and at the Graduate Institute of 
International Studies of Geneva. He has also acted as counsel to several 
governments in disputes before the International Court of Justice and arbitral 
tribunals. 59 
The arbitrators appointed by Iran and the United States have all been 
their respective nationals. Iran has, since the establishment of the Tribunal, 
made many appointments and at present none of the three Iranian arbitrators is 
an original member-60 Generally speaking, the Iranian arbitrators have been 
known judges or academics with domestic and civil law training. Apparently, 
they had not had any particular experience in international arbitration prior to 
their appointments to the Tribunal. 61 The three original Iranian members were 
Judges Kashani, Shafeiei and Enayat, who have been members of Chambers 
on the undecided cases in which they had previously participated. This participation for 
the original neutral members continued well into 1987 on some occasions. 
57 Press release, 18 July 1983, provided by the Secretariat of the Tribunal. 
58 Communique No. 85/2,15 April 1985 provided by the Secretariat of the Tribunal. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Annex V to AR 86/87, pp. 62-63. 
61 This statement may not be applicable to the non-original Iranian members of the Tribunal, 
who have usually had close dealings with the preparation of Iran's defence and with 
arguments for the cases before the Tribunal. 
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One to Three respectively. 62 Judges Kashani and Shafeiei had recognized 
backgrounds in teaching at The Law School of the National (Shahid Beheshti) 
University of Iran, with the former having experience as attorney at law and 
the latter being a former judge. Judge Enayat had been a former Foreign 
Ministry legal aide. Judge Enayat was replaced by Judge M. Jahangir Sani on 1 
March 1982, who in turn was replaced by Judge Ansari Moin on 14 September 
1983. Judge Kashani was replaced by Judge Mohsen Mostafavi on 29 
November 1984. He in turn was replaced by Judge Assadollah Nouri on 5 July 
1987. In 1989 Judges Ansari and Noun were still members of the Tribunal. 
Judge Hamid Bahrami-Ahmadi succeeded Judge Shafeiei on 29 September 
1984.63 The above members have qualifications similar to the original Iranian 
members. 64 
The American arbitrators in early 1988 were Judges H. M. Holtzman, H. 
Aldrich and Charles N. Brower, who were members of Chambers One to Three 
respectively. The first two are the original members, but the latter replaced 
Judge R. M. Mosk, the original American member, on 16 January 1984.65 
Judge Howard Holtzman is a New York attorney and a former Chairman of the 
Board of the American Arbitration Association. Judge H. Aldrich has been a 
former member of the International Law Commission and once headed the US 
delegation to the Law of the Sea Conference. Mr Richard Mosk of the 
California bar, has served on the staff of the President's Commission on the 
Assassination of President Kennedy. 66 
62 Annex V to AR 86/87, pp. 62-63. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Iran has also appointed Judges Ameli and Aghahoseini as substitute (ad hoc) arbitrators to 
act in a specific number of cases. (Ibid, p. 64. ) 
65 Ibid, pp. 62-63. The United States has also appointed substitute and ad hoc members. 
(Ibid, p. 64. ) 
66 See generally, Gerald Aksen, op. cit. p. 4. 
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It should be mentioned that Mr Charles Brower, the American Member 
of Chamber Three, has resigned effective from 31 March 198867 and Mr 
Richard Alison has been appointed as his successor. 68 Mr Hamid Bahrami- 
Ahmadi, the Iranian Member of Chamber Two, also resigned69 and Mr Khalil 
Khalilian replaced him effective 1 January 1988.70 
IV. The Process of Appointment of the Neutral Members 
IV(1)- There is no doubt that professionally all the neutral members of 
the Tribunal have been and are highly qualified persons of recognized standing 
in their home countries and in international arbitration. The subject matter of 
their professional backgrounds as a whole, seems to indicate a mixture of 
public international law and commercial law interests. Given the diversity in 
the nature and categories of the claims dealt with by the Tribunal this mixed 
emphasis on both public international and commercial law in selecting the 
neutral members is understandable. 
Quite clearly, the element of nationality in the composition of the 
neutral members of the Tribunal is one of the most important factors both in its 
own right and as an important criterion in assessing these members' legal- 
cultural backgrounds. So far, despite a relative diversity in the nationalities of 
the neutral members, on the whole they come from a common politico- 
economic bloc of countries, namely Western Europe. It is again true that under 
the CSD and the Tribunal Rules the selection of the neutral members is a 
product of the mutual agreement of the Party-appointed arbitrators- or if they 
fail to do so the appointing authority is the person who is authorised to make 
such appointments, as on two occasions he has done. In other words, it is true 
67 AR 87/88, p. 1. For the text of his letter of resignation see, Ibid, Annex I, p. 59. 
68 Ibid, p. 2. 
69 Ibid. For the notification by Mr Bahrami of the submission to and acceptance by the 
Government of Iran of his resignation from the Tribunal see, Ibid, p. 60. 
70 Ibid, p. 2. 
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that the ultimate responsibility for the appointment of the neutral members 
rests with the Parties themselves. 71 This choice of the Parties, however, should 
be seen in the context of the process by which they are to select a mutually 
acceptable arbitrator and/or the framework within which the appointing 
authority is empowered to make an appointment. Of course, in reality each 
Party will try to select a person of the nationality and background who best 
suits its own expectations. As a result, the question of whether there are any 
safeguards, such as Article 9 of the Statute of the ICJ, to guarantee a balanced 
representation of the expectations of both parties, is of principal significance. 
In the absence of such prior arrangements the question is whether the Parties 
have in practice observed that principle. Undoubtedly this question is equally 
applicable to the process of designation of the appointing authority as well as 
to the appointments made by that authority. 
A particular problem with the instruments governing the arbitral 
process in the Iran-US Tribunal is that the CSD, having been hastily drafted, 
essentially leaves many structural issues to the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. 
On the other hand, the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules which are drafted to be 
used as a universally acceptable model for international arbitration72 do not 
appear to have been designed principally to provide detailed guidance to a 
unique situation such as the Iran-US Tribunal. These Rules have primarily been 
designed to be adopted for ad hoc, single-case commercial arbitration 
tribunals73 rather than for a tribunal which has a multi-case, semi-permanent 
71 A kind of exception to this unlimited freedom of the parties is the provision made by the 
rules of some international arbitration institutions. For instance, Article 3(3) of the LCIA 
Rules of 1985 provides that the "Court" may refuse to appoint the arbitrators nominated by 
the parties if it determines that they are not "suitable or independent or impartial". Under 
the same Rules and the ICC Arbitration Rules the formal confirmation of the arbitrators 
nominated by the parties is to be made by the "Court" of the institutions concerned. (Ibid, 
Article 3(5), and Articles 2(3) and 3(4) of the ICC Rules of 1988. ) 
72 See Terence W. Thompson, "The UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules", 17 Harv. I. L. J. (1976), 
141, p. 143 ; also Pieter Sanders, Commentary on UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, op. Cit. 
p. 173. 
73 Ibid, pp. 174-175. 
204 
nature and works in an institutional framework. Moreover, the UNCITRAL 
Rules are designed to be adopted for an arbitral tribunal made up of a sole 
arbitrator or three arbitrators. 74 By contrast, the nine-member plenary structure 
is essential to the composition of the Tribunal. The three-member Chambers 
are also ultimately part of a bigger nine-member composition. These and the 
above-mentioned features require that the backgrounds of the neutral 
membership should have been paid much more detailed attention in the 
Tribunal's mandate and its Rules than that given in the UNCITRAL Rules. In 
fact, the only reference to the question in hand in the UNCITRAL Rules is that 
the neutral member will be of a nationality other than the nationality of the 
parties. 75 No further modifications have been made to the UNCITRAL Rules 
regarding the problem in question under the Tribunal Rules. 
IV(2)- It appears that in the course of negotiations for the appointment 
of the neutral members, the question of legal culture of arbitrators has not been 
given necessary attention by the Iranians. The limited amount of information 
available suggests that the negotiations were conducted by three Iranian 
members and the Agent of Iran with the American Arbitrators and the Agent of 
the United States during about three weeks at the Peace Palace with the 
assistance made available by the Secretary General of the PCA. 76 The result 
reached, however, is surprising from what might be described as the Iranian 
stand-point. The selection of two arbitrators from Sweden and one from 
France, whose legal system has close similarities to the pre-revolutionary legal 
system of Iran, indicate the Iranian concern not to select nationals of the closest 
allies of the United States, while the other areas of concern from the third 
world standpoints have been mainly left untouched. The selection at the same 
74 Ibid, pp. 184-187. See also Articles 6 and 7 of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. 
75 Article 7(3) of the UNCITRAL Rules. Even this reference primarily concerns the 
appointments made by the appointing authority rather than those made by the parties 
themselves. 
76 AR 83/82, p. 2. 
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time of two Swedish Judges from among over 150 nations is not only 
surprising, but has also limited the possibility of a broader base representation 
in the composition of the neutral members, which could have had at least one 
neutral member with Islamic, third world or socialist legal background. On the 
other hand, in view of the principal emphasis placed on fundamental Islamic 
principles in every and all aspects of Iranian society, including its judicial 
system, by the Islamic Government of Iran, and the kind of anti-Western 
philosophy it has advocated, it is not clear how the Iranian team has reconciled 
such trends with the predominantly Christian-Western structure of the neutral 
membership of the Tribunal- not to mention the ideological obstacles that the 
acceptance and enforcement by Iran of the awards of such an adjudicating 
body as a whole faces from the point of view of the Islamic principles strongly 
advocated by the Government of Iran, details of which are beyond the scope of 
this study. 
A clear sign of the Iranians' unease with the neutral membership, which 
in turn indicates that the earlier appointments were not conducted thoroughly 
and were not whole-heartedly accepted by Iran, emerged soon after the 
appointments were made. In fact, the Tribunal had not yet started with the 
proceeding of the actual cases when Iran announced that it had no confidence 
in the neutrality and impartiality of Mr Mangard, the Chairman of Chamber 
Three. 77 Iran's suspicion as to the impartiality of this Judge continued well into 
the last day of his office and beyond, effects of which will be discussed in the 
next subsection. The challenge, or what Iran called "disqualification", instituted 
against Judge Mangard, though not directly concerning the problem of legal 
culture, entails important questions in relation to the appointment and 
challenge of the neutral members. 
77 The Letter of 1 January 1982 and its enclosure from the Agent of Iran to Mr Mangard, as 
quoted in the Decision of the Appointing Authority concerning the challenge against Judge 
Mangard, 5 March 1982,1 Iran-USCTR. 509, p. 515. 
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Iran argued basically, that Judge Mangard by making statements 
condemning and "accusing the Islamic Republic of Iran of executions" had 
disqualified himself, and the Government of Iran had no confidence in his 
impartiality to decide highly controversial and politically sensitive disputes 
between the two countries. 78 It is not, however, clear why the Government of 
Iran chose to declare a unilateral disqualification of Judge Mangard in 
contravention of, and instead of acting under the challenge procedure provided 
for by the Tribunal Rules. 79 This unilateral method of action by Iran has not 
only provoked intervention by the Tribunal in the affair, which would 
otherwise have been unnecessary, but also appears to have been consequently 
prejudicial to the merits of Iran's claim in the course of consideration of the 
challenge by the Appointing Authority. 
Apparently, with the view that Iran's unilateral demand for Judge 
Mangard's resignation interfered with the due functioning of the arbitration, the 
Tribunal by intervening in the matter ruled that the only method by which an 
arbitrator could be removed was through challenge by a High Contracting 
Party and decision by the Appointing Authority pursuant to Articles 10-12 of 
the UNCITRAL Rules; and that Iran's action constituted a challenge to Mr 
Mangard pursuant to Article 11 of the UNCITRAL Rules. 8° The Tribunal's 
intervention in view of the method of action taken by Iran is understandable in 
order to emphasise the principle of integrity of the arbitration process and such 
intervention would have been unlikely if Iran had opted to act under the proper 
procedure of challenge under the Tribunal Rules. However, despite the 
Tribunal's mindfulness to express that its decision did not deal with the 
question of validity or timeliness of the challenge to be considered by the 
78 Ibid. 
79 See Ibid, and the arguments presented by Iran in the Decision of 15 January 1982 of the 
Tribunal concerning the Letter of 28 December 1981 and 1 January 1982 of the Agent of 
Iran to Mr Mangard, Ibid, 111, p. 112. 
80 Ibid, p. 115. 
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Appointing Authority81, the intervention may have overshadowed the merits of 
proceedings before that Authority. 
In other words, the decision of the A. A. (Appointing Authority) was 
principally devoted to the procedural shortcomings in Iran's challenge of Mr 
Mangard. No real attempt was made to analyse the merits of the claim. The AA 
did not seek any clarification or evidence from Iran in support of her claim. 82 
In fact, it appears that the AA by over-relying on procedural matters ignored 
the essential question. Therefore he gave no answer to the questions of: 1- 
whether or not Judge Mangard had made any such statement and if so when it 
was made, although in view of the fact that Judge Mangard did not deny Iran's 
claim the answer can be assumed in the affirmative ; 2- whether or not such 
statements can constitute a reasonable ground for the challenge and 
disqualification of the arbitrator. 
As to the point of whether a circumstance such as the one in question 
can be incompatible with the exercise of judicial function, it is beyond the 
scope of this study to provide a detailed analysis of the issue. 83 It is, however, 
to be observed that under the accepted norms of international law certain 
private activities of the international judge may be incompatible with his 
exercise of the judicial function. It is believed, for instance, that the publication 
of legal articles and books by members of the ICJ dealing with current aspects 
of the Court's activities or controversial aspects of the development of 
international law which are directly concerned with the disputable facts of the 
Court's Statute and Rules may be incompatible with the judicial function. 
84 
Acceptance of decorations by a serving judge from any government but his 
81 Ibid. See also Dissenting Opinion of Arbitrators Kashani and Shafeiei, Ibid, pp. 115-118. 
82 See Decision of Dr J. Moons, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Netherlands 
regarding the challenge of Judge Mangard, 5 March 1982,1 Iran-USCTR. pp. 509-518. 
83 On this see generally, Schwarzenberger, Vol 4, op. cit. pp. 345-373. 
84 Ibid, pp. 364,371-372. 
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own was considered incompatible with the spirit of the Statute of the PCIJ. 85 
The closest precedent to the case of Judge Mangard is perhaps the complaint 
made by the Indian Government on political speeches made in Pakistan, on 
Kashmir, by Judge Zafrulla Khan in 1968.86 What kind of treatment was given 
to the Indian Government's complaint by the Court is not known, but it may 
have been taken into consideration by the Court in adopting the Report on 
Judicial Incompatibilities in 1968.87 It is therefore rather surprising that the 
AA did not give any consideration to the issue of whether Judge Mangard's 
statement could have been incompatible with his role at the Tribunal. 
To return to the process of appointment, on further occasions in which 
the replacement of the resigning neutral members has been at issue, the 
Iranians have demonstrated a greater degree of awareness of the importance of 
the cultural-legal background of the neutral members. This has perhaps been a 
result of the experience they have had with the European members of the 
Tribunal. As a result, they have insisted that a person, or persons, from 
countries other than the political-military allies of the United States and as a 
whole outside the Western hemisphere be appointed. 88 Iran's attempts, 
however, have been completely rejected and blocked by the United States. For 
instance, the United States rejected Iran's proposal to appoint a nominee from 
an Eastern European country, who had been a member of the ICJ longer than 
any other person to that date, on the ground of his possible bias in favour of 
Iran. 89 All this resistance by the United States to the appointment of a person 
from the Third World or from the Eastern bloc in turn demonstrates the kind of 
ease and harmony they have felt with the judges from the Western hemisphere. 
85 Ibid, p. 363. 
86 Ibid, p. 356. 
87 Ibid. 
88 See generally, Letter from Dr M. Kashani to Dr Charles Moons, Chief Justice of the 
Supreme Court of the Netherlands, 24 September, 1984,6 Iran-USCTR. pp. 305-322. 
89 Ibid, p. 316. 
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The American arbitrators' refusal to participate in any effective 
negotiations regarding the candidates put forward by Iran, the Iranian 
arbitrators submit, has been because of the confidence they have had in the 
alternative method of selection, namely the appointment by the AA, if the 
parties failed to reach agreement. It is submitted that because of the identity of 
cultural-legal traditions that the American members have felt with the AA they 
have had no incentive to pursue negotiations with their Iranian counterparts 
since they could be certain that the individual appointed by the AA would not 
be from outside the Western hemisphere. 90 Indeed, both of the appointments 
made by the AA, namely Professor Riphagen and Professor Bockestiegel, 
support the argument advanced by the Iranian members. 
Indeed, this situation reveals two important problems regarding the 
proposition of the AA in relation to the question at issue in this Section. First, 
the unconditional adoption of the UNCITRAL Rules for the Tribunal, 
combined with the parties' failure to agree on an Appointing Authority, has 
meant that the important question of the designation of the AA has been left to 
the commercially structured provisions of these Rules. Second, the above point 
is in fact part of a bigger problem, namely the parties' failure to make necessary 
modifications to the UNCITRAL Rules in order to adjust them to the true 
character of the Iran-US arbitration. Certain modifications made by the 
Tribunal are necessarily concerned with procedural matters, and as a rule it 
could not have assumed the authority to modify the provisions concerning its 
own structure, which are matters for the Parties. Meanwhile, continuous 
disagreements and tension between the Parties have prevented any necessary 
modifications being made to the Rules. The Iranian arbitrators and the Agent of 
Iran have argued that their request for the modification of the structural 
provisions as provided for under Article 3(2) of the CSD has not been duly met 
90 Ibid, p. 305. 
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by the Americans, and therefore certain provisions, e. g. the designation of the 
AA, have not taken place under a mutually acceptable mechanism in line with 
the inter-State nature of the Tribunal, and as a result the United States has been 
granted a favoured and preferential position under the existing UNCITRAL 
Rules. 91 
The point is that, under the UNCITRAL Rules, if the Parties cannot 
agree on the Appointing Authority the Secretary General of the PCA will be 
asked by one of the Parties to designate an Appointing Authority. 92 It was 
argued by Judge Kashani that the Secretary-General of the PCA is an 
administrative official and takes his instructions from the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs of the Netherlands who acts as President of the Administrative Council 
of the PCA. 93 This reference of the designation of the AA to the Secretary- 
General of the PCA may therefore be consequential in inter-State arbitrations if 
not necessarily in commercial arbitrations for which the UNCITRAL Rules 
appear to have been primarily designed. Indeed, the Secretary General of the 
PCA seems to have neglected the sensitive inter-State aspect of the Iran-US 
arbitration in making his designation. The designation of the President of the 
Supreme Court of the Netherlands runs quite contrary to the idea accepted in 
many inter-State arbitration agreements, that the President of the ICJ should act 
as the Appointing Authority94, his position being free from political influence 
91 Ibid, pp. 306-314. 
92 See Articles 6 and 7 of the UNCITRAL Rules. 
93 See Letter from Kashani, 24 September 1984, op. cit. p. 313. See also Article IX of the 
Rules of the Administrative Council of the PCA (as quoted Ibid) providing that the 
Secretary-General of the PCA takes his instructions from the President of the 
Administrative Council who under the Preamble of the said Rules should be the Minister 
of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands. 
94 See, for instance, Article 3(2) of the ILC Model Rules on Arbitral Procedure of 1958 and 
Article 3(2) of the Draft Convention of the ILC on Arbitral Procedure of 1953. See also: 
Article 1(4) of the Charter of Arbitral Tribunal On Relations Between the Three Powers 
and the Federal Republic of Germany, 49 AJIL (1955), p. 62; Article 3(4) of the Charter of 
the Arbitration Commission on Property Rights and Interests in Germany, 49 AJIL (1955), 
p. 113; Article I of the Buraimi Oasis Arbitration Agreement, between Saudia Arabia and 
the United Kingdom, in Wetter, op. cit. Vol 3, p. 357. 
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and therefore a guarantee for a much more degree of neutrality. In other words, 
although the intervention by the Secretary General of the PCA appears to have 
been unavoidable and necessary in view of the Parties' failure to select a 
mutually acceptable Appointing Authority, his particular choice of the AA 
does not follow the desirable line in inter-State arbitrations. Nor does it reflect 
the rightful Iranian sensitivity that the AA and the neutral arbitrators should be 
selected from countries other than the closest political-military allies of the 
United States95- something that the Secretary General of the PCA should 
clearly have been aware of when making his selection. 
As noted earlier, both of the appointments made by the AA have been 
in total disregard of the justified Iranian concern in relation to the cultural-legal 
backgrounds of the arbitrators. The AA's first appointment, namely Professor 
Riphagen was his compatriot and with close association with the Ministry of 
the Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands as a legal adviser to the Ministry. The 
second appointment made by the AA, namely Professor Bockestigel, leaves no 
doubt as to the AA's- and ostensibly to the Americans'- intention to select the 
neutral membership of the Tribunal from the Western hemisphere and 
essentially from the European allies of the United States. No doubt, these 
selections reveal the sensitivity of the AA and of the United States to the fact 
of legal culture of neutral members and the possible influence that their 
Western legal tradition, or otherwise the non-Western legal thinking of any 
potential neutral member proposed by Iran, could exert on the outcome of 
95 Letter From Kashani, 24 September 1984, op. cit. 6 Iran-USCTR. pp. 314-316. 
It is notable that the AA has adopted an interpretation which runs quite contrary to the 
letter of Article 12(1)(c) in conjunction with Article 6 of the UNCITRAL Rules, in the 
sense that requirement for negotiating to reach agreement between the Parties on the AA 
within the one-month time limit has become redundant. [see decision of 15 March by the 
AA, Dr Moons, President of the Supreme Court of the Netherlands, regarding the 
challenge of Judge Mangard, 1 Iran-USCTR. 509, pp. 513-514]. For a detailed study on 
this, see the UNCITRAL preparatory history quoted Ibid, p. 514. 
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arbitration. There is no doubt that in the case of the Iran-US Tribunal the 
United States has mostly benefited from this factor. 
Two further neutral members of the Tribunal have been appointed by 
mutual agreement. By the time of these appointments, however, Iran appears to 
have realized that she enjoyed no effective leverage to cause the appointment 
of a non-Western arbitrator in view of the limited amount of manoeuvring it 
could exercise to influence the process, a restriction due particularly to the 
existence of the Security Account, and in view of the Western structure of the 
alternative method of selection, namely the appointment by the AA. Iran 
therefore seems to have tried to reach a mutual agreement rather than to leave 
the matter to the discretion of the AA. She has, however, attempted to select 
the new members either from the neutral countries of the Western Europe or 
from less enthusiastic allies of the United States. the appointment of Dr Briner 
of Switzerland and Professor Virally of France seems to indicates such trends. 
In fact, the United States' insistence on preventing the appointment of a 
non-Western European arbitrator has continued to date. It is significant that in 
1988 Mr Bockstiegel, the President of the Tribunal, and Mr Virally, the 
Chairman of Chamber Three, resigned from the Tribunal. 96 The negotiations 
over the replacements for these two Members by the six Party-appointed 
arbitrators failed to result in agreement. 97 It is obvious that the main difficulty 
in choosing the substitutes for the resigning Members did concern their 
nationality and background. 
The Agent of the United States by a letter dated 8 September 1988, 
requested the Appointing Authority to appoint two persons to serve as 
Members of the Tribunal. 98 Apparently, on the previous experience in respect 
96 AR 87/88, p. 3. For the text of the letters of resignation of Mr Bocksteigel and Mr Virally 
see Ibid, respectively, pp. 66-70 and 71-72. 
97 Ibid, p. 4. 
98 Ibid. For the text of the letter of the US Agent see, Ibid, Annex VIII, pp. 73-74. 
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of the disregard of Iranian concerns as to the nationality and background of the 
arbitrators and the fear that the arbitrators appointed by the AA could fall even 
short of what Iran could achieve through negotiations, on 9 November 1988 the 
six Party-appointed arbitrators reached agreement on appointment of two new 
members for the Tribunal. 99 The pattern imposed by the Americans in 
preventing the appointment of Third-World or Eastern Bloc arbitrators is still 
evident in the new appointments made. The two new Members are Mr Benget 
Broms of Finland and Mr Gaetano Arangio-Ruiz of Italy. 10 
V. Assessment 
A comprehensive assessment of the effects of the Western structure of 
the neutral membership of the Tribunal is neither possible nor intended, in 
view of the limited scope of this Section. Nor is it logical to assess the 
decisions of an international judicial body exclusively from the point of the 
view of the legal-cultural background of the decision-makers. Moreover, many 
of the related questions may largely depend on the individual personality, 
experience and integrity of the arbitrator, or arbitrators, in question. 
Nevertheless, it may be possible to detect the effects of the matter in question 
in certain specific aspects of the Tribunal's work. Take, for instance: the 
working relationship between the neutral arbitrators and the national arbitrators 
of the two Parties; the reaction of the arbitrating Parties to the work of the 
neutral members; the effect of the structure of the neutral membership on 
certain issues subject to controversy between the Third World and 
industrialized countries, e. g. expropriation cases; and the differences among 
99 Ibid, p. 4. For the text of the agreement of the six party-appointed arbitrators see, [bid, 
Annex IX, p. 75. 
100 Ibid, p. 4. 
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the neutral members in certain significant areas as reflected in the policies of 
their respective Chambers. 
V(1). Certain elements of the facts discussed in the preceding Sections 
of this Chapter, in particular in Section B, also bear upon our discussion 
regarding the working relationship between the neutral members of the 
Tribunal and its national members. Quite clearly, these facts reveal the creation 
of a certain rift between the Iranian members on the one hand and the rest of 
the Tribunal members on the other, in particular in the pre-September 84 phase 
of the Tribunal's work. The partisan tendencies of the Iranian members were 
discussed in Section B. However, this polarization of the Tribunal membership 
as between the Iranians and the neutral members also arises from the fact that 
the former have felt no sense of identity or similarity of understanding and 
culture with the latter members. Furthermore, the Iranian group have come to 
realize that the neutral members have shared considerable common values and 
views with the American members as to many of the questions involved. This 
has not only led to the polarization mentioned, but also created a feeling of 
suspicion among the Iranian members, and their Government, in regard to the 
full impartiality of some of the neutral members. 
It is significant that the Iranian members have been directly involved 
with their American colleagues in the negotiations for the appointment of the 
neutral members and should, naturally, have come to realize the importance 
that the Americans have attached to the Western perspectives of the neutral 
members by their insistent rejection of the appointment of even one member 
from the Third World or Eastern bloc countries. Although, for the reasons 
already explained, the Iranian members have not been able to block the 
Americans' efforts, this has not altered the feeling which has added to the rift 
within the Tribunal membership. 
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One may argue that the appointment of one or two of the neutral 
members from non-Western European countries could have led to a greater 
disharmony in the policies of the Tribunal. This might be true. However, the 
advancement of such an argument implicitly recognizes the effect of the legal 
culture of the arbitrators on the process of arbitration; the principle which we 
are trying to argue here. 
Consequently, the kind of statement cited from the Iranian arbitrators in 
Section B equally identifies the polarization of the Tribunal membership as 
arising from the closer identification of the background of its neutral members 
with that of the American arbitrators. Obviously, the neutral members of the 
Tribunal have not made any controversial statements of the kind expressed by 
the Party-appointed arbitrators. Therefore, the latter group of statements has to 
be relied on for the purpose of our discussion in this Section, though with great 
caution. In general, it can be stated that in most of the controversial legal issues 
the neutral members of the Tribunal have had closer views to those of the 
American members than to those of the Iranian arbitrators. Of course, this 
partly relates to the fact that Iran has been the respondent in most of these 
cases. However, in our view, the latter fact cannot exclusively explain the 
above situation. One may have to accept that the question of legal-cultural 
background of the neutral members has played a considerable role in the 
process. 
It has to be noted, briefly, that the above conclusion and our discussion 
in Section B do not negate the arguments we have made in Section A of this 
Chapter regarding the question of compromise decisions in international 
arbitration generally, as we have explained the latter's limits and peculiarities 
and its surrounding circumstances. 
In short, it is possible to say that part of the tension and suspicion which 
have existed between the Iranian members and the neutral members relates to 
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the particular background of the neutral members of the Tribunal. There is no 
need to refer to all the statements made by the Iranian members again, as we 
have discussed some of them already in Section B above. 101 However, it is 
notable that in certain instances the Iranian members have felt that a particular 
decision made against Iran by the majority of the Tribunal was rooted in the 
Western background of the neutral members of the Tribunal. For instance, in 
Case A/18 the Iranian arbitrators stated: 
... The composition of the so-called neutral arbitrators, itself the 
result of the imposed mechanism of the UNCITRAL Rules, is 
so unbalanced as to have made the Tribunal lose all credibility 
to adjudicate any dispute between the Islamic Republic of Iran, 
as a Third World revolutionary Country, and the United States, 
as the symbol of the world capitalism. The Tribunal is now 
composed of two Swedish arbitrators, one of whom persists in 
staying on despite the fact that he was rightly disqualified by the 
Islamic Republic prior to the commencement of the Tribunal's 
proceedings over two years ago, and of an agent of the Dutch 
Government's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the NATO military 
ally of the United States. 102 
In the same Case the Iranian arbitrators implicitly argued that the Tribunal 
because of its predominantly Western structure was not able to adjudicate 
fairly between the Parties, of which one was a Third World country. 103 Many 
other statements to that effect have also been made by the Iranian members. 104 
For instance, Judge Shafeiei in a statement pointed out that "owing to the 
101 See Supra, Section B, pp. 177-182. 
102 Declaration of the Iranian Arbitrators in Case A/18,5 Iran-USCTR. p. 266. 
103 Dissenting Opinion, Iranian Arbitrators, Case A/18,5 Iran-USCTR. 275, p. 336. 
104 See the following Cases: Declaration appended to the signature of Judge Ansari in R. J. 
Reynolds Tobacco Co v Iran, 7 Iran-USCTR. pp. 198-199; "Supplementary Comments" 
by Dr. Shafeiei on "Non-Signature of the Award", Tippetts, Abbett, and Others v TAMS- 
AFFA, 6 Iran-USCTR. 252, pp. 268-269, and Ibid, Shafeiei, "Reasons for Not Signing 
Award", 230, pp. 251-252; Dissenting Opinion, Shafeiei, 25 May 1983, Amoco Iran Oil 
Co v Iran, 2 Iran-USCTR. pp. 345-346; Kashani, Letter to Charles Moons, Chief Justice of 
the Supreme Court of the Netherlands, 24 September 1984,6 Iran-USCTR. 305, pp. 316- 
317; Statement by Judges Kashani and Shafeiei "in Connection with the Recent Events at 
the Iran-US Claims Tribunal", 7 October 1984,7 Iran-USCTR. 306, pp. 307-311; 
Dissenting Opinion, Shafeiei, Cases Nos. 39 and 55,2 September 1983,3 Iran-USCTR. 
297, p. 299. 
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completely Western structure of the Tribunal" it could not or did not want to 
understand Iran's problems. 105 
With the changes in the composition of both the Iranian and neutral 
arbitrators following the episode of September 1984, the tension in relations 
between the Iranian and some of the neutral members might have eased 
somewhat, but it has not relaxed completely. In certain controversial issues 
there are indications that it has re-emerged. For instance, in a recent Dissenting 
Opinion 1O6 Judge Ameli implied that the claimant had irregularly acquired 
knowledge of the deliberations by having contact with a Chamber member. 107 
In response, Judge Bockstiegel, the President and Chairman of Chamber One, 
felt the need to join Judge Holtzman in a Separate Opinion108 denying the 
assertion of improper conduct. 109 A further round of exchange of Separate 
Opinions continued between Judge Ameli and Judge Bockstiegel. 110 Again, 
Judge Ameli hinted that the claimant had been in contact with a member of the 
Chamber, which had enabled it to know "before the Tribunal's Order of 1 
October 1987 that it should correct, and how it should correct, the Bill of Sale 
it had originally submitted... "111 Judge Bockstiegel responded that he "had no 
contact whatsoever with either Party during the deliberations in this Case". 112 
He argued that Judge Ameli, like "bad losers in sport", found it difficult to 
105 "Dr Shafeiei Reasons for Not Signing the Awards Made by Mr Aldrich and Mr Bellet", 9 
August 1983,3 Iran-USCTR, 124, p. 130. 
106 Granger Associates v Iran, Dissenting Opinion of Ameli, 20 October 1987,16 Iran- 
USCTR, 317, p. 327. 
107 Ibid, p. 329. 
108 Se parate Opinion of Bockstiegel and Holtzman, 10 November 1987, Ibid, p. 329. 
109 Ibid, pp. 329-330. 
110 Separate Opinion of Ameli, 15 December 1987, Ibid, pp. 330-333; Separate Opinion of 
Bocksticgel, 27 January 1988, Ibid, pp. 333-334. 
111 Ibid, p. 333. 
112 1 bid, p. 334. 
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accept that "others may have different views for which they may even find a 
majority. "113 
Our discussion regarding the cultural-legal background of the neutral 
members of the Tribunal should by no means be interpreted as bearing upon 
the question of impartiality and independence of these members from the point 
of view of their personal integrity. Indeed, it is beyond the scope of this study 
or any academic study of this kind to approach the question from this point of 
view. It is true that some of the statements made by Iranian members of the 
Tribunal concerning certain neutral members do clearly amount to questioning 
the latters' personal impartiality. However, our reference to these statements is 
intended merely to demonstrate the fact of the polarization of the Tribunal 
membership and the tension therein. For instance, the Iranian members claimed 
that Mr Mangard, the first Swedish Chairman of Chamber Three, had "... 
totally hostile feelings specifically directed against the Islamic Republic of 
Iran". 114 They further claimed: 
In Chamber One, whose former Chairman was mutually 
acceptable to the parties, awards have been rendered against the 
Islamic Republic in only four Cases over the course of the past 
three and one half years, with their judgment sums amounting to 
approximately $2.7 million. Moreover, that same Chamber 
rendered two awards together of about $8.4 million in favour of 
the Islamic Republic. Chamber Three, however, has issued 
awards against the Islamic Republic in a total of about 22 Cases, 
including five awards issued in a single day; and in these 
contentious Cases above, awards amounting to approximately 
$83 million have been unjustly and wrongfully rendered against 
the Islamic Republic... Furthermore, that Chamber has not 
rendered a single award in favour of the Islamic Republic. 
In setting forth these facts and figures, it is not our 
intention to inquire why Chamber Three has issued a particular 
award against, or failed to issue one in favour of, the Islamic 
Republic. Our purpose here, rather, is to indicate through this 
113 Ibid. 
114 "Utter from the Iranian Arbitrators, Kashani and Shafeiei, to Mr Lagergren", 6 September 
1984,7 Iran-USCTR. p. 285. 
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simple comparison- under conditions where the Cases were by 
and large comparable and had been distributed by lot among the 
various Chambers of the Tribunal- why there is such a striking 
difference between the records of Chambers One and Three, and 
whether any factor other than the fact that the Chairman of 
Chamber Three has been imposed and is under the total control 
and protection of the United States, can possibly explain this 
striking discrepancy. 115 
It is impossible for us to verify the accuracy of the above statements or 
to rely on them as undisputed facts in the absence of any further independent 
evidence in support. However, there are some inconclusive indications of heed 
given by the Tribunal to the sensitivities expressed by Iran with regard to Judge 
Mangard. For instance, during the meetings of the Full Tribunal on 4 and 5 
September 1985, the question was discussed as to whether Article 13, 
paragraph 5 of the Tribunal Rules applied to Mr Mangard in Case No. 48.116 It 
is again notable that Article 13(5) requires the participation of a former 
member of the Tribunal in all Cases in which he has participated in a hearing 
on the merits. In the above-mentioned meetings, which were held in response 
to the Iranian Agent's request, the Tribunal decided that the requirement did not 
apply to Judge Mangard. 117 
115 "Statement of the Iranian Arbitrators, Mahmoud Kashani and Shafei Shafeiei, in 
Connection with the Recent Events at the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal", 7 Iran- 
USCTR. 306, p. 310. 
116 American Bell Int'l Inc v Iran, Case No. 48,12 September 1985,9 Iran-USCTR. p. 409. 
117 Ibid, pp. 409-410. Due to the absence of a majority between the Full Tribunal members, 
the President of the Tribunal, Judge Bockstiegel, by a casting vote decided the matter. 
It is notable that Mr Charles Brower, the American member, argued in a dissenting 
opinion to the President's view that: 
... This exercise of authority 
inevitably compromises in 
some measure the integrity of the Tribunal's processes. The 
exclusion of Judge Mangard from completing this Case can 
mean only of two things: Either it constitutes an interpretation 
of Article 13(5) at variance with that previously made by 
Chamber Three, in which case the previous Award would be 
Called into question; or it means that Article 13(5) thereby is 
changed, presumably to make its application discretionary. 
(Ibid, p. 412. ) 
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Indeed, the record of some of the neutral members of the Tribunal 
argues well for the strength of their integrity and impartiality, even in enabling 
them to transcend, to a considerable degree, the sub-conscious influences of 
cultural-legal predispositions. Judge Gunnar Lagergren, a national of Sweden 
and the first President of the Tribunal, is the most notable example in this 
regard. A general survey of the individual opinions expressed by Judge 
Lagergren clearly reveals the strength of his views, his integrity and his ability 
to establish a just balance in his working relationship between the two groups 
of Party-appointed arbitrators. 118 This is a manner of working against which 
neither of the two Governments, or their arbitrators, appear to have raised any 
objection. 
V(2). The development of different policies towards certain subjects, 
though not necessarily strategic ones from the point of view of what constitute 
the irreconcilable views of the Third World countries and industrialized States, 
demonstrates that the notion of cultural-legal background of the international 
judges should not be overstated in appraising their practice. It has been 
observed, for instance, that the Chambers of the Tribunal have developed their 
own special approach regarding certain issues, which in principle has to be 
attributed to the position of their neutral members. 
It is submitted that Chambers One and Three of the Tribunal, chaired 
respectively by Judges Bockstiegel and Virally, have relied on conflicting 
principles regarding the award of interest. 119 In Sylvania Technical Systems, 
118 See generally, Dissenting Opinion of President Lagergren, Case A/1,1 Iran-USCTR. pp. 
197-199; Dissenting Opinion, Lagergren, Kashani, Shafeiei, and Sani, GIBBS and Hill, 
Inc v Tavanir, 9 Nov. 1982,1 Iran-USCTR. p. 241; Dissenting Opinion of Lagergren, 
Kashani, Shafeiei and Sani, HNTB v Iran, 9 Nov. 1982,1 Iran-USCTR. pp. 250-251; 
Dissenting Opinion of President Lagergren, Intl School Services v Iranian Copper 
Industries, 6 April 1984,5 Iran-USCTR. pp. 348-353; and Separate Opinion Lagergren, 
INA Corp v Iran, 15 Aug. 1985,8 Iran-USCTR. p. 385. 
119 For an analysis of the issue see, Dr Gillis Wetter, "Interest as an Element of Damages in 
the Arbitral Process", International Financial Law Review, December 1986, pp. 20-23. 
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Inc v Iran 120 , Chamber One awarded 
12 percent simple interest on the ground 
that a general rate of interest should be derived from rates of return on 
investment even if in a particular case the claimant may have been borrowing 
at a higher rate. 121 On the other hand, in Mc Collough and Company, Inc v 
The Ministry of Post, Telegraphs and Telephones, NIOC and Bank Markazi 122, 
Chamber Three held that a fair rate of interest on all the amounts determined to 
be due and owing to the claimant was 10 percent simple interest per annum. 123 
The position of Chamber Three was that a reasonable or fair rate of interest 
based on a number of individual factors should be established. 124 
Of course, these instances of difference of opinion do not reveal any 
pattern of opinion which one could attribute to the cultural-legal background of 
the arbitrators. On the contrary, they demonstrate a difference of approach to 
identical questions by judges with apparent similarity of legal culture. On the 
whole, however, the Tribunal has consistently continued with the practice of 
awarding interest as a rule, despite the differences among the Chambers as to 
the rate and the principle according to which its rate should be established. 
Consequently, the Tribunal has offered no solution to the question that in Iran 
and other Muslim jurisdictions the law prohibits the award of any interest. 125 
Aside from the question of practicality of the prohibition of the award of 
interest in Muslim countries, the fact that the Tribunal has never approached or 
resolved the problem from the latter point of view lies mainly in the absence of 
neutral judges from Muslim countries in the composition of the Tribunal. 
120 Award of 27 June 1985,8 Iran-USCTR, p. 298. 
121 Ibid, pp. 320-322. 
122 Award of 22 April 1986,11 Iran-USCTR, p. 3. 
123 Ibid, pp. 29-32. 
124 Ibid. 
125 In Mc Collough the Tribunal referred to the question of interest in Iran and Muslim 
countries. (11 Iran-USCTR, p. 27) Moreover, the Tribunal accepted that "no uniform rule 
of law relating to interest has emerged from the practice in transnational arbitration. " (Ibid, 
p. 28) Also note that in Case A/19 the Full Tribunal had scheduled to solve the practice of 
awarding interest. No such decision has been made public so far. 
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On another subject the practice of the neutral members of the Tribunal 
has also tended to be a reflection of their legal-cultural training. This has 
proved to be in conflict with the Islamic Law views of the Iranian members. It 
is submitted that in approaching the question of party testimony, though the 
Tribunal has made a nominal distinction between a party giving information 
and a witness, it has in practice been open to accept all evidence presented to it, 
whether styled as witness "testimony" or as party "information". 126 This 
practice of the Tribunal has been developed to the point of representing the 
Common Law concept of testimony advocated by the American claimants and 
by the American Arbitrators and thus making the distinction made by the 
Tribunal nominal. 127 Interestingly, even this nominal distinction made by the 
Tribunal is believed to reflect the civil law traditions of the neutral members of 
the Tribunal. 128 
This approach was clearly unacceptable to the Iranian members. In 
Economy Forms Corporations v Iran129 Judge Kashani130 objected to the 
practice of the Tribunal in the following terms: 
... Although the 
Tribunal acknowledges that the claimant has 
presented no evidence or documentation in order to establish its 
nationality, the majority has exempted the claimant from the 
obligation to do so. Without the slightest legal basis, it has 
accepted the assertions solely on the basis of the statements of 
Mr. Jennings himself, who is an interested party in this claim 
and thus it has made it clear that its Award is invalid. 131 
126 For an analysis of the practice of the Tribunal in this respect see Michael Straus, "The 
Practice of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal in Receiving Evidence from Parties and 
from Experts", 3 J. Int'l. Arb. (1986), pp. 57-69. It is submitted that in the following Cases 
the Tribunal heard the claimants as witnesses: Esphahanian v Bank Tejarat, 2 Iran- 
USCTR. p. 157; Golpira v Iran, 2 Iran-USCTR. p. 171; and Leila Danesh Arfa Mahmoud 
v Iran (Mahmoud v Iran), 9 Iran-USCTR, p. 350; and Alan Craig v Ministry of Energy of 
Iran, 3 Iran-USCTR. p. 280. (Michael Straus, op. cit. pp. 59-60. ) 
127 Ibid, pp. 61-62. 
128 Ibid, p. 61. 
129 Junc 13,1983,3 Iran-USCTR. p. 42. 
130 The Dissenting Opinion of Judge Kashani is printed in 5 Iran-USCTR. P. 1. 
131 Ibid, p. 23. 
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Obviously, Kashani's objections should be seen against the background 
of principles in Iranian and Islamic Law that the testimony of an interested 
party is without legal effect. 132 Undoubtedly, there are theories in international 
arbitration which argue that the municipal legal rules of denying or excluding 
the testimony of interested parties are irrelevant in international arbitration 
because of difficulties in presenting other evidence. 133 However, there are no 
general rules in international law which would govern the question 
precisely. 134 As a consequence, the question of which of the above-mentioned 
views are desirable depends largely on the judicial conception applied. This is 
where the question of legal-cultural conceptions of the international judge 
becomes relevant. For instance, in the above Cases, for a neutral arbitrator with 
extreme civil law or Islamic law views it would hardly have been acceptable to 
rely on the testimony of an interested party as a sole basis for his decision. 
V(3). Perhaps the most unfortunate aspect of the absence of judges 
from Third World and Eastern bloc countries in the composition of the 
Tribunal relates to the decisions of the Tribunal regarding the question of 
expropriation and nationalization in general and the standard of compensation 
thereof in particular. Generally speaking, the absence of a truly diverse 
membership on the Tribunal, in terms of cultural-legal background of the 
arbitrators, has had the consequences that : 1- No serious consideration has 
been given to the position of Third World countries regarding the standard of 
compensation in the changing law of nationalization and expropriation; and 2- 
The majority members have approached the problem primarily from the point 
of view of industrialized countries. 
132 E. g., Article 1313(5) of the Iranian Civil Code of 1935. 
133 See Sandifer, Evidence Before International Tribunals, Revised Ed., University 
Press of Virginia, Charlottesville, 1975, p. 364; see also Michael Straus, op. cit. pp. 58-61. 
134 See Simpson and Fox, op. cit. p. 192. 
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Consequently, the Tribunal's decisions in this respect remain essentially 
Eurocentric. So is their decisions' precedent value. For in our view, in referring 
to the case law in particularly controversial areas such as the one in question, 
one should bear in mind the circumstances in which a judicial decision has 
been made. These circumstances includes the particular background of the 
decision-makers. 
Perhaps it would not be wrong to say that the position of neutral 
members of the Tribunal regarding the problem in question resembles the 
position of Judge Drago in the North Atlantic Fisheries Arbitration in relation 
to his attempt to define the meaning of the term "bay". 135 In fact, in one sense 
the neutral members of the Tribunal, as well as the American Arbitrators, have 
used the opportunity of the Iran-U. S. Cases to set standards in order to dispel 
the present confusion in the assessment of compensation which exists in the 
present law of expropriation, basing these standards upon the approach of the 
Western countries. 
In a series of important Cases of nationalization and expropriation, Iran 
has repeatedly argued that the traditional requirement of full compensation 
does not represent the current state of law. While Iran does not seem to have 
seriously disputed the principle of compensation generally, it has argued that 
present-day international law lays down a standard of partial compensation, the 
amount determined "with a view to the laws and regulations of the State 
concerned. " 136 
135 See Supra, pp. 191-192. 
136 Payne v Iran, 8 August 1986,121ran-USCTR. 3, pp. 11-12. 
Our concern with the Cases of nationalization is limited to demonstrating the position 
of the Tribunal regarding the issue, which is essentially a reflection of the position of its 
neutral members. Various analyses of the nationalization and expropriation Cases before 
the Tribunal have been made elsewhere. See generally: Brice M. Clagett, "The 
Expropriation Issue before the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal : Is Just Compensation 
Required by International Law or Not? ", 16 L. P. I. B. (1984), p. 814; Steven R. Swanson, 
"Iran-U. S. Claims Tribunal :A Policy Analysis of the Expropriation Cases", 18 
C. W. R. J. I. L. (1986), p. 307; Charles N. Brower, "Current Developments in the Law of 
Expropriation and Compensation :A Preliminary Survey of Awards of the Iran-United 
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In the American International Group v Iran 137, Iran argued that: 
... There is no international legal entitlement to compensation 
equal to "full value" of the property nationalized. The 
suggestion of full compensation derives from the traditionally 
asserted standard of "prompt, adequate and effective" 
compensation which has been repudiated by modern 
developments in international law; instead, a standard of "partial 
compensation" should be applied, based on references contained 
in resolutions of the United Nations organs and from post-War 
settlement practice. 138 
In Sedco v NIOC139, Iran contended that customary international law 
required "appropriate" compensation to be calculated in the light of all the 
circumstances of the case. 140 In all these Cases Iran argued that such 
compensation should be calculated according to the net book value of the 
property. 141 
Quite clearly, two of the main pillars of Iran's position were that : (a)- 
on the basis of the practice of "lump sum" agreements between States and 
compensation settlements between States and foreign companies these 
settlements have usually amounted to less than the full value of the property 
taken. 142; (b)- the conclusion derived from the UN resolutions required for 
"appropriate" compensation, meaning, less than the full value of the property. 
States Claims Tribunal", 21 Int'l Lawyer, (1987), p. 639; M. Pellonpaa and M. 
Fitzmaurice, "Taking of Property in the Perspective of the Iran-United States Claims 
Tribunal", XIX Neth. Y. B. I. L. (1988), p. 54. For a further review see also, Gunnar 
Lagergren, "Five Important Cases on Nationalization of Foreign Property Decided by the 
Iran-United States Claims Tribunal", Raoul Wallenberg Institute of Human Rights and 
Humanitarian Law, Report No. 5, University of Lund, 1988, p. 5. 
137 19 December 1983,4 Iran-USCTR. p. 96. 
138 Ibid, p. 103 and pp. 104-105. 
139 27 March 1986,10 Iran-USCTR. p. 180. 
140 Ibid, p. 183. 
141 [bid. See also : Amoco Intl Finance Corporation v Iran, 14 July 1987,15 Iran-USCTR. 
189, p. 245; American Int'l Group v Iran, 4 Iran-USCTR. 96, p. 106; and INA Corporation 
v Iran, 12 August 1985,8 Iran-USCTR. 373, p. 378. 
142 It is accepted that this category of settlement has been reached on less than the full value 
of the property taken. (On this and on the relevant references see M. Pellonpaa and M. 
Fitzmaurice, op. cit. pp. 104-105). 
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Obviously, in all these Cases the American claimants' position was that 
under both Article IV(2) of the Treaty of Amity between Iran and the United 
States143 and customary international law they were entitled to "just" 
compensation equal to the "full value", meaning the "fair market" value of the 
nationalized property. 144 
The Tribunal's approach in the various Cases of nationalization has 
generally been in support of the position of industrialized countries, shown in 
its practical rejection of all the arguments made by the Third World nations. 
The arguments employed by the Tribunal were: 
Assessment of the present state of customary law on this subject 
on the basis of the conduct of States in actual practice is 
difficult, inter alia, because of the questionable evidentiary 
value for customary international law of much of the practice 
available. This is particularly true in regard to "lump sum" 
agreements between States (a practice often claimed to support 
the position of less than full compensation), as well as to 
compensation settlements negotiated between States and foreign 
companies. Both types of agreements can be so greatly inspired 
by non-judicial considerations- e. g., resumption of diplomatic or 
trading relations- that it is extremely difficult to draw from them 
conclusions as to opino juris. 
As regards the resolutions of the General Assembly, the Tribunal said 
that they were not generally binding, but it was accepted that such resolutions 
in certain specific circumstances might be regarded as evidence of customary 
international law. 146 In the view of the Tribunal, from various relevant 
resolutions of the General Assembly only Resolution 1803(XVII) "reflects, if it 
143 For Article IV(2) of the Treaty of Amity and other issues related thereto see Supra Chapter 
One, p. 11, note 9. 
144 See American Int'l Group v Iran, 4 Iran-USCTR. p. 105; INA Corporation v Iran, 8 Iran- 
USCTR. pp. 377-378; Payne v Iran, 12 Iran-USCTR. pp. 11-12; Sedco v NIOC, 10 Iran- 
USCTR. pp. 182-183; and Amoco Intl Finance Corporation v Iran, 15 Iran-USCTR. pp. 
242-252. 
145 Sedco v NIOC, 10 Iran-USCTR. 157, pp. 184-185. See also, Amoco Int'l Finance 
Corporation v Iran, 15 Iran-USCTR. 189, p. 266. 
146 Sedco v NIOC, 10 Iran-USCTR. 157, p. 186. 
227 
does not evidence, current international law". 147 It is notable that from among 
the resolutions of the General Assembly on the permanent sovereignty over 
natural resources the above-mentioned resolution is, comparatively, the most 
ambiguous one in relation to the question of standard of compensation. 
Moreover, the Tribunal did not give any explanation at all as to why only the 
above resolution could reflect customary law and not the other resolutions as 
well, particularly in view of the fact that the voting pattern of all the relevant 
resolutions of the General Assembly on the question of nationalization and 
expropriation were, by and large, similar. Therefore the Tribunal's selection of 
that specific resolution in the context of the standard of compensation does not 
inspire confidence and amounts to only lip service to the Third World 
countries. 
More surprising is the fact that the Tribunal went on to say that, 
nevertheless, the pertinent part of Resolution 1803 was subject to conflicting 
interpretations as to whether it reflected the traditional standard of 
compensation or, on the other hand, signified an erosion of this principle. 148 
One wonders how, then, a resolution which according to the Tribunal was 
subject to such a degree of controversy could in the view of the Tribunal reflect 
current international law, and if so which of the two conflicting interpretations 
represented current law. As if aware of the paradox in its reasoning, the 
Tribunal went on to accept implicitly that learned writers believed that 
Resolution 1803 reflected a change in customary international law so that less 
than full compensation should be payable. 149 However, the Tribunal produced 
other reasoning to render the latter conclusion, in practice, inapplicable to the 
Cases before it. It declared that the standard of less than full compensation 
derived from Resolution 1803 did only apply in cases of compensation in the 
147 Ibid. 
148 Ibid, p. 187. 
149 Ibid. 
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context of a formal, systematic large-scale nationalization. 150 This, the 
Tribunal noted, did not exist in the Cases in hand. 151 
Apparently, none of the Cases of nationalization before the Tribunal 
qualified as large-scale nationalization and the Tribunal did not make any 
attempt to consider all these Cases together as part of a pattern which would 
qualify them as large-scale nationalization. The Tribunal's approach to the 
question was adopted despite the fact that in some of these Cases the sums 
awarded amounted to almost one hundred million US dollars. 152 Nor did the 
fact that all these expropriations or nationalizations had taken place as a result 
of a revolution and as part of a pattern for changing the political-economic 
structure of Iran persuade the Tribunal to accept that they qualified as large- 
scale nationalization. Therefore in all major cases of nationalization the 
Tribunal ruled that "full compensation" was the standard applicable under 
international law. 153 
The fact is that the current state of international law regarding standard 
of compensation is by no means settled. One can equally argue in favour of or 
against the position adopted by the Tribunal. There are strong enough 
authorities cited which can with equal cogency lead to a conclusion different 
from that arrived at by the Tribunal. 1M The question, therefore, depends 
ultimately on the sub-conscious predisposition resulting from the training and 
150 Ibid. See also INA Corporation v Iran, 8 Iran-USCTR. p. 378. 
151 Sedco v NIOC, 10 Iran-USCTR. p. 187. See also INA v Iran, 8 Iran-USCTR. p. 378. 
152 See e. g., the Award in Sedco v NIOC, 15 Iran-USCTR. pp. 186-187. 
153 See e. g., Payne v Iran, 12 Iran-USCTR. p. 12; Amoco Int'l Finance Corporation v Iran, 15 
Iran-USCTR. p. 269; American Int'l Group v Iran, 4 Iran-USCTR. p. 109; Sedco v NIOC, 
10 Iran-USCTR. p. 187; and INA v Iran, 8 Iran-USCTR. p. 378. 
154 On this see Dissenting Opinion of Judge Ameli, INA Corporation v Iran (8 Iran-USCTR. 
pp. 403-417). See also Concurring Opinion of Judge Holtzman, Ibid, p. 391 and Separate 
Opinion of Judge Brower, Sedoc v NIOC, 10 Iran-USCTR. p. 189. It is notable that the 
American Arbitrators maintained without qualification that "full" compensation was the 
proper state of law. 
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background of the judges in question. That is why even common facts are 
interpreted in conflicting ways by different judges. 
For instance, the LIAMCO Arbitration155 was cited by the Tribunal as 
probably the only one among the recent arbitrations concerning nationalization 
of oil concessions which "could be argued in a way to have expressed doubt 
about the traditional standard of full compensation". 156 Nevertheless, at the 
same time the Tribunal argued that in the latter Arbitration "... compensation at 
full value for damum emergens" was held as an undisputed minimum 
standard. 157 Quite clearly, this reading by the Tribunal is not only a 
misinterpretation of the LIAMCO Award, but also reveals a clear contradiction 
in the Tribunal's own reasoning. Judge Ameli of Iran, on the other hand, argued 
that the LIAMCO Award "by no stretch of imagination qualified as applying 
"full compensation" standard". 158 This difference of approach bears a clear 
resemblance to the different conclusions the majority and the dissenters in the 
Second Phase of the South West Africa Case arrived at as to the existence of 
legal interest in the applicants, both each conclusion arrived at by way of a 
private law analogy. 159 It is needless to mention that the existence of cultural- 
legal predispositions has been accepted as a major reason behind that approach 
by the judges of the ICJ. 160 
It should be noted briefly that in the LIAMCO Arbitration the sole 
arbitrator by expressly quoting various resolutions of the United Nations on the 
topic of nationalization, including Resolution 1803 and Resolution 3281, 
expressed the opinion that "... the said Resolutions, if not a unanimous source 
155 12 April 1977,62 ILR, p. 141. 
156 Sedco v NIOC, 10 Iran-USCTR. p. 187. 
157 Ibid, p. 188. 
158 Dissenting Opinion Ameli, INA v Iran, 8 Iran-USCTR. p. 414. 
159 See Supra, p. 190. 
160 See Ibid. 
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of law, are evidence of the recent dominant trend of international opinion... " 161 
However, the sole arbitrator did not rely on either of the terms "full" or 
"appropriate" compensation; instead, he adopted the formula of "equitable 
compensation". 162 In the final analysis, this arbitrator awarded a total of about 
$80 million to the claimant. 163 It is notable that the claimant had demanded a 
total amount of over $200 million. 164 Whether the amount awarded in this 
Case was based on the standard of full compensation is open to question. 
However, what constitutes the most relevant part of our argument in this 
discussion is that the Tribunal in Sedco v NIOC came to accept that the 
LIAMCO Award was probably the only one among recent arbitrations to have 
expressed doubt about the traditional standard of compensation. This, in our 
view, is because the sole arbitrator, Dr Sobhi Mahmassani of the Lebanon, was 
probably the only one judge of non-Western background to have had the 
opportunity in recent arbitrations to render a binding award on the question. 165 
It must be accepted that the Tribunal in arriving at the standard of "full 
compensation" also relied on Article IV(2) of the Treaty of Amity as a lex 
specialis, along with its reliance on customary international law. 166 Quite 
clearly, given the express provisions of Article IV(2) of the Treaty of Amity 
and the ruling of the International Court of Justice in the Hostages Case 
regarding the applicability of that Treaty between the two Countries 167, the 
Tribunal had a better case in relying on that Treaty as a basis for the standard 
of "full compensation". However, the controversial aspect of the Tribunal's 
161 LIAMCO Award, 62 ILR. p. 189. 
162 Ibid, pp. 209-210. 
163 Ibid, p. 218. 
164 Ibid, p. 210. 
165 For the process of appointment of Dr Mahmassani in the LIAMCO Arbitration see Ibid, 
pp. 146-148. 
166 INA Corp v Iran, 8 Iran-USCTR. p. 379; Sedco v Iran, 10 Iran-USCTR. p. 184; Amoco 
Int'l Finance Corp v Iran, 15 Iran-USCTR. pp. 214-224. 
167 See Supra, Chapter One, p. 12, note 10. 
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reasoning may be its ruling regarding the position of customary international 
law on the matter. 
Finally, it has to be noted that in INA v Iran, Judge Lagergren in his 
Separate Opinion provided a more even-handed analysis of the issue of 
compensation. 168 After referring to several authorities in support of his 
argument, he said: 
I conclude from the foregoing that an application of current 
principles of international law, as encapsulated in the 
"appropriate compensation" formula, would in a state 
undergoing a process of radical economic restructuring 
normally require the "fair market value" standard to be 
discounted in taking account of "all circumstances". 169 
Conclusion 
The idea of equitable geographical distribution of membership and 
representation of all forms of civilizations and principal legal systems in the 
composition of international judicial bodies is a well established principle. This 
is particularly relevant to international arbitration, in which it may be argued 
that the notion in question is one of its characteristic features. 
Various instances quoted above demonstrate the effect of conscious and 
sub-conscious legal-cultural training of the international judge on the outcome 
of his decisions. The influence of legal-cultural training of an international 
judge can be more consequential with regard to particularly controversial areas 
of international law over which certain blocs of States are divided in the world 
community. 
The principle of equitable geographical distribution of membership and 
representation of all possible forms of legal systems has been totally and 
consistently neglected in the composition of the neutral members of the 
168 8 Iran-USCTR. pp. 385-390. 
169 Ibid, p. 390. 
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Tribunal. This has been so because of the refusal by the American Government 
and/or by its arbitrators to agree on the appointment of non-Western European 
members. The reasons for the success of the Americans in this exclusion, 
which has resulted from the imbalance in the negotiating positions of the two 
Governments, lie in two facts: 1- the existence of the Security Account which 
in effect has deprived Iran of the traditional mechanisms of manoeuvring, e. g., 
threat of withdrawal; and 2- the Appointing Authority had in practice shown, 
through the appointment of Judge Bockstiegel and Judge Riphagen, no real 
understanding of the principle of equitable geographical distribution and 
representation of all possible forms of legal systems in the composition of the 
neutral members of the Tribunal. All the indications support the claims made 
by the Iranian arbitrators and the Agent of Iran that the American Arbitrators 
did not enter into any serious negotiations on the topic in question because they 
were confident that the AA would disregard the appointment of a non-Western 
European member. 
A reasonable composition for the neutral members could be: one 
Western European member, one with Third World/Islamic background, and the 
third from a background neither close to that of the Iranian members nor to the 
American Arbitrators. 
The consistent refusal by the American Arbitrators or their Government 
to accept the appointment of even one non-Western European arbitrator 
throughout the changes in the composition of the neutral members proves the 
importance of the influence of the cultural-legal predisposition of the 
international judges on the outcome of adjudication, in the calculations of the 
Americans for this purpose. In other words, this proof supports our argument in 
this Section. 
The effect of the absence of non-Western European judges or, in other 
words, the effect of the presence of an all Western European Judges on the 
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neutral membership of the Tribunal is evident in certain Cases decided by the 
Tribunal, particularly in the Cases of expropriation. The decisions of the 
Tribunal in these respects remain American-European orientated. Thus the 
precedent value of these particular decisions should be assessed in the light of 
all the relevant circumstances, including the composition of the Tribunal, in 
particular the legal-cultural background of its neutral members. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
WITHDRAWAL OF ARBITRATORS 
Introduction 
During the early years of the Tribunal's life the Iranian members of 
Chambers Two and Three failed to participate in certain parts of the 
deliberations in a number of Cases. This pattern was repeated in a Case 
decided in 1987. The remaining members of the Chambers concerned 
proceeded in the absence of the Iranian members and rendered Awards against 
Iran. The authority of the two remaining members of these Chambers and the 
validity of these Awards were strongly challenged by Iran and by the Iranian 
members. Nevertheless, Presidential Orders were issued for payment of these 
Awards out of the Security Account and they were paid to the claimants. In the 
absence of a due process to challenge the validity of awards under the 
Tribunal's governing provisions, Iran attempted to challenge the validity of 
these Awards via the municipal legal system of the place of arbitration. I 
However, because of the complexities and uncertainties involved in a challenge 
by way of recourse to municipal law2 and due to the fact that the payment of 
these Awards out of the Security Account had already made a challenge 
practically meaningless, Iran's attempts to challenge the Awards in the Dutch 
courts failed to bear results. Moreover, because of the same fact of the 
payment, Iran's unilateral declaration of nullity of the Awards was, in practice, 
without any effect. 3 
1 See generally Infra, Chapter Six, pp. 342-344. 
2 See generally Ibid, pp. 344-348. 
3 On the doctrine of nullity and the question of unilateral declaration of nullity of arbitral 
awards sec Infra, Chapter Six, pp. 328-330. 
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However, the situation gave rise to the still unsettled question of the 
authority of an arbitral tribunal to proceed and render valid awards in the 
absence of a party-appointed arbitrator. Regardless of the controversy which 
may exist over the facts presented by the disputing sides involved, the 
underlaying problem is mainly a question of law. That is, whether in the 
absence of an express provision the arbitral tribunal is legally constituted by 
two of its members, or two members of a three-member tribunal are authorized 
to continue the proceedings in the event of the withdrawal of a party-appointed 
arbitrator. 4 The question is one which refers to and has implications for the 
theory and distinguishing characteristics of international arbitration as distinct 
from judicial settlement in its strictest meaning, i. e., the ICJ system. In other 
words, although similarities between international arbitration and judicial 
settlement are generally appreciated, this particular question bears directly 
upon a point which can be regarded as distinguishing arbitration from other 
forms of judicial settlement. It follows that the problem should be analysed 
within the strict confines of the law and practice of international arbitration. 
We will divide the discussion of the question as follows: 
Section A: factual-legal provisions pertaining to the problems 
before the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal. 
Section B: the general problems of withdrawal of party- 
appointed arbitrators and frustration of arbitral proceedings. 
4 The most recent work on the issue is a book by Judge Schwebel of the ICJ, International 
Arbitration ; Three Salient Problems, Cambridge, Grotius Publications, 1987. 
Chapter Three of this book is devoted to a lengthy discussion of the authority of truncated 
tribunals to proceed in the absence of a withdrawing party-appointed arbitrator. This 
Chapter provides a fresh account of the problem in international arbitration. However, its 
conclusions are not totally free from controversy. We will elaborate on these issues 
throughout this Chapter. 
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SECTION A 
FACTUAL-LEGAL ISSUES PERTAINING TO THE NON- 
PARTICIPATION OF IRANIAN ARBITRATORS IN THE 
PROCEEDINGS IN A NUMBER OF CASES 
I. Relevant Rules of Procedure Applicable to the Validity of 
Awards of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal 
First, three procedural questions concerning an arbitral award should be 
distinguished: (a)- How should the Tribunal be composed? (b)- What are the 
rules of deliberation? and (c)- What is the form of the award? In other words, 
these questions concern three different issues: the composition and constitution 
of the Tribunal, the rules of deliberation, and the form of the award. Under the 
CSD and the Rules of the Tribunal these questions have been addressed in the 
following provisions. 
(a)- Rules Pertaining to the Composition and Constitution of the Tribunal 
The provisions of Articles III(1) and 111(2) of the CSD regarding the 
composition of the Tribunal and of its Chambers were quoted in the preceding 
Chapter. It is useful to recall that under Article III(1) of the CSD it is stated 
that : "claims may be decided by the Full Tribunal or by a panel of three 
members of the Tribunal as the President shall determine. Each such panel 
shall be composed by the President and shall "consist of one member appointed 
by Iran, one by the United States, and one from among the three neutral 
members". This requirement for the constitution of the three-member panels is 
restated in point 3(d) of the Introduction to the Tribunal Rules. 
Further provisions for the composition of the Tribunal were laid down 
in Article 13 of the Tribunal Rules in relation to the vacancies in the 
membership and filling of such vacancies. Article 13 of the UNCITRAL Rules 
which has been maintained under the Tribunal Rules provides: 
237 
Replacement of A Member 
Article 13 
1. In the event of the death or resignation of an arbitrator during 
the course of the arbitral proceedings, a substitute arbitrator 
shall be appointed or chosen pursuant to the procedure provided 
for in Article 6 to 9 that was applicable to the appointment or 
choice of the arbitrator being replaced. 
2. In the event that an arbitrator fails to act or in the event of the 
de jure or de facto impossibility of his performing his functions, 
the procedure in respect of the challenge and replacement of an 
arbitrator as provided in the preceding articles shall apply. 
The above provisions have been supplemented under the Tribunal Rules in the 
following terms: 
Modifications of UNCITRAL Rules 
Article 13 of the UNCITRAL Rules is maintained unchanged 
with the following additions: 
1. The following is added to the last sentence of paragraph 2: 
In applying the provisions of this paragraph, if the President, 
after consultation with the other members of the Full Tribunal, 
determines that the failure of a member to act or his 
impossibility to perform his functions is due to a temporary 
illness or other circumstances expected to be of relatively short 
duration, the member shall not be replaced but a suitable 
member shall be appointed for the temporary period in 
accordance with the same procedures as described in Note 5 to 
Articles 9-12.5 
5 Notes 4 and 5 to Articles 9-12 provide: 
Note 4 
In the event that a member of a chamber is challenged with 
respect to a particular case and withdraws, or if the challenge is 
sustained, the President will order the transfer of the case to 
another chamber. 
Note 5 
In the event the Full Tribunal is seized of a particular case and a 
member is challenged with respect to that case and withdraws, 
or if the challenge is sustained, a substitute member shall be 
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(b)- Rules of Deliberation 
The rules of deliberation are set forth in Article 31 of the Tribunal 
Rules: 
Decision 
Article 31 
1. When there are three arbitrators, any award or other decision 
of the arbitral tribunal shall be made by a majority of the 
arbitrators. 
2. In the case of questions of procedure, when there is no 
majority or when the arbitral tribunal so authorizes, the 
presiding arbitrator may decide on his own, subject to revision, 
if any, by the arbitral tribunal. 
Note to Article 31 
1. Any award or other decision of the arbitral tribunal pursuant 
to paragraph 1 of Article 31 shall be made by a majority of its 
members. 
(c)- Form of the Award 
The other relevant provision in Article 32(4) of the Tribunal Rules 
which is an unchanged version of the UNCITRAI Rules relates to the form of 
the award. Article 32(4) provides: 
Form and Effect of Award 
Article 32 
4. An award shall be signed by the arbitrators and it shall 
contain the date on which and the place where the award was 
made. Where there are three arbitrators and one of them fails to 
sign, the award shall state the reason for the absence of the 
signature. 
appointed to the Full Tribunal for the purpose of that case in 
accordance with the procedure set forth in Article III of the 
Claims Settlement Declaration as was used in appointing the 
member being substituted. An appointing authority, if needed, 
shall be assigned as provided in Article 12 of the UNCITRAL 
Rules. 
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It should be noted briefly that the provision of Article 31(1) of the 
Tribunal Rules refers solely to the method of reaching a decision and has no 
bearing on the way the Tribunal is composed and constituted. Therefore, the 
provisions of this Article can by no means be interpreted in such a way as to 
permit the majority of arbitrators to deliberate in the absence of one of the 
arbitrators. 
Further, the provision of Article 32(4) of the Tribunal Rules solely and 
exclusively refers to the form of the award. In other words, it refers exclusively 
to the absence of an arbitrator during the signing of an award to which he has 
participated in its drawing up. It is therefore, beyond any doubt that this Article 
cannot be extended to justify the majority of arbitrators to convene and 
deliberate, in part or on the whole, in the absence of one of the arbitrators. 
II. Facts Pertaining to the Cases in which Iranian Arbitrators 
Failed to Participate in the Deliberations 
A. Beginning on 15 December 1982 and continuing throughout 1983, 
the arbitrators Mangard and Mosk, respectively Chairman and American 
Member of Chamber Three, deliberated and rendered eight awards in the 
absence of arbitrator Sani of Iran. In the first of these Awards, Raygo Wagner 
Equipment Company v Star Line Company6, rendered on 15 December 1982, 
the following statement was appended to the Award: 
Judge Jahangir Sani took part in the hearing and deliberations in 
this case. The Tribunal was informed that he in effect would not 
sign the Award, and he was not present or available at the 
signing.? 
6 Case No. 17, Award No. 20-17-3,15 December 1982,1 Iran-USCTR. p. 411. 
lbid, p. 415. 
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In the second Award, Granite State Machine Co, Inc v Iran8, rendered 
on the same day, the statement by the two arbitrators read that "Having been 
informed of the time when the Award would be signed at the Tribunal, Judge 
Jahangir Sani failed to be present and was not available". 9 In the third Award, 
Rexnord Inc v Iran10, rendered on 10 January 1983, the statement appended by 
the two arbitrators to the Award read: "Judge Jahangir Sani took part in the 
hearing and deliberations in this Case. He has refused to sign the Award and 
has stated that he would not sign it". 11 
In five other Awards 12, all issued on 2 September 1983, and rendered in 
the above mentioned manner, the following statement, quoted here in full, was 
attached to each of the Awards by the two arbitrators: 
The deliberations in this case were held, with members 
Mangard, Jahangir Sani and Mosk present, after the Hearing 
which was held on 14 and 15 March 1983 and before the 
Tribunal's summer recess, which began on 11 June 1983. 
During the Chamber's final meeting prior to the recess, it was 
determined that the Chamber would re-convene in early August 
1983. In conformity with this determination, the Chairman 
issued a memorandum on 13 June 1983, requesting the 
arbitrators to reserve 8.10 and 12 August for deliberation. 
(Emphasis added). Presidential Order No. 10 dated 15 June 
1983, provided that, in cases involving requests for interim 
relief or other urgent matters, Chamber Two was authorized to 
act in lieu of Chamber Three until July 1983. Furthermore, the 
Tribunal's official schedule of proceedings, dated 6 June 1983, 
indicated that a meeting of the Full Tribunal was scheduled for 
15-17 August 1983, that Hearing before Chamber Three were 
scheduled for 18.19,25 and 30 August, and that a pre-Hearing 
8 Case No. 30, Award No. 18-30-3,15 December 1982,1 Iran-USCTR. p. 442. 
9 Ibid, p. 448. 
10 Case No. 132, Award No. 21-132-3,10 January 1983,2 Iran-USCTR. p. 6. 
11 Ibid, p. 13. 
12 These Awards were: Blount Brothers Corp v Ministry of Housing, Case No. 62, Award 
No. 74-62-3,3 Iran-USCTR. p. 225; Woodward-Clyde Consultants v Iran, Case No. 67, 
Award No 73-67-3, Ibid, p. 239; John Carl Warnecke & Associates v Bank Mellat, Case 
No. 124, Award No. 72-124-3, Ibid, p. 256; Chas T. Main International, Inc. v Mahab, 
Case No 185, Award No. 70-185-3, Ibid, p. 270; and Alan Craig v Ministry of Energy, 
Case No. 346, Award No. 71-346-3, Ibid, p. 280. 
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Conference before Chamber Three was scheduled on 1 
September 1983. 
On 6 August 
issued a schedule of 
awards was to take pl 
11 and 12 Au ut 
deliberations were to 1 
13 August 1983. 
1983, the Chairman of Chamber Three 
meeting under which the finalization of 
ace in Case Nos. 84.124.185 and 346 on 
1983 (Emphasis added), and further 
be held in Case Nos. 35,62,67 and 127 on 
By a letter dated 10 August 1983, the Agent of the 
Islamic Republic of Iran stated to the Tribunal, 
[that Judge Mostafa Jahangir Sani the Iranian Arbitrator of Chamber Three 
has submitted his resignation to the Government of the Islamic Republic of 
Iran. His resignation has been accepted by the Government and will be 
effective as of 10 August 1983. His successor will be introduced to the 
Tribunal in due course. ] 
No reasons were cited for the purported resignation. 
The President of the Tribunal ordered that certain 
Hearings before the Full Tribunal, which were scheduled to take 
place during its 15-17 August meetings, be postponed. In 
addition, the Chairman of Chamber Three cancelled the 
meetings set for the finalization of awards and further 
deliberations during the week of 8 August 1983. (Emphasis 
added) 
Judge Jahangir Sani did not appear at the Full Tribunal 
meeting held on 15 August 1983. At the 17 August 1983 Full 
Tribunal meeting, the President stated that the Tribunal had as 
yet received no valid reasons for Judge Jahangir Sani's absence 
and had not authorized that absence. The President also declared 
that it would be for Chamber Three and the Full Tribunal to 
determine the legal consequences of that absence in the 
individual cases pending before them. Thereafter, the Chairman 
of Chamber Three ordered that the Hearings scheduled for 18, 
19 and 25 August and the Pre-Hearing Conference scheduled 
for 1 September be postponed. 
By a letter dated 18 August 1983 and conveyed by post 
and telex, the Chairman of Chamber Three informed Judge 
Jahangir Sani of the President's declarations and notified him 
that a new schedule had been set under which, inter alia, the 
finalization (Emphasis added) and signing of the Award in this 
Case would take place on 2 September 1983. 
In a telex dated 24 August 1983 to the Chairman of 
Chamber Three, Judge Jahangir Sani acknowledged receipt of 
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the letter of 18 August 1983 and informed the Chairman that he 
considered his resignation to the Islamic Republic of Iran to be 
effective upon the Tribunal and that he was no longer legally 
authorized or empowered to participate in the taking of 
decisions or the issuance of awards except for "the preparing 
and drafting, or drawing up and elaborating, of a judicial 
opinion or award which has previously been communicated or 
announced". 
Neither in this telex nor in a telex received on the 
following day addressed, to the Full Tribunal, did Judge 
Jahangir Sani state that it would be physically impossible for 
him to take part in the meeting of 2 September. 
Judge Jahangir Sani was not present for the Signing of 
the Award in this Case at the 2 September Chamber meeting. 
Under the above circumstances, the Tribunal has determined 
that it may proceed with signing of the Award in the absence of 
Judge JahangirSani pursuant to Article 32. paragraph 4. of the 
Tribunal Rules. 13 (Emphasis added). 
B. In four Awards issued on 14 and 27 July 1983, Judges Bellet and 
Aldrich, Chairman and American Member respectively of Chamber Two, 
rendered Awards in the absence of Judge Shafeiei, the Iranian Member of 
Chamber Two. Two of these Awards were Awards on agreed terms. However, 
the two other Awards14 were rendered against Iran. Identical explanations were 
attached to these Awards by the two Arbitrators. The explanation read: 
After the Hearing in this Case on 26 May 1983 the three 
arbitrators agreed to begin deliberations at the end of June. 
Throughout the period from February to late June the three 
arbitrators had been in agreement that July would be fully 
dedicated to the final deliberations in this and the other pending 
cases (Emphasis added), in view of the 1 August effective date 
of Chairman Bellet's resignation from the Tribunal. 
On 23 June 1983, however, Mr Shafeiei sent Chairman 
Bellet a note informing him that he intended to be absent from 
the Tribunal on vacation until the end of July> The Chairman 
responded by a note dated 29 June saying that, while a brief 
vacation was acceptable, Mr. Shafeiei was expected after 5 July. 
13 Ibid, respectively pp. 237-238; 254-255; 268-269; 276-277; and 191-192. 
14 Gruen Associates, Inc. v Iran Housing Co, Case No. 188, Award No. 61-188-3,27 July 
1983,3 Iran-USCTR. p. 97; and Intrend International Inc., v Iranian Air Force, Case NO. 
220, Award NO. 59-220-2,27 July 1983, Ibid, p. 110. 
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Nevertheless, after a further exchange of notes, Me Shafeiei has 
absented himself until the present and has given no address or 
telephone number where he could be reached. Only yesterday 
afternoon, too late to be of any use, did Mr. Shafeiei's legal 
assistant give the Tribunal a telephone number in another 
country where Mr. Shafeiei could be reached. 
The Chairman has had all the successive drafts of this 
Award since Mr Shafeiei's departure deposited in his office in 
due time so that, if he had been present, he could have read and 
commented upon them, but no comments have been received. 
The Chairman also deposited in Mr Shafeiei's office on 20 July 
1983 a letter informing him of the place and time of signature. 
Mr Shafeiei failed to attend the signing. In these circumstances 
an arbitral tribunal cannot permit its work to be frustrated. This 
statement is made pursuant to Article 32. paragraph 4 of the 
Tribunal Rules of Procedure. 15 (Emphasis added). 
C- In the Cases involving Chamber Three, Judge Sani filed a dissenting 
opinion. 16 He also filed two identical statements in Cases Nos 17 and 132.17 
No statements were filed by Judge Sani in regard to five other Awards 
rendered in his absence. 
In the "Opinion" filed in Case No. 30, Judge Sani expressed his reasons 
for not signing the Award in that Case. He also stated that "the issues of 
damages and costs were not adequately deliberated upon" 18, and perhaps 
hinted that the decision by the two other members did not fall under Article 
32(4) of the Tribunal Rules. 19 Nevertheless, an overall reading of Judge Sani's 
"Opinion" in Case No. 30 suggests that he did not regard himself as being 
excluded from the deliberations, since he never suggested that he was absent 
from the deliberations. His main objection is, rather, to the signing of the 
Award in his absence. This indicates that unlike other Cases, Case No. 30 was 
15 Ibid, respectively, pp. 92; 120; 108-109; and 117-118. 
16 " he "Opinion" of Judge Jahangir Sani, in Case No. 30,1 Iran-USCTR. p. 452. 
17 "Mr Jahangir Sani's Reasons for Not Signing the Decision Made by Mr Mangard and Mr 
Mosk", I Iran-USCTR., p. 415; and 2 Iran-USCTR. p. 14, respectively. 
18 1 Iran-USCTR. p. 454. 
19 Ibid. 
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indeed a case of failure to sign the award. This conclusion is supported by the 
fact that Iran did not challenge the Award in Case No. 30 in the Dutch courts. 20 
Unlike his "Opinion" in Case No. 30, Judge Sani's statement filed in 
Case Nos. 17 and 132 expressly stated that these Awards were rendered 
without deliberation and in his absence. He expressed that "... I was not 
notified of the deliberative session which resulted in the issuance of an Award 
in the present Case: nor did I happen to be present on the Tribunal premises 
(Emphasis added) and, consequently, at the meeting itself, when it was held". 21 
He added that the fact that this Award was rendered "without consultation" 
(Emphasis added) with him and in his absence constituted a serious violation of 
recognized legal principles and therefore he would not take part in the signing 
of that Award. 22 Judge Sani went on to say: 
On Wednesday 13 December 1982, at the same time that I had 
been requested to return to Tehran to further discuss my 
resignation tendered in relation to case No. 30, I was confronted 
by the unanticipated and surprising news that Mr. Mangard and 
Mr. Mosk had proceeded to issue Awards in cases Nos. 17 and 
132. As I have explained in my "Opinion" with respect to case 
No. 30, in the few days preceding the signing of these cases we 
had some forms of discussion in relation to case No. 30, but did 
not have the least discussion about the two other Cases... 
... I expressed my utter repudiation of what 
had 
transpired in the preceding few days, and stated unequivocally 
that my colleagues' issuance of awards in the cases mentioned 
above without my presence and participation were legally 
unsupportable. (Emphasis added) I sensed there that my 
colleagues had formed a wrong impression of my resignation. 
Supposing that I had tendered my resignation so closely 
following that of Mr Bellet, to further delay the issuance of 
Award in Case No. 30, they had considered themselves bound to 
also take actions in relation to cases NOs. 17 and 132, for which 
Hearing sessions had been held but no deliberations had taken 
place. 23 (Emphasis added). 
20 See Infra Chapter Six, p. 343, note 11. 
21 1 Iran-USCTR. p. 415; and 2 Iran-USCTR. p. 14, respectively. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid, pp. 415-416; and pp. 14-15, respectively. 
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Judge Sani then went on to elaborate on the facts in support of his assertion. 
In response to Judge Sani's statement, Judge Mosk filed a statement in 
which he stated that "Judge Sani's statement of facts was inaccurate". 24 Judge 
Mosk added that Judge Sani "refused to participate in some of the deliberations 
in Case No. 17, (Emphasis added) and did not sign the Award. "25 Judge Mosk 
further explained two points. First, "refusal to sign is not looked upon 
favourably in arbitration practice". 26 Second, "under international law, Judge 
Sani cannot frustrate the work of the Chamber or the Tribunal by wilfully 
absenting himself and refusing to sign an Award. "27 
Furthermore, in his Concurring Opinion in Rexnord v Iran (Case No. 
132)28 , Judge 
Mosk rejected Judge Sani's assertion that there had been no 
discussion concerning this Case. 29 He said that Judge Sani had participated in 
deliberations and been invited to attend further deliberations (Emphasis added), 
but that Judge Sani had chosen to absent himself and had refused to sign any 
award. 30 Judge Mosk added: 
Apparently under Judge Sani's theory, an award is invalid unless 
he has been able to deliberate not once, not twice, but as many 
times as he desires and only at the times which suit his 
preference. Under this theory, few of the thousands of cases 
before this Tribunal could be decided. 31 
In a "Reply to Mr Mosk's Comments"32, Judge Sani disputed Mr 
Mosk's account of the facts and maintained that he had not participated in any 
24 Comments of Richard M. Mosk With Respect to Mr Jahangir Sani's Reasons for Not 
Signing the Decision Made by Mr Mangard and Mr Mosk in Case No. 17,1 Iran-USCTR. 
424, p. 425. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid. 
28 2 Iran-USCTR. 27, p. 28. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Mr Jahangir Sani's Reply to Mr Mosk's Comments of 3 March 1983, Concerning Case No 
17,1 Iran-USCTR. p. 428. 
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final deliberative session about the Case. 33 He added that "where an arbitrator 
has not participated in the deliberation, it is meaningless to talk about his 
refusal to sign". 34 He argued that the Tribunal Rules did not authorize two 
arbitrators to deliberate in the absence of the third, they simply authorize them 
to act when the third fails to sign an award. 35 In Judge Sani's view Article 
IH(1) of the Claims Settlement Declaration which provided that "claims may 
be decided by the Full Tribunal or by a panel of three members of the 
Tribunal... " required that "at least until such time as the final deliberation is 
concluded and appropriate decision is made, the presence of all the three 
members is absolutely necessary". 36 
Judge Mangard, the Chairman of Chamber Three, also issued a 
statement regarding Judge Sani's refusal to sign the Awards. Recounting his 
version of the events, Judge Mangard's statement implied that the deliberations 
in Case Nos. 17 and 132 had not been completely finalized. The following are 
quotations from Judge Mangard's statement: 
In Judge Sani's opinion, he was no longer a member of the 
Tribunal and not competent to take part in any deliberations 
(Emphasis added) or to sign awards... 
.... In 
his view there had not been sufficient deliberations 
in these two Cases previously, and he was not prepared for final 
deliberations with such short notice.... 
.... In view of 
Judge Sani's firm refusal to take part in any 
further deliberations (Emphasis added) and to sign any awards 
at all... Mr Mosk and I then signed the three Awards and filed 
them with the Registry. 37 
33 Ibid, p. 413. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid, p. 432. 
36 Ibid. 
37 "Notes on Judge Jahangir Sani's refusal to sign the Awards issued in Cases Nos. 30,17, 
and 132", dated 13 June 1983, filed with the Tribunal on 14 July 1983, pp. 4-5; the 
statement is also quoted in Schwcbel, op. cit. pp. 260-261. 
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D- In the four Cases involving Chamber Two, Judge Shafeiei filed a 
statement on 9 August 1983 in relation to all four of these Cases to which two 
other memoranda dated 5 and 8 August 1983 were attached. 38 We will quote 
Judge Shafeiei's statement at some length in order to shed light on the 
circumstances under discussion. Judge Shafeiei wrote: 
The recording of the name of an arbitrator at the bottom 
of an award signifies that he participated in the making of that 
award- that is, that he participated in the Chamber hearings and 
in completely democratic discussions and deliberations, in 
taking a decision, in preparing the draft award, in studying it 
and, finally, in preparing the final award and signing it. I have 
had absolutely no part or role in the formulation of the present 
awards, nor have I been present therein. Everything has been 
carried out in my absence and even without my knowledge. 
Therefore, it would have been appropriate for Mr George 
Aldrich and Mr Bellet to explain just why they have recorded 
my name. Throughout the month of July, I availed myself of my 
annual leave in order to take a much needed rest and to 
complete some backlogged chamber work; and this was entirely 
permissible and justified. But meanwhile, Mr Bellet and Mr 
Aldrich held formal Chamber meetings on a two-member basis 
and rendered the present Awards. 
If these gentlemen had refrained from recording my 
name at the end of those Awards, I could at least have praised 
their frankness. However, these gentlemen wrote my name, 
along with making certain presentations. I call this action by Mr 
Bellet, the former Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of France, 
and Mr George Aldrich, the American Arbitrator, as 
prevarication, duplicity, and hypocrisy. 
... 
Under no circumstances a Chamber meeting may be 
convened in the absence of either of the two arbitrators 
appointed by their respective Governments, even with respect to 
urgent administrative matters. The action by Mr Bellet and Mr 
Aldrich constitutes a flagrant and intentional violation of the 
Algiers Declarations and other regulations governing the 
Tribunal. 
Today, it is clearer than ever before that the Government 
of Iran has become a victim of breach of trust because of the 
existence of the Security Account, which has induced this 
38 "Dr Shafeiei's Reasons for Not Signing the Awards Made by Mr Aldrich and Mr Bellet", 9 
August 1983,3 Iran-USCTR. p. 124. 
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Chamber to engage in blatant, intentional violations of the 
Algiers Declarations and the Tribunal Rules. 
At any event, nothing can justify, or diminish the 
odiousness of these illegal acts by the above-mentioned 
gentlemen.... In my memos to Mr Lagergren dated 5 and 8 
August 1983, I have explained in detail why my signature does 
not appear at the end of the aforementioned Awards. It appears 
appropriate to attach the said memos hereto. 39 
In his memo of 5 August 1983 to Judge Lagergren, the President of the 
Tribunal, Judge Shafeiei restating his position wrote: 
Now, even supposing, in arguendo, that I have unjustifiably 
failed to perform my functions- and it is of course possible that 
an arbitrator might, like any other human being, either die, 
resign, or fail to act- clear provision has been made for such 
exigencies in Article 13, paragraph 2 of the Tribunal Rules. 40 
Judge Shafeiei noted that the Security Account in particular had 
prompted "the Tribunal to violate the law". If it did not exist, Judge Shafeiei 
argued, "then at least the interests of the American claimants themselves would 
demand that law and judicial procedure be properly observed in the issuing of 
Awards, for illegal awards will in that case certainly encounter difficulties at 
the enforcement stages". 41 Judge Shafeiei further complained that the President 
of the Tribunal bore a major share of responsibility for the above illegal acts by 
instructing to pay the Awards out of the Security Account. 42 
In his Memo of 8 August 1983, Judge Shafeiei elaborated on his 
previous arguments. He explained that the American Arbitrators and the United 
States Department of State had created the impression that the Tribunal had 
been established solely and exclusively to examine the hundreds of claims by 
American claimants and pay "each American claimant its share out of the 
39 Ibid, pp. 124-125. 
40 Ibid, pp. 125-126. 
41 Ibid, pp. 127-128. 
42 Ibid, p. 128. 
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Security Account, as quickly as possible". 43 He explained that Iran was being 
sent notice to file defences within a short space of time and as a country which 
was in a state of war, revolution, and internal disarray was therefore placed 
under great pressure. ' In the face of this attempt and this inequitable pressure, 
he said, and "owing to the completely Western structure of the Tribunal" which 
could not or did not want to "understand Iran's problems", the Iranian 
arbitrators were trying to protect "Iran's right to a defence" and to prevent the 
Tribunal from "being transformed into an internal claims commission of the 
United States Department of State". 45 He stated that the impression was 
created by the American arbitrators that the Iranian arbitrators were preventing 
the Tribunal from "examining cases, thwarting its work, and slowing down its 
operations". 46 
After explaining the difficulties of working under such pressure and 
with the onerous workload and language problems for the Iranian arbitrators, 
Judge Shafeiei maintained that he had permitted himself to take a one-month 
summer leave. 47 He said that he had informed the Chairman of Chamber Two 
of his intention and had refused to accept any date for meetings in July. The 
attachments to Judge Shafeiei's memoranda of 8 August showed that on 23 
June 1983 he wrote to Mr Bellet about his intention to take a few weeks of 
holiday until the end of July and requested that no Chamber meeting be held in 
his absence. 48 Judge Bellet in reply, explaining that Chamber Two was in 
function until 31 July and that several Cases had to be deliberated before that 
date, because he had to leave the Tribunal by that date, invited Judge Shafeiei 
43 Ibid, p. 129. 
44 Ibid, pp. 129-130. 
45 Ibid, p. 130. 
46 Ibid, p. 129. 
47 Ibid, p. 130. 
48 Ibid, p. 132. 
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to be present at the Tribunal from 5th July. 49 In a letter dated 1 July Judge 
Shafeiei replied that Mr Bellet's end of mission on 31 July could not deprive 
him of his annual holidays and that circumstance did not obligate the Chamber 
members to decide "through accelerated and abnormal deliberations". 50 Judge 
Shafeiei also urged Judge Bellet not to hold a Chamber meeting during the 
Tribunal's annual recess and during his absence. 51 
On July 13, one day prior to the signing of the Award in Case No. 449, 
Judge Bellet responded to Judge Shafeiei's letter of Ist July. Judge Shafeiei 
argues that at the time of sending that letter, Mr Bellet knew that he was on 
leave, and that that memo did not reach him at all; a Xerox copy was merely 
given to Judge Shafeiei's legal assistant. 52 In the memo, Mr Bellet responded 
that the annual recess extended only until 17 July and not after that date and 
rejected Mr Shafeiei's request for a longer period of leave. 53 Judge Bellet 
stated that according to an order from the President of the Tribunal, Chamber 
Two should be available at any time during July 1983. He further urged Mr 
Shafeiei to be present until the end of July at all Chamber meetings to 
deliberate especially on the Cases of Intrend, Gruen, Hoffman and Chas T. 
Main. Otherwise, he stated, Mr Aldrich and he would have to proceed without 
Judge Shafeiei. 54 
Relying on this account, Judge Shafeiei argued that his departure on 
annual leave was completely justified and natural-55 Even if he had failed to 
carry out his duties, Judge Shafeiei stated, Article 13(2) of the Tribunal Rules 
had already very simply and clearly made provision for the replacement of an 
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid, p. 134. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Ibid, p. 135. 
53 Iid, p. 136. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Ibid, p. 139. 
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arbitrator failing to perform his function. 56 According to Judge Shafeiei, 
Article III(1) of the CSD did not permit the convening of the Chamber in his 
absence. 57 In support of his argument Judge Shafeiei cited a Full Tribunal 
precedent according to which, "if the plenary Tribunal found it necessary to 
vote on any administrative issue in the absence of a member appointed by a 
High Contracting Party, one of the members appointed by the other High 
Contracting Party (chosen by consultation among themselves) should not take 
part in the vote". 58 
It is notable that on October 13,1983, Judge Aldrich, the American 
Member of Chamber Two, filed his "Comments on "Judge Shafeiei's Reasons 
for Non-Signature of Awards... "59 Judge Aldrich argued that Judge Shafeiei's 
absence was "unauthorised and impermissible" and that he intended: 
(a) to avoid any further deliberations with Judge Bellet; (b) to 
attempt thereby to prevent Chamber 2 from rendering awards in 
the pending Cases prior to the 31 July effective date of Judge 
Bellet's resignation on any awards issued during that absence. 60 
In such circumstances, Judge Aldrich said, he and Mr Bellet had decided that: 
... The 
Chamber was justified, and in fact obligated, by 
international law and precedent to proceed with the awards on 
which we could agree, explaining therein the reasons for the 
absence of Judge Shafeiei's signature. Any other conclusion, in 
a continuing tribunal of this type with many cases on its docket, 
would permit the Tribunal's work to be sabotaged. In this 
connection, we were aware that the Full Tribunal on a number 
of occasions had met and taken decisions, even judicial 
"61 decisions, in the absence of one or more of arbitrators. 
E- The clearest example of the withdrawal of a Party-appointed 
arbitrator from the deliberations took place recently. In this Case, Saghi v 
56 Ibid. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Ibid, pp. 139-140. 
59 Ibid, p. 145. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Ibid, p. 146. 
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Iran62, neither the withdrawing arbitrator nor the remaining members of 
Chamber Two, who decided the Case, attempted to misrepresent the facts or 
the legal issues governing them. The statement appended to the Award read: 
"Mr Bahrami-Ahmadi did not participate in the deliberation of this case, stating 
that in his view such cases are not admissible, and refused to sign the present 
Award". 63 
Mr Bahrami-Ahmadi, the Iranian Arbitrator, filed a "Declaration of 
Hamid Bahrami-Ahmadi with Respect to the Legal Opinion Issued by Two 
Members of Chamber Two, In Connection with Case No 298". 64 By naming 
the decision of the two remaining members as "legal opinion" Mr Bahrami has 
hinted that he did not consider it as being an Award properly made. The 
Declaration of Mr Bahrami read as follows: 
I take note of the legal opinion rendered by two 
members of Chamber Two in connection with determination of 
the nationality of the claimants in the above-mentioned case. I 
have neither participated in the deliberations in that Case, nor 
signed the legal opinion relating thereto, for the following 
reasons: 
1. The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran has not 
agreed, on the basis of any of the provisions of the Algiers 
Declarations, to this Tribunal's jurisdiction to hear claims 
against its own nationals. Moreover, by its objection following 
the issuance of the Award in Case No. A/18, the Government of 
Iran eliminated whatever doubts possibly existed as to whether 
it tacitly accepted the Tribunal's jurisdiction in this regard. 
Because there has not been any agreement as to the 
Tribunal's jurisdiction (clause compromissoire) in this 
connection, my esteemed colleagues and I are unable to 
intervene in such claims. 
2. The Tribunal Rules do not grant any authority for two 
members of a Chamber to issue an Award without the third 
member's having participated in the deliberations thereon. The 
62 Award No. ITL-66-298-2,12 January 1987,14 Iran-USCTR. p. 3. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Ibid. 
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Chambers of this Tribunal are three member panels, and a 
necessary precondition of the validity of their Awards is that all 
three arbitrators have been effectively present at the deliberative 
sessions thereon. Therefore, I regard the present "Interlocutory 
Award" as constituting a "legal opinion" by my colleagues, for 
which reason the instant Declaration cannot be construed as a 
separate opinion by this writer. My purpose here is merely to 
note that the document which has been issued cannot be taken 
as constituting an Award by Chamber Two of the Tribunal.... 65 
In response to Mr Bahrami's Declaration the two remaining members of 
Chamber Two, Mr Briner and Mr Aldrich, filed "Comments on the Declaration 
of Judge Bahrami-Ahmadi". 66 The "Comments" read: 
The Declaration of Judge Bahrami-Ahmadi which was filed in 
this Case on 19 January 1987 requires a brief comment by the 
other two Members of the Chamber in order to avoid any 
misunderstandings. While we understand the reasons why Judge 
Bahrami-Ahmadi felt it necessary to refuse to participate in the 
deliberation and signature of the Interlocutory Award filed on 
12 January 1987 in this Case, it was clear to us that he 
understood the reasons why we felt obliged to proceed without 
him. As this Tribunal has previously held, a continuing 
international tribunal with many cases on its docket cannot 
permit its work to be frustrated by the refusal of one of its 
members to deliberate a claim or sign an award. The Award in 
this case, ITL 66-298-2, like the decision of the Full Tribunal in 
Case No. A18, Dec 32-A18-FT, which determined the meaning 
of the Claims Settlement Declaration with respect to claims by 
dual nationals, is final and binding pursuant to Article IV, 
paragraph 1 of the Declaration and 32, paragraph 2 of the 
Tribunal Rules. The Tribunal has the right to expect all 
concerned to act accordingly. 67 
F- It is notable that in a number of Cases the Iranian members have 
refused to sign the Awards. These Cases, like Case No. 30 mentioned earlier, 
are instances of failure to sign, for which clear provision has been made under 
Article 32(4) of the Tribunal Rules. For instance, in International School 
Services v Iranian Copper Industries68, decided by the Full Tribunal, the 
65 Ibid, pp. 8-9. 
66 Ibid, p. 9. 
67 lbid, pp" 9-10. 
68 6 April 1984,5 Iran-USCTR. p. 338. 
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Iranian arbitrators refused to sign the Award. The statement appended to the 
Award said: 
In this Case final deliberation and voting took place in the week 
of 5-9 March 1984. The Iranian Members of the Tribunal refuse 
to sign the Award because they assert that the Award was 
"improperly provided by a U. S. Arbitrator and signed by the so- 
called neutral arbitrators without due deliberation and 
consideration. 69 
There are also other cases of failure to sign awards of the Tribunal by the 
Iranian members. 7° However, these are all instances of refusal to sign and thus 
distinct from the examples of deliberation in the absence of a party-appointed 
arbitrator as discussed earlier. 
G- In short, despite the confusion created by the statements appended to 
the Awards which were decided in the absence of Judges Sani and Shafeiei, as 
to whether they were instances of failure to sign the Award or failure to 
participate in the deliberation, on which we will elaborate below, it is clear that 
the Parties have treated them as instances of failure to participate in the 
deliberation. Thus, for its part the United States Government has maintained 
that the Iranian arbitrators did not have the right to frustrate the proceedings by 
refusing to participate in the deliberations. According to the US Government, 
the Tribunal was not only empowered but required to continue despite the 
absence of a Party-appointed arbitrator. 71 
69 Ibid, p. 348. Also note Dissenting Opinion of Judge Lagergren, the then President of the 
Tribunal, Ibid, pp. 348-353. As a consequence, the Award was adopted by a majority of 5 
members. 
70 See generally: American International Group, Inc v Iran, 19 December 1983,4 Iran- 
USCTR. 96, p. 111; The DOW Chemical Company v Iran, 8 May 1984,6 Iran-USCTR. 
38, pp. 39-40; Tippetts and others v TAMS-AFFA, 22 June 1984,6 Iran-USCTR. 219, p. 
229; General Motors Corp v Iran, 28 August 1984,7 Iran-USCTR. 220, p. 222; and Sedco, 
Inc v NIOC, 2 July 1987,15 Iran-USCTR. 23, pp. 187-188. 
71 Letter from John Crook, the U. S. Agent, to the President of the Tribunal, 16 August 1983, 
pp. 1-6; the U. S. position stated in the above letter is also quoted in Schwebel, op. cit. pp. 
264-269. 
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On the other hand, the position which can be inferred from the 
comments of the Iranian members and the further challenge of the Awards in 
question in the Dutch Courts72, is that the Tribunal cannot legally be 
constituted in the absence of a Party-appointed arbitrator. 
III. A Factual-Legal Confusion 
Before beginning to discuss the question of withdrawal of arbitrators in 
international arbitration, the clarification of an important point is necessary. As 
noted earlier, the rules relating to the composition and constitution of the 
Tribunal, deliberation, and the form of the Award are three separate matters. 
As a consequence, Article 32(4) of the Tribunal Rules relates to the form of the 
Award; that is, the absence of an arbitrator during the signing of a document 
which he has helped to draw up. On the other hand, the absence of an arbitrator 
during all or part of the proceedings, e. g. deliberation, is an entirely distinct 
matter which can by no means be covered by Article 32(4) of the Tribunal 
Rules. It is again important to point out that the rules of deliberation permitting 
a decision to be made by the majority of the members should not be confused 
with the rules according to which an arbitral Tribunal has to be composed and 
constituted. The latter can perhaps be termed as "the rule of quorum". In other 
words, the application of the rule of decision by a majority vote is dependent 
upon whether the arbitral tribunal has been properly composed and constituted 
in the first place. 
The point is that in all the Cases decided by Chambers Two and Three 
in the absence of Judges Sani and Shafeiei, the remaining members relied on 
Article 32(4) of the Tribunal Rules to explain the absence of the Iranian 
member's signature. The contents of the explanations appended to the Awards 
by the remaining members, however, reveal that these instances are not simply 
72 See Infra, Chapter Six, pp. 343-344. 
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examples of failure to sign the Awards. They are, rather, examples of failure or 
refusal by the Iranian arbitrators to participate at least in parts of the 
deliberations. 
This fact is supported not only by the statements made by the Iranian 
members, but also by the counter-statements of the American arbitrators. The 
expressions quoted in the preceding pages, such as: "... to reserve 8,10,12 
August for deliberations... " 73; "July would be fully dedicated to the final 
deliberations... " 74, make it clear that the deliberations were not yet finalized. 
Moreover, the counter-statements made by the American arbitrators, 
including expressions such as, "Judge Sani refused to participate in some of the 
deliberations in Case No. 17... "75; or "he was invited to attend further 
deliberations...,, 76, clearly acknowledge that these were instances of failure or 
refusal to participate in the deliberation and not in the signing of the Awards. 
This fact is also evident in the line of reasoning adopted by the American 
members in their counter-statements, where they have attempted to explain the 
legality of an incomplete tribunal to function in the absence of a withdrawing 
arbitrator. 
What is surprising, therefore, is that the initial explanations appended to 
the Awards in question by the two arbitrators- particularly their reference to 
Article 32(4) of the Tribunal Rules- have portrayed the matter as if it were 
merely a case of refusal to sign the Award. In consequence, they have made no 
attempt to explain their view as to the legality of an incomplete tribunal to 
proceed in the absence of a withdrawing arbitrator. Thus they have not made it 
explicit and clear whether in their view the remaining members were legally 
authorised to proceed in the absence of a Party-appointed arbitrator. Therefore 
73 E. g. Blount Brothers Corp, v Ministry of Housing, 3 Iran-USCTR. 225, p. 237. 
74 E. g. Gruen Associates Inc. v Iran Housing Co, 3 Iran-USCTR. 97, p. 108. 
75 Comments of Richard M. Mosk..., 1 Iran-USCTR. p. 425 
76 Concurring Opinion of Mosk in Rcxnord v Iran, Case No. 132,2 Iran-USCTR. p. 28. 
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the Tribunal has not made any analytical contribution to the question of 
whether the remaining members of an incomplete tribunal are authorised to 
proceed in the absence of a defaulting Party-appointed arbitrator. They have 
also created confusion as to the facts of these Cases. In other words, they have 
not made it entirely clear in express terms whether they were asserting a right 
to proceed in the absence of a Party-appointed arbitrator from the deliberations, 
or simply asserting the right established under Article 32(4) of the Tribunal 
Rules. 
However, despite the fact that the majority members have merely relied 
on Article 32(4) of the Tribunal Rules, their action implies the assertion of the 
right to proceed in the absence of a defaulting Party-appointed arbitrator. 
Whether or not such an action is permitted under international law and practice 
will be discussed in the next Section. 
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SECTION B 
THE GENERAL PROBLEMS OF WITHDRAWAL OF 
ARBITRATORS AND FRUSTRATION OF ARBITRAL 
PROCEEDINGS : THE LEGALITY OF AN INCOMPLETE 
TRIBUNAL 
I. Generally 
In Chapter Two above it was briefly noted that a distinguishing 
characteristic of international arbitration, as against other means of judicial 
settlement, has been in the greater degree of control and influence that the 
arbitrating parties have traditionally exercised over the whole proceedings. 
This has been termed as the "necessity for consent of the arbitrating parties to 
every stage in the arbitration". 1 It follows that a State may withdraw its consent 
at various stages in the arbitration, either before or after the constitution of the 
tribunal. In other words, a State may withhold co-operation necessary for the 
constitution of the tribunal, for instance, by not appointing its own arbitrator or 
by not agreeing on the appointment of the neutral members. Similar obstructive 
attempts may be made in the course of the arbitral tribunal's work; for instance, 
by withdrawing the party-appointed arbitrator or by refusal to appoint or agree 
to the appointment of a substitute in the event of some change in the 
composition of the tribunal. Within the traditional conception of arbitration, as 
a consequence, "consent, not only given at the beginning of the arbitration 
proceedings, but continued throughout the proceedings until the tribunal retires 
to make its award, is, therefore, an essential ingredient to the completion of any 
arbitration". 2 
I Hazel Fox, Arbitration, in H. Waldock, "International Disputes... " op. Cit_ p. 101. 
2 Ibid. 
259 
Needless to say, the assumption of such a pattern for international 
arbitration was rooted in the traditional idea of arbitration which was reflected 
in the establishment of arbitral tribunals structured according to that 
conception. As a consequence, especially in the past, many of the arbitration 
instruments did not find it necessary to establish certain safeguards for assuring 
the parties' compliance with the arbitral process. In other words, consent of the 
parties constituted an essential ingredient during the whole process of 
arbitration. 
Instances which appear to be indicative of the application of such a 
notion of arbitration are not rare. By way of example it is useful to point out 
that Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania refused to appoint their representatives to 
the Arbitral Commission provided for under the Peace Treaties of 1947 on the 
ground that there were no treaty violations to be arbitrated. 3 In the French- 
Tunisian Arbitral Tribunal the Tunisian arbitrators did not appear and the 
Tribunal failed the first time it was resorted to by France. 4 
The theory of "consent to every stage in the arbitration" may, however, 
result in an unlimited freedom for the parties which would undermine the 
judicial nature of the arbitral process as a method of dispute settlement on the 
basis of respect for law. Further, it may seriously undermine the binding 
character of the process stemming from the initial agreement of the parties to 
submit to arbitration. In other words, such a conception of arbitration may 
result in what is termed "diplomatic arbitration"5, rather than a fully judicial 
system. 
3 See, Interpretation of the Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, Advisory 
Opinion, First Phase, ICJ Rep. 1950, p. 65; Second Phase, ICJ Rep. 1950, p. 221. 
4 24 ILR (1957), pp. 767-770. 
5 E. g., H. Fox observes that in the Casablanca Case (Scott, Hague 
Court Reports, Ist 
Series, 1916, p. 110), and the North Atlantic Coast Fisheries Case, Ibid, p. 141), the 
arbitrators were prepared to waive a strict application of the law in order to achieve an 
acceptable settlement. (Fox, op. cit. p. 102. ) 
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In view of the problems associated with the above-mentioned 
conception of arbitration, there have been new developments aimed at limiting 
the excessive control of the parties over the arbitral process and securing a 
stricter judicial character for international arbitration. These new trends, known 
as "judicial arbitration", place a greater emphasis on the judicial nature of 
arbitration, and are based on a sound principle, namely the principle of non- 
frustration. Underlying this principle is the belief that an agreement to arbitrate 
involves an international obligation and that States having once entered into an 
undertaking are legally bound to take all necessary steps to allow the 
arbitration to proceed and to refrain from any action which would frustrate 
their undertaking. 6 Relying upon this principle and in order to secure the 
effectiveness of the arbitral process, certain procedural safeguards are proposed 
which would provide alternative guarantees in the areas where the co-operation 
by one of the parties to arbitration is lacking.? 
The new conception of international arbitration emerged during the 
Hague Conventions for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, but 
manifested itself principally in the work of the International Law Commission 
on Arbitral Procedure. Similar tendencies have been expressed in a series of 
multilateral and bilateral treaties concluded mainly during this century. 
It is therefore clear that the answer to the problem of frustration of 
arbitration depends partly on the question of which of the two conceptions of 
international arbitration is employed or which of them is assumed to be the 
generally accepted view. 8 However, what in our view should also be taken into 
account is not only the sustainability of one conception over the other on 
theoretical grounds but the extent of its acceptance by State practice. 
Moreover, even if the new notion of "judicial arbitration" were to be generally 
6 Ibid, p. 106. 
7 Ibid. 
8 See Schwebel, "International Arbitration... ", op. cit. p. 146. 
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accepted, it would still be necessary to identify the specific areas of the arbitral 
structure over which this conception should prevail. In addition, limits to the 
remedies which the judicial conception of arbitration might offer to the 
problem of withdrawal of arbitrators would also have to be established. These 
are the considerations which we will attempt to examine in relation to the 
theory and practice of international arbitration. 
II. Theoretical Analysis 
Before beginning the discussion, we need to offer a general clarification 
of the problem of withdrawal of a party-appointed arbitrator in international 
arbitration. Article 25(3) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice 
provides that "a quorum of nine judges shall suffice to constitute the Court. " 
This rule establishes the rule of quorum. The rule specifies the minimum 
number of judges whose presence allows the court or the tribunal to be legally 
constituted. It is notable that neither under the Statute nor under the Rules of 
the Court has a quorum provision been made for the five-member chambers of 
the Court, provided for in Articles 26 and 29 of the Statute. The absence of a 
quorum requirement for chambers of the Court has led to the logical 
conclusion that a proper constitution and meeting for a chamber requires the 
participation of all five judges specified under those Articles-9 This conclusion 
is supported by the last section of Article 29 of the Statute which provides for 
the selection of two substitute judges for the purpose of replacing those judges 
of the chamber who find it impossible to sit. This means that a chamber is not 
permitted to hold a meeting if one of its five members is unable to sit, and a 
substitute member must replace him. Moreover, the general view is that where 
there is no provision for a quorum the presence of the full number of judges of 
the tribunal is required. 10 
9 Simpson and Fox, "International Arbitration", op. cit. p. 220. 
10 Ibid, p. 222. 
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In international arbitration throughout its historical inception to the 
present time, with certain exceptions, a provision stipulating the minimum 
number of judges who can legally constitute the arbitral tribunal is generally 
lacking in arbitration instruments. This lack of provision does not happen 
simply because of the negligence of the arbitrating parties. On the contrary, it 
is closely connected with the special structure of arbitral tribunals normally 
composed of the arbitrators appointed by each party in equal numbers and the 
neutral arbitrator or arbitrators. That is to say, the structure of arbitral tribunals 
normally demonstrates a balanced representation of the interests of both parties 
in their composition. Because of this structure the parties could hardly confer 
in advance on their case in anticipation of problems like the rule of quorum and 
on the constitution of the tribunal in the absence of the arbitrator appointed by 
one of the parties. 
What needs to be added briefly is that the rules on deliberations that 
require the majority vote, and the rules specifying the form and signing of the 
award should be distinguished from the rules which govern how the tribunal is 
to be composed. For instance, Judge Hudson rightly points out that provisions 
requiring that a decision may be made by a majority is not tantamount to 
provisions that a "majority may constitute a quorum. I I 
11(1). The Rule of Equilibrium 
The arguments in favour of and against the legality of rump tribunals 
are equally sound and the preference of one view over the other may ultimately 
depend on the conception of arbitration applied. Such is the case with the 
position of commentators. To begin with, the theory which may act against the 
legality of rump - truncated, or incomplete - tribunals is the carefully 
balanced 
equilibrium in the composition of arbitral tribunals. This is particularly relevant 
II Hudson, International Arbitration, Washington, 1944, p. 53. 
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if the tribunal is a tripartite one of the kind in the Iran-United States arbitration. 
On the basis of this equilibrium in the membership of the arbitral tribunals it 
has been argued that: 
... It can hardly be supposed that the compromis or general 
arbitration treaty would have allowed that a dispute could be 
dealt with and decided without the presence of both parties' 
arbitrators, whose absence would essentially alter the 
complexion of the tribunal set up. Rather, it must be concluded 
that it was the will of the parties that the tribunal should 
function only when fully constituted. 12 
This principle appears to have been equally recognized in arbitration in the 
field of international commerce to the effect that the parties "must play an 
equal role in the constitution of the arbitral tribunal. 13 
A clear support for the notion of necessity for equilibrium or equality in 
the composition of arbitral tribunals can be found even in those rare 
instruments which do provide for the rule of quorum. In a number of arbitration 
tribunals established between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Three 
Powers of France, the United Kingdom and the United States, principle of 
equilibrium has been clearly recognized. 
To begin with, the Arbitral Tribunal under the Convention on Relations 
between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic of Germany 14 consists of 
nine members, three of whom are appointed by the Federal Republic of 
Germany, three by France, the United Kingdom and the United States and the 
remaining three, who are neutral, by joint agreement of the FRG and the three 
Powers. 15 The quorum for a plenary session is to be five, provided that it 
12 Hans Mangoldt, "Arbitration and Conciliation", op. cit. p. 533. 
13 Rene David, "Arbitration in International Trade", op. cit. p. 265. 
14 As amended 1954, Supplement to 49 AJIL (1955), p. 57. 
15 Charter of the Arbitration Tribunal, Article 1, Ibid, p. 62. 
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includes an equal number of members appointed by the Federal Republic of 
Germany and the Three Powers, and at least one neutral member. 16 
The Arbitral Commission on Property, Rights and Interests in 
Germany17 is composed on the same pattern as the Arbitration Tribunal on 
Relations between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic of Germany. A 
quorum of five is again sufficient for a plenary session, provided it is 
established in the observance of the above-mentioned equilibrium. 18 Provision 
has also been made for the establishment of Chambers, which are to consist of 
one of the members appointed by the FRG, one of the members appointed by 
France, the United Kingdom or the United States, and a neutral member. 19 
What is highly significant with regard to these arbitral bodies is the fact 
that the principle of equal participation of the parties in the composition of the 
tribunal has not only been observed in their full plenary structure, but also 
when the tribunal has to function in the absence of some of its members. The 
natural conclusion to be made from these provisions is that the constitution of 
the tribunal where one of the parties is unequally represented in the 
composition of the tribunal is not legally permitted. 
It is notable that the provision of quorum in these arbitration 
instruments is warranted by the fact that they are composed of more than three 
arbitrators. For instance, Article 6 of the Jay Treaty provided that three of the 
five commissioners could act provided that one of the commissioners named 
on each side and the fifth (neutral) commissioner were present. 
20 In the Iran- 
United States Claims Tribunal also there has been a precedent according to 
which if the Full Tribunal which consists of nine members has found it 
16 Ibid, Article 4. 
17 Charter of the Arbitration Commission, Article 3, Supplement to 49 AJIL (1955), p. 113. 
18 Ibid, Article 5. 
19 Ibid, Article 5(4). 
20 Treaty of 19 November 1794, Between Great Britain and the United States, 52 CTS, p. 
243. 
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necessary to vote on any administrative matter in the absence of a member 
appointed by one of the two Governments, one of the members appointed by 
the other Government has not taken part in the vote. 21 
In short, the provision for the rule of quorum in arbitration instruments 
providing for arbitral tribunals of more than three members is generally rare, 
and in the case of arbitral tribunals composed of three members the rule of 
quorum is almost non-existent. 22 As noted, there are some arbitration 
instruments providing for a tribunal composed of more than three members 
which included the rule of quorum. However, the rule of quorum in these 
instruments is subject to the condition that the rule of equilibrium in the 
composition of the tribunal, when it is constituted by a quorum, is observed. 
Taking these facts together, it is obvious that the general absence of the rule of 
quorum in three-member arbitral tribunals is because no equilibrium could be 
achieved if a provision is made for the rule of quorum under such 
circumstances. That is to say, under normal circumstances an arbitral tribunal, 
especially a three-member tribunal, is not properly constituted when the rule of 
equilibrium is not observed and when its governing provisions do not explicitly 
permit it to function without such equilibrium. 
The second argument, which may lead to a conclusion unsupportive of 
the idea of the legality of an incomplete tribunal in the absence of a party- 
appointed arbitrator, lies in some measure in the nature of arbitration. It has 
been argued that arbitration is a flexible method of dispute settlement 
responsive to the will of the parties. In the words of Judge De Visscher, these 
21 See statement of Judge Shafeiei, 3 Iran-USCTR. p. 139-140. 
22 There are two exceptional cases: Judge Hudson points out that the provision in the Inter- 
American Plan of Arbitration of 1890 that a majority may act notwithstanding the absence 
or withdrawal of the minority was exceptional. (Hudson, International Arbitration, op. cit. 
p. 53) The other known exception is the Lena Goldfields Arbitration Agreement which 
expressly provided that the two arbitrators could constitute the Tribunal should the 
arbitrator of the other party default. (5 A. D., p. 426; for a detailed summary of this Case 
see The Times, 3 September 1930, p. 7. ) 
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flexible qualities in arbitration "which at all times have kept arbitration in 
certain favour with governments-23 are essential in preserving the identity of 
the arbitral process as distinct from other means of judicial settlement. 
A similar deduction can be made from the comments of Professor 
Carlston on the Draft Convention on Arbitral Procedure of the International 
Law Commission. He argued that: 
The strength of the existing system of international arbitration 
as a means for the pacific settlement of disputes lies in its 
flexibility and responsiveness to the will of the parties, even 
though as a procedure it is subject to the interruptions which the 
Commission now seeks to remedy ; that these interruptions or 
breakdowns of arbitration have in practice been few in number 
as against the great number of international arbitrations which 
have taken place successfully; that many of these breakdowns 
could have perhaps been avoided by a more skilled use of 
technique; and, finally, that the ultimate end to be sought is to 
preserve all various procedures developed through history 
which conduce to the amicable settlement of international 
disputes. 24 
H(2). The Principle of Effective Interpretation 
The situation, however, is not that simple. For the question of the 
authority of a "rump tribunal" arises mainly where the arbitrators of one party, 
usually instructed by that party, withdraw from the proceedings in order to 
frustrate the arbitration. This problem should be measured against the very 
important principle that arbitration treaties are treaties, and where States have 
undertaken by treaty to arbitrate, their obligation is binding and this obligation 
they are bound to fulfil. 25 
Having accepted the general rule that treaties are to be "interpreted in 
good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of 
23 Charles De Visscher, "Reflections on the Present Prospects of International Adjudication", 
50 AJIL, (1956), 467, p. 469. 
24 Kenneth Carlston, "Codification of International Arbitral Procedure", 47 AJIL, (1953), 
203, p. 218. 
`5 Stephen Schwcbel, "International Arbitration... ", op. Cit. p. 149. 
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the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose"26, it 
follows that the parties are under an obligation to co-operate in constituting the 
tribunal. Such a conclusion has been confirmed by the International Court of 
Justice in the Advisory Opinion in the first Phase of the Peace Treaties Case. 27 
In this Case the second among four of the questions put to the Court read: 
Are the Governments of Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania 
obligated to carry out the provisions of the Articles referred to 
in Question I, including the provisions for the appointment of 
their representatives to the Treaty Commissions? 28 
The Court answered the question in the affirmative, saying that "either party is 
obligated, at the request of the other party, to cooperate in constituting the 
Commission, in particular by appointing its representative. Otherwise the 
method of settlement by Commission provided for in the Treaties would 
completely fail its purpose". 29 
Similarly, in the Ambatilos Case30 the International Court of Justice 
held that the United Kingdom was under an obligation to submit to 
arbitration. 31 
It is therefore clear that the binding character of the agreement to 
arbitrate requires the parties' co-operation in constituting and conducting the 
arbitration. The implication is that the failure to co-operate, or any obstructive 
attempt by a party, is a breach of obligation and engages international 
responsibility. This is the conclusion which appears to be generally accepted 
by many authorities. 32 However, whether the breach of a treaty obligation of 
26 Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 8 ILM, (1969), p. 679. 
27 ICJ Rep. 1950, p. 65. 
28 Ibid, p. 75. 
29 Ibid, p. 77. 
30 Judgement of May 19th 1953, "Merits: Obligation to Arbitrate", ICJ Rep. 1953, p. 10. 
31 Ibid, p. 23. 
32 Sec Michael Reisman, Nullity and Revision, Yale University Press, London, 1971, pp. 
462-473, especially, p. 473; Hans Mangoldt, op. cit. pp. 532-533; and Schwebel, op. cit. 
pp. 152-153. 
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that nature could be remedied by constituting a "rump tribunal" or authorising 
such a body to proceed in the absence of a party-appointed arbitrator, is a 
separate question. 
Premised upon the principle that withdrawal of an arbitrator, on the 
initiative or with the approval of his government, that is not authorized by the 
parties or by the tribunal, constitutes an international wrong, Judge Schwebel 
concludes that the withdrawing State cannot be heard to challenge the tribunal's 
right to proceed and render an award. 33 He bases his argument on the doctrine 
that no legal right may spring from a wrong, which is generally recognized in 
international law. 34 The cogency of this principle, he argues, may resolve the 
problem "in favour of the binding character of international awards rendered by 
truncated tribunals". 35 
What follows from the conclusion of Judge Schwebel is that the breach 
of an arbitration treaty obligation in the circumstances in question can be 
remedied by methods not contemplated in the treaty by the parties, be it the 
authority of the truncated tribunal to assume for itself the right to proceed in 
the absence of a party-appointed arbitrator. 
However, it would seem that the idea that a breach of an arbitration 
treaty obligation, in a manner in question, can be remedied by methods not 
contemplated by the parties was rejected by the International Court of Justice 
in the Peace Treaties Case. The Court, while accepting the principle that the 
parties were under an obligation to co-operate in constituting the Commission, 
rejected the question that the Arbitral Commission could be constituted in the 
33 Ibid, pp. 152-153. 
34 Ibid, p. 153. 
35 Ibid. 
269 
absence of the arbitrator of the defaulting party. The wording of the Court is 
clear and unambiguous. 36 The Court said: 
In these circumstances, the appointment of a third 
member by the Secretary-general, instead of bringing about the 
constitution of a three-member commission such as the Treaties 
provided for, would result only in the constitution of a two- 
member Commission. A Commission consisting of two 
members is not the kind of commission for which the Treaties 
have provided. The opposition of the Commissioner of the only 
Party represented could prevent a commission so constituted 
from reaching a decision whatever. Such a commission could 
only decide by unanimity, whereas the dispute clause provides 
that "the decision of the majority of the members of the 
Commission shall be the decision of the Commission and shall 
be accepted by the parties as definitive and binding". Nor would 
the decisions of a Commission of two members, one of whom is 
appointed by one party only, have the same degree of moral 
authority as those of a three-member Commission. In every 
respect, the result would be contrary to the letter as well as the 
spirit of the Treaties. 
In short, the Secretary-general would be authorized to 
proceed to the appointment of a third member only if it were 
possible to constitute a Commission in conformity with the 
provisions of the Treaties. In the present case, the refusal by the 
Governments of Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania to appoint 
their own commissioners has made the constitution of such a 
Commission impossible and has deprived the appointment of 
the third member by the Secretary-General of every purpose. 
As the Court has declared in its Opinion of March 30th 
1950, the Governments of Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania are 
under an obligation to appoint their representatives to the Treaty 
Commission, and it is clear that refusal to fulfil a treaty 
obligation involves international responsibility. Nevertheless, 
such a refusal cannot alter the conditions contemplated in the 
Treaties for the exercise by the Secretary-general of his powers 
of appointment. These conditions are not present in this case, 
and their absence is not made good by the fact that it is due to 
the breach of a treaty obligation. The failure of machinery for 
settling disputes by reason of the practical impossibility of 
36 It is notable that in the course of preparation by the International Law Commission of its 
Draft Convention on Arbitral Procedure, Judge Hudson pointed out that in accordance 
with the Peace Treaties Case the International Court of Justice did not accept the legality 
of a rump tribunal. (YBILC, 1952, Vol 1, p. 35). Judge Schwebel argues that Judge 
Hudson's reading of the Case was in error. (Schwebel, op. cit. p. 161. ) 
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creating the Commission provided for in the Treaties is one 
thing: international responsibility is another. The breach of 
a treaty obligation cannot be remedied by creating a 
Commission which is not the kind of commission 
contemplated by the Treaties. It is the duty of the Court to 
interpret the Treaties, not to revise them. 37 (Emphasis added) 
It is quite clear that the Court has acknowledged the engagement of 
international responsibility of the non-cooperating State. However, it has not 
found it appropriate to reach a conclusion on the basis of the principle that no 
one can profit from his own wrong. In the Opinion of the Court, the creation of 
a two-member commission cannot be said to be an appropriate remedy for the 
breach of obligation by a party in refusing to appoint its own arbitrator. In the 
view of the Court such a remedy would be a revision of the treaty obligation of 
the party concerned, rather than providing an appropriate remedy for it. 
However, there is an internal conflict with the Opinion of the Court in 
this Case. In a passing reference in dictum, apparently in response to the 
arguments raised by the dissenting Judges, the Court distinguished between an 
arbitration commission originally established with a full number of its 
members and later reduced by such circumstances as the withdrawal of one of 
the arbitrators, and an arbitration tribunal not originally constituted. Without 
taking a clear position on the matter, the Court said that "it has been pointed 
out" that such an arbitral tribunal- an arbitral tribunal originally constituted- 
"may make a valid decision". 38 Further, the Court went on to say that this 
situation "presupposes the initial validity of a commission, constituted with the 
will of the parties" and was distinct from the earlier situation where "the initial 
validity of the constitution of the commission" was in doubt. 
39 This dictum of 
the Court's Opinion is in effect giving conflicting signals. Though the Court 
37 ICJ Rep. Peace Treaties Case, Second Phase, 1950,221, pp. 228-229. For a commentary 
on the Peace Treaties Case, see D. H. N. Johnson, "the Constitution of An 
Arbitral 
Tribunal", 30 BYIL, (1953), 152, pp. 160-163. 
38 ICJ Rep, 1950, p. 229. 
39 Ibid. 
271 
made a distinction between the two situations described above, there is no 
reason why the two situations should be treated as distinct and separate. If the 
absence of a national arbitrator prevents a proper constitution of the tribunal by 
reason of the lack of moral authority or by the reason of not being the same 
commission for which the parties have provided, for the same reason the 
withdrawal of a national arbitrator should deprive the tribunal of its legal 
authority. Of course, this reasoning could equally apply vice versa. That is , if 
the withdrawal of a national arbitrator does not deprive a tribunal already 
constituted of its legal authority, for the same reason a national arbitrator's non- 
participation from the beginning may not prevent a two-member tribunal being 
constituted in his absence. 
Professor Carlston has submitted the opinion that the distinction made 
by the Court between the two situations was prompted by the citation to the 
Court of two precedents in which the arbitral tribunals had proceeded in the 
absence of the withdrawing arbitrator. ' Professor Carlston argues that the fact 
that in one of these precedents the two governments did not accept as binding 
the decisions made by the Tribunal lacking in membership of the third member 
and submitted anew to a separate commission, was not brought to the attention 
of the Court. 41 In the view of Professor Carlston, the circumstances of other 
cases brought to the attention of the Court were totally irrelevant. 42 
It is notable that in the Peace Treaties Case two dissenting Judges, Read 
and Azevado, took the view of authorizing a "rump tribunal" to proceed in both 
40 Kenneth Carlston, "Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, 
Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice", 44 AJIL (1950), 728, pp. 732, 
734. We will analyse these precedents in this Chapter. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid. 
Among the precedents cited was the Lena Goldfields Arbitration (5 A. D. p. 426; The 
Times 3 September 1930, p. 7). As noted earlier, in the Lena Goldfields Arbitration the 
arbitration agreement had expressly authorized the Tribunal to proceed if one of the 
arbitrators was withdrawn. The implications of this Case will be analysed below. 
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of the circumstances contemplated in the Opinion of the Court. 43 Their 
reasoning was that effective meaning should be given in interpretation of 
treaties and wrongful conduct should not be put at an advantage-44 These two 
Judges held that the case of absence of a member ab initio and the case of 
absence of a member later, after the establishment of the tribunal, had no 
essential difference between them. 45 Judge Read relied in particular on the 
principle recognized in the Factory at Chorzow Case46, that the defaulting 
government was estopped from alleging its own treaty violation in support of 
its own contention. 47 
Another point which should be borne in mind is that in the Peace 
Treaties Case the Parties' agreement did not make a provision for the third 
Party appointment of national members of the Arbitral Commission, in the 
event of a Party's failure to appoint its own arbitrator. Such a provision was 
only made for the appointment of the neutral member by the Secretary-general 
of the UN, in the event of the neutral member failing to be agreed upon by the 
Parties. Therefore the Court's answer to both of the above-mentioned 
circumstances, especially when it was referring to the situation where a 
tribunal has been truncated after its establishment, presupposes the situation 
that there is no provision for the third-party appointment of a national 
arbitrator. In other words, if the dictum of the Court's Opinion were to be 
interpreted as a positive answer to the authority of an arbitral tribunal 
becoming truncated after its constitution, this should be rationalized because of 
the absence of a provision for the third party appointment of a national 
43 ICJ Rep. 1950, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Read, p. 231; and [bid, Dissenting Opinion of 
Judge Azevado, p. 248. 
44 Ibid, respectively, pp. 241-245; and 251-253. 
45 Ibid, p. 253. 
46 PCIJ Reports, Series A, No. 9, Judgement No: 8, p. 31, (as reported in Hudson 1 World 
Court Reports, 589, p. 610). 
47 ICJ Rep. 1950, Dissenting Opinion Judge Read, p. 244. 
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member. On the other hand, in a situation where a provision has been made for 
the third party appointment of the national arbitrator the facts and the 
circumstances are totally different. This may make the applicability of the 
dictum of the Court's Opinion totally unrelated. That is, where there exists an 
alternative method for the appointment of national/party-appointed arbitrator, 
the arguments relating to the frustration of arbitration and the recourse to the 
rule of effectiveness are irrelevant. 
Indeed, at the time when the Court's Opinion was rendered, according 
to the Court itself a review of arbitration practice showed that few arbitration 
treaties contained express provisions for the third-party appointment of 
national arbitrators to remedy the refusal by a party to appoint its arbitrator. 48 
In other words, most views which have been expressed in support of the 
legality of an incomplete tribunal, including an interpretation which may be 
derived from the dictum of the Opinion of the Court in the Peace Treaties Case, 
have in mind a situation where no alternative method guarantees the 
appointment of the national arbitrator, or filling the vacancy arising from his 
withdrawal. As a consequence, where there exists a mechanism for the 
enforced filling of vacancy arising from the withdrawal of a party-appointed 
arbitrator the circumstances are totally different from those assumed under the 
dictum of the Opinion of the Court in the Peace Treaties Case. The 
circumstances where a system for the enforced filling of vacancies has been 
provided for in the arbitration agreement, or the arbitration rules, in effect 
render most of the views which have been expressed without the consideration 
of this factor somewhat irrelevant. This argument applies equally to the 
interpretation of the precedents existing in this field. 
48 ICJ Rep. 1950, p. 229. 
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M. The Development of the Notion of Third-Party 
Appointment of National/Party-Appointed Arbitrators as an 
Alternative to the Legality of a Rump Tribunal 
In line with a fully judicial conception of international arbitration and in 
order to safeguard the arbitral process against obstructive attempts by a party, 
e. g., withdrawal of a party-appointed arbitrator, two logical solutions come 
automatically to mind: either to provide a provision in the arbitration 
agreement, or rules, authorizing the remaining members of the tribunal to 
function in the absence of a party arbitrator who has been withdrawn; or to 
foresee the possibility in the arbitration agreement of the third-party 
appointment of the party arbitrator, as well as the neutral one, in the event of 
failure to do so by a party. These two solutions, as it is clear, are not 
complementary to one another. They are two alternatives; it is either the first 
one or the second. 
In the course of the historical development of international arbitration, 
in order to transform it into a fully judicial institution these two solutions 
would naturally have occurred to the very many able draftsmen and to the 
Parties of the huge number of arbitration agreements concluded in the course 
of this and the preceding centuries. While the notion of third-party appointment 
of the neutral members and gradually of the national members, appears to have 
gained an evolutionary measure of acceptance, over the same time the idea of 
authorising the arbitral tribunal to function in the absence of a national 
member, except in the extremely few instances already cited, has not been 
taken up with any degree of seriousness. 49 
The first Hague Conference on the Pacific Settlement of International 
Disputes in 1899 was intended to deal with voluntary arbitration only, and this 
49 A series of reviews has been conducted in this respect. See generally, M. Habicht, "Post- 
War Treaties" op. cit. pp. 20 ff..; UN, Systematic Survey, op. cit. pp. 94-108; see also 
Louis B. Sohn, "International Arbitration Today", op. cit. pp. 61-81; and Hans Mangoldt, 
"Arbitration and Conciliation", op. cit. pp. 432-461. 
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attitude was reflected in the Convention of 1899. It was only during the second 
Hague Conference that some aspects of compulsory arbitration were 
discussed. 50 Even so, the process of appointment of arbitrators was left 
primarily to the goodwill of the Parties. The 1899 Hague Convention on the 
Pacific Settlement of Disputes, for instance, offers no guarantee for the 
appointment of party arbitrators. 51 The alternative offered for the appointment 
of umpire, which is an improvement on the 1899 Convention, is not a 
guarantee at all and ultimately depends on the consent of both Parties. 52 
Nevertheless, the changes made under the 1907 Convention regarding the 
composition of the arbitral tribunal were part of developments operating to 
limit the absolute freedom of the parties in international arbitration. 53 
A further step in the direction of judicial arbitration was taken in the 
Geneva General Act for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, 
(1928). 54 Article 23 of this Act, which was retained unchanged in the revision 
of 1949 provided: 
1. If the appointment of the members of the Arbitral Tribunal is 
not made within a period of three months from the date on 
which one of the parties requested the other party to constitute 
an arbitral tribunal, a third power, chosen by agreement between 
the parties, shall be requested to make the necessary 
appointment. 
2. If no agreement is reached on this, each party shall designate 
a different power, and the appointments shall be made in 
concert by the powers thus chosen. 
3. If, within a period of three months, the two powers so chosen 
have been unable to reach an agreement, the necessary 
appointment shall be made by the President of the Permanent 
50 Mangoldt, op. cit. pp. 433-434. 
51 See Article 24 of the 1899 Hague Convention on the Pacific Settlement of Disputes. 
52 See Article 45 of the 1907 Hague Convention on the Pacific Settlement of International 
Disputes. 
53 See J. B. Scott, Proceedings of the Hague Peace Conferences, the Conference 
of 1907, Vol I, p. 416. 
54 93 LNTS, p. 345, as revised in 1949 in 71 UNTS, p. 101. 
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Court of International Justice (the President of the ICJ under the 
revised Act). If the latter is prevented from acting or is a subject 
of one of the parties, the nomination shall be made by the Vice- 
President. If the latter is prevented from acting or is a subject of 
one of the parties, the appointment shall be made by the oldest 
member of the Court who is not a subject of either party. 
It is clear that although this Convention succeeded in establishing a role 
for an independent third-party appointment of the arbitrators by the President 
of the International Court, failing agreement by the parties, this appointment 
can only be made after the exhaustion of two protracted processes, for both of 
which the consent of both parties is necessary. Nevertheless, the Convention 
marks an improvement compared to the Hague Conventions. Professor Sohn 
has noted that similar provisions are contained in some twenty bilateral treaties 
for the pacific settlement of disputes. 55 
It appears from Professor Sohn's study that while some of the treaties 
concluded during the 1920s and 1930s contained explicit provisions that the 
third-party appointment mechanism was to include national arbitrators as well 
as the neutral ones, others were rather vague in this regard. 56 A series of 
bilateral treaties concluded by Iran with Belgium, the Netherlands and 
Switzerland fell within the first category. 57 So did a series of bilateral treaties 
concluded by Germany with Switzerland, Sweden, the Netherlands and 
Denmark. 58 It is necessary to remember that although such provisions 
indicated the emphasis placed on the judicial and compulsory character of the 
arbitration, the idea was not entertained at all that the tribunal could be 
permitted to function in the absence of the defaulting party's arbitrator. 
55 Sohn, "International Arbitration Today", op. cit. p. 64. 
56 Ibid, p. 65. 
57 Iran and Belgium, May 23,1929, Article 5, UN Systematic Survey, op. cit. p. 581; Iran 
and the Netherlands, March 12,1930, Article 3, Ibid, p. 770; and Iran and Switzerland, 
April 25,1934, Article 4, Ibid, pp. 1069-70. 
58 Germany and Switzerland, December 3,1921, Article 8, Habicht, Post-War Treaties, op. 
cit. p. 20; Germany and Sweden, August 29,1924, Article 7, Ibid, p. 456. 
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The significance of the latter point becomes even more apparent when 
it is read in conjunction with the Advisory Opinion of the International Court 
of Justice in the Peace Treaties Case. It was noted here above that the Court 
rejected the authority of the Secretary-General of the UN, designated by the 
Parties as the Appointing Authority, to appoint the third member of the Arbitral 
Commission, for the reasons explained in the Opinion of the Court. There was 
no provision for the third-Party appointment of the national Commissioners, 
and according to the Court "it was intended that the appointment of both 
national Commissioners should precede that of the third member". 59 The 
Court's Opinion alerted the arbitration agreements concluded afterwards to the 
wisdom of providing more adequate mechanisms against non-appointment or 
withdrawal of party arbitrators. Indeed, there appear to have been some steps 
taken in this direction, but again no question of authorization of the arbitral 
tribunal to function in the absence of a party arbitrator has been entertained in 
any of these agreements concluded after the Opinion of the Court in the Peace 
Treaties Case. The effect of the Opinion of the Court in the Peace Treaties 
Case has, however, been to cause more treaties to include provisions for the 
third-party appointment of national members of the arbitral tribunal. For 
instance, Article 21 of the European Convention for the Pacific settlement of 
International Disputes60 is intended to cover such as circumstance as the 
absence of a party arbitrator. It is notable that although Article 21 of this 
Convention shortens the delays in the procedure for the appointment of the 
arbitrators for the purpose of eventual appointment by the President or Vice- 
President of the ICJ, no significant improvement is evident, compared to 
Article 23 of the Geneva General Act. 
59 ICJ Rep. 1950,221, p. 227. 
60 320 UNTS, p. 243. 
278 
A phenomenon of highest significance in this respect is the work of the 
International Law Commission conducted during the greater part of the 1950s. 
The work of the ILC sheds light not only on the theoretical aspects of the 
problem but also in some measure on the practice of States. We will examine 
this issue in some detail. In so doing we will try to demonstrate the relationship 
between the notion of third-party appointment of national members and the 
question of the authority of rump tribunals to function in the absence of a 
party-appointed arbitrator. One of the aims behind this analysis will be to 
demonstrate that the notion of third-party appointment mechanism and the idea 
of permitting an incomplete tribunal are not co-existent. They are, rather, two 
different alternatives. That is, either of them may be adopted for securing the 
integrity and functioning of the arbitral process, and there is no rationale 
whatever for having both of these mechanisms at the same time. Further, it will 
be attempted to demonstrate which of the above options was regarded by the 
ILC and by States as an acceptable system for securing the integrity of the 
arbitral process. 
HI(1). Codification of International Arbitral Procedure by the 
International Law Commission 
The codification of international arbitral procedure was among the three 
topics which were given priority by the International Law Commission at its 
First Session in 1949.61 At the same session Professor George Scelle was 
elected Special Rapporteur on the arbitral procedure and was asked to prepare 
a working paper for submission to the Commission at its Second Session. 62 
Interestingly, in a mandate summed up by the Chairman of the Commission, 
Professor Scelle was asked in particular to conduct a thorough study in regard 
61 See generally Report of the ILC Covering its First Session, in Yearbook of the ILC, 1949, 
277, p. 281. 
62 Ibid. 
279 
to the question of legality of incomplete tribunals. The mandate of Professor 
Scelle read: 
... [a] question which had already arisen several times, in the Case of Hungarian Optants, for example, as also before a 
Franco-Mexican Claims Commission and a German-American 
Claims Commission : namely, what were the powers of a 
commission made up of two members representing the two 
powers concerned and one arbitrator, after the representative of 
one of the powers had withdrawn? 63 
At the Second Session in 1950, Professor Scelle submitted a draft 
proposal on arbitral procedure to the International Law Commission. On the 
question of the right of "rump tribunals" to function, Professor Scelle was of 
the view that the withdrawal by an arbitrator, spontaneously or on the orders of 
his government were both inadmissible and should this occur the remaining 
members were authorized to proceed. He gave the following analysis: 
Spontaneous withdrawal is inadmissible. The arbitrator 
was not bound to accept the task entrusted to him; but he can no 
more give up his functions... 
The withdrawal by a Government of a so-called national 
arbitrator is still less admissible, since the investiture of the 
arbitrator is not the act of his Governments, but of the parties to 
the dispute. It is a well-established principle in public law that a 
judicial act cannot be revoked or modified except by persons 
who were competent to perform in accordance with the 
procedure by which it was originally carried out.... We shall 
therefore accept as an obligatory rule of a procedural code that 
the withdrawal of an arbitrator cannot prevent the tribunal from 
acting nor from rendering a binding award whenever it is 
materially able to do so. 
... To withdraw a national judge is a breach of the obligation 
implicitly but necessarily assumed under the agreement to 
submit the dispute to a judicial settlement. Full approval should 
therefore be given to the decision taken by presidents of mixed 
arbitral tribunals or commissions in such cases not to interrupt 
the procedure before the diminished tribunal. Thus the Franco- 
Mexican Commission, under the chairmanship of Professor 
63 General Directives on the Drafting of Reports, Ibid, p. 237. 
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Verzyil, pronounced twenty-three awards in the absence of the 
Mexican Commissioner... 
... A national arbitrator may not withdraw or be withdrawn by 
the Government that appointed him. Should this occur, the 
tribunal is authorized to continue the proceedings and to render 
64 an award which shall be binding... 
Professor Scelle's proposal aroused some controversy within the 
International Law Commission. Some members of the Commission accepted 
the same line as Professor Scelle's, while others expressed the opinion that the 
withdrawal of an arbitrator should be permissible. 65 What is most significant to 
note, however, is that there was unanimity among all the members of the 
Commission, including Professor Scelle himself, that the latter's proposal was 
not declaratory or codificatory of the existing law; it went clearly beyond that. 
This point was raised by Judge Hudson and was accepted by Professor Scelle. 
Referring to the instances he could recall66, Judge Hudson implied that they 
did not constitute convincing evidence that such a principle existed in the 
law. 67 Moreover, Judge Hudson maintained that in his view the principle 
authorizing a "rump tribunal" to function did not "actually exist in the current 
law". 68 Therefore, he suggested that since the principle did not exist in the law, 
he preferred to see the question of replacement of an arbitrator who withdrew 
or was withdrawn, stipulated in the compromis or the treaty between the parties 
as one which should be settled by agreement between the parties. 69 However, 
64 U. N. Doc. A/CN. 4/18, pp. 32-35; See also M. Whiteman, Digest of International 
Law, Department of State Publication, 1971, Vol 12, p. 1071. Substantial parts of the 
ILC's discussions on arbitral procedure are also quoted in Schwebel, op. cit. pp. 154-175. 
65 See generally, Yearbook of the ILC, 1950, Vol I, pp. 268-273. 
66 Ibid, p. 270. Judge Hudson referred to the following Cases: Lena Goldfields Co Ltd v 
USSR Arbitration Award; The Mexican Claims Commission Cases; the Black Tom 
Explosion Case; and the Hungarian Optants Case. (Ibid, p. 270) For references see Ibid. 
67 YBILC, 1950, Vol I, p. 270. 
68 Ibid. 
69 Ibid. 
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Judge Hudson was prepared to accept that the law should be in conformity with 
the principle proposed by the Rapporteur. 70 
Interestingly, in response to Judge Hudson's contention, Professor 
Scelle accepted that: 
What he was advocating was not a universally recognized 
principle of international law. But there were precedents. He 
accepted Mr Hudson's notion, provided the question of 
replacement of an arbitrator were stipulated in the compromis. 
But he could not accept it if it were not laid down in the 
compromis. His concern was to establish a principle. He would 
like to go further than the existing law, since he considered that 
the Commission was not called upon merely to record the 
positive law on the subject. 71 
There were other objections raised against Mr Scelle's proposal. For 
instance, Mr Francois pointed out: 
Mr Scelle had stated that once the undertaking to arbitrate had 
been accepted by the parties, the latter could not evade the 
obligation to arbitrate. But the point was, what was the 
undertaking that the parties had accepted? The undertaking was 
to have recourse to arbitration- namely, to a procedure for the 
settlement of disputes which left the parties a certain amount of 
latitude either to agree or to decline to submit any particular 
issue to arbitration. 
That latitude allowed to States was what distinguished 
arbitration from judicial proceedings. The 1899 Hague 
Convention had been very rough and ready. It had been revised 
in 1907 with the object of perfecting it. Mr Scelle wanted still 
more; he wanted absolute perfection, but he also regarded it 
with apprehension. A scheme as perfect as the one Mr Scelle 
proposed establishing ran the risk of remaining a dead letter... 
Theoretically, Mr Scelle's point of view was entirely justified, 
but in practice it might prove risky. Hence, he wished Mr Scelle 
had been less ambitious, and he hoped he would be prepared to 
review the proposals he had put before the Commission, and to 
return a year hence with a text which might be more easily 
accepted by the various States. 72 
70 Ibid. 
71 Ibid. 
72 Ibid, p. 27 1. 
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As a consequence of the debates in the ILC, Mr Scelle was asked to draft his 
proposal less categorically, so that the Commission would be able to reach 
agreement on it the following year. 73 
Accordingly, Professor Scelle submitted a second report, the second 
preliminary draft, to the Third Session of the ILC in 1951. Infact, the 
discussion over Professor Scelle's proposal took place in 1952 at the Fourth 
Session of the ILC. 74 At this Fourth Session the second preliminary draft was 
discussed. Article 9 of the second preliminary draft, which had kept the idea of 
legality of incomplete tribunals intact, provided: 
9. An arbitrator may not withdraw or be withdrawn by the 
Government which has appointed him, save in exceptional cases 
and with the consent of the other members of the tribunal. 
Should the withdrawal take place without the consent of the 
constituted tribunal, the latter shall be authorized to continue the 
proceedings and to render its award. 
If the withdrawal prevents the continuation of the proceedings, 
the tribunal may require that the absent arbitrator be replaced 
and, if the procedure employed for his appointment fails, may 
request the President of the International Court of Justice to 
replace him. 75 
There were a number of jurists opposed to the above proposal, 
including Mr Francois and Mr Kozhevnikov. 76 Mr Hudson and Mr Zourek also 
doubted the competence of an incomplete tribunal, contending that a tribunal 
from which an arbitrator was absent could not be regarded as legally 
constituted. 77 
73 Ibid. 
74 YBILC, 1952, Vol 1, pp. 28-38. 
75 Ibid, p. 28. 
76 Ibid, pp. 22-23; sec also generally, pp. 28-38. 
77 Ibid, p. 35. 
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At the end of the debate, however, a revised version of Article 9 of the 
second preliminary draft was tentatively adopted by the Commission. The 
revised version provided: 
1. Once the hearing has begun, an arbitrator may not withdraw 
or be withdrawn by the Government which has appointed him, 
save in exceptional cases and with the consent of the tribunal. 
2. If, for any reason such as previous cognizance of the case, a 
member of the tribunal considers that he cannot take part in the 
proceedings, or if any doubt arises in this connexion within the 
tribunal, it may decide, on the unanimous vote of the other 
members, to require his replacement. 
3. Should the withdrawal take place, the remaining members, 
upon the request of one of the parties, shall have the power to 
continue the proceedings and render the award. 78 
The most important phase in the work of the ILC on arbitral procedure 
is, however, the Fifth Session of the Commission, which marks a turning point 
with regard to the work of the Commission in relation to the legality of 
incomplete tribunals. It is notable that after the tentative adoption of a "draft on 
arbitral procedure" in its Fourth Session, the Commission decided to transmit 
the draft to governments with the request that they should submit their 
comments. The Commission also decided to draw up, during its Fifth Session 
in 1953, a final draft for submission to the General Assembly. 
The written comments made by governments prompted the 
Commission to rethink its proposal and to introduce substantial changes in the 
draft accordingly. 79 By the introduction of these changes the notion of 
authorizing a "rump tribunal" to function was totally abandoned in the 
Commission's final Draft. 8° There is no need to examine the views expressed 
by governments; 81 the fact that the ILC had to alter fully its earlier position 
78 Ibid, p. 38. 
79 Report of the ILC Covering the Work of Its Fifth Session, in YBILC, 1953, Vol II, 200, p. 
204. 
80 Ibid. 
81 See generally, Ibid, pp. 232-241. 
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and to introduce substantial changes demonstrating the weight of the reaction 
of governments to the Commission's initiatives. 
What is most significant is that in the final draft adopted in 1953 the 
notion of authorizing an incomplete, or diminished, tribunal to function was 
totally abandoned within the Commission. Furthermore, in line with the 
"judicial arbitration" approach an alternative solution was suggested, namely, 
filling the vacancy arising from the withdrawal of an arbitrator by the same 
method as that laid down for the original appointment, including the possibility 
of the appointment by a third authority, the President of the International Court 
of Justice. 82 Even Professor Scelle came to admit that the Commission had a 
choice of either allowing the tribunal to function in the absence of one or more 
of its members, or stipulating that any vacancy must be filled by a third 
authority in the final eventuality. 83 It was the second alternative which was 
adopted by the Commission, to the exclusion of the idea of allowing the 
remaining members of the tribunal to function. 
The logic of the exclusionary nature of these two alternatives with 
regard to each other was clearly pointed out by Professor Lauterpacht, the 
Chairman, in concluding the meeting. He stated that: 
... although truncated tribunals 
had been known since the end of 
the eighteenth century, the reason why they had functioned as 
such was because no provision for the replacement of an 
arbitrator had existed. The purpose of the present draft was to 
make provisions for replacement, and to ensure that a tribunal 
should always function with a quorum. 84 
A similar line of reasoning was adopted in the Report of the 
Commission concerning its Fifth Session, which was submitted with the final 
draft to the General Assembly. We will quote the relevant paragraphs of the 
Report at some length in order to demonstrate the exclusionary nature of the 
82 Ibid, p. 204. 
83 YBILC, 1953, Vol I, p. 20. 
84 Ibid, p. 52. 
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two alternatives - the authority to function and the enforced replacement of 
arbitrator, with regard to each other. The Report said: 
32... At the same time, the draft makes provision against the 
work of the tribunal being frustrated by the withdrawal of an 
arbitrator for reasons not approved by the tribunal. In such 
cases, it is laid down, the vacancy shall be filled in the manner 
prescribed for the cases in which the parties have been unable to 
agree on the appointment of arbitrators. Thus, although illicit 
withdrawal on the part of an arbitrator may cause some delay in 
the proceedings, it can no longer bring them permanently to a 
standstill. 
33. For the latter reason it has been found unnecessary, unlike in 
article 7, paragraph 3, of the previous draft, to lay down that in 
the case of the withdrawal of an arbitrator the remaining 
members of the tribunal shall have the power to continue the 
proceedings and render an award. Such a procedure would 
hardly be warranted in cases in which the withdrawal takes 
place with the consent of the tribunal. However, even in cases in 
which an arbitrator has withdrawn in face of the refusal by the 
tribunal to allow him to do so, the Commission is of the opinion 
that the sanction as previously proposed was both too drastic 
and unnecessary. (Emphasis added) Undoubtedly, cases have 
occurred in the past in which the tribunal, after a national 
arbitrator has withdrawn, continued with its work and rendered 
an award. This was probably unavoidable seeing no 
machinery was at the time in existence for filling the 
vacancy created by the illicit withdrawal of an arbitrator. 
Once such machinery is created as is the case in the present 
draft - there is no longer any reason for an incomplete 
tribunal to proceed with the case. 85 (Emphasis added) 
As a consequence, the relevant Article in the ILC's Draft Convention on 
Arbitral Procedure of 1953 contains no provision whatever authorizing an 
incomplete tribunal to function. As an alternative solution, therefore, provision 
has been made for filling the vacancy created by the illicit withdrawal of an 
arbitrator. Article 7(2) of the Draft reads: 
Should the withdrawal take place without the consent of the 
tribunal, the resulting vacancy shall be filled, at the request of 
the tribunal in the manner provided for in paragraph 2 of article 
3. 
85 YBILC, 1953, Vol II, p. 204. 
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It is notable that paragraph 2 of Article 3 provides for the appointment by the 
President of the ICJ, should a party fail to appoint its arbitrator. 
Again, it is crystal clear that the idea of power of an incomplete tribunal 
to function was fully rejected by the ILC in the final draft and instead an 
alternative solution was adopted. The rationale behind the adoption of this 
solution is that while it is against frustration of arbitration, it keeps the tripartite 
structure and the equilibrium in the composition of the tribunal intact, in line 
with the special characteristics of international arbitration. Indeed, having born 
the above facts and circumstances in mind any other conclusion derived from 
the experience of the ILC on arbitral procedure can hardly be convincing. One 
such conclusion is the opinion expressed by Judge Schwebel in his recent 
treatise on the issue in question. After a careful examination of the work of the 
ILC on arbitral procedure, Judge Schwebe! has expressed a view which can 
hardly be accepted by the present writer, especially in relation to what can be 
inferred from the experience of the ILC. Judge Schwebe!, concluding on the 
basis of the work of the ILC, writes: 
... The 
better view of the law is that truncated tribunals do have 
the power to proceed and to render valid awards. That the 
International Law Commission itself oscillated, and adopted an 
alternative solution for withdrawal, i. e. enforced replacement, 
does not derogate from this conclusion. Nor is that conclusion 
destroyed by the possibility, perhaps probability, that, if 
formulated as a draft rule of international law on which all 
States were invited to vote, a majority might reject the authority 
of a truncated arbitral tribunal to act. 86 
The main problem with Judge Schwebel's conclusion derived from the 
work of the International Law Commission is that in the final analysis it turns 
out to rely on exclusively theoretical grounds and not on what can logically be 
deducted from the work of the ILC. It further disregards State practice and the 
circumstances which led to the failure of the idea of legality of an incomplete 
86 Schwcbcl, op. cit. p. 177. 
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tribunal, proposed during the work of the ILC on arbitral procedure, to 
crystallize into a rule of law. Judge Schwebel appears to take no account of the 
fact of States' practice, and by extension, their disapproval of the notion in 
question throughout the history of arbitration. In our view, it is one thing to 
make a case for the theoretical or logical validity and viability of a principle. It 
is another to make a case for its viability as an established rule of law. Given 
the undisputed fact, unanimously acknowledged by the ILC, that the notion of 
authorizing a truncated tribunal to function did not form part of the existing 
law when it was proposed to the International Law Commission, and the fact 
that it failed the very first test of being transformed into a legal rule, it is not 
clear how and at which point of time the notion entered into the body of 
international law, let alone the unsoundness of arguing that it represents the 
better view of the law. 
The second problem, which is an argument entirely within the judicial 
conception of international arbitration, is how to reconcile the notion of 
legality of an incomplete tribunal with the alternative solution of enforced 
replacement of the withdrawing arbitrator. It was noted earlier that, as 
acknowledged by the International Law Commission, with the adoption of the 
enforced replacement mechanism there was no logical-legal basis whatever for 
an incomplete tribunal to function in the absence of one of its members. 
Indeed, as the Report of the International Law Commission shows, the Cases 
which could be interpreted as being supportive of the legality of an incomplete 
tribunal have taken place out of necessity and in a context where no machinery 
was at the time in existence for preventing the frustration of the arbitration. 
The acceptance of the legality of an incomplete tribunal in the 
circumstances where a provision exists for the enforced replacement of an 
arbitrator, leads to conflicting results. That is to say, this exclusionary nature of 
the two alternative solutions in question vis-a-vis each other is not only evident 
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in the historical evolution of the concept of enforced replacement, including in 
the work of the ILC, but is also inherent in their nature, their rationale and the 
purpose for which they are designed. In other words, the existence of a 
machinery for filling the vacancy created by the illicit withdrawal of an 
arbitrator clearly indicates that the parties have excluded the other option, 
namely that of authorizing an incomplete tribunal to proceed. Therefore the 
support under such circumstances of the authority of an incomplete tribunal to 
function would clearly lead to a violation of the agreement of the parties and a 
revision of their original intention as to the method by which they wished to 
prepare a remedy against an illicit withdrawal. 
With the rejection of the idea of the power of an incomplete tribunal to 
function within the ILC, there may be no need to go beyond the events after the 
submission of the Report of the ILC to the General Assembly. However, since 
the ILC's Draft Convention contained certain other initiatives representing the 
progressive development of international arbitral procedure based on the 
judicial conception of arbitration, a brief glance at the outcome of the work of 
the ILC in the General Assembly is useful in order to shed light on the attitude 
of States towards the change in the traditional conception of arbitration. 
First of all, as a result of opposition by many States which regarded the 
International Law Commission's approach as a departure from the traditional 
conception of party autonomy arbitration, the II, C's Draft failed to be adopted 
as a multilateral convention. The Draft was discussed in the Sixth Committee 
of the General Assembly at its 8th Session. The discussion centred mainly on 
the Commission's departure from international practice and from the traditional 
concept of international arbitration. 87 
87 See Resolution 797 (VIII), 7 December 1953, UN Resolutions, Vol 4, p. 223. Details of 
discussions are beyond the scope of our study here. For a review of the views expressed 
see a summary review in L. B. Sohn, "International Arbitration Today", op. cit. pp. 
69-77; 
Hazel Fox, "Arbitration", op. cit. pp. 106-108; and for a final analysis of the reaction of 
States see Report by George Scelle, Special Rapporteur, to the ILC, 24 April 1957, 
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The discussion of the ILCs Draft was renewed at the Tenth Session of 
the General Assembly, taking into account comments received from 
Governments in the interval. After a considerable discussion of the question as 
to what extent the draft departed from international practice, the matter was 
referred back to the ILC for further study. 88 
As a result of opposition from a considerable number of States, the ILC 
abandoned the goal of a multilateral convention on arbitral procedure. 
Alternatively, the ILC, after modifying the Draft and in some respects adopting 
a compromise approach between the two - judicial and diplomatic - 
conceptions of arbitration89, decided to submit the rules as "Model Rules" to 
the General Assembly. 90 
YBILC, 1957, Vol H, pp. 1-12. Interestingly, the Report by Professor Scelle indicates 
some anger at the reaction of many Third World countries in rejecting the ILC's proposal 
which primarily included his proposals. Professor George Scelle, whose insistence on his 
proposals had carried a slight majority of the ILC with him, thus enabling the ILC to adopt 
his proposal (Ibid, p. 2), made the following remark in his Report: 
"While recording these facts very objectively, the 
Special Rapporteur is somewhat relieved to note from the 
comments on the 1953 draft that several Governments of States 
with a long democratic tradition and a constant concern for 
judicial correctitude were, with certain minor reservations, 
favourably disposed to the adoption of [the Draft] in both its 
letter and spirit... " (Ibid. ) 
Professor Scelle further remarked: 
"Indeed, the fact that international organization is now 
passing through a period of transition and the contradictory 
social and constitutional conceptions of the various groups of 
States- among them those which have most recently attained to 
major international competence, i. e. full sovereignty- should 
warn against harbouring disappointing illusions. " (Ibid, p. 11. ) 
See also Report by George Scelle to the ILC, 6 March 1958, YBILC, 1958, Vol II, p. 2, 
paragraph 2. 
88 General Assembly Resolution 989 (X), December 1955, G. A. O. R., 10th Session, Suppl. 
No. 19 (A/1316), pp. 46-47; also quoted in Report by George Scelle of April 1957, 
YBILC, 1957, Vol II, p. 2. 
89 Report by George Scelle, YBILC, 1957, Vol II, p. 7. 
90 Ibid, p. 11 and Report of the ILC to the General Assembly concerning the work of its 9th 
Session, Ibid, pp. 143-144. 
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In the General Assembly the Model Rules which the Commission 
intended to be looked at as "a guide, not as a straitjacket"91, were subject to 
further debate and opposition by some States which favoured the traditional 
concept of arbitration. 92 As a consequence, the General Assembly by adopting 
a resolution merely took note of the ILC's Model Rules on Arbitral Procedure 
and decided to bring them to the attention of member States for their 
consideration and use. 93 It is notable that the Model Rules have not as yet been 
adopted in a single case. 
This summary of evolution of the work of the ILC further demonstrates 
the extent to which many States regard international arbitration as an institution 
distinct from compulsory forms of judicial settlement, and the extent to which 
its peculiar features are the source of acceptance by them. 
It is, however, possible to make an argument in favour of the 
advancement of the judicial conception of arbitration on the basis of the work 
of the ILC and its surrounding circumstances, particularly in regard to the 
theory of non-frustration as it relates to the notion of enforced filling of 
vacancies. Indeed, a survey by Professor Sohn demonstrates that most States of 
the world have actually accepted provisions for the third-party appointment of 
arbitrators on at least one occasion in bilateral agreements concluded between 
them. 94 
What is, however, important to note is that even an argument based on 
the judicial conception of arbitration also negates the theory which favours 
allowing an incomplete tribunal to function. This is because the developing 
trends in the judicial conception of arbitration have generally opted for the idea 
91 Report of the ILC covering the work of its 10th Session, (1958), YBILC, 1958, Vol II, p. 
82, Paragraph 18. 
92 G. A. O. R., 13th Session, Sixth Committee, pp. 27 ff; see also L. B. Sohn, op. Cit. pp. 75-76. 
93 Resolution 1262 (XIII), November 14,1958, G. A. O. R., 13 Session, Suppl No. 18 
(A/4090), p. 53; also in UN Resolutions, Vol 7, p. 147. 
94 L. B. Sohn, "International Arbitration Today", op. Cit. pp. 77-78. 
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of enforced filling of vacancies. The implications are that: first, in none of 
these many circumstances have States actually accepted or contemplated the 
notion of permitting an incomplete tribunal to function; second, by adopting an 
alternative method, the automatic or enforced filling of vacancies, they have 
implicitly but necessarily rejected the possibility that the Tribunal could 
function in the absence of one of its members. 
In view of these circumstances, the views expressed in support of the 
authority of an incomplete tribunal are not totally convincing. 95 In other words, 
given the fact that the notion of enforced filling of vacancies has itself been 
developed in the context of the judicial concept of arbitration, and the inherent 
exclusionary nature of this system vis-a-vis the idea of legality of an 
incomplete tribunal, even the judicial conception of arbitration declines to 
favour the latter view. That is to say, although an illicit withdrawal of a party- 
appointed arbitrator on the instructions of his government is a wrongful act, the 
nature and the kind of procedural remedy against that wrong has been 
restricted by the parties to only enforced filling of vacancies. The importance 
of this argument can be appreciated if it is noticed that the resort to the judicial 
safeguard of enforced filling of vacancies lies in the wish of the parties to keep 
the special equilibrium in the structure of arbitration tribunals untouched; a 
result which cannot be achieved by the notion of authorizing an incomplete 
tribunal to function. 
111(2). The Concept of Enforced Replacement in International Commercial 
Arbitration 
A review of major arbitration rules frequently referred to in the field of 
international commerce also reveals a general endorsement of the method of 
enforced filling of vacancies, and by implication, the exclusion of the power of 
an incomplete tribunal. Article 2(11) of the ICC Rules of Arbitration of 1988, 
95 Sec Schwebe!, op. Cit. P. 167. 
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for instance, provides for the replacement of an arbitrator by the ICC Court of 
Arbitration if he is "prevented de jure or de facto from fulfilling his functions, 
or that he is not fulfilling his functions in accordance with the Rules or within 
the prescribed time-limit". In fact, the ICC Court of Arbitration regularly 
applies its general powers of appointment when a party refuses to nominate its 
arbitrator96 or when a replacement becomes necessary. 
Provisions for the enforced filling of vacancies arising from an 
arbitrator's inability to fulfil his functions are also foreseen under the Rules of 
the LCIA. 97 The Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Commercial 
Arbitration have also incorporated the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules and make 
the same provisions for the replacement of the arbitrator as those under Article 
13(2) of the latter Rules. That is the case where arbitrations are conducted 
under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules by the American Arbitration 
Association. 98 
The most elaborate provisions regarding the problem in question are 
contained in Article 56(3) of the ICSID and particularly in Rules 8(2) and 
11(2)-(a) of the Rules of Procedure of the ICSID for Arbitration Proceedings 
under the ICSID Convention. Interestingly, these regulations provide not only 
for the filling of vacancies, but also for the authority of the Chairman of the 
Administrative Council to appoint a substitute directly, in the circumstances 
96 E. g., see Islamic Republic of Iran v Cementation International Ltd, Cour de Justice Civile, 
Geneva, December 21,1983, Appeal for nullity of arbitral award for lack of jurisdiction 
and arbitrariness of appointment conducted under the ICC auspices; in W. Laurence Craig, 
and others, "International Commercial Arbitration", Loose Leaf, 12A, issued November 
1986, Oceana Publications Inc, London pp. 60-63. 
97 Article 3(6) of the LCIA Rules of 1985. 
It is notable that Article 16(2) of the LCIA Rules provides that "if an arbitrator refuses 
or fails to comply with the mandatory provisions of any applicable law relating to the 
making of the award, having been given reasonable opportunity to do so, the remaining 
arbitrators shall proceed in his absence". This provision is included in the 
Section 
concerning the award and apparently refers to the failure of an arbitrator to comply with 
the provisions referred to in that Article after the hearing and in the course of making of 
the award. 
98 American Arbitration Association, Procedure for Cases Under the UNCITRAI Arbitration 
Rules; published by the AAA. 
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where the resignation of a party-appointed arbitrator is not acceptable to the 
tribunal. 99 As a result, in the latter case the vacancy is not filled by the original 
method of appointment, which is appointment by the relevant party in the first 
instance, and if this party fails to appoint, by the Chairman of the 
Administrative Council. However, in circumstances where the resignation is 
not acceptable to the tribunal, the appointment is made directly by the 
Chairman of the Administrative Council. This provision is intended to lessen 
the possibility of a malicious resignation. Furthermore, with the direct 
appointment of a substitute by the Chairman the possibility of repeated 
withdrawals and appointments of party-appointed arbitrators is removed. In 
fact, this provision of the ICSID Rules provides a clear safeguard against the 
abuse of enforced replacement mechanism, and can be used in the future 
structuring of arbitral instruments. 
The ICSID Arbitration Rules also require that "upon the notification by 
the Secretary-General of a vacancy on the Tribunal, the proceedings shall be or 
remain suspended until the vacancy has been filled. 100 
Most important of all is the position of the UNCITRAL Arbitration 
Rules because of their adoption as the Rules of Procedure of the Iran-United 
States Claims Tribunal. The drafting history of the UNCITRAL Rules gives no 
indication that the drafters gave any contemplation to the idea of authorizing an 
incomplete tribunal to function. Indeed, the Commentary on the relevant 
provisions of the draft UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, appended to the report 
of the Secretary-General101, supports this assumption. This Commentary 
clearly indicates that the relevant provisions governing the replacement of 
99 Article 56(3) of the ICSID Convention and Rule 11(2)-(a) of the ICSID Rules of 
Procedure for Arbitration (Text of the Rules in Wetter, op. cit. Vol 4, p. 469). 
100 Rule 10(2) of the ICSID Arbitration Rules. 
101 See "Report of the Secretary General: Revised draft set of UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules: 
Commentary on the Draft UNCITRAL Rules", (A/CN. 9/112/Add. l), 12 December 1975, 
7 YB. UNCITRAL, 1976, pp. 166-181. 
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arbitrators are applicable, among other grounds, to the situation where an 
arbitrator is unwilling to perform his functions. 102 This express reference by 
the Commentary leaves no doubt that under the UNCITRAL Rules the only 
remedy against the withdrawal of a party arbitrator is the enforced replacement 
mechanism. 
The UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration 
which was finally adopted in 1985 - when the events in the Iran-US Claims 
Tribunal mentioned in Section A of this Chapter had been brought publicly to 
the attention of international lawyers - follows the same pattern of enforced 
filling of vacancies regardless of their cause and nature. 103 The wording of 
Article 15 of the Model Law, referring to the "withdrawal from office for any 
other reason", apparently covers the situations such as obstructive withdrawal, 
since other justifiable circumstances of failure by an arbitrator to act are clearly 
mentioned under Article 14 of the Model Law. 
It is notable that according to a survey by Dr Gillis Wetter on major 
national arbitration laws, the presence of all arbitrators is necessary during the 
hearing under the laws of the State of New York, England, Switzerland and 
104 It must however, be noted that Article 660 of the Iranian Code of 
Civil Procedure of 1972 requires that: 
Where one of the arbitrators after he has been informed, does 
not appear in the session held for proceedings or consultations, 
or he appears but refuses to give award, the award given by the 
majority of votes shall be valid even if unanimity of votes has 
been a condition in the agreement for arbitration. Non- 
appearance or refusal of an arbitrator to give an award or to sign 
the same shall be recorded in the Award. 
Generally speaking, despite the exceptions mentioned above, the 
remedy against the withdrawal of arbitrators in private law arbitration also 
102 Ibid, p. 171. See also the Working Paper prepared by the Secretariat on the UNCITRAL 
Rules, (A/CN. 9/113), Ibic1,181, p. 185. 
103 UNCITRAL Model Law, Articles 14 and 15. 
104 Wetter, op. cit. Vol II, p. 457. 
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appears to be the enforced filling of vacancy, rather than authorizing the 
remaining members of the tribunal to proceed. 
In conclusion to this sub-section it must be said that in our view, where 
there is a provision for the enforced replacement of all arbitrators, including the 
party arbitrator, the need to apply the doctrine of non-frustration, for 
authorising the remaining members to proceed does not necessarily arise. The 
reason is that with enforced replacement there is possible delay, but no cause 
for the permanent frustration of the arbitration. 
In fact, in answering the above question one may also need to 
distinguish between two circumstances. First, where the agreement of the 
parties does not provide for the enforced replacement mechanism in the event 
of the withdrawal by an arbitrator. In that case, the doctrine of non-frustration 
of arbitration may be relevant, despite the fact that the absence of a provision 
for replacement in the arbitration agreement may represent a traditional and 
diplomatic approach to the arbitration in question. In other words, the conflict 
between the diplomatic conception of arbitration and the theory of non- 
frustration, which is based on the judicial conception of arbitration, should be 
resolved in favour of the latter. 
The second situation is where the agreement of the parties provides for 
an enforced replacement mechanism as a safeguard against the frustration of 
arbitration in the event of withdrawal by an arbitrator. With this safeguard, the 
withdrawal by an arbitrator should not necessarily lead to frustration of 
arbitration. As a result, the application of the doctrine of non-frustration of 
arbitration as an argument for authorizing the remaining members to proceed 
becomes irrelevant, since the withdrawing arbitrator can be substituted by a 
third party in the final eventuality. Furthermore, while in the first situation 
there may be no clear evidence that the parties have excluded the possibility of 
an incomplete tribunal functioning, in the second situation the existence of the 
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enforced replacement mechanism implies that the parties have necessarily 
excluded the possibility of an incomplete tribunal functioning. 
Another point which needs attention is whether the multi-case structure 
of the arbitration, such as the Iran-US Claims Tribunal, is in itself strong 
enough reason to deviate from the parties' agreement providing for the 
enforced replacement mechanism and to authorize an incomplete tribunal to 
function in such circumstances. It has been argued that "provisions for third- 
party appointment of a substitute arbitrator may not be sufficient to meet the 
situation of a claims tribunal hearing a multiplicity of claims in which 
arbitrators appointed by one of parties repeatedly withdraw at critical stages of 
the proceedings", since such withdrawals may result in undue and unacceptable 
delay. 105 Although this argument cannot be taken lightly, there are still serious 
doubts as to whether it can in theoretical terms be considered as any different 
from the case of ad hoc single-case tribunals and thus justify the legality of an 
incomplete tribunal. 
IV. Precedents 
There is a considerable body of instances which can be utilized for 
studying the problem in question. These Cases have generally been noticed in 
the context of the problem of frustration of arbitration-106 What is significant 
to note is that the relevance and value of many of these Cases may be subject 
to differing interpretations. It follows that a straightforward review of them 
without a set of criteria against which they can be assessed, may not produce 
105 Schwebel, op. Cit. P. 145. It is notable that the remaining members of the Chambers 
involved in the Cases discussed in Section A of this Chapter have also implicitly relied on 
the continuing function of the Tribunal as an argument to proceed in the absence of the 
Iranian member of the Chamber. 
106 E. g., see Schwebel, op. cit. p. 180 ff; Carlston, the Process of International Arbitration, op. 
cit. pp. 42-51; and Reisman, Nullity and Revision, op. cit. pp. 316-369. 
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the desirable result. The criteria which can be established in this regard may be 
summarized as follows: 
1. Unlike the normal circumstances of a Case interpretation in which 
the opinion of a judicial body constitutes the primary source of interpretation, 
such an approach may not be the only method, not even the principal method, 
for an optimum analysis in this case. This is because in the present situation it 
is not only the very propriety of the action or inaction by the remaining 
members of an arbitral tribunal which is the subject of the analysis, but also the 
extent to which that action or inaction reflects a body of principles acceptable 
as law. In such circumstances the views expressed by a truncated tribunal in 
support or rejection of its authority may primarily be of theoretical value, 
contributing to the theoretical aspect of the argument. It is the attitude of the 
arbitrating parties towards the problem in a given Case which should, in 
addition to the view of the remaining members of an incomplete tribunal, be 
taken into account as reflecting State practice. This is due to the special 
characteristics of international arbitration as being created by the will of the 
parties. This is not to minimize the role of the Case law on the issue; rather, to 
point out the interrelation between a given relevant judicial precedent and its 
acceptability by the parties involved. 
The above point is particularly delicate, because the problem is not 
disposed of by relying simply on the rule that arbitral tribunals are competent 
to decide their own jurisdiction. It is, rather, to establish whether such a body 
was properly constituted in the view of not only itself but also of the parties 
upon whose agreement it was created. Furthermore, the particular 
circumstances in which an incomplete tribunal has acted or not acted should be 
read in conjunction with the arbitral tribunal's governing provisions, that is, the 
provisions of the arbitration agreement and the rules of procedure. 
298 
2. A particularly relevant point to be borne in mind is also the specific 
composition of the arbitral tribunal in regard to whether or not the role of the 
party-appointed arbitrator was of principal significance in the particular Case 
in question, considering that in the case of arbitral tribunals composed 
predominantly of neutral members the continuation of the proceedings by the 
remaining members may be less controversial. 
3. Another very important point with regard to the review of the Cases 
in which an incomplete tribunal has proceeded in the absence of a withdrawing 
arbitrator, is that they should be read in conjunction with the very many other 
cases in which withdrawing arbitrators have routinely been replaced. In other 
words, a review of the reported precedents alone does not give a complete 
picture of the story. For there are many instances in international arbitration, 
usually unreported, in which an incomplete tribunal has awaited the 
replacement of the withdrawing arbitrator in accordance with its governing 
provisions without continuing the proceedings. It is not convincing to say that 
these cases do not shed light on the question. 107 In fact, such cases are highly 
relevant. They demonstrate that continuing the process in the absence of one of 
the arbitrators was not regarded as the proper course of action by the remaining 
members of the tribunal. 
Due to the fact that these instances are not normally reported widely, a 
complete citation of relevant cases is not feasible. However, it is possible to 
note some examples which are well-known. For instance, the Arbitration 
between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Cementation International Ltd 108 
indicates that the ICC Court of Arbitration has applied its general powers of 
appointment. In fact, it has been noted that the ICC Court of Arbitration 
regularly applies its general powers of appointment when an express mode of 
107 Schwebel, op. cit. p. 295. 
108 Laurence Craig and others, "International Commercial Arbitration", op. cit. 12A; issued 
November 1986, pp. 60-63. 
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designation of an arbitrator provided for by the contract is frustrated. 109 The 
Arbitration between the Postal Administration of Portugal and the Postal 
Administration of Yugoslavia110, and the Arbitration between SPA and the 
Government of Congol 11 are among such cases, though they were conducted 
by other arbitration institutions. 
4. In fact, not in all instances has the Iran-US Tribunal relied on the 
idea of continuing the proceeding in the absence of a Party-appointed 
arbitrator. Most recently, in two Cases Nos. 20 and 21 before Chamber One, 
Mr Noori, the Iranian member of the Chamber, disqualified himself pursuant to 
Article 9 of the Tribunal Rules on the ground of his previous dealing with these 
Cases while a legal adviser to the Government. 112 The other Iranian members 
of the Tribunal designated by the President to act instead of Mr Noori similarly 
disqualified themselves on the same ground. The President of the Tribunal 
taking into account Articles 13 and 7(2) of the Tribunal Rules requested the 
Agent of Iran to appoint a member for these Cases within thirty days. The 
President's action was approved by the non-Iranian members of the 
Tribunal. 113 Preparations by the American Agent for the request for 
appointment by the Appointing Authority was under way when one of the 
Iranian members of the Tribunal, Mr Ansari, agreed to act instead of Mr Noori. 
Although the above case does not fall within the category of malicious 
withdrawals, and in principle Mr Noori was obliged to disqualify himself, the 
circumstances surrounding this case, including the refusal by other Iranian 
members to act instead of Mr Noori and the delay by the Iranian Government 
109 Ibid. 
110 March 1956,23 ILR, pp. 591-592. 
111 November 1979, ICSID Arbitration, 67 ILR, p. 319. 
112 Article 9 of the Tribunal Rules, with its Modifications made by the Tribunal, provides that 
an arbitrator should disqualify himself if there are circumstances likely to give justifiable 
doubts as to his impartiality or independence with respect to a particular case. 
113 Sec AR 87/88, pp. 2-3; Letter of 15 February 1988 from the President of the Tribunal to 
the Agent of Iran, Ibid, pp. 61-62. 
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to appoint a replacement, raise some questions as to the real intention behind 
this act of disqualification. However, despite these surrounding circumstances 
the Tribunal did not attempt to argue for its authority to proceed. On the 
contrary, it requested the Government of Iran to appoint a replacement for Mr 
Noori. Nor was the multiplicity of the Cases to be dealt with by the Tribunal 
regarded as a cause for continuing the proceedings in the absence of Mr Noori's 
substitute, even in view of the refusal by other Iranian members of the Tribunal 
to replace Mr Noori. Nevertheless, the relevance of this Case is very limited in 
view of the fact that the absence of Mr Noori had a legitimate justification 
which may have prevented the Tribunal from asserting the right to proceed in 
his absence. That is to say, in view of the apparent justification for the absence 
of Mr Noori it would have been hard for the remaining members of the 
Chamber to argue that his absence was not justified. 
Interestingly, the latter point brings to the surface another contradiction 
in the theory of legality of incomplete tribunals; that is, that the question of 
whether a withdrawal is justified or not falls with the remaining members of 
the tribunal, whose legality is in question in the first place. In other words, the 
theory of legality of incomplete tribunals is principally legitimized on the basis 
of an illegal withdrawal by an arbitrator. However, an implication of the theory 
is that an incomplete tribunal whose right to continue the proceedings depends 
primarily on the illegality of the withdrawal, under that theory, is already 
constituted before ascertaining its own legality, in order to determine the 
legality of the withdrawal. 
Such a competence could be accepted if there were indications in the 
governing provisions that the other members of the tribunal were competent to 
decide the legality of the withdrawal. For instance, the ICSID Convention 
gives the remaining members of the tribunal the power to decide whether the 
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resignation of one of its arbitrators has been justified. 114 However, even under 
the ICSID system the penalty or remedy against an illegal withdrawal or 
resignation of a party-appointed arbitrator is to deprive the party concerned of 
the right to make a substitute appointment and as an alternative to authorize the 
Chairman of the Administrative Council to appoint a replacement directly. 115 
However, many other rules of arbitration, including the Rules of the 
Iran-US Claims Tribunal, do not differentiate between illicit and other forms of 
withdrawals. As a consequence, it should be assumed that the provision for the 
enforced filling of vacancies covers all categories of withdrawals. 
In the light of the foregoing presumptions, the Cases relating to the 
problem of incomplete tribunals may be reviewed in the following categories: 
IV(1). Cases in which the arbitration agreement or the governing 
rules expressly permitted the remaining members of the 
tribunal to continue the proceedings in the event of the 
withdrawal by a party-appointed arbitrator 
The only known case falling within this category is the Lena Goldfields 
Arbitration. 116 In this Case, the Agreement of 1925 between the Government 
of the Soviet Union and the Lena Goldfields Company provided for a three- 
member tribunal consisting of two Party arbitrators and a neutral member. It is 
significant that the Agreement expressly provided that should one of the Parties 
or its arbitrator default the two remaining members could, at the request of the 
other Party settle the dispute, on condition that such decision was 
unanimous. 117 
114 Article 56(3) of the ICSID Convention, and Rule 82) of the ICSID Rules of Arbitration. 
115 Article 56(3) of the ICSID Convention , and 
Rule 11(2)-(a) of the ICSID Rules of 
Arbitration. 
116 Lena Goldfields Co Ltd. v USSR, Arbitration Award of 2 September 1930,5 A. D., pp. 
426-427; The Times, 3 September 1930, p. 7. 
117 Ibid. 
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After the appointment of the three arbitrators the Soviet Union 
withdrew her arbitrator and refused to participate in the arbitration. The 
remaining members of the Arbitration Court met and declared that "according 
to the plain language of Article 90, paragraph 6, the jurisdiction of the Court 
remained unaffected". 118 Thus the Arbitration Court rendered award in favour 
of the Lena Goldfields Company. 119 
It is obvious that the Lena Goldfields Arbitration Court was able to act 
by two of its members solely on the basis of express provision in the 
Agreement of the Parties. Therefore the relevance of this Case depends largely 
on whether the provision authorizing the remaining members to act represents 
a general principle or an exception. In terms of frequency of inclusion of such 
provisions in arbitration agreements it is certain that the above-mentioned 
clause in the Lena Goldfields Arbitration Agreement represents an extremely 
exceptional example. The question is therefore why such provisions are not 
inserted in other arbitration agreements. Is it because the theory of permitting 
an incomplete tribunal to function is so well-established that the insertion of 
such a provision would merely be declaratory of an established principle? The 
answer can hardly be in the affirmative. For if such a principle did actually 
exist in the law, one would find no explanation at all for the failure of the 
attempts by the ILC in its long years of work to introduce the concept of 
legality of incomplete tribunals into international law. 
Judge Schwebe! has argued that the above-mentioned clause in the 
Lena Goldfields Agreement may be assumed to be the common intention in 
many other arbitration agreements which are silent on the matter. 120 In our 
view such an argument runs not only contrary to the realities of the situation, 
including the above-mentioned experience of the ILC, but also against the very 
118 Ibid. 
119 Ibid. 
120 Schwcbcl, op. cit. pp. 214-215. 
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fact of the need for conducting such a scholarly research into the matter. 
Moreover, if such a common intention existed in many other arbitration 
agreements which are silent on the matter there would have been no need 
throughout the history of the law of international arbitration to develop the 
notion of enforced filling of vacancies. For if such an assumption could be 
derived from the Lena Goldfields Agreement, that is, if the above-mentioned 
clause in the Lena Agreement represented the common intention in many other 
arbitration agreements, the painstaking work done over the years for the 
development of the notion of enforced filling of vacancies would be quite 
absurd. 
Moreover, in view of the express authorization of the remaining 
members of the Lena Goldfields Arbitration Court, we do not find any direct 
connection between that Case and the rule of effective interpretation, upon 
which the doctrine of non-frustration of arbitration is based. We have 
acknowledged that the rule of effectiveness in interpretation of treaties is a 
viable principle resulting in some support to the authority of an incomplete 
tribunal as far as the theoretical aspects of the argument are concerned. 
However, there appears to be little connection between the above Case and the 
rule of effective interpretation. Again, the primary aim of a Case study in these 
particular circumstances is to establish the extent of the support which one may 
be able to derive for one's theoretical arguments from the practice. However, in 
view of the express provision in the Lena Goldfields Arbitration for the 
authority of an incomplete tribunal, one can hardly derive a direct practical 
support for the rule of effective interpretation from that Case, in spite of what 
some have suggested. 121 
In short, the Lena Goldfields Case represents a uniquely exceptional 
example and its relevance to the argument in favour of the legality of a 
121 [bid, p. 215. 
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truncated tribunal is very limited. Had the clause in the Lena Goldfields Case 
been further inserted into a number of other agreements one could possibly 
argue in favour of its representing a principle, but this certainly is not the case. 
IV(2). Cases in which the remaining members have continued 
the proceedings in the absence of an express provision 
In addition to the Lena Goldfields Case, there are some other instances 
in which incomplete tribunals have continued the proceedings despite the 
withdrawal of a party-appointed arbitrator. All these Cases provided for a 
three-member tribunal. 
a- During the later phase of the Republic of Columbia-Cauca Company 
Arbitration 122, on 22 October 1897 the Columbian Commissioner, Mr Pena, 
resigned from the Commission in protest at what he called the majority's 
intention to render an award in excess of jurisdiction. 123 The two remaining 
members of the Commission, the arbitrator appointed by the Claimant 
Company and the neutral member, passed a resolution that it was impracticable 
to procure timely appointment of a replacement because the extended time 
fixed by Article 8 of the Arbitration Agreement would expire on 31 October 
1897.124 Therefore the two arbitrators resolved to proceed and rendered an 
award against the Government of Columbia. 125 
The validity of that award was challenged by the Columbian 
Government in the US courts, among other points, on the ground of absence of 
its arbitrator. 126 The validity of the action by the two Commissioners was, 
122 Republic of Columbia v Cauca Co, (Circuit Court, D. West Virginia, January 1901), 106 
Fed. P. 337. 
123 Letter from Mr Pena, Columbian Commissioner, Ibid, p. 345. 
124 Ibid, pp. 345-346. 
125 Ibid, pp. 346-347. 
126 Ibid, p. 337. 
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however, confirmed by these courts127, in particular by the US Supreme 
Court. 128 
b- During the hearing in the French-Mexican Arbitration129 the 
Mexican member of the Commission withdrew from the proceedings. Despite 
this withdrawal the French member of the Commission and the Chairman 
continued the proceedings in his absence and rendered twenty-three Awards. 
Mexico lodged a protest against the awards, declaring that they were invalid. 
By a Convention of August 2,1930, a new Commission was set up, which was 
to decide, among others, the claims which the "rump Commission" had already 
decided. 130 
c- The so-called Sabotage Cases, or Black Tom Explosion Case 131 
provides another example for discussion in the context of our problem. This 
Arbitration Commission consisted, unusually, of two American members and 
one German. Established under the Claims Agreement of August 10,1922, it 
was composed of Mr Justice Owen J. Roberts of the United States Supreme 
Court, as Umpire; Colonel Christopher B. Garrett, as American Commissioner; 
and Dr Victor L. F. Henecking, as German Commissioner. 132 The Tribunal was 
constituted and continued its work for some length of time. Because of certain 
disagreements, in a note of 24 March 1939 the German Embassy notified the 
Department of State of the withdrawal of the German Commissioner, and in a 
note of 10 June added that after the withdrawal of the German member "the 
Commission has been incompetent to make decisions". 133 
127 Ibid, pp. 348-349. 
128 190 U. S. 524, pp. 527-528, As reproduced in 47 U. S. Sup. Crt. Rep. 1159, pp. 1162-1163. 
129 5 A. D., p. 424-426; Whiteman, Digest of International Law, op. cit., Vol 12, pp. 1067- 
1069. 
130 Ibid. 
131 L. H. Woolsey, "The Arbitration of the Sabotage Claims Against Germany", 33 AJIL, 
(1939), p. 737; see also United States of America on Behalf of Lehigh Valley Railroad 
Co, 
etc. v Germany [The Sabotage Cases-Black Tom and Kingsland], Ibid, pp. 770-772. 
132 Ibid, p. 737. 
133 Ibid, 740. 
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The Umpire and the remaining Commissioner declined to allow the 
arbitration to be frustrated and proceeded with the consideration of the 
Case. 134 The American Commissioner and the Umpire expressed the view that 
the withdrawal of the German member did not terminate the jurisdiction of the 
Commission. 135 However, the German Government declared that the decision 
of the remaining members was without legal effect and refused to recognize 
the validity of the Award. 136 
d- The Norwegian Shipowners Claims Arbitration137 has also been 
cited by some writers as being supportive of the legality of incomplete 
tribunals. 138 However, it can definitely be said that this Case is an instance of 
refusal by an arbitrator to sign the award and to appear in the session in which 
the Award was announced, and not an example of withdrawal from the 
proceedings. The Agreement of 30 June 1929 between Norway and the United 
States provided for a three-member Arbitration Commission, composed of one 
American member, one Norwegian and one neutral who was the President of 
the Commission. 139 It is notable that the decision was to be made by a majority 
vote. 140 
The Award was announced on 13 October 1922. On the same date and 
by a letter dated 13 October, the American member of the Commission sent a 
134 Ibid. 
135 Ibid. 
136 Ibid. Judge Schwebel notes that in 1953 the German Government entered into an 
international agreement with the US for the payment of the very Awards rendered by the 
two remaining members. But he cites no reference or treaty for his assertion. (Schwebel, 
op. cit. pp. 225-226. ) 
137 Scott, "United States-Norway Arbitration Award", 17 AJIL, (1923), p. 287. The Award is 
reported Ibid, pp. 362-398; also in I RIAA. pp. 307-346. 
138 Schwebel, op. cit. pp. 292-295. 
139 " he text of the Arbitration Agreement is included at the beginning of the Award, 17 AJIL, 
(1923, pp. 362-365). 
140 Article IV of the Arbitration Agreement, Ibid. 
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letter to the Secretary General of the PCA, under whose auspices the 
Arbitration was conducted, which read: 
Sir: 
In making the award signed today, Friday, October 13, by Mr 
James Vallotton and the Secretary General of the Permanent 
Court of Arbitration, Mr Vallotton and Mr Vogt, in my opinion, 
have disregarded the terms of submission and exceeded the 
authority conferred upon the United States-Norway Arbitration 
Tribunal by the Special Agreement of June 30,1921, which 
imposes definite limits upon its jurisdiction. 
I have therefore refused to be present when the award was 
announced. 
I send you this notice in order that the parties to this Arbitration 
may be informed by you of the reasons for my absence and that 
they may be made a matter of record... 141 
It is obvious not only from the date of the letter but also from the 
contents of it that after all the judicial processes were completed, the American 
member simply refused to be present when the Award was formally 
announced. The Norwegian Shipowners Case was not a case of withdrawal 
from the proceedings at all. It can only be treated as tantamount to a refusal to 
sign the award. There is no problem in international arbitration if an arbitrator 
refuses formally to sign the award; the majority can simply record his refusal 
and announce the award. The argument that the Case was not a typical example 
of withdrawal from the proceedings is strengthened by the fact that although 
the United States Government protested against the Award, prior to its 
acceptance of the Award, it did not rely at any time on the withdrawal of the 
US Arbitrator as a basis of the protest. It is also clear from the letter of the 
United States Secretary of State142 which indicates his Government's intention 
141 Ibid, p. 399. 
142 The text of the letter of 26 February 1923 of the US Secretary of State, in Scott, op. cit. 17 
AJIL, (1923), pp. 287-289. 
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to pay the amount of the Award, that its earlier protest was on the ground of the 
failure of the Tribunal to give the reasons for the Award. 143 
While some of the above-mentioned cases appear to provide some 
support to the notion of legality of incomplete tribunals, certain points may 
affect their relevance to the issue. 
First, the governing provisions in the above cases did not provide for an 
automatic mechanism for the replacement of the resigning or withdrawing 
member. Although in the Cauca Case a mechanism for the filling of vacancies 
did exist by the joint agreement of the Foreign Ministers of Columbia and the 
United States144, the limited amount of time left to the expiry of the life of the 
Commission was asserted as a basis of action by the remaining members of the 
Commission to proceed with the Case. Moreover, the replacement mechanism 
under that system was not a fully guaranteed system. 
Second, the fact that the Franco-Mexican Commission's decisions' were 
further submitted to a new tribunal diminishes the value of that precedent. 
Three, all these and other factors have led commentators to adopt 
conflicting interpretations of these cases, according to and in support of their 
own conceptions of international arbitration. Professor Carlston, a great 
authority on international arbitration, does not appear to regard any of these 
cases as legally valid. 145 On the other hand, Michael Reisman points out that 
the subsequent referral of the Franco-Mexican Commission's decisions to a 
new commission may be regarded as a clear indication that the Commission's 
ruling was unlawful. However, he further says that the remaining members' 
decisions in that Case were not incorrect. Nevertheless, he points out that the 
143 Ibid, p. 290. 
144 Article VI of the Columbia-Cauca Company Arbitration Agreement of 4 January 1897, in 
190 U. S. 524, as reported in 47 U. S. Sup. Crt. Rep. p. 1159. 
145 Carlston, the Process of Int'l Arbitration, op. cit_ pp. 42-51. 
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fact that the "Commission subsequently terminated proceedings reveals the 
presiding Commissioner's uneasiness and failure of his strategy". 146 
Judge Schwebe!, on the other hand, appears to regard all these cases as 
supportive of his theory of the authority of truncated tribunals to proceed. 147 
For instance, he appears to disregard the effect of the 1930 Convention 
referring the decisions of the French-Mexican Commission to a new 
commission. 148 In his view, the 1930 Convention had been concluded solely 
for political reasons, that is because France was more interested in having 
awards rendered by a process which would result in Mexican payment of these 
twenty-three claims. 149 The point is that this argument is exactly the same as 
the one which the proponents of illegality of incomplete tribunals have 
advanced. After all, they argue, an effective result in international arbitration 
depends on a process which would be acceptable to both parties. 
IV(3). Cases in which the withdrawal of party arbitrators has 
led to the disruption of the proceedings 
IV(3)-(A). Arbitral tribunals with more than three members 
There are instances in which the withdrawal of party arbitrators has 
disrupted or virtually terminated the work of the arbitral tribunal. In the 
absence of any indications to the contrary, it is possible to assume that the 
remaining members of these tribunals did not consider it to be legally justified 
to proceed in the absence of one or more of party-appointed arbitrators. 
However, there might also have been other considerations for suspending the 
proceedings in the particular circumstances of each case. 
146 M. Reisman, Nullity and Revision, op. cit. pp. 467-468. 
147 Schwebe!, op. cit. pp. 188-189,193,210, and 295. 
148 Ibid, p. 210-211. 
149 Ibid, p. 211. 
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a- To begin with, in the Jay Treaty Arbitrationl50, the work of the two 
Arbitration Commissions, set up in Philadelphia and London, respectively 
under Articles 6 and 7 of the Treaty, was halted because of the withdrawal of 
the American Commissioners in the Philadelphia Commission and the 
retaliatory withdrawal of the British Commissioners in the London 
Commission. 151 Both Commissions were composed of five members - two 
Americans, two British and one neutral. 152 Three Commissioners constituted a 
quorum, provided that one of the Commissioners of each side and the neutral 
member were present. 153 
It is notable that before the final withdrawal of the Party-appointed 
Commissioners, they had occasionally withdrawn and after the suspension of 
the proceedings returned and the Commissions had been reconstituted. 154 
However, after the final withdrawals the proceedings were permanently 
disrupted. Later, the Parties signed an agreement for a lump sum solution to the 
Philadelphia Cases and the reconstitution of the London Commission. 155 
b- In the 1955 Buraimi Oasis Arbitration 156, the British Arbitrator in 
protest at what he called the lack of impartiality on the part of the Saudi 
Arabian Arbitrator resigned during the work of the Tribunal. 157 It is notable 
that the Tribunal consisted of five members - three neutral members, one 
150 For the text of the Treaty see 52 CTS, p. 243, Treaty of 19 November 1794, between Great 
Britain and the United States. For the Report of the work of the Philadelphia Commission 
acting under Article 6 of the Treaty see Moore, International Adjudications, Vol 3, Oxford 
University Press, London, 1931. For the report of the Work of the London Commission, 
acting under Article 7 of the Treaty see Ibid, Vol 4. Certain parts of the Treaty of Jay 
including Articles 6 and 7 are printed in lbid, Vol 4, pp. 3-6. 
151 See Moore, op. cit. Vol 3, pp. 96-97,165-171,233-234; and Ibid, Vol 4, p. 108. 
152 November 19,1794, Treaty of Jay, Articles 6 and 7. 
153 Ibid. 
154 Moore, op. cit. Vol 3, pp. 96-97,165-171. 
155 Ibid, Vol 3, pp. 352-356. 
156 For the text of the Arbitration Agreement establishing the Arbitral Tribunal between Saudi 
Arabia and Britain, 1954, see Wetter, International Arbitral Process, op. cit. Vol 3, pp. 
357-365. 
157 For the documents relating to the incident see Ibid, pp. 368-378. 
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British and one Saudi Arabian. 158 A provision for the eventual replacement of 
the Party-appointed arbitrators, in case of their withdrawal or death, etc., by the 
President of the ICJ was incorporated into the Arbitration Agreement. 159 The 
decision of the Tribunal was to be made by a majority vote. 160 
It is significant that, despite the fact that the Tribunal was 
predominantly composed of neutral members, after the resignation of the 
British member the remaining four members of the Tribunal made no attempt 
to continue the proceedings. The Saudi Government urged for the replacement 
of the British member and shortly after the withdrawal of the British arbitrator, 
the President of the Tribunal and later one other neutral member resigned from 
the Tribunal. 161 Therefore the work of the Tribunal came to a halt and the 
remaining members instead of taking up the idea of continuing the 
proceedings, chose to resign from the Tribunal. 
c- The Franco-Tunisian Arbitration Commission162 consisted of three 
French and three Tunisian members. A provision was made for a neutral 
member who was to resolve any eventual dispute between the national 
members by a casting vote. According to Article 21 of the Convention 
establishing the Tribunal, four members constituted a quorum on condition that 
two of the members were French and two Tunisian. The presidency of the 
Tribunal was to alternate, every two years, between a French and a Tunisian 
arbitrator. 
After the constitution of the Tribunal the Tunisian arbitrators argued 
that the Arbitration Convention was inapplicable following Tunisia's 
158 Article I of the Arbitration Agreement, Ibid, p. 358. 
159 Article XIV(e), Ibid. A similar provision regarding the replacement of the neutral 
members existed under Article I of the Agreement. 
160 Article XIII(a), Ibid. 
161 Ibid, pp. 377-378. 
162 24 ILR, pp. 767-770; Whiteman, Digest of International Law, op. cit. Vol 12, pp. 
1071- 
1072. 
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independence, and withdrew from the Tribunal. 163 Lacking a quorum, the 
French President of the Tribunal asked for the replacement of the Tunisian 
arbitrators in accordance with the Arbitration Agreement and suspended the 
proceedings. 164 
It has been argued that the failure of the Jay Treaty Commissions and 
the French-Tunisian Arbitration Tribunal to proceed was because of the 
express quorum requirement under the relevant provisions and therefore they 
do not constitute relevant precedents. 165 It is also submitted that the Buraimi 
Oasis Tribunal's failure to proceed was on the ground of the lack of majority 
following the resignation of two of its neutral members. 166 In our view, 
although certain aspects of these Cases may limit their relevance, such as the 
existence of the rule of quorum, they are not totally unrelated to our question in 
this Chapter, for the following reasons: 
1- The existence of the rule of quorum in two of these Cases, the 
Franco-Tunisian, and Jay Treaty arbitrations, in effect argues in favour of the 
principle of equal representation of the arbitrators of both parties in the 
composition of arbitral tribunals. Because in all the cases cited above and 
throughout this Chapter, the presence of an equal number of arbitrators of each 
of the parties has been a precondition for a quorum. With the very rare 
exceptions already discussed, there are no other examples of the quorum rule in 
international arbitration instruments which would derogate from that principle. 
2- The provision for the rule of quorum has generally been made in 
those arbitration agreements which have provided for more than three members 
- usually five or more. Nevertheless, the rule of equal representation of the 
arbitrators of both parties has been maintained in the quorum provisions. The 
163 Ibid. 
164 Ibid. 
165 Schwebel, op. Cit. pp. 183,250. 
166 Ibid, p. 245. 
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natural conclusion is that, because of the impossibility of achieving a quorum 
based on the principle of equal representation, the parties have generally 
refused to provide for the rule of quorum in the three-member arbitral 
tribunals. That is to say, this kind of tribunal is not permitted to function in the 
absence of one of its members, since there is no possibility of observing the 
equilibrium between the parties. 
3- In the Buraimi Oasis Arbitration Tribunal the neutral arbitrators 
resigned only after the resignation of the British arbitrator. In other words, their 
resignation was a way of suspending the proceedings because of the 
withdrawal of the British arbitrator. Thus, the fact that the neutral members 
resigned may be seen as their recognition of their inability to continue the 
proceedings in the absence of a Party-appointed arbitrator. 
IV(3)-(B). The Case of three-member arbitral tribunals 
There are three important Cases which may lend considerable support 
to the argument that the notion of enforced filling of vacancies implies an 
exclusion of the right of an incomplete tribunal to function. These Cases have a 
close identity with the current judicial conception of arbitration. First of all, all 
three of these Cases provided for a three-member tribunal similar to the 
Chambers of the Iran-US Claims Tribunal. Secondly, they all provided for an 
advanced mechanism for the eventual replacement of the withdrawing 
arbitrator by a third party. 
a- In the Romanian-Hungarian Mixed Arbitral Tribunal, or the well- 
known Hungarian Optants Cases167, the Treaty of Trianon provided for the 
167 Francis Deak, The Hungarian-Rumanian Land Dispute, New York, Columbia 
University Press, 1928, pp. 74-154; Reisman, op. cit. p. 686-698. The Case has also been 
extensively analysed in Schwebel, op. cit. pp. 193-200. 
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establishment of a three-member Tribunal, consisting of one Hungarian, one 
Romanian and one neutral who would be the President of the Tribunal. 
After the Constitution of the Tribunal and during the hearing of a case, 
the Romanian arbitrator under the instruction of his Government withdrew in 
protest at what was called the Tribunal's excess of jurisdiction. 168 The work of 
the Tribunal was suspended and both Parties appealed to the Council of the 
League of Nations. In a controversial decision the Council of the League of 
Nations proposed certain conditions before appointing a substitute. This was 
not accepted by Hungary. Finally, the Council of the League of Nations, 
despite the objections of Romania, decided to appoint substitute arbitrators to a 
Mixed Arbitral Tribunal Which would be expanded to a five-member 
Tribunal. 169 Before the establishment of that Tribunal the Parties reached a 
settlement. 170 
b- The second one is the Upper Silesian Arbitral Tribunal Case. The 
1922 Geneva Convention of Upper Silesia provided for a Tribunal composed 
of one German, one Polish and a neutral arbitrator, as President chosen by the 
League of Nations. 171 After the constitution of the Tribunal, the Polish 
arbitrator resigned and the Polish Government maintained that the activity of 
the Tribunal had come to an end. 172 The President of the Tribunal suspended 
the proceedings and asked the Polish Government for the replacement of its 
arbitrator. The matter was finally resolved by negotiations between the 
Parties. 173 
168 Deak, op. cit. pp. 74-77; Reisman, op. Cit. p. 692. 
169 Deak, op. cit. P. 154. 
170 Ibid; and Schwebel, op. cit. p. 197. 
171 Georges Kaeckenbeeck, The International Experiment of Upper Silesia, Oxford 
University Press, 1942, pp. 26-30. 
172 Documents concerning the resignation of the Polish arbitrator annexed to Kaeckenbeeck's 
report are in French. The Case has also been analysed in Schwebel, op. cit. pp. 
285-288. 
Our reference regarding the resignation of the Polish arbitrator is to the lauer. 
173 Ibid, pp. 287-288. 
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c- The third illustrative precedent and the most recent one is the Sudan 
Arbitration Case. 174 According to the Arbitration Agreement between the 
Government of Sudan and the Turriff Construction Company Ltd, a British 
Company, the Arbitration Tribunal consisted of three arbitrators, one appointed 
by the Government of Sudan, one appointed by Turriff and the President by 
common agreement of the two Parties. 175 After the appointment of all three 
members and constitution of the tribunal, the Tribunal met on 14th March 1969 
at the Hague for preparation for the hearing. The Arbitration was conducted 
under the auspices of the PCA. 176 
On 8th May 1969, the Government of Sudan wrote to the British 
Ambassador at Khartoum stating that, for the reasons set out in the letter, it had 
decided to withdraw from the Arbitration. The Secretary-General of the PCA 
was also informed of this by the Government of Sudan. 177 Nevertheless, the 
three members of the Tribunal confirmed to the Secretary-General that it was 
their several intention to be present at the Peace Palace on the date fixed for the 
hearing. 178 However, on 26 May the Secretary-General received a cable from 
Judge Mudawi, the member of the Tribunal appointed by the Government of 
Sudan, reading: "Owing personal reasons unable to attend please postpone". 179 
On 29 May 1969, the President of the Tribunal also received a cable from 
Judge Mudawi which read: "Owing unforeseen circumstances unable attend 
postpone". 180 
Thereafter, repeated efforts were made by the Secretary-General and by 
the President of the Tribunal to obtain further information from Judge Mudawi 
174 The Case was reported by Dr L. Erades, the President of the Sudan Arbitration Tribunal in 
17 Neth. I. L. R., (1970), pp. 200-222. 
175 Ibid, p. 202. 
176 Ibid, pp. 205-207. 
177 Ibid, p. 207. The text of the letter is reprinted in Ibid, pp. 207-209. 
178 Ibid, p. 211. 
179 Ibid, p. 212. 
180 Ibid. 
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as to the length of the postponement required. 181 Judge Mudawi did not appear 
at the hearing which was to commence on 5 June 1969. On 5th June 69, at the 
request of Turriff, 9th June was fixed as a new date for the hearing, with the 
further request that "if Judge Mudawi be not present at the date and time fixed 
for the hearing ... the 
hearing be further adjourned until further order". 182 
Turriff s request was accepted and it was agreed that in the event of the hearing 
being further adjourned as aforesaid the following actions should be taken: (a)- 
the submissions of Turriff and any written evidence or other material desired to 
be advanced or deposited by Turriff should be taken before and deposited with 
two members of the Tribunal and fully recorded, authenticated and preserved 
at the Peace Palace by the Secretariat. 183; (b)- "On such date thereafter as the 
hearing shall take place the Tribunal shall consider the said transcripts and 
written evidence and other material together with such additional submissions, 
evidence and material as may then be placed before it". 184 
It is notable that neither Turriff nor the arbitrator appointed by it argued 
that the two remaining members had the authority to proceed in the absence of 
Mr Mudawi. 
On 19th June 1969 Judge Mudawi was still absent. However, the 
depositing of evidence by Turriff in the manner described above with the two 
arbitrators continued until 3 July 1969.185 On 4th July 1969, the Secretary- 
General having been unable to obtain any information from Judge Mudawi that 
he would be able to attend for the hearing at any time in the future, despite a 
further cable dated 3 July asking Judge Mudawi whether he would be available 
on any date, September, or October, concluded that a vacancy had occurred 
181 Ibid. 
182 Ibid, p. 213. 
183 Ibid. 
184 Ibid. 
185 Ibid, p. 214. 
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within the meaning of Clause 2(I) of the Submission. He notified the Parties 
accordingly. Under Clause 2(3) of the Submission it then became the duty of 
the Government forthwith to appoint a new arbitrator to fill the vacancy. The 
Government did not fill the vacancy within 60 days as prescribed in the 
Submission Agreement. 186 Under Clause 2(6) of the Submission Agreement 
Turriff requested the President of the ICJ to fill the vacancy. On 2nd October 
1969 the President of the ICJ duly appointed Professor Kwamena Bentsi- 
Erchill, Dean of the Law School of the University of Zambia and he accepted 
the appointment-187 Dr Erades, the President of the Tribunal, describing these 
events in his article writes that upon the appointment of the new member the 
remaining members were automatically deemed to have been re-appointed. '88 
It has to be noted that although the Arbitration Agreement expressly 
provided for the suspension of the proceedings in the event of a vacancy, such 
a provision in our view is nothing more than declaratory of the principle which 
is inherent in the provision for the third-party replacement mechanism. 
In short, in our view these Cases clearly demonstrate that neither the 
Parties involved nor the remaining members felt that an incomplete tribunal 
was permitted to continue the proceedings in the absence of a withdrawing 
arbitrator. It is true that certain criticisms have been levelled at the action by 
the Council of the League of Nations in regard to the appointment of a 
replacement in the Hungarian Optants Cases during the sessions of the ILC by 
some of its members. 189 However, these criticisms concern the failure of the 
Council of the League of Nations to make a prompt appointment. There was 
nothing wrong with the action of the remaining members of that Tribunal in 
186 Ibid, p. 215. 
187 Ibid. 
188 Ibid. 
189 YBILC, 1952, Vol 1, pp. 22-29. 
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suspending the proceedings and asking for a replacement in accordance with its 
governing provisions. 
Finally, it is worth mentioning that one of the illustrative examinations 
into the problem of incomplete tribunals has been conducted by the Office of 
Legal Advisor to the US Department of State. In a memorandum prepared in 
the course of the Peace Treaties Case by this Office it was stated that it was 
unsound to argue in favour of the legality of incomplete tribunals. 190 
Nevertheless, for obvious reasons the United States adopted a different position 
in the Peace Treaties Case. 
The above-mentioned memorandum, after a thorough study of the 
views of various writers 191, pointed out that: 
The views of the treatise writers lead to the conclusion that it is 
unsound to argue that a tribunal composed of less than the 
number of members contemplated by the basic agreement may 
decide without having been organized as a full tribunal. 192 
The memorandum noted that cases decided by less than a full tribunal 
did not inspire confidence. With regard to the Cauca Company Case, the 
memorandum observed: 
This Case cannot be regarded as a precedent for action by a two- 
member tribunal, when the agreement calls for a three-member 
tribunal. Here, as Justice Holmes emphasized, the Columbian 
Commissioner resigned when hardly anything remained to be 
done except to sign the award. 193 
With respect to the Lena Goldfields Case, the memorandum noted: 
If anything is to be gleaned from the Lena Goldfields Case in 
support of the contention that a two-man tribunal can decide a 
case in lieu of a three-man tribunal, provided they are in 
agreement, it is the proposition that if it is desired that a two- 
man tribunal shall be authorized to decide the case provided 
190 M. Whiteman, Digest of International Law, op. cit. Vol 12, pp. 1063-1068. 
191 Ibid, pp. 1063-1066. 
192 Ibid, p. 1063. 
193 Ibid, pp. 1066-1067. 
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they are unanimous in their views, such a provision must be 
made in the agreement to arbitrate. Even, in such a case, the 
USSR refused to comply with the decision as binding. 194 
The memorandum also doubted that the Sabotage Cases could have any 
precedent value, because: 
The only reason why it was found possible to give effect to the 
award in those cases was the fact that such money was used in 
settlement of the awards made pursuant to the above-discussed 
decision, was already in the Treasury of the United States in the 
Special Deposit Account, ear-marked for settlement of the 
awards of the Commission. 195 
Finally, with regard to the French-Mexican Claims Commissions, the 
memorandum pointed out that: 
This then was an instance where awards of a two-member 
Commission, presuming to act for a three-member Commission, 
were subsequently repudiated. Even the action here taken 
differentiated between decisions made before the Mexican 
Commissioner withdrew and those made by the two-man 
Commissions. 1% 
Conclusion 
From the consideration of the foregoing discussion it is obvious that the 
practice and theory of international arbitration do not provide a uniform answer 
to the question of legality of "rump, incomplete, or truncated" tribunals. The 
answer to the question depends largely on the conception of arbitration applied. 
It is true that international arbitration in the late twentieth century has 
gradually developed a closer identity with the judicial conception of 
arbitration. However, there are certain areas of international arbitration which 
retain its unique and characteristic features as distinct from other forms of 
194 Ibid, 1). 1067. 
195 Ibid, p. 1067. 
196 Ibid, pip. 1067-1068. 
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judicial settlement. Among these features is the particular structural 
equilibrium in the composition of most arbitral tribunals with respect to the 
parties. This equilibrium is particularly relevant where the tribunal is composed 
of three members, and/or a multiple of that number with the same formation. It 
is also important to note that the arbitration tribunal derives its powers from the 
agreement of the parties. 
The principle of non-frustration of the arbitral proceedings is well- 
founded and sound. However, the controversy is not so much over the illegality 
of a malicious withdrawal by a party-appointed arbitrator, over which the 
theory of non-frustration becomes applicable. There can be little doubt that 
such a withdrawal is unlawful and engages the international responsibility of 
the State in question, should it be proved that the withdrawal has taken place 
under its instructions. The question is, rather, whether authorizing an 
incomplete tribunal to proceed is an appropriate remedy for that action. This 
question has to be answered in the light of the practice of States as one of the 
main sources of the law of international arbitration as well as other applicable 
principles. 
The work of the International Law Commission on Arbitral Procedure 
clearly demonstrates that the notion of legality of an incomplete tribunals did 
not form part of international law at the time of that work, and with the failure 
of that idea to materialize in the instruments adopted by the International Law 
Commission, it can hardly be assumed to have legality now. 
On the basis of the strength of the principle of non-frustration and some 
precedents, it may be argued that, in cases where there is no specific provision 
for the enforced filling of vacancies, an incomplete tribunal, in the event of an 
obstructive withdrawal may be permitted to function, on the assumption that 
the parties have not excluded such a possibility. 
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The situation in which there is a provision for the enforced filling of 
vacancies is totally different. The existence of such a provision clearly implies 
that the parties have necessarily excluded the possibility for the remaining 
members to continue the proceedings, particularly if the tribunal is a three- 
member one, where the indications derived from the structure of the tribunal 
are stronger in the direction of the above conclusion. 
The existence of the provision for the enforced filling of vacancies 
implies that in the view of both parties the constitution of the tribunal by the 
remaining members in the absence of a member is not the proper remedy 
against the withdrawal by an arbitrator. Moreover, it indicates that the parties 
have intended to keep the carefully balanced equilibrium in the tripartite 
structure of the tribunal untouched. 
In addition, in such cases an argument based on the principle of non- 
frustration is less relevant. This is because if the procedure for the replacement 
is followed there should be no possibility for the permanent frustration of the 
arbitration. 
The history of the development of international arbitration also supports 
the above argument. It is that while almost all arbitration instruments, 
especially those drafted currently, provide for the enforced replacement of 
vacancies, the provisions permitting an incomplete tribunal are almost non- 
existent. Therefore the simple question arises of why these instruments have 
not chosen the solution of permitting, beforehand, an incomplete tribunal to 
function, despite the fact that by providing for the enforced replacement system 
they have shown an awareness of the problem of frustration by providing a 
remedy against it. A particularly relevant point in this respect and in respect to 
the Iran-US Claims Tribunal is the drafting history of the UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules, during which there was no contemplation of permitting an 
incomplete tribunal to function. 
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Furthermore, although the multiplicity of claims dealt with by the Iran- 
US Tribunal is an argument which cannot be taken lightly in relation to the 
problem in question, it is doubtful whether it can by itself justify a departure 
from the agreement of the Parties regarding the nature of the remedy against 
the withdrawal of arbitrators. Moreover, the Iran-US Claims Tribunal has been 
working since 1981 and it may have to work for some years to come. As a 
consequence, many Cases are still pending before the Tribunal which were 
filed in 1981/82. With the exception of very minor interruptions, there are no 
indications that the Party-appointed arbitrators have been withdrawn regularly. 
That is, interruptions arising from the withdrawal of an arbitrator have not been 
the main cause of prolongation of the proceedings. 
The legality of an incomplete tribunal is even less admissible in the 
circumstances where the remaining members of the tribunal have not made any 
attempt to ask for the replacement of the withdrawing member prior to 
continuing with the case. 
With regard to the Iran-US Claims Tribunal Cases, what is important to 
be borne in mind is that in the instances of withdrawal cited earlier, the 
remaining arbitrators, with the exception of the Saghi Case197, have not in 
explicit terms claimed the right to proceed with these cases based on the 
principle of non-frustration. They have, rather, justified and presented the 
action as a case of refusal to sign the Award. There are individual opinions of 
the American arbitrators which have asserted the right to proceed on the basis 
of the rule of non-frustration. However, the explanations appended to the 
Awards themselves by the remaining arbitrators concerned have justified the 
action solely on the basis of the provision in the Tribunal Rules which concerns 
the case of refusal to sign the award. Given the absence of any legal reasoning 
to explain the international legal basis of their action in relation to the principle 
197 Sec Supra, pp. 252-254. 
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of non-frustration by the remaining members involved, the contribution of 
these Cases to the theory of non-frustration is ambiguous and limited. 
There is a question as to whether Iran's withdrawal of its challenges to 
the Awards in the Cases discussed198 may constitute a tacit recognition of the 
validity of the Awards made by the remaining members of the Chambers of the 
Iran-US Tribunal. In view of the circumstances in which Iran found it 
imperative to withdraw its challenges, described in Chapter Six below, this is 
unlikely to be the case. 
Finally, it is necessary to distinguish between two circumstances. First, 
is the question of personal liability of the arbitrator, who by unjustifiable 
action, deprives the tribunal of the power to act. The personal liability of the 
arbitrator cannot necessarily be remedied against the appointing party by 
allowing the remaining members of the tribunal to proceed, in the absence of 
express authorization to do so. 
Second, when the international responsibility of a State is engaged as a 
result of a withdrawal by instructing its arbitrator to withdraw, it is doubtful 
that the remaining members of an arbitral tribunal with a limited mandate 
would be competent to consider the international responsibility of that State 
and thus remedy it by proceeding with the case. It is the right of the other party 
to bring an action before a competent tribunal for the breach of international 
obligations against the State concerned. 
198 S«. Infra, Chaptcr Six, p. 345. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
PROCEDURAL REMEDIES AGAINST AWARDS OF THE 
IRAN-UNITED STATES CLAIMS TRIBUNAL 
SECTION A 
PROCEDURAL REMEDIES AGAINST INTERNATIONAL 
ARBITRAL AWARDS 
I. The Legal Possibility of Nullity or Invalidity of International 
Arbitral Awards 
It is undisputed that a judgement or award duly pronounced is binding 
upon the parties. This binding force of the award is "inherent in the judicial 
process". 1 That is, by "entering into the arbitration agreement and participating 
in the proceedings before the tribunal, the parties impliedly engage to execute 
the award when rendered". 2 
Thus the binding effect of res judicata constitutes a general principle of 
law3 and as such it has been stressed in many international legal instruments. 
Article 37 of the Hague Convention of 1907 for the Pacific Settlement of 
International Disputes provides that "recourse to arbitration implies an 
engagement to submit in good faith to the award". Article 60 of the Statute of 
the PCIJ and of the ICJ provides that "the judgement is final and without 
appeal". Moreover, Article 94(l) of the Charter of the United Nations provides 
that "each member of the United Nations undertakes to comply with the 
Simpson and Fox, "International Arbitration", op. cit. p. 228. 
2 Carlston, "The Process of International Arbitration", op. cit. p. 205; see also E. K. Nantwi, 
The Enforcement of International Judicial Decisions and Arbitral Awards 
in Public International Law, Sijthoff, Leyden, 1966, p. 65; and Schwarzenberger, Vol 
4, op. cit. p. 639. 
3 Dissenting Opinion, Judge Anzilotti, Chorozow Factory Case, PCIJ Rep., Series A, No. 
13, p. 27, in Hudson I World Court Reports, (1922-1926) pp. 638-640; and Nantwi, op. 
cit. p. 66. 
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decisions of the International Court of Justice in any case to which it is a party. 
Provisions stressing the rule of finality of international awards have also been 
expressed under Article 26 of the ILC's Draft Convention on Arbitral 
Procedure of 1953 and Article 30 of its Model Rules on Arbitral Procedure of 
1958. Similarly, Article 4(1) of the Claims Settlement Declaration between 
Iran and the United States and Article 32(2) of the Rules of the Tribunal 
provide that "all decisions of the Tribunal shall be final and binding". 
The binding character of the award cannot, however, extend to judicial 
decisions which are seriously and irremediably deficient. It is universally 
admitted that an international judicial decision may, on certain specific 
grounds, be treated as null and void. 4 The existence of the principle of nullity 
in international law is supported by the practice of States and the views of 
writers. 5 The views, however, may differ as to the exact scope of these grounds 
and as to what constitutes a ground of nullity. 
Since 1875 the Institute of International Law has recognized that it is 
possible for an international arbitral award to contain a flaw which makes it 
liable to be declared a nullity. In the view of the Institute, nullity of the 
compromis, excess of arbitral powers, proved corruption and essential error are 
four basic grounds for the nullity of international arbitral awards. 6 Even though 
the Hague Conventions on the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes are 
silent on the matter, the unanimous view is that such a silence could hardly be 
regarded as a change in the established doctrine on nullity of international 
arbitral awards.? In other words, the rule of nullity is a generally accepted 
principle, and the reference to the rule of finality of international arbitral 
4 Simpson and Fox, op. cit. p. 250; Nantwi, op. cit. p. 114; Schwarzenberger, op. cit. Vol 4, 
p. 700. 
5 Carlston, The Process.., op. cit. p. 221. For an in-depth analysis of the arbitral practice in 
this respect see generally, Reisman, Nullity and Revision, op. Cit. pp. 419-634. 
6 Schwarzenberger, Vol 4, op. cit. p. 700. 
7 Carlston, the Process of..., op. cit. p. 214. 
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awards in the arbitration agreement, or the silence of the arbitration agreement 
on the question of nullity, does not prevent the possibility of an award being 
declared a nullity on certain specific grounds. 
Professor Carlston has expressed the view that the insertion of a clause 
expressing the finality of the award in various arbitration agreements is 
declaratory of existing law providing for the obligatory force of the award as 
distinct from its moral force. 8 Nevertheless, he believes that the declaration of 
the customary rule of finality of the award cannot be "construed with prejudice 
to the legitimate rights of the contracting parties to justify a denial of justice by 
reason of exceeding of powers or of any other legal fault which carries with it 
the nullity of the decision. "9 An examination of various cases, conducted by 
Professor Carlston, reveals that the presence of the rule of finality of the award 
has not prevented States from making successful claims of nullity. 10 Neither 
has it prevented appropriate international judicial bodies set up specifically to 
review an arbitral award subject to a claim of nullity from declaring the award 
a nullity. For instance, in the Orinoco Steamship Company Case before the 
Hague Tribunal under the compromis of 13 February 1909, an award of an 
international tribunal was for the first time formally annulled and modified by 
the decision of a second tribunal. I I 
The most convincing expression of the principle of nullity in modem 
international law can be found in the comprehensive work of the International 
Law Commission on arbitral procedure as embodied in the Draft Convention of 
8 Ibid, pp. 211-218. 
9 Ibid, p. 212. 
10 For a review, see Ibid, pp. 211-218. 
11 William Cullen Dennis, "The Orinoco Steamship Company Case before the Hague 
Tribunal", 5 AJIL, (1911), 35, p. 36; see also Carlston, the Process of.., op. Cit. pp. 145- 
151. 
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1953 and the Model Rules of 1958. Article 30 of the Draft Convention 
provides that: 
The validity of an award may be challenged by either party on 
one or more of the following grounds: 
(a) that the tribunal exceeded its powers; 
(b) that there was corruption on the part of a member of the 
tribunal; 
(c) that there was a serious departure from a fundamental rule of 
procedure, including failure to state the reasons for the award. 
We have already noted the Orinoco Steamship Company Case of 1910. 
A further confirmation of the principle of nullity can be found in the decision 
of the International Court of Justice in the Arbitral Award Rendered by the 
King of Spain Case. 12 The issue before the International Court of Justice was 
an award made in 1906 by the King of Spain between Honduras and Nicaragua 
on a sector of their common frontier. The parties brought the case before the 
Court under Article 36 of the Court's Statute and a special agreement 
concluded in 1957.13 The decision of the Court was that the Award was valid 
on the grounds of estoppel by express declarations and by conduct on the part 
of Nicaragua. 14 In a subsidiary way, the Court also dealt with the substance of 
the submissions of excess of power and essential error, made by Nicaragua as 
grounds of nullity of the Award, and rejected both contentions. 15 The point 
which is relevant to our discussion here is that the Court did consider itself 
competent to hear an international dispute submitted to it by two States 
concerning the validity of an award. It said: 
... The 
Court will observe that the Award is not subject to appeal 
and that the Court cannot approach the consideration of the 
objections raised by Nicaragua to the validity of the Award as a 
12 ICJ Reports, 1960, p. 192. 
13 Ibid, pp. 194 and 203. 
14 Ibid, p. 213. 
15 Ibid, pp. 214-216. 
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Court of Appeal. The Court is not called upon to pronounce on 
whether the arbitrator's decision was right or wrong. These and 
cognate considerations have no relevance to the function that 
the Court is called upon to discharge in these proceedings, 
which is to decide whether the Award is proved to be a nullity 
having no effect. 16 
A modem form of recognition of the principle of nullity or invalidity of 
arbitral awards has been provided for in Article 52(1) of the ICSID 
Convention. Under this Article either party may reque 
(e award on one or more of the following grounds: 
(a) that the tribunal was not properly constituted; 
(b) that the tribunal has manifestly exceeded its powers; 
(c) that there was corruption on the part of a member of the 
tribunal; 
(d) that there was a serious departure from a fundamental rule of 
procedure; or 
(e) that the award failed to state the reasons on which it was 
based. 
In practice, the right to challenge the validity of the ICSID arbitration 
awards has been exercised by the parties within the special framework 
provided for under the ICSID Convention. 17 The exercise of this right has, on 
occasion, led to the annulment of the award. Two recent Cases of AMCO Asia 
Corp. v Republic of Indonesia18, and Mocker Industrieanlagen GmbH v 
United Republic of Cameron19, are notable in respect of the annulment of 
international arbitral awards. 20 
16 Lbid, p. 214. 
17 See Article 52(3) of the ICS ID Convention. 
18 The annulment decision of May 16,1986,25 ILM, (1986), p. 1439. 
19 11 YB. Comm. Arb. (1986), p. 162. 
20 For an analysis of the practice of the ICSID with regard to the annulment of its arbitral 
awards, particularly the above quoted Cases, see generally, Bjorn Pirrwitz, "Annulment of 
Arbitral Awards Under Article 52 of the Washington Convention on the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States", 23 Texas I. LJ. 
(1988), pp. 73-116. 
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H. The Principle of Nullity of Arbitral Awards in Private Law 
A private law analogy also leads to a result similar to that generally 
accepted in international law. In fact, in international commercial arbitrations, 
which at some stage fall within the domain of private law, there exists an 
already established mechanism for the judicial supervision of arbitral awards 
by way of recourse to the courts of competent national jurisdiction. 
The review by the courts of competent national jurisdiction of 
international commercial arbitral awards has traditionally taken place in the 
forms of appeal and challenge of the validity of the award. While recent trends 
in most countries where major international arbitration institutions are situated 
tend to restrict a review by way of appeal in favour of the finality of the arbitral 
process, the essence of the right of the parties to challenge the validity of an 
award on fundamental grounds of invalidity remains intact in most of these 
arbitration laws. 21 That is, the legal possibility of nullity or invalidity of 
international commercial arbitral awards is generally accepted and the validity 
of the award can be checked by the courts of competent national jurisdiction 
upon a challenge by a party. 
Notably, the French International Arbitration provisions of the Decree 
of 1981 Amending Code of Civil Procedure22, which represents current trends 
in favour of the finality of arbitral awards, expressly recognizes that the 
validity of the award can be challenged on five specific grounds, as follows: 
1. if there is no valid arbitration agreement; 
2. if there were irregularities in the appointment of the 
arbitrators; 
3. if the arbitration tribunal exceeded the authority conferred 
upon it; 
4. whenever due process has not been respected; 
21 See generally, Alan Redfern and Martin Hunter, "International Commercial Arbitration", 
op. cit. pp. 315-319. 
22 20 1LM, p. 917. 
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5. when the award has been made in contravention of 
international public policy (ordre public). 23 
Similarly, provision has been made for the annulment of the arbitral 
awards under the Netherlands new Statute of 1986 on Arbitration. 24 The Swiss 
Statute of 1987 on International Arbitration25 also recognizes that an arbitral 
award can be set aside on the grounds specified under this Statute. 26 Under the 
1979 United Kingdom Arbitration Act27 a limited right of appeal against an 
arbitrator's decision to the High Court, either with the consent of all parties or 
with the leave of the Court, on a question of law has been granted. 28 
Furthermore, the most recent arbitration instrument which is designed 
with the aim of universal acceptability, the UNCITRAL Model Law on 
International Commercial Arbitration of 1985, expressly recognizes the 
importance of the legal possibility of invalidity of arbitral awards. Under 
Article 34(2) of the UNCITRAL Model Law an arbitral award may be set aside 
by the courts of competent national jurisdiction29 if the party making the 
application furnishes proof that the award is invalid on one or more of the 
grounds specified under this Article. The latter elaborates extensively on the 
grounds upon which an arbitral award may be set aside. These grounds may be 
summarized as refering to : 1- the invalidity of the arbitration agreement; 2- 
procedural irregularities; 3- excess of jurisdiction; 4- failure to constitute the 
tribunal properly; and 5- the subject matter of dispute being not capable of 
23 Ibid, Article 1502. See also Article 1504. For an example in this respect see Arab Republic 
of Egypt v SPP, Paris Court of Appeal, 12 July 1984,23 ILM, (1984), p. 1048. 
24 26 ILM, p. 921, Article 1065. 
25 27 ILM, p. 37. 
26 Ibid, Articles 190 and 192. 
27 18 ILM, p. 1248. 
28 Ibid, Sections 1(2)-(3). For a review of the case law interpreting the 1979 Arbitration Act, 
sec Paul A. C. Jaffe, "Judicial Supervision of Commercial Arbitration 
in England", 55(3) 
Arbitration, (1989), p. 184. 
29 The competent national jurisdiction is specified under Article 
6 of the Model Law which 
mainly includes the law of the place of arbitration. 
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settlement by arbitration under the law of the country of arbitration; or the 
award being in conflict with the public policy of that country. 
It is significant that regarding failure to constitute the tribunal properly 
the following provision has been made under this Article: 
(iv) The composition of the arbitral tribunal or the arbitral 
procedure was not in accordance with the agreement of the 
parties, unless such agreement was in conflict with a provision 
of this Law from which the parties cannot derogate, or failing 
such agreement, was not in accordance with this Law;... 
Most important of all is the existence of a provision similar to Article 
34(2) of the UNCITRAL Model Law under Article 5 of the Convention on 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the New York 
Convention). Although the New York Convention does not deal with the 
setting aside of arbitral awards, its provisions can be relied on as ground for the 
refusal of recognition and enforcement of the award. The importance of the 
New York Convention in creating uniformity of policy among the many States 
parties to the Convention in regard to international commercial arbitration is 
undeniable. What is more significant is that it may equally represent a uniform 
opinion forming a general principle of law. 
III. A Particular Reference to Irregularities in Composition of 
the Arbitral Tribunal 
In the preceding sub-section it was shown that the principle of nullity is 
a viable norm of international law and international arbitrations in all forms. 
The grounds upon which the validity of an award can be challenged, though 
subject to some differences of opinion as to their scope, are nevertheless 
identifiable in general from a survey of various arbitral instruments of past and 
present times. 
It is important to point out that organizing the composition of the 
tribunal in strict accordance with the agreement of the parties constitutes a 
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fundamental procedural matter. This fact has been acknowledged in the 
overwhelming majority of arbitral instruments either by express reference to 
"irregularities in the composition" of the arbitral tribunal or by a general 
reference to "a serious departure from a fundamental rule of procedure", these 
circumstances providing grounds for challenge of the validity of the award. For 
instance, Article 30(c) of the ILC's Draft Convention of 1953 and Article 35(c) 
of its Model Law on Arbitral Procedure both recognize that a serious departure 
from a fundamental rule of procedure is a ground upon which the validity of an 
award may be challenged. It is obvious enough that the right to due 
deliberation by a tribunal duly constituted is of a fundamental procedural 
character. 30 It is undisputed that the tribunal must respect the " law governing 
its creation and defining its powers as laid down in the compromis, and it must 
likewise observe certain other established rules of a fundamental character 
which inherently, under the generally accepted rules of law and justice, 
regulate the conduct of any judicial body". 31 In fact the view has been 
expressed that "there are certain fundamental procedural rights upon which a 
State may rely in any international arbitration and of which no State would 
consent to be deprived". 32 It would not be wrong to assume that the right to 
due deliberation by a tribunal duly constituted is of such nature. 
Moreover, the fundamental procedural character of an irregularity 
regarding the composition of the arbitral body has been acknowledged by the 
express reference of many arbitration rules to this issue as constituting a 
ground for challenge of the validity of the award. Such a recognition can be 
found in Article 52(l)-(a) of the ICSID Convention, which refers to the failure 
to constitute the tribunal properly. Such is the case with Article 5(d) of the 
Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards and 
30 Carlston, "The process of... ", op. cit. pp. 42-43. 
31 Ibid, p. 36. 
32 Ibid, p. 38. 
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Article 34(2)-(a)-(iv) of the UNCITRAL Model Law on International 
Commercial Arbitration, both of which refer to a departure from the agreement 
of the parties regarding the composition of the tribunal. 
In view of the normative character of these provisions, which can 
hardly be doubted, it is clear that failure to constitute the tribunal properly or a 
departure from the agreement of the parties regarding the composition of the 
arbitral body is a ground for invalidity of the award. 
IV. Forms of Remedies Against Arbitral Awards 
IV(1). In international arbitral processes one may distinguish three 
different remedies against awards: revision (by the arbitral tribunal having 
rendered the award); challenge or appeal (to another body, typically a court); 
and nullity. 33 The terminology is not precise. In fact they are sometimes 
interchangeable. An award may be null and void ab initio without any claim 
alleging nullity having been formally presented. 34 However, as far as the 
procedural aspects of these remedies are concerned, they can be categorized as 
revision, appeal and challenge. The latter concerns the validity of the award or 
a claim asking for the annulment of the award. 35 
The purpose of an action challenging the validity of the award is to 
annul or set aside the award on certain fundamental grounds. On the other 
hand, an appeal may usually be made to a higher judicial body for a general 
judicial review or on a point of law. Revision, it is submitted, is designed as a 
33 J. Gillis Wetter, International Arbitral Process, op. cit. Vol II, p. 539. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Throughout this study the term "challenge" of the award is used to signify a challenge 
regarding the validity of the award as distinguished from an appeal for a general judicial 
review. The term "challenge" is used with the same meaning as described above in Article 
35 of the ILC's Draft Convention. 
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remedy for the purpose of rectifying an error committed by the tribunal or for 
allowing it to consider and adjudicate upon a newly discovered fact. 36 
It is obvious that the legal system which governs the arbitration process 
is, in addition to the arbitration agreement and its rules of procedure, the 
ultimate yardstick against which the validity of the award can be tested. This 
law, the governing law of arbitration, is public international law when the 
arbitration takes place within the domain of that law. In other forms of 
arbitration it is primarily the law of the place of arbitration which determines 
the validity of the arbitral award. However, in the latter case, the law of the 
country where recognition and enforcement of the award is sought may also 
exercise a degree of judicial review pertaining to the validity of the award. 
Thus it becomes clear that in all forms of arbitration, other than public 
international arbitration, the legal system and the courts of the competent 
national jurisdiction offer already existing procedural remedies by which the 
validity of the award can be challenged. In addition, under the rules of some 
international commercial arbitration institutions there is a mechanism for a 
review of the award before its announcement. For instance, under the ICC 
arbitration system the award may not be signed by the arbitral tribunal until it 
has been scrutinized by the ICC's Court of Arbitration. 37 
36 Wetter, op. cit. Vol II, p. 539. See, for instance, Article 29 of the ILC Draft Convention 
and Article 38 of its Model Rules . E. g., 
for documents concerning the re-opening of the 
BP/Libya Case see Wetter, op. cit. Vol II, pp. 559-662. See also generally, " The 
Venezuela-Guyana Boundary Dispute : An In-Depth Documentary Case Study of Nullity 
of An Arbitral Award", Ibid, Vol III, p. 3. 
37 See Article 21 of the ICC Rules of Conciliation and Arbitration of 1988, published by the 
ICC. Under this provision the Court is empowered to modify the form of the award to 
ensure that it meets the procedural requirements for enforcement under the law of the 
place of arbitration and of the parties' countries. The Court is also permitted to bring 
substantive points to the arbitrator's attention for further consideration, such as defective 
reasoning or miscalculation of damages. The Court, however, may not exercise any 
binding power over the arbitrator in this respect. (See Steven J. Stein and Daniel R. 
Wotman, "International Commercial Arbitration in the 1980s: A Comparison of Major 
Arbitral Systems and Rules", 38 Bus. Lawyer, (1983), 1685, p. 1720. ) 
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IV (2). Unlike the structure of municipal legal system, international law 
does lack an automatic mechanism for the challenge of the validity of the 
award. Due to this inherent problem in international law, it mainly falls to the 
parties to foresee in their arbitration agreement or their rules of procedure the 
possibility of challenging the award before a separate tribunal or before the 
International Court of Justice. It has been stipulated under Article 31(1) of the 
ILC's Draft Convention on Arbitral Procedure that "the International Court of 
Justice shall be competent, on the application of either party to declare the 
nullity of the award on any of the grounds set out in the preceding article". 38 
Similar provisions have been made under Article 36 of the Model Rules of the 
ILC on Arbitral Procedure for recourse to the ICJ for challenge of the award. 
The most practical and institutionalized provision for challenge of the 
award has been made under Article 52 of the ICSID Convention. The existence 
of this provision is significant because of the self-contained and mostly public 
international structure of the ICSID arbitration. Within the time-limit of 120 
days prescribed under this Article a party may request annulment of the award 
on the grounds specified therein. 39 This Article provides that an ad hoc 
Committee of three persons should be appointed from the Panel of Arbitrators 
and that: 
None of the members of the Committee shall have been a 
member of the Tribunal which rendered the award, shall be of 
the same nationality as any such member, shall be a national of 
the State party to the dispute or of the State whose national is a 
party to the dispute, shall have been designated to the Panel of 
Arbitrators by either of those States, or shall have acted as a 
conciliator in the same dispute. The Committee shall have the 
authority to annul the award or any part thereof on any of the 
grounds set forth in paragraph (1). 
40 
38 Note the time-limit required for the submission of the challenge under Article 
31(2) of the 
Draft Convention. See also Article 32, Ibid. 
39 Article 52, paragraph 2 of the ICSID Convention. 
40 Article 52, paragraph 3, Ibid. 
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As noted earlier, the ad hoc Committee is set up frequently to hear the 
challenges made against the ICSID arbitration awards. 
It is therefore obvious that in public international arbitrations, in the 
absence of express provisions in the arbitration agreement it would be difficult 
in practice to find an appropriate forum to challenge the validity of the award. 
Nevertheless, theoretically, the absence of such provision does not exclude the 
possibility of an ab initio nullity of the award. On the other hand, a mere 
declaration of nullity by the dissatisfied party can hardly deprive the award of 
its obligatory force. Ordinarily, awards are binding upon the parties and mere 
objection by one of the parties cannot destroy this obligation. Professor 
Carlston argues that a State's entitlement to the exercise of the power to refuse 
enforcement will depend upon the merits of its contentions as to the validity of 
the award. 41 He writes: 
If a State should refuse to execute the award, it would do so in 
its own risk, and to maintain that the award is null will not itself 
free the State from the responsibility which it incurs by its 
action or inaction. Only if the award is null in fact and law will 
the State be free from such responsibility. In such a case the 
award never had an obligatory force to be suspended. 42 
Obviously, Carlston's view, while it recognizes the responsibility that a 
unilateral declaration of nullity may involve, does give a degree of subjective 
discretion to the disaffected State by not insisting upon the per se illegality of 
such a declaration. 
In practice, however, given the well-known fact that international law is 
not sanctioned by an enforcement mechanism, the enforcement of the award 
depends largely on its acceptance by the party against which the award has 
been made. Consequently, in the event of a unilateral declaration of nullity by a 
State a regulation of some final settlement between the parties becomes 
41 Carlston, the Process, of... ", op. Cit. p. 222. 
42 Ibid, pp. 222-223. 
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necessary. This settlement may be in the form of an agreement to submit the 
dispute of nullity to another tribunal- as was done in the Orinoco Steamship 
Company Case43 and the Arbitral Award made by the King of Spain Case44- 
or in any other form on which the parties may agree. The possibility for this 
situation regarding the awards rendered against Iran by the Iran-US Claims 
Tribunal is different because of payment of that category of award out of the 
Security Account. This will be elaborated upon below. 
Finally, it has to be noted that the doctrine of nullity is a deep-rooted 
principle. However, the problems associated with it should not be neglected. 
The theory of nullity may be abused by the dissatisfied party. This may 
undermine the effectiveness of the arbitral process and the rule of finality of 
the award. In particular, in public international arbitration, in which a unilateral 
declaration of nullity by a party may in practice prevent the enforcement of the 
award, the problems are greater. On the other hand, it is obvious that a 
possibility should exist for setting aside awards which are deficient and invalid. 
The solution appears to be in striking a balance between the rule of finality of 
the award and the doctrine of nullity, by way of limiting the grounds of 
invalidity to a minimum of specific fundamental points. 
43 5AJIL, (1911), p. 35. 
44 ICJ Rep. (1960), p. 192. 
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SECTION B 
PROCEDURAL REMEDIES AGAINST AWARDS OF THE 
IRAN-UNITED STATES CLAIMS TRIBUNAL 
I. Generally 
Article IV(1) of the Claims Settlement Declaration, as well as Article 
32(2) of the Tribunal Rules, provides that "awards of the Tribunal shall be final 
and binding". There are no provisions in the CSD regarding the grounds for 
invalidity of the award or its revision. Given the extraordinary circumstances 
and the short period of time in which the CSD was drafted it is not surprising 
that it does not contain specific provisions concerning the above or other 
similar issues. This can at least partly explain its shortcomings. The effect of 
these circumstances is also evident in the fact that the parties have essentially 
referred the question of rules of procedure to the UNCITRAL Arbitration 
Rules. Ideally, given the peculiar characteristics of the Tribunal, it would have 
been better for the parties to draft their own rules of procedure in conformity 
with the institutional and multi-case structure of its function. 
Surprisingly, the Tribunal Rules too do not provide any clear guidance 
as to the rules of nullity, invalidity and revision of the award, and provisions to 
these effects are generally lacking. It is submitted that the silence on the matter 
under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules is in apparent reliance upon the New 
York Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards. 1 It was noted earlier that Article V of the New York Convention 
provides elaborate provisions regarding the grounds upon which recognition 
and enforcement of arbitral awards can be rejected by the courts of the relevant 
Andrew Glen Weiss, "The Status of UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial 
Arbitration Vis-A-Vis the ICC, LCIA and UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules: Conflict or 
Complement? ", 13 Syracuse J. I. L. C. (1986), 367, p. 387. 
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national jurisdiction. Although the New York Convention concerns only the 
recognition and enforcement of the award, it is logical to assume that the same 
grounds are deemed to constitute bases for an action for setting aside of an 
arbitral award. 2 Thus, the silence under the UNCITRAI Arbitration Rules does 
not appear to reflect a desire to derogate from the provisions under the New 
York Convention by any means- rather, to keep in harmony with that 
Convention. 
In short, the UNCITRAI Rules were primarily drafted for use in 
commercial arbitration. Although they have chosen to remain silent on the 
question of the grounds for invalidity of the award, that silence by no means 
excludes the possibility of challenge of the validity of the award or its revision 
in the courts of competent national jurisdiction. The UNCITRAI Rules in effect 
leave the matter to the authorities which are in principle competent to decide 
on the question3, these being the courts of the place of arbitration and/or the 
courts of the country where the recognition and enforcement is sought. 
The silence on the question in discussion under the UNCITRAL Rules 
is not something unusual in view of the fact that the Rules are designed for the 
use of commercial arbitration. Such is the case with the Rules of the LCIA and 
of the ICC. It is, however, notable that the ICC and LCIA Rules contain an 
express provision to the effect that by submitting to arbitration under the 
respective Rules the parties waive the right to appeal against an award, 
provided the waiver can be validly made. 4 Nevertheless, even if a waiver of the 
right to appeal can be validly made, the right to challenge the award is not 
affected by that waiver. The latter right is generally regarded as not capable of 
2 See also Article VI of the New York Convention. 
3 See generally Report by the Special Rapporteur on preparatory work of the UNCITRAL 
on International Commercial Arbitration, 3 YB. UNCITRAL (1972), 193, pp. 228-231; see 
also the Commentary appended to the Report of the Secretary-General on the UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules, 12 December 1975,7 YB. UNCITRAL, 1976,166, p. 178. 
4 Article 24(2) of the ICC Rules of 1988, and Article 16(8) of the LCIA Rules of 1985. 
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being excluded even by express agreement. 5 Moreover, the question of 
whether or not a waiver of the right to appeal against the award has been 
validly made may ultimately be determined by the law of the place of 
arbitration which governs the arbitral proceedings. 6 
Furthermore, the silence on the matter in discussion under the 
UNCI TRAT Rules does in a way make the issue capable of being subjected to 
varying interpretations by the courts of different countries to which arguments 
regarding the validity of the award have been proposed. The idea appears to 
have been that in the courts of States members of the New York Convention a 
harmonized policy would exist in relation to the scope of the grounds for 
challenge or refusal of recognition and enforcement.? However, the problem 
may not even be totally solved in that case. That is why the UNCITRAI Model 
Law on International Commercial Arbitration of 1985 has not chosen to remain 
silent on the matter. It has expressly introduced specific grounds on the basis of 
which the validity of the award can be challenged8, or its recognition and 
enforcement may be refused. 9 
In short, despite the controversy which may exist as to the scope of the 
grounds for invalidity of the arbitral awards made under the UNCITRAI Rules, 
the Rules do not exclude the procedural remedy of challenge of the validity or 
revision in the courts of competent national jurisdiction, provided that the 
arbitration is a non-public international arbitration. However, in circumstances 
where the right to challenge the validity of the award has been expressly 
waived, when the challenge could be made, the situation would be different. 
5 Alan Redfern and Martin Hunter, op. cit. p. 318. 
6 Andrew Glen Weiss, op. cit. pp. 387-388. 
7 Ibid, p. 387. 
8 Article 34 of the UNC1 RAI Model Law. 
9 Ibid, Article 36. See also, Mary E. McNerney and Carlos A. Esplugues, "International 
Commercial Arbitration: The UNCITRAL Model Law", IX(1) Bos. C. I. C. L. R. (1986), 47, 
pp. 57-58. 
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This is not the case with the UNCITRAI Rules which have been adopted as the 
Rules of the Iran-US Claims Tribunal. 
However, there might be other problems connected with the nature of 
the arbitration between Iran and the United States. This problem may exclude 
the recourse to national courts for challenge of the award. The question is 
whether the arbitration between Iran and the United States is a public 
international arbitration or a private one, or a combination of both. On the first 
assumption it is unlikely that any national court would be competent to hear a 
challenge against the validity of a public international award. On the second 
the answer is in the affirmative. On the third assumption the answer is not 
totally clear. We will elaborate on this matter only in relation to the question of 
procedural remedies against the awards of the Tribunal, in the following sub- 
section. 
H. Character of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal in 
Relation to the Procedural Remedies Against its Awards: The 
Private Law Remedy 
The problems concerning character of the Iran-US Claims Tribunal 
have been discussed adequately elsewhere. 10 Therefore we do not intend to 
analyse this question in detail. However, some reference to the question is 
necessary in order to establish its relationship with the problem of procedural 
remedies against the awards of the Tribunal. 
11(1). Following the issuance of awards by Chambers Two and Three in 
the absence of the Iranian members in the Cases discussed in Chapter Five 
above, Iran attempted to challenge their validity in the Dutch courts. Nine suits 
10 On this see generally, William T. Lake and Jane Tucker Dana, "Judicial 
Review of 
Awards of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal: Are the Tribunal's Awards 
Dutch? ", 16 
L. P. I. B. (1984), p. 755; David Lloyd Jones, The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal: 
Private Rights and State Responsibility", 24(2) Virg. J. I. L. (1984), p. 259; L. 
Hardenberg, 
"The Awards of the Iran-US Claims Tribunal", Int'l. Bus. Lawyer, September 1984, p. 
337; 
and Albert Jan van Den Berg, "Proposed Dutch Law on the 
Iran-US Claims Settlement 
Declaration", lnt'l. Bus. Lawyer, Sept. 1984, p. 341. 
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were filed by Iran in the District Court of the Hague between April and 
December 1983.11 Eight of the challenges were based on the non-participation 
of Iranian arbitrators in the deliberations of these Cases. 12 In the ninth 
challenge, Esphahanian v Bank Tejarat13, Iran argued that the Tribunal had 
failed to consider a defence put forward by Iran that the transaction in question 
violated Iranian foreign exchange regulations. 14 
The challenge in the Dutch courts by Iran of the Tribunal awards 
highlighted the question of character of the Tribunal's awards. The question 
was whether they were public international awards or awards made under and 
governed by the law of the place of arbitration, namely, the law of the 
Netherlands. The difference between the two situations is obvious. On the first 
assumption, the awards are public international awards and national courts 
cannot normally be expected to be competent to hear against such awards. On 
the second assumption, however, the law of the place of arbitration is 
competent to determine whether an arbitral award made in that country is 
validly made. Moreover, the enforcement of the awards may be facilitated by 
the national courts with regard to those awards of the Tribunal which are not 
paid out of the Security Account , if the 
latter assumption is accepted. 
It is notable that under the Dutch Arbitration Law which was in force 
when the awards of the Tribunal were challenged, an award could be set aside 
11 These Cases were: Raygo Wagner Equip. Co v Star Line Iran Co, (15 Dec. 1982), 1 Iran- 
USCRT, p. 411; Rexnord v Iran, (10 Jan. 1983), 2 Iran-USCTR. p. 6; Intrend Intl, Inc v 
Iranian Air Force, (2 July 1983), 3 Iran-USCTR., p. 110; Gruen Assoc., Inc. v Iranian 
Housing Co, (27 July 1983), 3 Iran-USCTR. p. 97; Alan Craig v Ministry of Energy of 
Iran, (2 Sept. 1983), 3 Iran-USCTR. p. 280; John Carl Warnecke & Assoc. v Bank Mellat, 
(2 Sept 1983), 3 Iran-USCTR., p. 256; Woodward-Clyde Consultants v Iran, (2 Sept. 
1983), 3 Iran-USCTR. p. 239; Blount Brothers, Corp v Ministry of Housing and Urban 
Development, (2 Sept. 1983), 3 Iran-USCTR., p. 225; and Esphahanian v Bank Tejarat, 
(29 March 1983), 2 Iran-USCTR., p. 157. See also AR 84/85, p. 17. 
12 E. g., Writ Contesting Issuance of Enforcement Order in Raygo Wagner 
Equipment Co. v 
Star Line Iran Co., Action No. AZ. 983.131.51 at 8 (District Court of the Hague, 8 April 
1983), as quoted in William T. Lake, and Jane Tucker Dana, op. cit. pp. 759-764. 
13 March 29,1983,2 Iran-USCTR. p. 157. 
14 William Lake and Jane Tucker Dana, op. cit. p. 764. 
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on ten different grounds. 15 The action to set aside the arbitral award could be 
brought under that law even if the arbitral award was final and not subject to 
appeal. 16 It is notable that Article 649(3) of the Dutch Code of Civil Procedure 
provided that an award could be set aside if it "has been made by some 
arbitrators who were not competent to render an award in the absence of the 
others". 
While the cases brought by Iran were pending before the Dutch courts 
in 1983, the Dutch Government for unknown reasons proposed a legislation 
specifically concerning the awards of the Iran-US Tribunal. The proposed 
legislation was entitled, "the Bill Regarding the Applicability of Dutch law to 
the Awards of the Tribunal Sitting in the Hague to Hear Claims Between Iran 
and the United States". 17 
The proposed Dutch legislation made it clear that Tribunal awards 
rendered under Article II(1) of the CSD (relating to claims of nationals of Iran 
and the United States against the other's Government) were arbitral awards 
within the meaning of Dutch law. 18 Thus this category of awards could be 
challenged in the Dutch courts. However, the proposed legislation strangely 
restricted the grounds for challenge of the Iran-US Tribunal awards to only two 
ambiguous grounds. This was despite the fact that under the Dutch Arbitration 
Law in force at the time an award could be challenged on ten different and 
specific grounds. The most surprising provision was that the Bill retroacted 
15 Arbitration Provisions of the Netherlands Code of Civil Procedure, Book III, Title I, 
Section 3, Article 649, reprinted in Annual Report Period ending 30 June 1983, Annex X; 
these provisions are also reprinted in 4 Iran-USCTR. pp. 299-304. 
16 Ibid, Article 649. 
17 The Bill is undated. An English translation of the Bill is reprinted in 4 Iran-USCTR. pp. 
306-307. See also Aide Memoire and Explanatory Notes attached to the Bill by the Dutch 
Government, Ibid, respectively, pp. 305,308-316. The Explanatory Notes by taking into 
account dual aspects of the claims decided by the Tribunal, proposed that claims subject to 
private law could be subjected to Dutch law. Inter-governmental claims of Iran and the 
United States were not regarded as being subject to Dutch law (Ibid, pp. 310-311). On 
balance, the Explanatory Notes accept the superiority of the inter-State character of the 
claims before the Tribunal. 
18 Section 2 of the Proposed Bill, Ibid. 
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enforcement of its provisions to 1 July 1981 (the time when the Tribunal was 
established), and expressly included proceedings challenging an award of the 
Tribunal pending on the day of its entry into force. 19 
The two grounds that the proposed Bill permitted for challenge of the 
awards made under Article II(1) of the CSD were: 1- "That the proceedings 
leading to the award were conducted in a manner that constitutes a manifest 
breach of the principles of proper judicial procedure"; and 2- that "the award is 
manifestly contrary to public order or morals-. 20 
It was obvious that the Bill would seriously restrict Iran's right to 
challenge the validity of Tribunal awards. Upon this consideration the Iranian 
Agent, M. K. Eshragh, wrote to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the 
Netherlands protesting the legislation. 21 It is also understood that the Agent of 
Iran and Arbitrator Kashani of Iran appeared before a closed meeting of the 
Dutch Parliament's First Chamber's Justice and Foreign Affairs Committee to 
attempt to dissuade the Chamber from passing the Bill. Apparently Iran could 
find no way of dissuading the Dutch Government other than withdrawing its 
challenges from the Dutch courts. This Iran did and the enactment of the Bill 
was suspended in the Dutch Parliament. 22 The proposed Bill was never 
enacted. 
It is notable that the Netherlands, in a general attempt to update its 
Arbitration Law, enacted new Arbitration provisions for its Code of Civil 
Procedure in July 1986.23 The New Statute on Arbitration has restricted the 
19 Ibid, Section 7(1) and (2). 
20 Ibid, Section 4. 
21 Letter from Mohammad K. Eshragh to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands 
(24 Feb. 1984), reprinted in 5 Iran-USCTR. p. 405. 
22 Sec W. T. Lake and J. Tucker Dana, op. cit. pp. 786-787. See also AR 84/85 p. 17 and Ar 
86/87, pp. 16-17. 
23 Netherlands New Statute on Arbitration, 2 July 1986,26 ILM, p. 921. 
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grounds for challenge of arbitral awards to five24, from the ten grounds under 
its earlier regulations. 
11(2). It is notable that Iran's action in submitting the above-mentioned 
challenges to the Hague District Court implicitly recognized that awards of the 
Tribunal were governed by Dutch law and therefore were not fully public 
international awards. Ironically, the letter of 24 February from the Agent of 
Iran protesting the proposed legislation argued that the awards of the Tribunal 
were public international awards and could not be subject to Dutch law. 25 
Explaining this inconsistency, the Agent of Iran said that "referral to the Dutch 
courts to prevent issuance of exequaturs on some void awards of the Tribunal 
and to safeguard Iran's right, which was done out of necessity, cannot be the 
determining factor of the nature of the Tribunal or of the claims pending before 
it. "26 
Iran's position presented in the Letter of her Agent was that the 
proposed legislation defined extremely limited grounds for challenging the 
Tribunal awards in the Dutch courts. 27 He argued that the proposed Bill "... 
subjects the Tribunal awards to Dutch law, thus excluding the arbitration from 
public international law, and thereby facilitating the enforcement of the 
Tribunal awards against Iran in other countries pursuant to the 1958 
Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards". 28 It 
also said that "It denies Iran the advantages of the applicability of Dutch law 
which is the automatic subjection of the Tribunal awards to all provisions of 
24 [bid, Article 1065, and generally Articles 1064-1068. 
25 Letter from Eshragh of 24 Feb. 1984, op. Cit. pp. 405-407. 
26 Ibid, p. 408. 
27 Ibid, p. 409. Eshragh also argued that Iran was the party against which most of the awards 
were rendered. Thus provisions of the proposed Bill were in practice directed against Iran. 
(Ibid) 
28 Ibid, p. 410. 
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the Dutch Arbitration Law, particularly the provisions concerning the 
challenging of arbitral awards". 29 
According to the Agent of Iran, the proposed legislation effectively 
accommodated two "contradictory wishes" of the United States by conferring 
Dutch nationality on the arbitral awards- thereby facilitating their enforcement 
under the New York Convention- and by limiting the jurisdiction of the Dutch 
courts with respect to challenges of awards". 30 The Agent of Iran also attached 
to his letter the Memorial of the Government of Iran on the Issue of Dual 
Nationality31 in which a detailed argument in support of the public 
international character of the Tribunal claims was presented. 32 
The outline of the arguments advanced in support of the inter-State 
nature of the Tribunal are as follows: (a)- The Tribunal is created by a Treaty 
concluded between Iran and the United States: (b)- It is adjudicating claims 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid. See also generally pp. 410-413. 
An apparent problem with Eshragh's arguments with regard to the New York 
Convention is that due to the existence of the Security Account the awards rendered 
against Iran by the Tribunal are paid out of that Account. Thus, recourse to the New York 
Convention by the American claimants may not be needed at all, provided that there are 
enough funds in that Account. On the other hand, the awards rendered against American 
nationals or the American Government are not secured by any such account. Therefore, in 
principle, it is Iran which might have benefited from the applicability of the New York 
Convention. However, it must be noted that Iran is not a party to the New York 
Convention and because of the application of the rule of reciprocity required under that 
Convention its application in favour of Iran might have been a problem any way. (See 
Article 1(3) of the New York Convention. ) In practice also, it is Iran which is facing 
greater difficulties regarding the enforcement of the Tribunal awards rendered against 
American nationals even in the courts of the United States. First, because of the 
inapplicability of the New York Convention due to the fact that Iran is not a party to it- 
regardless of the uncertainty as to whether that Convention applies to the awards of the 
Tribunal at all. Second, because of the doubts raised by the American courts as to the 
applicability of the Algiers Declaration as the law of land in the United States. (On this see 
generally, Robert P. Lewis, "What Goes Around Comes Around: Can Iran Enforce 
Awards of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal in the United States? ", 26 Col. J. T. L. 
(1988), p. 515, and pp. 529-539). 
31 For the main case of dual nationality see Case A/18,5 Iran-USCTR. p. 251. For the 
Dissenting Opinion of the Iranian Arbitrators see, Ibid, pp. 275-337. See also Esphahanian 
v Bank Tejarat, 2 Iran-USCTR. p. 157. For the Dissenting Opinion of Dr Shafeiei, the 
Iranian Arbitrator, see Ibid, p. 178. 
32 For the text of the attachment to Eshragh's letter of 24 Feb. 1984, see 5 Iran-USCTR. pp. 
413-427. 
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based upon the exercise of diplomatic protection by the Parties to this Treaty. 
Thus the presence of individuals before the Tribunal is explained in that 
context; (c)- The Tribunal is specifically charged with deciding inter-State 
claims, as well as disputes concerning the interpretation and application of the 
Algiers Declarations; (d)- The designation of arbitrators and payment of 
relevant expenses are to be borne both by Iran and the United States; (e)- The 
aim of the Algiers Declarations was to resolve a conflict between Iran and the 
United States; (f)- The function of the Security Account can only be 
understood in the context of the inter-State nature of the Tribunal, etc. 33 
The arguments advanced in relation to the private nature of the main 
category of claims decided by the Tribunal, namely claims of nationals, can be 
outlined as follows: (a)- The circumstances of the creation of the Tribunal as 
regards the termination of the claims of US nationals in US courts suggest that 
the Tribunal was assumed to have the role of a national court; (b)- There are 
references in the General Declaration and the CSD which indicate that the 
Tribunal was established for the purpose of deciding and terminating claims of 
nationals of each government against the other34; (c)- The presence of 
individuals before the Tribunal supports the private law nature of the Tribunal; 
(d)- The applicable law to the substance of the dispute envisaged by the parties 
includes commercial law and relevant usages of trade, as well as international 
law. 35 
The American Government for its part has hinted on occasion that the 
presence of individuals before the Tribunal represented a direct exercise of 
their right before an international tribunal and was not taking place as a result 
of the exercise of diplomatic protection. 36 The Tribunal has also indicated that 
33 See generally, Ibid. See also David Lloyd Jones, "Private Rights and State Responsibility", 
op. cit. pp. 267-273; and L. Hardenberg, op. cit. pp. 337-440. 
34 See Principle B of the GD and Article II(1) of the CSD. 
35 See Lloyd Jones, op. cit. pp. 264-267; and A. Van Den Berg, op. cit. pp. 341-344. 
36 Case A/18,6 April 1984,5 Iran-USCTR. 251, p. 258. 
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the claims of private claimants were not adjudicated as a result of the 
traditional exercise of diplomatic protection. 37 
In our view, the arguments in support of the private law nature of the 
above said category of the Tribunal awards can hardly undermine the 
overwhelming public international aspect of the Tribunal's function. Moreover, 
it is questionable whether a combination of both functions are possible. 
However, the resultant dichotomy has obscured the real character of the 
Tribunal, leading to the suggestion that the Tribunal exercises a dual, public 
and private law, function. 38 
In this regard there are further developments, subsequent to the 
withdrawal by Iran of is challenges to the Tribunal awards, which merit some 
brief attention. Notably, a former member of the Tribunal's staff, Spaans, sued 
the Tribunal before the County Court of the Hague contesting the validity of 
his dismissal and claiming his fees. 39 The Court noted that the Government of 
The Netherlands had granted the Tribunal the usual immunity of international 
organizations, as expressed in a letter from the Foreign Ministry of the 
Netherlands to the Secretary-General of the Tribunal. 40 The Court did accept 
public international character of the Tribunal. However, it made a distinction 
between its acts of jure imperii and acts of jure gestionis. 41 The Court decided 
that the claim fell within the second category and declared itself competent to 
hear the claim. 42 
The decision of the Hague County Court was appealed by the Tribunal 
to the District Court of the Hague. 43 The District Court accepted the public 
37 Ibid, p. 261. See also, Esphahanian v Bank Tejarat, 2 Iran-USCTR. 157, p. 165. 
38 Lloyd Jones, op. cit. pp. 27-277. 
39 Reported in AR Period ending 30 June 1984, Annex VI, pp. 1-3. 
40 Ibid, pp. 1-2. For the statements made by the Dutch Government regarding the legal 
personality and immunity of the Tribunal see, Supra, Chapter 3, pp. 95-96. 
41 AR period ending June 1984 (AR 83/84), Annex VI, pp. 1-3. 
42 Ibid, p. 3. 
43 Ibid, p. 4. 
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international character of the Tribunal. However, it rejected that the above- 
mentioned distinction made by the County Court was applicable to the Case. It 
held that "... lack of legal protection for employees of the Tribunal does not 
make the Netherlands' judiciary competent yet, once the Tribunal's immunity 
based on public international law has been recognized". 44 
Spaans appealed and brought the Case before the Supreme Court of the 
Netherlands 45 The Supreme Court upheld the District Court's decision and the 
appeal by Spaans was dismissed. 46 
The courts of England have also had the opportunity to declare on the 
character of the Tribunal awards. In Dallal v Bank Mellat47, the plaintiff had 
his claim dismissed before by the Iran-US Claims Tribunal. Therefore he re- 
instituted his claim in England against the respondent which had its place of 
business there. The Court held that: 
The jurisdiction and authority of the Tribunal at the Hague was 
created by an international treaty between the United States and 
the Republic of Iran, and was within the treaty-making powers 
of the governments of each of those Countries. Each of the 
parties was respectively within the jurisdiction and subject to 
the law-making powers of one of the parties to the treaty. 
Further, the situs of all the relevant choses in action are within 
the jurisdiction of one or other of the two States which are 
parties to the treaty. Again, the municipal legal systems of each 
of the relevant States recognises the competence of the tribunal 
at the Hague to decide the relevant disputes. Accordingly, the 
arbitration proceedings at the Hague are recognised as 
competent not only by competent international agreement 
between the relevant States, but also by the municipal laws of 
those States. It would be a surprising result if the courts of this 
country felt constrained to hold that the proceedings were 
nevertheless incompetent. I do not consider that one is forced to 
"48 that conclusion. 
44 Ibid, pp. 5-6. 
45 22 November 1985, reported in AR 85/86, Annex VIII, pp. 74-88. 
46 Ibid, pp. 87-88. 
47 2 W. L. R. (1986), p. 745. 
48 Ibid, p. 760. 
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11(3). With the withdrawal of the challenges to the awards of the 
Tribunal in the Dutch courts and the ensuing developments it is almost certain 
that the procedural remedy of private law, mainly the courts of the place of 
arbitration, cannot be resorted to for the purpose of challenge or revision of the 
Tribunal awards. Indeed, the problem is not so much that national law cannot 
be used for the purpose of challenging the Tribunal awards. It is rather that 
there are no other forms of procedural remedies available at all. It might be true 
that the submission to a public international arbitration necessarily implies that 
there is no automatically available forum outside the Tribunal for rectifying 
any deficiencies in its awards. In other words, the existence of such a 
rectification could primarily depend on whether the parties themselves have 
made a provision for a system by which the validity of the award could be 
checked. 
On the other hand, the need for finality of international arbitral awards 
and expediency of the proceedings may well argue against the employment of 
such a mechanism in the parties' agreement. However, given the particular 
multi-case function of the Tribunal, involving thousands of claims, the 
possibilities for rendering of deficient awards are far greater than with the 
usual ad hoc, single-case arbitrations. This fact could well argue the need for 
the provision of a system permitting the challenge of the validity of an award 
on certain specific and limited grounds. 
Ironically, with the existence of the Security Account, out of which the 
awards made against Iran are paid, the need for the judicial review of the 
Tribunal awards on the basis of a challenge is more than ever warranted. 
Because with the existence of that Account, which unequally applies only to 
It is significant that the Court in recognizing the award of the Tribunal relied on not 
only the fact that it was created by a treaty but also the recognition that the municipal laws 
of Iran and of the US accorded with the Tribunal's proceedings. (For a discussion on this 
see generally, Hazel Fox, "States and Undertaking to Arbitrate", 37 ICLQ, (1988), 1, pp. 
24-29. 
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awards made against Iran, the right to challenge the validity of the award 
becomes practically meaningless. As we noted earlier, theoretically, a party to 
a public international arbitration has the right to challenge the validity of the 
award. In addition, the existence of the Security Account can by no means be 
interpreted as being intended to be a waiver of that right. 
Moreover, because of the existence of the Security Account Iran is 
deprived of the possibilities available in practice in public international 
arbitration- though not necessarily acceptable in principle- of bargaining and 
negotiating over the enforcement of certain controversial awards. This has 
always been a reality in public international arbitration. Indeed, the American 
nationals against whom the counterclaim awards of the Tribunal have been 
rendered, do fully exploit the above said practical possibility of refusing to 
enforce the awards. 49 Moreover, they effectively exercise their right to 
49 This complicated situation has partly been created by the fact that the Tribunal has refused 
to recognize a fully public international character for its awards and to hold the American 
Government responsible for the payment of the counterclaim awards rendered against its 
nationals. In Case A/21 (4 May 1987,14 Iran-USCTR. p. 324), Iran filed a request for 
interpretation of the Algiers Accords concerning the commitment of the United States to 
satisfy awards rendered in favour of Iran against U. S. nationals. Iran contended that the 
US was obliged to satisfy awards rendered by the Tribunal against US nationals. Iran 
argued that the obligations undertaken by the two governments under the Accords were a 
"reciprocal system of commitments". (Ibid, p. 326). She also argued that "relying on the 
international character of the Tribunal, the United States has espoused the claims of its 
nationals, and that it carries with it the obligation to satisfy Tribunal awards against such 
nationals. " (Ibid). 
The United States denied that it had undertaken such obligations. (Ibid, p. 327). The 
Tribunal held that the Accords contained no obligation, express or implied, on the part of 
the United States to pay awards rendered by the Tribunal against its nationals. (Ibid, pp. 
328-329). The Tribunal also rejected Iran's argument that the Accords established a 
reciprocal system of commitments in regard to the problem at issue. It said that "... Iran's 
contention would ignore the express provisions of the Declarations which, in establishing 
a Security Account as the source for payments of awards against the Government of Iran 
and its controlled entities and in not imposing an identical obligation of payment upon the 
United States, clearly contemplated something other than parity of the treatment of the two 
States as regards enforcement mechanisms". (Ibid, p. 329). 
However, the Tribunal added that 
... 
if no enforcement procedure were available in a State Party, 
or if recourse to such procedure were to eventually result in a 
refusal to implement Tribunal awards, or unduly delay their 
enforcement, this would violate the State's obligations under the 
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challenge the validity of these awards before the American courts, where Iran 
has to seek their enforcement. 50 
For instance, in Gould Marketing, Inc v Ministry of Defence (Iran)51 
the Tribunal had issued an Award of over three million in favour of Iran on the 
basis of the latter's counterclaim against the American claimant. 52 Iran brought 
an enforcement action before the District Court of California against Gould. 53 
Details of this Case have been analysed elsewhere. 54 However, it is worth 
noting that this Case raised a complexity of legal issues regarding the 
enforcement of Tribunal awards in United States courts. These issues included 
Iran's standing before U. S. courts, the latters' subject matter jurisdiction, the 
applicability of the Algiers Accords as the law of land in the United States and 
several other questions; all these being raised by the American nationals to 
argue against the enforcement of Tribunal awards. 55 The consequences are that 
the American nationals can in practice exercise a right to challenge the 
enforcement of Tribunal awards via the relevant municipal legal system. In 
short, because of these circumstances most of the counterclaim awards made in 
favour of Iran remain unsatisfied. 56 
Furthermore, the practical possibility of negotiating over the 
enforcement of awards has been fully available to the United States with regard 
Algiers Declarations. It is therefore incumbent on each State 
Party to provide some procedure or mechanism whereby 
enforcement may be obtained within its national jurisdiction, 
and to ensure that the successful Party has access thereto. (Ibid, 
p. 331) 
50 See generally R. P. Lewis, op. cit. pp. 523-542. 
51 Cases Nos. 49 and 50, Award No. 136-49/50-2,22 June 1984,6 Iran-USCIR. p. 272. 
52 Ibid, p. 288. See also the Interlocutory Award of 27 July 1983 in this 
Case in 3 Iran- 
USCTR. p. 147. 
53 Iran v Gould, Case No. 87-036773 (CD. Cal. filed July 1987), as quoted 
in R. P. Lewis, op. 
cit. p. 517. 
54 See generally R. P. Lewis, op. cit. pp. 523-551. 
55 See Ibid, pp. 523-550. 
56 Ibid, p. 516. 
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to the awards rendered against the latter. First of all, theoretically speaking, in 
the event of the refusal by the US Government to enforce such awards, Iran has 
to seek their enforcement in the courts of the United States, or other national 
courts. Although the Claims Settlement Declaration provides that awards of the 
Tribunal against either Government are enforceable in the courts of the two 
countries and of any other nations in the world57, with the kind of confusion 
that the courts of the United States have created over the issue with regard to 
the counterclaim awards, it may take years to achieve the enforcement of these 
awards. 
Moreover, the courts of third countries are under no obligation- 
possibly other than by the New York Convention, whose applicability is 
doubtful- to enforce these awards. What is, however, most of all significant and 
relevant to our discussion with regard to the question of procedural remedies is 
that with the need for the application for enforcement of this category of 
awards in the courts of the US, or of third countries, a theoretical possibility 
may be created for the United States, and her nationals, to argue against the 
validity of the award in question as a ground for the refusal of enforcement. 
That is to say, a certain form of procedural remedy against the awards of the 
Tribunal is available to the US Government and its nationals. These remedies 
in the case of awards made against Iran are in practice, and unequally, non- 
existent. 
The circumstances in which the Awards of the Tribunal in Case 
(A/15)58 were rendered59, and enforced, clearly carry practical implications 
such as the need for negotiations and bargaining over the enforcement of the 
award. In this Case those realities were clearly present. The United States 
has 
57 Article IV(3) of the CSD. 
58 Case A/15, Awards dated 20 August 1986 and 4 May 1987, respectively, 12 Iran-USCTR, 
p. 40, and 14 Iran-USCTR. p. 311. 
59 See generally Supra Chapter 4, Section A, pp. 132-140. 
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finally paid the amount of the Award in that Case. 60 Nevertheless, all the 
circumstances indicate the presence of the above said realities in this Case 
involving all forms of negotiations and manoeuvering by the loser party. 61 
Perhaps these circumstances reveal some other unforeseen implications 
of the existence of the one-sided Security Account for the payment of awards. 
Under such circumstances the Security Account turns out to be not merely a 
mechanism for the enforcement of awards. It clearly upsets the balance in the 
judicial structure and decision-making process, particularly by leading to the 
actual exclusion of any forum for challenging awards, which exclusion could 
operate only to the detriment of the provider of the funds for the Security 
Account. 
In the circumstances described above it would have been useful for the 
Parties to provide for the possibility, on very limited grounds, for challenging 
the validity of the awards of the Tribunal. This kind of provision could be 
made either before the International Court of Justice or a separate body within 
the framework of the Tribunal itself similar to what already exists under 
Article 52(3) of the ICSID Convention. Such a body could be composed 
exclusively of three or five neutral arbitrators, other than the members who 
have made the award, with a true representation of as many forms of different 
legal systems as possible in its composition. 
60 The United States Agent indicated in a letter of 20 April 1988, that an amount of 
$454,390,207.71 had been transferred to Iran on 17 May 1987 and an amount of 
$37,900,000.00 had been transferred on 15 April 1988. (AR 87/88, p. 27. ) 
61 Apparently the President of the Tribunal conducted negotiations with the two 
Governments regarding the arrangements for the payment of the Award and 
in relation to 
the discharge and indemnity of the United States' obligations regarding 
its earlier refusal to 
return the assets involved in this Case. (See AR 
87/88, pp. 13-14. ) 
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III. Remedies Within The Tribunal System 
III(1). The Relationship between the Full Tribunal and the 
Chambers 
The classification of the Tribunal as either the Full Tribunal or the 
Chambers makes it an interesting subject of study, since the relationship 
between these two bodies is relevant to our question in this Chapter. The 
question concerns the extent to which the Full Tribunal has in practice been 
utilized as a body for reviewing the decisions of the Chambers. The Claims 
Settlement Declaration does not expressly provide for any such role for the Full 
Tribunal. It merely indicates that "claims may be decided by the Full Tribunal 
or by a panel of three members". 62 Moreover, the Full Tribunal is merely 
composed of members of all three Chambers. Therefore the assumption of a 
true role of a review body would not be realistic. 
However, given the fact that a full panel of nine members- which 
naturally carries a greater weight than the Chambers- has been introduced in 
the CSD, it is important to understand if and how the system has been utilized 
for the purpose of a review body. Moreover, in practice, disputes referred to in 
Article 11(3) of the CSD regarding the interpretation or performance of the 
General Declaration, as well as questions of the interpretation or application of 
the CSD referred to in Article VI(4) of that Declaration (all coded "A" Cases)- 
all these are assigned to the Full Tribunal. 
63 The importance of the point is that 
these cases involve interpretation and application of the Algiers Accords. 
M 
Therefore decisions of the Tribunal on these cases may have a harmonizing 
62 Article III(1) of the CSD. 
63 AR 86/87, p. 21. See also Presidential Order No. 8, Ibid, p. 68. 
64 E. g., see the following Cases: Case A/I, I Iran-USCTR. pp. 144,189; Case A/2, Ibid, p. 
101; Case A/16,5 Iran-USCTR. p. 57; Case A/18, Ibid, p. 251; Case A/20,11 Iran- 
USCTR. p. 271; Case A/21,14 Iran-USCTR. p. 324; and Case A/15,12 Iran-USCTR. p. 
40 and 14 Iran-USCTR. p. 311. 
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effect on the policies of the Chambers and may in effect imply a confirmation 
or rejection of a certain decision adopted by the Chambers. 
Iran appears to have used this opportunity as a mechanism for review of 
the awards made by the Chambers, though with very limited success. This is 
because the Tribunal itself has shown no desire to take up such a role, partly 
because of its composition and partly on the assertion that the awards of the 
Tribunal are not subject to review. 
a- Following the hearing by Chamber Two of the Tribunal of some 
cases of dual nationality, particularly Esphahanian v Bank Tejarat65, it became 
obvious to Iran that the majority of the Chamber members tended to favour the 
application of the principle of effective nationality in deciding its jurisdiction 
with regard to this category of claims. The Chamber did actually favour this 
principle in this Case. Consequently, the Government of Iran filed a request for 
interpretation of the Claims Settlement Declaration concerning the issue. 66 It is 
obvious that an adverse decision by the Full Tribunal on the matter could have 
effectively undermined the validity of the Award of Chamber Two in the 
Esphahanian Case. This in effect proves the potential existing in the Tribunal 
for the practical exercise of the role of a review body. However, in the above 
Case the Full Tribunal did have the same opinion regarding the matter which 
had already been adopted by Chamber Two in the Esphahanian Case; that is, 
the principle of effective nationality was the applicable rule. 67 Obviously, the 
question for interpretation of the Algiers Accords is not taken up by the Full 
Tribunal normally as an exercise of the role of a review body. However, the 
Tribunal is clearly aware of the implications of its decisions. In fact, in our 
view it is the composition of the Full Tribunal, as being exclusively composed 
65 2 Iran-USCTR. p. 157. 
66 Case A/18,5 Iran-USCTR. p. 251. 
67 Ibid, pp. 259-266. 
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of the same members of the Chambers, which has principally prevented the 
adoption of a more flexible approach in adopting the role of a review body. 
b- In Case (A/20)68 the Full Tribunal was asked by Iran to give "the 
proper criteria for the proper application of Article VII of the Claims 
Settlement Declaration concerning the evidence required to establish the 
nationality of corporate claimants". 69 Apparently, by filing this request Iran 
intended to question the validity of an earlier Order made by Chamber One in 
Flexi-Van v Iran7° and in General Motors v Iran. 71 Such a result, however, 
depended upon the question of whether the Full Tribunal would give an 
interpretation contradicting those Orders. 
The Full Tribunal avoided Iran's question somehow, giving the 
impression that it did not favour questioning the propriety of the Chambers' 
decisions. The Tribunal said: 
It would seem that the request of Iran arises out of its 
dissatisfaction with the content of the Flexi-Van Order, and to a 
certain extent, its confirmation in the General Motors Order. 
Iran presents this Case as a question concerning the 
interpretation or application of the Declaration, raised pursuant 
to Article VI, paragraph 4. It is obvious, and both parties are in 
full agreement, that neither Article VI, paragraph 4, nor the 
Tribunal Rules provide for any kind of review by the Full 
Tribunal of Orders or Awards made by Chambers. To the 
contrary, Article IV, paragraph 1, which applies equally to 
actions by the Full Tribunal and the Chambers, states that "all 
decisions and awards of the Tribunal shall be final and binding". 
The only exception to this rule of finality are those contained in 
Articles 35 and 36 of the Tribunal Rules, dealing with 
interpretation and correction, which clearly do not apply here. 
In so far as Iran's case might be interpreted as a request 
for that Full Tribunal lay down a uniform rule of evidence 
applicable to the establishment of corporate nationality, the 
68 11 Iran-USCTR. p. 271. 
69 Ibid. 
70 Order of 15 December 1982, Chamber One, I Iran-USCTR. p. 455. See Dissenting 
Opinion of Judge Kashani, Iranian Arbitrator, Ibid, pp. 463-482. 
71 Order of 18 January 1983,3 Iran-USCTR. p. 1. 
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Tribunal holds that the request does not pose a question 
concerning the interpretation of the Declaration... 72 
With regard to Iran's request for interpretation of the term "capital 
stock" in Article VII, Paragraph 1 of the Claims Settlement Declaration, the 
Tribunal held that it included both voting and non-voting stock. 73 It is notable 
that in the Flexi-Van Order Chamber One had in fact issued a set of tests and 
criteria for the purpose of determining nationality of juridical persons. 74 In the 
same Order Chamber One indicated that only voting stock was taken as a basis 
for the purpose of determining corporate nationality. 75 
As the Iranian members in their Separate Opinion76 noted, the 
significance of the Full Tribunal's interpretation of "capital stock" as including 
both voting and non-voting stock was that it cast doubt on the validity of the 
earlier criteria laid down in the Orders made in the Flexi-Van and General 
Motors Cases. 77 
In general the attitude of the Full Tribunal in the above Case indicates 
its unwillingness to take up any kind of review of the decisions made by the 
Chambers. It might be true that the governing provisions of the Tribunal do not 
permit any kind of review of its decisions. On the other hand, the parties have a 
right to, and the Tribunal is bound to give its opinion on, a request for 
interpretation of the Algiers Accords. The fact that any such interpretation may 
effectively turn out to be a review of the Chambers' decisions, especially when 
72 11 Iran-USCTR. pp. 273-274. 
73 Ibid, p. 275. 
74 1 Iran-USCTR. 455, pp. 456-463. 
75 Ibid, p. 463. 
76 Separate Opinion Ansari, Bahrami and Mostafavi, Case A/20,11 Iran-USCTR. pp. 277- 
282. 
77 Ibid, p. 278. 
It is notable that Judge Brower, the American arbitrator, in his Separate Opinion 
pointed out that Iran's request was clearly nothing more than a request that the Full 
Tribunal overturn the Orders of Chamber One in Flexi-Van and General Motors. He 
argued that the CSD and the Tribunal Rules did not permit any such appeal. (Ibid, pp. 276- 
277. ) 
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it is in conflict with the decision of a particular Chamber, should not prevent 
the Tribunal from exercising its duties. 
c- A further example exists to show that the Tribunal has actually 
considered the propriety of an earlier decision made by Chamber Two. This 
Chamber gave the interpretation that after the resignation of a party-appointed 
member following a hearing (Cases 39 and 55) Article 13, Paragraph 5 of the 
Tribunal Rules 78 did not require the continued participation of the member 
who had resigned. 79 The majority of the members of Chamber Two8° argued 
that "in view of all the circumstances, including the latter's [arbitrator's] own 
plans and the presence of his successor, to require such continued participation 
would not advance the orderly functioning of the arbitral process in Cases 
concerned". 81 The Chamber, while expressing the belief that such a decision 
was most properly made by it, and noting a similar decision taken by the Full 
Tribuna182, nevertheless by memorandum of the Chairman addressed to the 
President requested the Full Tribunal to decide whether the decisions made and 
communicated to the parties in these Cases were within its jurisdiction. The 
Chairman's memorandum further declared that if the Tribunal were to decide 
that any of those decisions were not within the Chamber's jurisdiction, the 
Chamber would request the Tribunal to take the necessary decisions on any 
such matters. 83 
78 Article 13(5) of the Tribunal Rules provides that: 
"After the effective date of a member's resignation he shall 
continue to serve as a member of the Tribunal within respect to 
all cases in which he had participated in a hearing on the merits, 
and for that purpose shall be considered a member of the 
Tribunal instead of the person who replaces him. " 
79 Annual Report 87/88, p. 9. 
80 The Iranian Member of the Chamber dissented from the decision., Ibid. 
81 Ibid, p. 10. 
82 For the Report regarding this Decision of the Full Tribunal see, Ibid, p. 9. 
83 Ibid, p. 10. 
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The Full Tribunal decided on 8 November 1988 without meeting84 that 
the decisions made and communicated to the parties in Cases 39 and 55 were 
decisions within the jurisdiction of Chamber Two. 85 
It is obvious from the consideration of these Cases that the Full 
Tribunal has implicitly exercised the function of a review body regarding the 
decisions of the Chambers. However, it has not been willing to accept and 
broaden explicitly and effectively the exercise of that role. 
III(2). Revision of the Award 
Articles 35,36 and 37 of the Tribunal Rules make provisions for 
interpretation, correction and additional award respectively. Under Article 36 
the provision for the correction of award covers errors in computation, any 
clerical or typographical errors, or any errors of a similar nature. The provision 
for additional award is intended to cover claims presented in the arbitral 
proceedings but omitted from the award. 86 
Given the limited scope and somewhat administrative nature of the 
above-mentioned provisions, the Tribunal Rules obviously lack a 
comprehensive provision for revision of the award on relevant grounds such as 
discovery of some new and important fact regarding the award. This again 
arises from the fact that the UNCITRAL Rules by implication of their nature 
have intended to leave these matters to the courts of competent national 
jurisdiction. In the case of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal such a forum 
is not available for the reasons already explained. 
84 The Iranian members dissented from the decision of the Full Tribunal, Ibid. 
85 Ibid. 
86 Article 37 of the Tribunal Rules. 
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It is notable that the inclusion of a provision for the revision of award 
is recognized even in public international arbitration. For instance, Article 29 
of the Draft Convention of the ILC provides that: 
An application for the revision of the award may be made by 
either party on the ground of discovery of some fact of such a 
nature as to have a decisive influence on the award, provided 
that when the award was rendered that fact was unknown to the 
tribunal and to the party requesting revision and that such 
ignorance was not due to the negligence of the party requesting 
revision. 87 
It is significant that the above provision has been adopted along with the 
provision for the validity of the award to be challenged before the ICJ. That is, 
two separate remedies, though with different characteristics and fora, are 
provided under the ILC's Draft Convention. Any such provisions are lacking 
under the governing provisions of the Iran-US Claims Tribunal. 
In the absence of such provisions in the Tribunal's governing 
instruments and the non-availability of any forum outside the Tribunal, at least 
as far as the awards made against Iran are concerned, it is necessary to analyse 
the extent to which the Tribunal has been willing to utilize the provisions 
regarding interpretation, correction and additional award for the purpose of 
revision of the award if need be. 
In Morris v Iran88, the Claimant had moved Chamber One for 
"reconsideration" of its Award in which the Chamber had earlier dismissed his 
claim. 89 The Tribunal noted that: "... the Tribunal Rules do not permit such 
reconsideration in the circumstances present here. In order to promote the 
87 See also Article 38 of the Model Rules of the ILC for a similar effect; and Article 51 of the 
ICSID Convention for the provision regarding the revision of the award on grounds 
similar to Article 29 of the ILC Draft Convention. Article 51(3) of the ICSID Convention 
provides that the request for revision "shall, if possible, be submitted to the tribunal which 
rendered the award. If this shall not be possible, a new tribunal shall be constituted in 
accordance with Section 2 of the Chapter". 
88 16 September 1983,3 Iran-USCTR. p. 364. 
89 Ibid. 
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finality of Awards, the Tribunal Rules limit the powers of the Tribunal after an 
Award has been issued. Following issuance of an Award, the arbitrators may 
only" give an interpretation of their Award, or correct any errors in 
computation, any clerical or typographical errors, or any errors of similar 
nature, or make an additional Award as to claims presented in the arbitral 
proceedings but omitted from the award. 90 In the Tribunal's view Mr Morris's 
motion was not based on any of the circumstances covered by Articles 35,36 
and 37 of the Tribunal Rules. 91 
Chamber One further gave the opinion that "... no procedure for appeal 
from a Chamber to the Full Tribunal is provided in the Algiers Accords or the 
Tribunal Rules". 92 However, the Chamber hinted that the Tribunal might have 
an inherent power to review and revise an Award under exceptional 
circumstances, despite the absence of any express provision, e. g., when an 
Award was based on forged documents or perjury. 93 However, the Chamber 
pointed out, this was not the case before it. 94 
In Chas T. Main v Khusestan Water and Power Authority95, Chamber 
Two ruled that the Tribunal Rules did not provide for substantive 
reconsideration or revision of awards. 96 Similarly, in Dallal v Bank Mellat97 
the Claimant asked for "reconsideration" of the Award. In this Case98 Chamber 
Two decided that there was no provision for the revision of, or appeal from, an 
90 Ibid. 
91 Ibid. 
92 Ibid. 
93 Ibid, p. 365. 
94 Ibid. 
95 Order of 23 Nov. 1983,4 Iran-USCTR. P. 60. 
96 Ibid. 
97 Decision of 10 January 1984,5 Iran-USCTR. p. 74. 
98 Ibid. 
363 
Award of the Tribunal, or for the re-hearing of a Case in which an Award had 
been rendered, under the Tribunal Rules. 99 
In Dames and Moore v Iran100, on 20 December 1983, Chamber One 
rendered an Award against Iran for the payment of $108,435 to the 
Claimant. 101 Shortly after the Award was rendered the Government of Iran 
asked the Chamber to re-open the Case and reconsider the Award in the light of 
the Respondent's post-hearing submissions and on the grounds that the 
evidence and testimony upon which the Award of the Tribunal was based were 
perjured, and false. 102 Chamber One rejected the Respondent's reliance on 
Articles 15(1) and (2), 29(2), 35 and 37 of the Tribunal Rules as a proper basis 
for its request. 103 The Tribunal noted that none of these Articles constituted a 
grant of authority for the Tribunal to act as was requested. 104 Nevertheless, the 
Tribunal noted in dictum that: 
In the absence of an express grant of authority to the Tribunal to 
reopen and reconsider cases on the merits after issuance of an 
award, the question has been posed as to whether an "inherent 
power" to do so may exist under "exceptional circumstances", at 
least where an award "was based on forged documents or 
perjury" the implied or inherent power" of an international 
claims tribunal in this area is an issue which has been subject to 
learned analysis and limited judicial scrutiny, with wholly 
inconsistent results. The instant request for reopening and 
reconsideration, however, falls well short of justifying any such 
effort to ascertain the precise balance struck between finality of 
the Tribunal dispositions, on the one hand, and the integrity of 
its process on the other. "105 
99 Ibid. See also Woodward-Clyde Consultants v Iran (Ibid, p. 73) for a Case in which 
request for an additional Award was denied. 
100 4 Iran-USCTR. p. 212. 
101 Ibid. 
102 Decision of 17 April 1985,8 Iran-USCTR. 107, pp. 113-114. 
103 Ibid, p. 115. 
104 Ibid. 
105 Ibid, p. 117 (footnotes omitted). 
364 
Further, the Tribunal noted that the Respondent's reference to "forged 
documents" and "perjury" did not raise justified concern that the processes of 
the Tribunal had been subverted. 106 
In a more recent Case the Tribunal reaffirmed its earlier position on the 
matter. 107 The Respondent argued that the Interim Award made by Chamber 
One was based on an invalid consideration of law, in that it failed to give effect 
to the provisions of Article VII, Paragraph 2 of the CSD. 108 The motion was 
denied on the ground that there was no basis in the Tribunal's Rules of 
Procedure or elsewhere for review of an award on such grounds. 109 
In short, the practice of the Tribunal in these respects mostly favours 
the rule of finality of the award. The indication regarding the inherent power of 
arbitral tribunals to re-open the case in exceptional circumstances is a 
significant development. However, the Tribunal has not made any serious 
attempt to resolve the problems concerning the lack of relevant provisions for 
the revision of the award arising from the adoption of the UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules. 
106 Ibid, pp. 117-118. 
107 Panacaviar, S. A. v Iran, (10 Feb. 1987), 14 Iran-USCTR. p. 100. 
108 Ibid. nn. 100-101. 
109 Ibid, p. 101. 
For a similar decision and decisions concerning cases of interpretation, correction and 
additional Award, see generally: PepsiCo, Inc. v Iran, 19 December 1986,13 Iran- 
USCTR. 328, p. 329; Behring International, Inc. v Iranian Air Force, 3 May 1984,6 Iran- 
USCTR. p. 30; Westinghouse Electric Corp, v Iran, 17 October 1986,13 Iran-USCTR. p. 
93; Trustees of Columbia University v Iran, 1 July 1986,11 Iran-USCTR. p. 283; Kochler 
v Iran, 3 July 1986, Ibid, p. 285; Maccollough and Company v Ministry of Post, 7 July 
1986, Ibid, p. 287; and Bagell v Iran, 7 August 1986, Ibid, p. 300. 
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IV. The Role and Function of the Escrow Agent with Regard to 
the Validity of the Award 
It is now clear that in the course of the challenge of the Awards in the 
Dutch courts mentioned in Section B(II) of this Chapter, Iran tried to block the 
payment of these awards out of the Security Account. In other words, Iran tried 
to persuade the Banque Centrale d'Algerie, which is acting as the Escrow 
Agent for the Security Account, to refuse to forward payment instructions in 
these Cases. 110 to the N. V. Settlement Bank, in which the Security Account is 
held. 111 Apparently, Iran succeeded in delaying the payments for some months 
but at the end the Escrow Agent made the payments to the Claimants. 
Iran's argument put to the Escrow Agent appears to have been that these 
awards lacked the formal requirements for the validity of awards and therefore 
they should not be enforced. On another occasion Iran raised technical 
objections with the Escrow Agent regarding the voting and therefore the 
validity of the Decision of the Tribunal, i. e. in Case A/1 regarding the interest 
accrued on the Security Account. The Banque Centrale d'Algerie held up 
payments for approximately three months, until it convinced itself that the vote 
was proper. 112 In Case A/1 the Decision was reached by a majority of 5 to 4. 
The American Members, who voted with the majority, also filed a Separate 
Opinion stating that, while they concurred with the majority in order to form a 
majority, they felt that the interest should be left in the Security Account to pay 
awards rather than be kept in a separate account as the majority had ruled. 113 
110 W . T. Lake and 
Tucker Dana, op. cit. pp. 808-809. 
111 See generally, Paragraphs 6 and 7 of the General Declaration and the Technical 
Agreement of 17 August 1981, among Banque Centrale d'Algerie as Escrow Agent, Bank 
Markazi Iran, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York as Fiscal Agent of the U. S. and N. V. 
Settlement Bank of the Netherlands. (1 Iran-USCTR. p. 38). See, particularly, Clause 1(e) 
of the latter Agreement. 
112 WT Lake and Tucker Dana, op. cit. pp. 808-809. 
113 Case A/1,1 Iran-USCTR. 189, pp. 200-202. For a discussion on this Case see Supra 
Chapter 4, Section A, pp. 124-131. 
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The instances indicated above highlight the question of authority of the 
Escrow Agent with regard to the formal requirements regarding the validity of 
awards rendered by the Tribunal. Due to the novelty of the subject and its 
relationship to the question of review of the award, we will discuss it briefly. 
The function of escrow agent in the field of international arbitration as 
a mechanism for the payment of awards is quite unprecedented. In the field of 
private law the traditional use of the term "escrow" was defined as: 
A scroll or writing sealed and delivered to a person not a party 
thereto, to be held by him till some condition or conditions be 
performed by the party intended to be benefited thereby; and, on 
the fulfilment of those conditions, to be delivered to such party, 
and to take effect as a deed to all intents and purposes. 114; 
or in simple terms: 
A document which is intended to take effect as a deed when 
certain conditions have been fulfilled may be executed as an 
escrow. 115 
Today, however, "escrow" has acquired a much wider application. It 
may apply to money, company stock, securities and other items of property. It 
may be "a writing, deed, money, stock, or other property delivered by the 
grantor, promissor or obligor into the hands of a third party, to be held by the 
latter until the happening of a contingency or performance of a condition, and 
then by him delivered to the grantee, promisee or obligee. A system of 
document transfer in which a deed, bond, or fund is delivered to a third person 
to hold until all conditions in a contract are fulfilled; e. g., delivery of deed to 
escrow agent under instalment land sale contract until full payment for land is 
made". 116 
114 John B. Saunders, Mozley & Whitely's Law Dictionary, London Butterworths, 
1977, p. 121. 
115 John B. Saunders, Words and Phrases Legally Defined, 2nd Ed., Supplement 1986, 
London, Butterworths, p. 121. 
116 1bid, p. 122. 
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In the field of protection of foreign investment certain discussions have 
taken place regarding the incorporation of escrow into an investment protection 
mechanism. 117 However, the practical use and legal aspects of the powers and 
duties of the escrow agent have not been covered in these discussions. A 
private law analogy is not encouraging either. Certain cases concerning the 
issue relate to the traditional concept of escrow and even then do not say much 
on the topic in question. 118 
The question which arises from the role entrusted to the escrow agent is 
the nature and extent of the function to be performed by him in determining 
whether or not the condition or contingency upon which the delivery should 
take place has been fulfilled. In normal circumstances it may not be a difficult 
question. However, it may well be that the question of determination of the 
fulfilment of the conditions required becomes a complex one and involves a 
process of decision-making, though not necessarily in the judicial sense of the 
word. 
Clause 1(e)(i) of the Technical Agreement of 17 August 1981 provides 
that: 
The Escrow Agent shall instruct the Depositary to make 
payments to Federal Reserve as necessary for the execution of 
arbitral awards rendered in favour of US claimants by the 
Tribunal, promptly upon receipt from the President of the 
Tribunal of a notification that the Tribunal has rendered such an 
award, together with the identifying number of the claim, the 
name and address of the claimant, the amount of the award, 
including any interest thereon awarded by the Tribunal, and the 
identifying number of the award when issuing its instructions to 
the Depositary the Escrow Agent shall provide this information 
with respect to each award, and will sequentially number its 
instructions in the order of receipt of the notices from the 
Tribunal. 
117 See generally, Michael Kitay and Robert P. Trout, "Escrow: A Private Law Device 
Adopted for the Protection of Foreign Investment", 13 VirgJ. I. L. (1972), p. 48. 
118 E 
. g. 
Terrapin International, Ltd. v Inland Revenue Commissioners, [ 197612 All E. R. 461, 
pp. 465,466; and Alan Estates, Ltd. v W. G. Stores, Ltd. [ 198113 All E. R. 481, p. 486. 
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Clause 1(e)(iv) also provides: 
The escrow Agent may rely on and shall be protected in acting 
on any award notified to it by the President of the Tribunal in 
accordance with this clause 1(e) and reasonably believed by it to 
be genuine and to have been signed or dispatched by the 
appropriate person or persons of the Tribunal. 
Given the function entrusted to the Escrow Agent under the Technical 
Agreement and in general, the question is whether he has any duty or authority 
to check the validity of the award as to the formal requirements of making and 
signing, e. g., the number of signatures needed for the signing of the award. 
It is obvious that the Escrow Agent has no authority to verify the 
contents of the awards or the competence of the Tribunal. What can be inferred 
from the Technical Agreement is that the Escrow Agent has to have reason to 
believe that the notification made by the President of the Tribunal is genuine 
and has been signed and dispatched by the appropriate person or persons of the 
Tribunal. it is therefore questionable whether the Escrow Agent is authorized 
to look beyond what is required in that Agreement. 
It is beyond any doubt that in the circumstances where the validity of 
the award is questioned as regards its contents the Escrow Agent has no 
authority to verify that award. However, the Escrow Agent may be presented 
with the argument by Iran that the document of the award is lacking in validity 
as to the formal requirements for signing it by the members of the Tribunal; 
that is to say, the signature of a member of the Tribunal is absent from the 
award on the ground of his non-participation in the proceedings. Is the Escrow 
Agent authorized to test this question against the appropriate Rules of the 
Tribunal? An affirmative answer to the question entails a degree of authority 
for the Escrow Agent to interpret the Rules of the Tribunal. It can hardly be 
assumed that the Escrow Agent has such an authority. His powers appear to be 
limited to verifying the authenticity of the notification made to him by the 
President of the Tribunal. 
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Conclusion 
It is quite clear from the foregoing discussion that the legal possibility 
of nullity, invalidity and revision of arbitral awards has been, in principle and 
in practice, accepted in both private law and public international law. 
As to the procedural remedy for challenge or revision of non-public 
international awards, there is a mechanism in private law for setting aside of 
the award by recourse to the courts of the place of arbitration. Moreover, 
similar attempts can be made against the award in the courts of the country 
where recognition and enforcement is sought, in order to argue for the refusal 
of that request. 
In public international law there is no automatic procedural mechanism 
providing for the challenge or revision of the award within or outside the 
arbitral tribunal. The question largely depends on the arbitration agreement and 
the rules of procedure adopted for that purpose. However, many creditable 
rules do provide for a procedural system regarding the challenge or revision of 
the award. The ILC's Draft Convention and its Model Rules on Arbitral 
Procedure and the ICSID system offer significant examples of this kind. 
Moreover, given the single-case and ad hoc structure of most of the 
recent public international arbitration tribunals the absence of a procedural 
remedy provision may not pose a problem in those cases. However, in view of 
the multi-case and institutional structure of the Iran-US Claims Tribunal, the 
need for such provisions is obvious and the absence of them can be regarded as 
a structural defect. 
Furthermore, due to the absence of sanctions system for the 
enforcement of public international awards, the parties have in practice felt the 
need to negotiate over the objections of a dissatisfied party regarding the 
validity of the award, and to reach a settlement. This may not be desirable in 
principle. It is, nevertheless, a reality of the structure of public international 
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law. In the case of the Iran-US Claims Tribunal awards, Iran has been deprived 
of that bargaining position due to the existence of the Security Account. As a 
result, the American claimants have not felt any need to enter into any such 
negotiations. This might not have been a problem if there had been a security 
account equally applicable to the awards rendered against the American 
parties. This, however, is not the case. 
The problems arising from the lack of provisions for procedural 
remedies against the awards of the Tribunal can be attributed to two major 
factors: 1- The adoption of the CSD under extraordinary circumstances and 
within a short period of time, as a result of which the question of rules of 
procedure was relinquished to the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules; 2- The 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules are primarily designed for use in private 
arbitrations in the field of international commerce. It is not surprising that they 
are silent on the matter, because in arbitrations of that nature the lack of 
stipulation in regard to the remedies against the award does not deprive the 
party concerned of the right to challenge the award in the courts of the place of 
arbitration, or argue against its recognition and enforcement before the relevant 
national court. The adoption of the UNCITRAI Rules, with their inherent 
private law implications, by the public international structure of the Tribunal 
has created this gap. As a consequence, the question of procedural remedies 
against awards of the Tribunal has been left unanswered. 
Given the silence of the governing provisions on the matter in question, 
the Full Tribunal could have shown more flexibility in opening a forum within 
its structure for a degree of review of the Chambers' awards. The Full Tribunal 
has expressly refused to undertake that role, although certain examples 
demonstrate a practical but limited exercise of such a role. In any case, by way 
of its structure, in consisting of the same members of the Chambers, the Full 
Tribunal could hardly have qualified as a review body. 
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It is significant that the Tribunal has implicitly accepted that it may 
have an inherent power for revision of its awards in exceptional circumstances. 
In practice it has never conducted a full-scale revision of any one of its awards. 
The resultant situation is that due to the existence of the Security 
Account there is no forum for challenge or revision of the awards rendered 
against Iran. On the other hand, the American claimants, against whom 
counterclaim awards have been rendered, can in practice exercise a form of 
right to challenge the validity of these awards by way of arguing against their 
enforcement and recognition in the courts of the United States, or of other 
countries, where Iran has to seek their recognition and enforcement. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
CONCLUSION 
I. The historical background to the establishment of the Iran-United 
States Claims Tribunal demonstrates how the need for the submission of 
outstanding claims between the two Governments emerged. Not only did this 
solution help remove a major obstacle to the resolution of the hostage crisis; it 
also offered a reasonable and practical forum for the settlement of the claims. 
For in these circumstances of inflamed emotions and huge demands, neither 
the courts of the United states nor those of Iran could reasonably be expected to 
offer for totally unprejudiced legal proceedings. Thus the submission to 
arbitration was the most reasonable and acceptable option. This in itself is a 
great credit to international arbitration. 
However, given the extraordinary circumstances under which the two 
Governments' agreement to arbitrate was negotiated, many fundamental 
questions regarding the structure, function and jurisdiction of the Tribunal have 
been left unanswered. These deficiencies have had later consequences for the 
policies and function of the Tribunal. 
As we have stated earlier, international arbitration is a very complex 
subject. In a comprehensive arbitration such as the Iran-United States Claims 
Tribunal, essential issues concerning the arbitration, such as the basis of 
jurisdiction, the composition of the panel, the qualifications and background of 
the arbitrators, the designation of the Appointing Authority and the provision 
for judicial review of awards- all these need to be clearly defined beforehand. 
It might even be desirable to conclude relevant agreements with the country of 
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the place of arbitration in order to clarify the nature and nationality of the 
arbitration. 
In the absence of such detailed specifications in the Claims Settlement 
Declaration, these questions have been left to the UNCITRAL Arbitration 
Rules and to a certain extent to the Tribunal itself to decide. While the 
UNCITRAL Rules have acted as a useful basis for regulating the process of 
arbitration, they have shown a degree of conflict with many public 
international characteristics of the Tribunal, as regards the designation of the 
Appointing Authority, the possibility for judicial review of the awards, etc. 
Although the Claims Settlement Declaration provided for the 
possibility of modification of the UNCITRAL Rules by the Tribunal or by the 
two Governments, such modification by the parties has never taken place. The 
adjustments made by the Tribunal itself are not and could not be expected to 
touch upon the structural issues concerning its own composition, the role of the 
Full Tribunal, the designation of the Appointing Authority and other 
constitutional issues. These are necessarily matters for the Parties themselves. 
The failure of the Parties to modify the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules in 
relation to the above issues has arisen primarily from the refusal by the 
American Government to enter into any serious negotiations in this regard, 
obviously because the present state of the Rules has been more to its own 
advantage. 
In normal circumstances, the adoption of a comprehensive agreement 
and rules of procedure such as the ICSID system, with possibilities for the role 
of the President of the ICJ as the Appointing Authority, could have been 
useful. This belief is based on the fact that the Iran-United States Claims 
Tribunal and the ICSID arbitration have close similarities. They both have 
overwhelming public international features and a self-contained structure. The 
ILC's Model Rules or Draft Convention as a modifiable basis for the Rules of 
374 
the Tribunal could also have been a useful set of procedural criteria. It is 
significant that these Rules are principally designed for use in public 
international arbitration, provide for the role of the President of the ICJ as the 
Appointing Authority, and include clear provisions regarding the challenge and 
revision of the arbitral award. 
H. Added to its own peculiarities, the practice of the Tribunal throws 
fresh light on the theoretical arguments regarding the composition of and 
"politics" engendered by tripartite arbitral tribunals. Quite clearly, there are 
indications as to the formation of a majority for rendering an award which are 
dictated by the balancing of three different tendencies within the membership 
of the Chambers, rather than by purely legal considerations. Traditionally and 
theoretically, the "politics" dictated by the tripartite composition of arbitral 
tribunals has been attributed to the need for elliciting the consent of the loser 
party and providing the ground for the enforcement of the award by that party. 
That is why, it is argued, arbitration tribunals have usually attempted to explain 
the reasons for the award more extensively than normal domestic judgements. 
In the case of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal the "politics" created by 
the Tribunal's membership structure has operated to a certain degree. However, 
in regard to the awards rendered against Iran, because the Tribunal has been 
less concerned with the enforcement of its awards, due to the existence of the 
Security Account, the scope of operation of such "politics" has been 
comparatively limited, confined only to certain occasions concerning serious 
strategic and politically sensitive decisions. 
The assessment of the role of Party-appointed arbitrators of both Iran 
and the United States again demonstrates the gap between the reality of their 
function and the theoretical assumptions of especially those who refuse to 
accept this fact. The attitude, conduct and voting behaviour of the Party- 
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appointed arbitrators in the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal are by no 
means on a comparable scale with what could be expected of neutral members. 
Obviously, this has implications for the judicial nature of the arbitration 
process as well. 
The reality is that States and other arbitrating parties alike have been 
more willing to submit to an arbitration mechanism composed of a tripartite 
structure rather than other forms of arbitral tribunals. This should not be 
regarded as totally undermining the role of law in the arbitral process. 
However, it should be accepted that the process is to a certain degree 
influenced by the partisan voting of the party-appointed arbitrators. In an ideal 
situation the submission to an arbitral tribunal composed predominantly of 
neutral members might be more desirable. In the absence of that, one should be 
prepared to accept the implications inherent in the system of tripartite arbitral 
tribunal. 
The theory and practice proves that the cultural-legal training of the 
international judge is of considerable relevance to the process and outcome of 
international adjudication. This principle has been reaffirmed by the Statute 
and practice of the International Court of Justice. Moreover, it is a basic and 
characteristic feature and an advantage of submission to international 
arbitration, that judges selected from different legal-cultural environments 
should decide the dispute. 
The above-mentioned principle has clearly not been applied in the Iran- 
US Claims Tribunal regarding the appointment of neutral members. Despite 
the frequent changes made in the composition of the neutral members of the 
Tribunal, all of them have been appointed from Western European countries. In 
other words, not a single judge from other parts of the world has been allowed 
by the American Government to be appointed as a neutral member of the 
Tribunal. Thus it can be safely assumed that by way of legal-cultural 
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background the Western European members have had closer identity with the 
American expectations and the American arbitrators than with the Iranian 
members. Moreover, it implies that in the view of the American Government 
and of its arbitrators the appointment of an arbitrator with a different 
nationality and legal-cultural training could have been influential on the 
outcome of the arbitration. That is, it could have been influential on the 
adoption of policies possibly other than those already adopted under the 
present structure of the neutral members. 
The success of the American Government in excluding neutral 
members from parts of the world other than Western Europe lies in the 
combined effect of the existence of the Security Account and the provision 
regarding the designation of the Appointing Authority in the UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules. Due to the existence of the Security Account the Iranian 
Government's bargaining position has been limited, since it has at least partly 
secured Iran's continued participation in the arbitration. Moreover, the 
Appointing Authority selected by the Secretary-General of the PCA has not 
shown any real understanding of the need for diversity of legal-cultural training 
for the neutral members of the Tribunal. 
The instances indicated above and certain other examples referred to in 
this study clearly demonstrate the effect of the Security Account beyond what 
it actually was intended for, namely the enforcement of awards against Iran. 
The existence of the Security Account has, to a certain extent, altered the 
traditional and characteristic aspects of international arbitration, at least as far 
as Iran is concerned. 
As a consequence of the predominantly Western structure of the 
Tribunal, through, its neutral members, the awards and decisions of the 
Tribunal in particularly controversial areas fail to represent a universal view of 
the problem. For instance, in regard to the various cases of nationalization, 
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there are no contributions based on recent developments in law in this respect. 
These decisions are principally representative of the views of the European and 
American publicists. 
HI. As regards the appropriate remedy against the withdrawal of a 
party-appointed arbitrator from the proceedings in a tripartite arbitral tribunal, 
the theory and practice are evenly divided. There is no doubt that the malicious 
withdrawal of a party-appointed arbitrator on the instructions of his 
government engages the international responsibility of that State. The question 
is, however, whether this responsibility confers an automatic right and 
competence on the remaining members of the arbitral tribunal to continue the 
proceedings in the absence of a party-appointed arbitrator. This is not clearly 
established. 
Moreover, the historical evolution of the notion of third-party 
appointment of arbitrators, particularly that of the party-appointed arbitrators, 
suggests that this solution has been developed in response to the possibility of 
frustration of arbitration by such actions as withdrawal, resignation etc. This 
development shows that in almost all of the arbitration agreements made so far 
the parties have never contemplated the idea of authorizing the remaining 
members of the arbitral tribunal to continue in the absence of the withdrawing 
arbitrator. Instead, the parties have developed a system for the third-party 
appointment and replacement of such arbitrator. This proves that the latter 
solution has been adopted as a generally preferred alternative to the solution of 
authorizing the remaining members to continue. In other words, by the 
adoption of the third-party replacement solution the parties have implicitly 
rejected the option of authorizing the remaining members to proceed. 
Moreover, the aim of this replacement mechanism is to maintain the carefully 
balanced equilibrium in the composition of the arbitral tribunal. 
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However, we should not take lightly the argument regarding the 
continuing function and multi-case structure of the Iran-US Claims Tribunal, 
which is advanced in support of the authority of the remaining members to 
continue the proceedings in the absence of the withdrawing arbitrator. 
Nevertheless, the reality is that the decision of the remaining members of the 
Tribunal to proceed in the absence of the Iranian member of the Chamber 
concerned has some connection with the existence of the Security Account. In 
other words, on the assumption of the absence of the Security Account system, 
the need for cooperation and enforcement of the award by the withdrawing 
arbitrator's party would have been greater. It is not clear whether in such 
circumstances the remaining members would have taken the risk of proceeding 
with the case. In other words, the Iran-U. S. Claims Tribunal's experience in 
this respect constitutes a special case. 
It has to be accepted that in abstract theoretical terms the argument in 
support of the authority of an incomplete tribunal based on the doctrine of non- 
frustration and State responsibility is very sound and reasonable. What is 
important, however, is that the strength of that theory is not fully matched by 
the practice of arbitration. Moreover, the theoretical argument should be read 
in connection with the special characteristics and structure of international 
arbitral tribunals, particularly in regard to the need for equilibrium in the 
composition of the tribunal with respect to both parties. That is why almost all 
arbitration instruments have adopted the solution of enforced replacement by a 
third party in response to the problem of frustration of arbitration. 
IV. Given the multiplicity of cases involved before the Tribunal 
appropriate procedural remedies, both inside and outside the Tribunal against 
its awards are clearly lacking. The need for the finality of the award is 
understandable. It is acceptable for that reason to restrict the right of appeal 
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against the award. This does not, however, extend to the remedies against 
invalid and deficient awards. The lack of such procedural remedies arises 
partly from the conflict involved in the adoption of a commercial arbitration set 
of rules for a tribunal which is exercising a public international function and 
against the awards of which no private law remedies are available. 
For the reason explained above, no clear mechanism inside the Tribunal 
has existed for review of the Tribunal's awards. It is obvious that a review body 
should be composed of judges other than the Tribunal whose decision is the 
subject of review. This characteristic has been, in principle, lacking in the Full 
Tribunal. For the same reason and because the Full Tribunal has not 
approached the topic of review as liberally as it has done with some similarly 
ambiguous and difficult questions 1, it has not seriously exercised that role with 
regard to the awards of the Chambers. The result is that , 
for instance, while in 
certain cases it has become obvious that the policy adopted by a Chamber has 
conflicted with that of the Full Tribunal2, no possibility has been created to 
overturn the Chamber's decision. 
V. Generally speaking, the submission of disputes to arbitration has 
served a good purpose. Given the continued inter-governmental tension 
between Iran and the United States, the reference to arbitration is the most 
conceivable option by which the parties could have resolved these disputes. By 
the submission of the disputes to arbitration, Iran has been able to get most of 
its assets released from the American freeze action. Moreover, a large number 
of outstanding claims between the two countries have been settled which 
would otherwise have kept the parties engulfed in protracted legal processes in 
the courts of various countries. 
1 See, for instance, Case A/I, decision regarding interest earned on the Security Account, 30 
July 1982,1 Iran-USCTR. p. 189; and Case A/18,5 Iran-USCTR. p. 251. 
2 Sec Supra, Chapter Six, pp. 358-359, regarding the Decision in Case A/20. 
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The fact that the Tribunal has survived the tension during these years is 
a positive sign. However, its work is by no means over yet. A large bulk of 
small claims remains unsettled. Further, there are about a hundred sensitive and 
major claims of dual nationals and a similar number of other important Cases 
which are still pending. 3 In addition, a number of important intergovernmental 
claims, "A" and "B" cases remain to be decided. All these may take some years 
of work for the Tribunal. Most important of all, the biggest test for the Tribunal 
is still ahead. Notably, in Case (B-1)4, Iran has sought $11 billion from the 
United States for military equipment purchases and related services. In fact, in 
addition to the existence of the Security Account, it is believed that the 
potential recovery from this claim has contributed to Iran's continued 
participation in the Tribunal. 5 Given the magnitude of the amount involved and 
the political circumstances surrounding it, this Case is indeed one of the 
biggest tests for the Tribunal and for international arbitration. In addition, it is a 
test for sincerity of the United States as regards its claim of respect for the 
arbitral processes of the Tribunal. 
Finally, despite a number of controversial decisions made by the 
Tribunal, the role and contribution of the Tribunal in both areas of public 
international and commercial international arbitration are very significant, and 
as a whole, representative of a unique experience in contemporary international 
arbitration. 
3 Sec Charles N. Brower and Mark D. Davis, The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal After 
Seven Years: A Retrospective View from the Inside", 43(4) ArbJ. (Dec. 1988), 16, p. 27. 
4 See Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States, Interlocutory Award No. ITL 60-B1- 
FT, (April 4,1986), 10 Iran-USCTR. p. 207. 
5 Sec Charles Brower and Mark Davis, op. cit_ p. 28. 
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APPENDIX ONE 
GENERAL DECLARATION 
DECLARATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE 
DEMOCRATIC AND POPULAR REPUBLIC OF ALGERIA 
(General Declaration), 19 January 1981 
The Government of the Democratic and Popular 
Republic of Algeria, having been requested by the Governments 
of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States of America 
to serve as an intermediary in seeking a mutually acceptable 
solution of the crisis in their relations arising out of the 
detention of the 52 United States nationals in Iran, has consulted 
extensively with the two governments as to the commitments 
which each is willing to make in order to resolve the crisis 
within the framework of the four points stated in the Resolution 
of November 2,1980, of the Islamic Consultative Assembly of 
Iran. On the basis of formal adherences received from Iran and 
the United States, the Government of Algeria now declares that 
the following interdependent commitments have been made by 
the two governments: 
General Principles 
The undertakings reflected in this Declaration are based on the 
following principles: 
A. Within the framework of and pursuant to the provisions 
of the two Declarations of the Government of the Democratic 
and Popular Republic of Algeria, the United States will restore 
the financial position of Iran, in so far as possible, to that which 
existed prior to November 14,1979. In this context, the United 
States commits itself to ensure the mobility and free transfer of 
all Iranian assets within its jurisdiction, as set forth in 
Paragraphs 4-9. 
B. It is the purpose of both parties, within the framework of 
and pursuant to the provisions of the two Declarations of the 
Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of 
Algeria, to terminate all litigation as between the government of 
each party and the nationals of the other, and to bring about the 
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settlement and termination of all such claims through binding 
arbitration. Through the procedures provided in the Declaration 
relating to the Claims Settlement Agreement, the United States 
agrees to terminate all proceedings in United States courts 
involving claims of United States persons and institutions 
against Iran and its state enterprises, to nullify all attachments 
and judgements obtained therein, to prohibit all further litigation 
based on such claims, and to bring about the termination of such 
claims through binding arbitration. 
POINT I: NON-INTERVENTION IN IRANIAN AFFAIRS 
1. The United States pledges that it is and from now on will 
be the policy of the United States not to intervene, directly or 
indirectly, politically or militarily, in Iran's internal affairs. 
POINTS II AND III: RETURN OF IRANIAN ASSETS AND 
SETTLEMENT OF U. S. CLAIMS 
2. Iran and the United States (hereinafter "the parties" will 
immediately select a mutually agreeable Central Bank 
(hereinafter "the Central Bank") to act, under the instructions of 
the Government of Algeria and the Central Bank (hereinafter 
"the Algerian Central Bank") as depositary of the escrow and 
security funds hereinafter prescribed and will promptly enter 
into depositary arrangements with the Central Bank in 
accordance with the terms of this Declaration. All funds placed 
in escrow with the Central Bank pursuant to this Declaration 
shall be held in an account in the name of the Algerian Central 
Bank. Certain procedures for implementing the obligations set 
forth in this Declaration and in the Declaration of the 
Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria Concerning the 
Settlement of Claims by the Government of the United States 
and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran (hereinafter 
"the Claims Settlement Agreement") are separately set forth in 
certain Undertakings of the Government of the United States of 
America and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran 
with Respect to the Declaration of the Democratic and Popular 
Republic of Algeria. 
3. The depositary arrangements shall provide that, in the 
event that the Government of Algeria certifies to the Algerian 
Central Bank that the 52 U. S. nationals have safely departed 
from Iran, the Algerian Central Bank will thereupon instruct the 
Central Bank to transfer immediately all monies or other assets 
in escrow with the Central Bank pursuant to this Declaration, 
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provided that at any time prior to the making of such 
certification by the Government of Algeria, each of the two 
parties, Iran and the United States, shall have the right on 
seventy-two hours notice to terminate its commitments under 
this Declaration. If such notice is given by the United States and 
the foregoing certification is made by the Government of 
Algeria within the seventy-two hour period of notice, the 
Algerian Central Bank will thereupon instruct the Central Bank 
to transfer such monies and assets. If the seventy-two hour 
period of notice by the United States expires without such a 
certification having been made, or if the notice of termination is 
delivered by Iran, the Algerian Central Bank will thereupon 
instruct the Central Bank to return all such monies and assets to 
the United States, and thereafter the commitments reflected in 
this Declaration shall be of no further force or effect. 
Assets in the Federal Reserve Bank 
4. Commencing upon completion of the requisite escrow 
arrangements with the Central Bank, the United States will 
bring about the transfer to the Central Bank of all gold bullion 
which is owned by Iran and which is in the custody of the 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York, together with all Iranian 
assets (or the cash equivalent thereof) in the custody of the 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York, to be held by the Central 
Bank in escrow until such time as their transfer or return is 
required by Paragraph 3 above. 
Assets in Foreign Branches of U. S. Banks 
5. Commencing upon the completion of the requisite 
escrow arrangements with the Central Bank, the United States 
will bring about the transfer to the Central Bank, to the account 
of the Algerian Central Bank, of all Iranian deposits and 
securities which on or after November 14,1979, stood upon the 
books of overseas banking offices of U. S. banks, together with 
interest thereon through December 31,1980, to be held by the 
Central Bank, to the account of the Algerian Central Bank, in 
escrow until such time as their transfer or return is required in 
accordance with Paragraph 3 of this Declaration. 
Assets in U. S. Branches of U. S Banks 
6. Commencing with the adherence by Iran and the United 
States to this Declaration and the Claims Settlement Agreement 
attached hereto, and following the conclusion of arrangements 
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with the Central Bank, for the establishment of the interest- 
bearing Security Account specified in that Agreement and 
Paragraph 7 below, which arrangements will be concluded 
within 30 days from the date of this Declaration, the United 
States will act to bring about the transfer to the Central Bank, 
within six months from such date, of all Iranian deposits and 
securities in U. S. banking institutions in the United States, 
together with interest thereon, to be held by the Central Bank in 
escrow until such time as their transfer or return is required by 
Paragraph 3. 
7. As funds are received by the Central Bank pursuant to 
Paragraph 6 above, the Algerian Central Bank shall direct the 
Central Bank to (1) transfer one-half of each such receipt to Iran 
and (2) place the other half in a special interest-bearing Security 
Account in the Central Bank, until the balance in the Security 
Account has reached the level of U. S. $1 billion. After the U. S. 
$1 billion balance has been achieved, the Algerian Central Bank 
shall direct all funds received pursuant to Paragraph 6 to be 
transferred to Iran. All funds in the Security Account are to be 
used for the sole purpose of securing the payment of, and 
paying, claims against Iran in accordance with the Claims 
Settlement Agreement. Whenever the Central Bank shall 
thereafter notify Iran that the balance in the Security Account 
has fallen below U. S. $500 million, Iran shall promptly make 
new deposit sufficient to maintain a minimum balance of $500 
million in the Account. The Account shall be so maintained 
until the President of the Tribunal established pursuant to the 
Claims Settlement Agreement has certified the Central Bank of 
Algeria that all tribunal awards against Iran have been satisfied 
in accordance with the Claims Settlement Agreement, at which 
point any amount remaining in the Security Account shall be 
transferred to Iran. 
Other Assets in the U. S and Abroad 
8. Commencing with the adherence of Iran and the United 
States to this Declaration and the attached Claims Settlement 
Agreement and the conclusion of arrangements for the 
establishment of the Security Account, which arrangements will 
be concluded within 30 days from the date of this Declaration, 
the United States will act to bring about the transfer to the 
Central Bank of all Iranian financial assets (meaning funds or 
securities) which are located in the United States and abroad, 
apart from those assets referred to in Paragraphs 5 and 6 above, 
to be held by the Central Bank in escrow until their transfer or 
return is required by Paragraph 3 above. 
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9. Commencing with the adherence by Iran and the United 
States to this Declaration and the attached Settlement 
Agreement and the making by the Government of Algeria of 
the certification described in Paragraph 3 above, the United 
States will arrange, subject to the provisions of U. S. law 
applicable prior to November 14,1979, for the transfer to Iran 
of all Iranian properties which are located in the United States 
and abroad and which are not within the scope of the preceding 
paragraphs. 
Nullification of Sanctions and Claims 
10. Upon the making by the Government of Algeria of the 
certification described in Paragraph 3 above, the United States 
will revoke all trade sanctions which were directed against Iran 
in the period November 4,1979, to date. 
11. Upon the making by the Government of Algeria of the 
certification described in Paragraph 3 above, the United States 
will promptly withdraw all claims now pending against Iran 
before the International Court of Justice and will thereafter bar 
and preclude the prosecution against Iran of any pending or 
future claim of the United STates or a United States national 
arising out of events occurring before the date of this 
Declaration related to (A) the seizure of the 52 United States 
nationals on November 4,1979, (B) their subsequent detention, 
(C) injury to United States property or property of United States 
nationals within the United States Embassy compound in 
Tehran after November 3,1979, and (D) injury to the United 
States nationals or their property as a result of popular 
movements in the course of the Islamic Revolution in Iran 
which were not an act of the Government of Iran. The United 
States will also bar and preclude the prosecution against Iran in 
the courts of the United States of any pending or future claim 
asserted by persons other than the United States nationals 
arising out of the events specified in the preceding sentence. 
POINT IV: RETURN OF THE ASSETS OF THE FAMILY OF 
THE FORMER SHAH 
12. Upon the making by the Government of Algeria of the 
certification described in Paragraph 3 above, the United States 
will freeze, and prohibit any transfer of, property and assets in 
the United States within the control of the estate of the former 
Shah or of any close relative of the former Shah served as a 
defendant in U. S. litigation brought by Iran to recover such 
property and assets belonging to Iran. As to any such defendant, 
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including the estate of the former Shah, the freeze order will 
remain in effect until such litigation is finally terminated. 
Violation of the freeze order shall be subject to the civil and 
criminal penalties prescribed by U. S. law. 
13. Upon the making of the Government of Algeria of the 
certification described in Paragraph 3 above, the United States 
will order all persons within the U. S. jurisdiction to report to the 
U. S. Treasury within 30 days, for transmission to Iran, all 
information known to them, as of November 3.1979, and as of 
the date of the order, with respect to the property and assets 
referred to in Paragraph 12. Violation of the requirement will be 
subject to the civil and criminal penalties prescribed by U. S. 
law. 
14. Upon the making by the Government of Algeria of the 
certification described in Paragraph 3 above, the United States 
will make known, to all appropriate U. S. courts, that in any 
litigation of the kind described in Paragraph 12 above the claims 
of Iran should not be considered legally barred either by 
sovereign immunity principles or by the act of state doctrine and 
that Iranian decrees and judgements relating to such assets 
should be enforced by such courts in accordance with United 
States law. 
15. As to any judgement of a U. S. court which calls for the 
transfer of any property or assets to Iran, the United States 
hereby guarantees the enforcement of the final judgement to the 
extent that the property or assets exists within the United States. 
16. If any dispute arises between the parties as to whether 
the United States has fulfilled any obligation imposed upon it by 
Paragraphs 12-15, inclusive, Iran may submit the dispute to 
binding arbitration by the tribunal established by, and in 
accordance with the provisions of, the Claims Settlement 
Agreement. If the tribunal determines that Iran has suffered a 
loss as a result of a failure by the United States to fulfil such 
obligation, it shall make an appropriate award in favour of Iran 
which may be enforced by Iran in the courts of any nation in 
accordance with its laws. 
SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES 
17. If any other dispute arises between the parties as to the 
interpretation or performance of any provision of this 
Declaration, either party may submit the dispute to binding 
arbitration by the tribunal established by, and in accordance 
with the provisions of, the Claims Settlement Agreement. Any 
387 
decision of the tribunal with respect to such dispute, including 
any award of damages to compensate for a loss resulting from a 
breach of this Declaration or the Claims Settlement Agreement, 
may be enforced by the prevailing party in the courts of any 
nation in accordance with its laws. 
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APPENDIX TWO 
CLAIMS SETTLEMENT DECLARATION 
DECLARATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE 
DEMOCRATIC AND POPULAR REPUBLIC OF ALGERIA 
CONCERNING THE SETTLEMENT OF CLAIMS BY THE 
GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC 
OF IRAN (Claims Settlement Declaration), 19 January 1981 
The Government of the Democratic and Popular 
Republic of Algeria, on the basis of formal notice of adherence 
received from the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran 
and the Government of the United States of America, now 
declares that Iran and the United States have agreed as follows: 
Article I 
Iran and the United States will promote the settlement of 
the claims described in Article II by the parties directly 
concerned. Any such claims not settled within six months from 
the date of entry into force of this Agreement shall be submitted 
to binding third-party arbitration in accordance with the terms of 
this Agreement. The aforementioned six months' period may be 
extended once by three months at the request of either party. 
Article II 
1. An international arbitral tribunal (the Iran-United States 
Claims Tribunal) is hereby established for the purpose of 
deciding claims of nationals of the United States against Iran 
and claims of nationals of Iran against the United States, and 
any counterclaim which arises out of the same contract, 
transaction or occurrence that constitutes the subject matter of 
that national's claim, if such claims and counter-claims are 
outstanding on the date of this Agreement, whether or not filed 
with any court, and arise out of debts, contracts (including 
transactions which are the subject of letters of credit or bank 
guarantees), expropriations or other measures affecting property 
rights, excluding claims described in Paragraph 11 of the 
Declaration of the Government of Algeria of January 19,1981 
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and claims arising out of the actions of the United States in 
response to the conduct described in such paragraph, and 
excluding claims arising under a binding contract between the 
parties specifically providing that any disputes thereunder shall 
be within the sole jurisdiction of the competent Iranian courts, 
in response to the Majlis position. 
2. The Tribunal shall also have jurisdiction over official 
claims of the United States and Iran against each other arising 
out of contractual arrangements between them for the purchase 
and sale of goods and services. 
3. The Tribunal shall have jurisdiction, as specified in 
Paragraphs 16-17 of the Declaration of the Government of 
Algeria of January 19,1981, over any dispute as to the 
interpretation or performance of any provision of that 
Declaration. 
Article III 
1. The Tribunal shall consist of nine members or such 
larger multiple of three as Iran and the United States may agree 
are necessary to conduct its business expeditiously. Within 
ninety days after the entry into force of this Agreement, each 
government shall appoint one-third of the members. Within 
thirty days after their appointment, the members so appointed 
shall by mutual agreement select the remaining third of the 
members and appoint one of the remaining President of the 
Tribunal. Claims may be decided by the full Tribunal or by a 
panel of the three members of the Tribunal as the President shall 
determine. Each such panel shall be composed by the President 
and shall consist of one member appointed by each of the three 
methods set forth above. 
2. Members of the Tribunal shall be appointed and the 
Tribunal shall conduct its business in accordance with the 
arbitration rules of the United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) except to the extent 
modified by the Parties or by the Tribunal to ensure that this 
Agreement can be carried out. The UNCITRAL rules for 
appointing members of three-member tribunals shall apply 
mutatis mutandis to the appointment of the Tribunal. 
3. Claims of nationals of the United States and Iran that are 
within the scope of this Agreement shall be presented to the 
Tribunal either by the claimants themselves or, in the case of 
claims of less than $250,000, by the government of such 
national. 
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4. No claim may be filed with the Tribunal more than one 
year after the entry into force of this Agreement or six months 
after the date the President is appointed whichever is later. 
These deadlines do not apply to the procedures contemplated by 
Paragraphs 16 and 17 of the Declaration of the Government of Algeria of January 19,1981. 
Article IV 
1. All decisions and awards of the Tribunal shall be final 
and binding. 
2. The President of the Tribunal shall certify, as prescribed 
in Paragraph 7 of the Declaration of the Government of Algeria 
of January 19,1981, when all arbitral awards under the 
Agreement have been satisfied. 
3. Any award which the Tribunal may render against either 
Government shall be enforceable against such Government in 
the courts of any nation in accordance with its laws. 
Article V 
The Tribunal shall decide all cases on the basis of 
respect for law, applying such choice of law rules and principles 
of commercial and international law as the Tribunal determines 
to be applicable, taking into account relevant usages of trade, 
contract provisions and changed circumstances. 
Article VI 
1. The seat of the Tribunal shall be The Hague, The 
Netherlands, or any other place agreed by Iran and the United 
States. 
2. Each government shall designate an Agent at the seat of 
the Tribunal to represent it to the Tribunal and to receive notices 
or other communications directed to it or to its nationals, 
agencies, instrumentalities, or entities in connection with 
proceedings before the Tribunal. 
3. The expenses of the Tribunal shall be borne equally by 
the two governments 
4. Any question concerning the interpretation or 
application of this Agreement shall be decided by the Tribunal 
upon the request of either Iran or the United States. 
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Article VII 
For the purpose of this Agreement: 
1. A "national" of Iran or of the United States, as the case 
may be, means (a) a natural person who is a citizen of Iran or 
the United States; and (b) a corporation or other legal entity 
which is organized under the laws of Iran or the United States or 
any of its states or territories, the District of Columbia or the 
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, if, collectively, natural persons 
who are citizens of such country hold, directly or indirectly, an 
interest in such entity equivalent to fifty per cent or more of its 
capital stock. 
2. "Claims of nationals" of Iran or the United States, as the 
case may be, means claims owned continuously, from the date 
on which the claim arose to the date on which this Agreement 
enters into force, by nationals of that state, including claims that 
are owned indirectly by such nationals, collectively, were 
sufficient at the time the claim arose to control the corporation 
or other entity, and provided , further, that the corporation or 
other entity is not itself entitled to bring a claim under the terms 
of this Agreement. Claims referred to the arbitration Tribunal 
shall, as of the date of filing of such claims with the Tribunal, be 
considered excluded from the jurisdiction of the courts of Iran, 
or of the United States, or of any other court. 
3. "Iran" means the Government of Iran, any political 
subdivision of Iran, and any agency, instrumentality, or entity 
controlled by the Government of Iran or any political 
subdivision of thereof. 
4. The "United States" means the Government of the 
United States, any political subdivision of the United States, and 
any agency, instrumentality or entity controlled by the United 
States or any political subdivision thereof. 
Article VIII 
This Agreement shall enter into force when the 
Government of Algeria has received from both Iran and the 
United States a notification of adherence to the Agreement. 
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APPENDIX THREE 
UNDERTAKINGS 
UNDERTAKINGS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE GOVERNMENT 
OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN IN RESPECT TO 
THE DECLARATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE 
DEMOCRATIC AND POPULAR REPUBLIC OF ALGERIA 
(The Undertakings), 19 January 1981 
1. At such time as the Algerian Central Bank notifies the 
Governments of Algeria, Iran and the United States that it has 
been notified by the Central Bank that the Central Bank has 
received for deposit in dollar, gold bullion, and securities 
accounts in the name of the Algerian Central Bank, as escrow 
agent, cash and other funds, 1,632,917.779 ounces of gold 
(valued by the parties for this purpose at U. S. $0.9397 billion), 
and securities (at face value) in the aggragate amount of 
U. S. $7.955 billion, Iran shall immediately bring about the safe 
departure of 52 U. S. nationals detained in Iran. Upon the 
making by the Government of Algeria of the certification 
described in Paragraph 3 of the Declaration, the Algerian 
Central Bank will issue the instructions required by the 
following paragraph. 
2. Iran having affirmed its intention to pay all its debts and 
those of its controlled institutions, the Algerian Central Bank 
acting pursuant to Paragraph 1 above will issue the following 
instructions to the Central Bank: 
(A) To transfer U. S. $3.667 billion to the Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York to pay the unpaid principal of and interest 
through December 31,1980 on (1) all loans and credits made by 
a syndicate of banking institutions, of which a U. S. banking 
institution is a member, to the Government of Iran, its agencies, 
instrumentalities or controlled entities, and (2) all loans and 
credits made by such a syndicate which are guaranteed by the 
Government of Iran or any of its agencies, instrumentalities or 
controlled entities. 
(B) To retain U. S. $1.418 billion in the Escrow Account for 
the purpose of paying unpaid principal of and interest owing, if 
393 
any, on the loans and credits referred to in Paragraph (A) after 
application of the U-S. $3.667 billion and on all other 
indebtedness held by United States banking institutions of, or 
guaranteed by, the Government of Iran, its agencies, 
instrumentalities or controlled entities not previously paid, and 
for the purpose of paying disputed amounts of deposits, assets, 
and interests, if any, owing on Iranian deposits in U. S. banking 
institutions. Bank Markazi and the appropriate United States 
banking institutions shall promptly meet in an effort to agree 
upon the amounts owing. In the event of such agreement, the 
Bank Markazi and the appropriate banking institution shall 
certify the amount owing to the Central Bank of Algeria which 
shall instruct the Bank of England to credit such amount to the 
account, as appropriate, of the Bank Markazi or the Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York in order to permit payment to the 
appropriate banking institution. In the event that within 30 days 
any U. S. banking institution and the Bank Markazi are unable 
to agree upon the amounts owed, either party may refer such 
dispute to binding arbitration by such international arbitration 
panel as the parties may agree, or failing such agreement within 
30 days additional days after such reference, by the Iran-United 
STates Claims Tribunal. The presiding officer of such panel or 
tribunal shall certify to the Central Bank of Algeria the amount, 
if any, determined by it to be owed, whereupon the Centr-al 
Bank of Algeria shall instruct the Bank of England to credit 
such amount to the account of the Bank Markazi or of the 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York in order to permit payment 
to the appropriate banking institution. After all disputes are 
resolved either by agreement or by arbitration award and 
appropriate payment has been made, the balance of the funds 
referred to in this Paragraph (B) shall be paid to Bank Markazi. 
(C) To transfer immediately to, or upon the order of, the 
Bank Markazi all assets in the Escrow Account in excess of the 
amounts referred to in Paragraphs (A) and (B). 
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The Deputy Secretary of State 
Washington 
Algiers, 
January 19th, 1981 
Dear Mr Minister, 
You have drawn my attention to the omission of the words "not 
less than" before the figure of U. S. $7.955 in the Declaration of 
the Governments of Algeria designated: "Undertakings of the 
Government of the United States of America and the 
Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran with respect to the 
Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular 
Republic of Algeria". 
I agree and authorize you on behalf of the United States to issue 
this correction. 
Sincerely yours, 
(Sgd. ) Warren M. Christopher 
Mr. M. Benyahia 
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Government of the 
Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria 
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APPENDIX FOUR 
IRAN-UNITED STATES CLAIMS TRIBUNAL RULES OF 
PROCEDURE 
3 May 1983 
INTRODUCTION AND DEFINITIONS 
1. The Tribunal Rules which follow are organized in the following manner: 
- First, as to each Article, the text of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules is set forth. 
- Second, as to each Article, the text of any modifications to the UNCITRAL 
Rules made by the Tribunal is set forth. Such modifications have been 
made within the framework of the Algiers Declarations and specifically 
pursuant to Article III, paragraph 2 of the Claims Settlement Declaration. 
- Third, various Articles include notes to indicate how the Tribunal will 
implement or interpret the UNCITRAL Arbitrations Rules, as modified. 
2. The Tribunal Rules incorporate the UNCITRAL Rules and Administrative 
Directives 1,2,3 and 4 previously issued by the Tribunal, with certain 
modifications to each. 
3. The following definitions apply for the purpose of the Tribunal Rules: 
(a) "Algiers Declarations" means the two Declarations of the Government 
of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria, dated 19 January 1981. 
(b) "Arbitral tribunal" means either the Full Tribunal or a Chamber, 
depending on whichever is seized of a particular case or issue. 
(c) "Arbitrating party" means, in a particular case, the party or parties 
initiating recourse to arbitration (the claimant), or the other party or parties 
(the respondent). The term "arbitrating party" also means one of the 
Governments when, in a particular case, it is a claimant or respondent, or 
when it refers a dispute or question to the Tribunal pursuant to the Algiers 
Declarations. 
(d) "Chamber" means a panel of three members composed by the President 
of the Tribunal from among the nine members of the Full Tribunal, 
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pursuant to his powers under Article III, paragraph 1 of the Claims Settlement Declaration. 
(e) "Claims Settlement Declaration" means the "Declaration of the 
Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria Concerning the Settlement of 
Claims by the Government of the United States and the Government of the 
Islamic Republic of Iran", dated 19 January 1981. 
(f) "Full Tribunal" means the nine member Tribunal. 
(g) "Member" as used in the Tribunal Rules shall have the same meaning as 
"arbitrator" where used in the UNCITRAL Rules. 
(h) "National", "Iran", and the "United States" shall have the same meaning 
as defined in Article VII of the Claims Settlement Declaration. 
(i) "President" means the President of the Tribunal. 
(j) "Presiding arbitrator" or "presiding member" means the President of the 
Tribunal or the Chairman of a Chamber, as the case may be. 
(k) "Registrar" means the Registrar of the Tribunal and includes any deputy 
of, or other person authorized by, the Registrar, the President, or the Full 
Tribunal to perform a function for which the Registrar is responsible. 
(1) "Secretary-General" means the Secretary-General of the Tribunal and 
includes any deputy of, or other person authorized by, the Secretary- 
General, the President, or the Full Tribunal to perform a function for which 
the Secretary-General is responsible. 
(m) "Tribunal" means the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal established 
within the framework of and pursuant to the Algiers Declarations. 
(n) "Tribunal Rules" means these Rules, as they may from time to time be 
modified or supplemented by the Full Tribunal or the two Governments. 
(o) "The two Governments" means the Government of the Islamic Republic 
of Iran and the Government of the United States of America. 
(p) "UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules" and "UNCITRAL Rules" mean the 
Arbitration Rules of the United Nations Commission on International Trade 
Law which are the subject of Resolution 31/98 adopted by the General 
Assembly of the United Nations on 15 December 1976. 
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SECTION I. INTRODUCTORY RULES 
SCOPE OF APPLICATION 
ARTICLE 1 
Text of UNCITRAL Rule 
Article 1 
1. Where the parties to a contract have agreed in writing 
that disputes in relation to that contract shall be referred to 
arbitration under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, then such 
disputes shall be settled in accordance with these Rules subject 
to such modification as the parties may agree in writing. 
2. These Rules shall govern the arbitration except that 
where any of these Rules is in conflict with a provision of the 
law applicable to the arbitration from which the parties cannot 
derogate, that provision shall prevail. 
Modification of UNCITRAL Rule 
1. Paragraph I of Article 1 of the UNCITRAL Rules is modified to read as 
follows: 
1. Within the framework of the Algiers Declarations, the 
initiation and conduct of proceedings before the arbitral tribunal 
shall be subject to the following Tribunal Rules which may be 
modified by the Full Tribunal or the two Governments. 
2. Paragraph 2 of Article 1 of the UNCITRAL Rules is maintained 
unchanged. 
3. The following is added to Article I of the UNCITRAL Rules as paragraph 
3: 
3. The Claims Settlement Declaration constitutes an 
agreement in writing by Iran and the United States, on their own 
behalfs and on behalf of their nationals submitting to arbitration 
within the framework of the Algiers Declarations and in 
accordance with the Tribunal Rules. 
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NOTICE. CALCULATION OF PERIODS OF TIME 
ARTICLE 2 
Text of UNCITRAL Rule 
Article 2 
1. For the purposes of these Rules, any notice, including a 
notification, communication or proposal, is deemed to have 
been received if it is physically delivered to the addressee or if it 
is delivered at his habitual residence, place of business or 
mailing address, or, if none of these can be found after making 
reasonable inquiry, then at the addressee's last-known residence 
or place of business. Notice shall be deemed to have been 
received on the day it is so delivered. 
2. For the purposes of calculating a period of time under 
these Rules, such a period shall begin to run on the day 
following the day when a notice, notification, communication or 
proposal is received. If the last day of such period is an official 
holiday or a non-business day at the residence or place of the 
addressee, the period is extended until the first business day 
which follows. Official holidays or non-business days occurring 
during the running of the period of time are included in 
calculating the period. 
Modification of UNCITRAL Rule 
Article 2 of the UNCITRAL Rules is modified to read as follows: 
1. All documents must be filed with the Tribunal. Filing of 
a document with the Tribunal shall be deemed to have been 
made when it is physically received by the Registrar. 
2. All documents filed in a particular case shall be served 
upon all arbitrating parties in that case through the Agents. Ile 
Registrar shall promptly deliver copies to the offices of each of 
the two Agents. Each Agent shall be responsible for transmitting 
one copy to each concerned arbitrating party in his country or to 
the representative designated by each such arbitrating party to 
receive documents on its behalf. 
399 
3. The filing of documents with the Tribunal shall 
constitute service on all of the other arbitrating parties in the 
case and shall be deemed to have been received by said 
arbitrating parties when it is received by the Agent of their 
Government. 
4. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraphs 1-3 of Article 2, when the arbitral tribunal has so permitted in a 
particular case, service of written evidence may be effected by 
actual delivery to the representative of an arbitrating party 
during a hearing or pre-hearing conference in that case. The 
Secretary-General shall make a record of such service which 
shall be signed by him. A copy of each document so served, 
together with such record of service, shall be delivered by the 
Secretary-General to the Registrar after the hearing or pre- 
hearing conference at which service was made. 
5. The Registrar may refuse to accept any document which 
is not received with the required time period or which does not 
comply with the Algiers Declarations or with the Tribunal 
Rules. Any such refusal by the Registrar is, upon objection by 
an arbitrating party concerned within thirty days of notification 
of refusal, subject to review by the arbitral tribunal. 
Notes to Article 2 
1. For the purposes of calculating a period of time under these Rules, such 
period shall begin to run on the day following the day when the document 
is received. If the last day of such period is an official holiday or a non- 
business day at the seat of the arbitral tribunal, the period is extended until 
the first business day which follows. Official holidays and non-business 
days occurring during the running of the period of time are included in 
calculating the period. The Secretary-General will issue a list of such days. 
2. Twenty copies of all documents shall be filed with the Registrar, unless a 
smaller number is determined by the arbitral tribunal. In the event that there 
are more than two arbitrating parties in a case, a sufficient number of 
additional copies shall be filed to permit service on all arbitrating parties in 
the case. Also, the arbitral tribunal, or the Registrar, may at any time 
require a party which files a document to submit additional copies. 
3. Exhibits and written evidence, other than those annexed to the Statement 
of Claim or Statement of Defence, shall be submitted in such manner and 
numbers of copies as the arbitral tribunal may determine in each case based 
on the nature and volume of the particular exhibit or written evidence and 
any other relevant circumstances. 
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4. Upon the filing of a document, the Registrar shall note on all copies the date received. The Registrar shall issue a receipt to the arbitrating party 
which filed the document. In all instances in which the Registrar is required 
to deliver copies to the Agents, he will secure a written receipt of such delivery, which will be kept in the case file and available for inspection or 
copying by any arbitrating party in that case. 
5. All documents filed with the Registrar are to be submitted on paper 8 1/2 
inches x 11 inches or on A-4 size paper (21 cm x 29.5 cm), or on paper no 
larger than A-4. If a document, exhibit or other written evidence cannot 
conveniently be reproduced on paper no larger than A-4, it is to be folded 
to A-4 size, unless the Registrar permits otherwise in special circumstances. 
6. Upon filing a Statement of Claim, the Registrar shall assign an identifying 
number to the claim, and the case shall be assigned to the Full Tribunal, or 
by lot to a Chamber. Thereafter, all documents filed in the case, including 
the award, shall have a caption stating: 
(i) the names of the parties, 
(ii) the case number of the assigned Registrar and 
(iii) the number of the Chamber seized of the case; 
otherwise the caption shall state "Full Tribunal. " 
7. At least two copies in English and two copies in Farsi of all documents 
mentioned in Article 17, Note 3 and filed with the Tribunal shall be 
manually signed by the arbitrating party submitting them or by its 
representative. Exhibits and annexes to documents need not be signed. If a 
document is presented without signatures, it shall be accepted for filing, but 
the filing party shall be notified and required promptly to submit two 
manually signed copies in each language. 
NOTICE OF ARBITRATION 
ARTICLE 3 
Text of UNCITRAL Rule 
Article 3 
1. The party initiating recourse to arbitration (hereinafter 
called the "claimant") shall give to the other party (hereinafter 
called the "respondent") a notice of arbitration. 
2. Arbitral proceedings shall be deemed to commence on 
the date on which the notice of arbitration is received by the 
respondent. 
3. The notice of arbitration shall include the following: 
(a) A demand that the dispute shall be referred to arbitration; 
(b) The names and addresses of the parties; 
(c) A reference to the arbitration clause or the separate arbitration 
agreement that is invoked; 
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(d) A reference to the contract out of or in relation to which the dispute arises; 
(e) ýMe general nature of the claim and an indication of the arnount involved, if any; 
(f) The relief or remedy sought; 
(g) A proposal as to the number of arbitrators (i. e. one or three), if the 
parties have not previously agreed thereon; 
4. The notice of arbitration may also include: (a) The proposals for appointments of a sole arbitrator and an appointing 
authority referred to in article 6, paragraph 1; 
(b) The notification of the appointment of an arbitrator referred to in article 7; 
(c) The statement of claim referred to in article 18. 
Modification of UNCITRAL Rule 
No notice of Arbitration pursuant to Article 3 of the UNCITRAL Rules is to be 
given. 
PRESENTATION AND ASSISTANCE 
ARTICLE 4 
Text of UNCITRAL Rule 
Article 4 
The parties may be represented or assisted by persons of 
their choice. The names and addresses of such persons must be 
communicated in writing to the other party; such 
communication must specify whether the appointment is being 
made for purposes of representation or assistance. 
Article 4 of the UNCITRAL Rules is maintained unchanged. 
Notes to Article 4 
1. As used in Article 4 of the UNCITRAL Rules, the term "parties" means the 
arbitrating parties. 
2. For the purpose of a particular case, the two Governments may each 
appoint representatives in addition to their Agents and each of the other 
arbitrating parties may appoint representatives. An appointed representative 
shall be deemed to be authorized to act before the arbitral tribunal on behalf 
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of the appointing party for all purposes of the case and the acts of the 
representative shall be binding upon the appointing party. A representative 
is not required to be licensed to practice law. Parties who appoint a 
representative shall file with the Registrar notice of appointment in such 
form as the Registrar may require. 
3. Arbitrating parties may also be assisted in proceedings before the arbitral 
tribunal by one or more persons of their choice. Persons chosen to assist 
who are not also appointed as representatives are not deemed to be 
authorized to act before the arbitral tribunal on behalf of the appointing 
party, to bind the appointing party or to receive notices, communications or 
documents on behalf of the appointing party. Any such assistant is not 
required to be licensed to practice law. 
SECTION II. COMPOSITION OF THE ARBITRAL 
TRIBUNAL 
NUMBER OF MEMBERS 
ARTICLE 5 
Text of UNCITRAL Rule 
Article 5 
If the parties have not previously agreed on the number 
of arbitrators (i. e. one or three), and if within fifteen days after 
the receipt by the respondent of the notice of arbitration the 
parties have not yet agreed that there shall only be one 
arbitrator, three arbitrators shall be appointed. 
Modirication of the UNCITRAL Rule 
Article 5 of the UNCITRAL Rules is replaced by the following: 
The composition of the Chambers, the assignment of 
cases to various Chambers the transfer of cases among 
Chambers and the relinquishement by Chambers of certain cases 
to the Full Tribunal will be provided for in orders issued by the 
President pursuant to his powers under Article IH, paragraph I 
of the Claims Settlement Declaration. 
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APPOINTMENT OF MEMBERS 
ARTICLES 
-6 -8 
Text of UNCITRAL Rules 
Article 6 
1. If a sole arbitrator is to be appointed, either party may 
propose to the other: 
(a) Ile names of one or more persons, one of whom 
would serve as the sole arbitrator, and 
(b) If no appointing authority has been agreed upon 
by the parties, the name or names of one or more institutions or 
persons, one of whom would serve as appointing authority. 
2. If within thirty days after receipt by a party of a proposal 
made in accordance with paragraph I the parties have not 
reached agreement on the choice of a sole arbitrator, the sole 
arbitrator shall be appointed by the appointing authority agreed 
upon by the parties. If no appointing authority has been agreed 
upon by the parties, or if the appointing authority agreed upon 
refuses to act or fails to appoint the arbitrator within sixty days 
of the receipt of a party's request therefore, either party may 
request the Secretary-General of the Permanent Court of 
Arbitration at the Hague to designate an appointing authority. 
3. The appointing authority shall, at the request of one of 
the parties, appoint the sole arbitrator as promptly as possible. In 
making the appointment the appointing authority shall use the 
following list-procedure, unless both parties agree that the list- 
procedure should not be used or unless the appointing authority 
determines in its discretion that the use of the list-procedure is 
not appropriate for the case: 
(a) At the request of one of the parties the appointing 
authority shall communicate to both parties an identical list 
containing at least three names; 
(b) Within fifteen days after the receipt of this list, each 
party may return the list to the appointing authority after having 
deleted the name or names to which he objects and numbered 
the remaining names on the list in the order of his preference; 
(c) After the expiration of the above period of time the 
appointing authority shall appoint the sole arbitrator from 
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among the names approved on the lists returned to it and in 
accordance with the order of preference indicated by the parties; 
(d) If for any reason the appointment cannot be made 
according to this procedure, the appointing authority may 
exercise its discretion in appointing the sole arbitrator. 
4. In making the appointment, the appointing authority 
shall have regard to such considerations as are likely to secure 
appointment of an independent and impartial arbitrator and shall 
take into account as well the advisability of appointing an 
arbitrator of a nationality other than the nationalities of the 
parties. 
Article 7 
1. If three arbitrators are to be appointed, each party shall 
appoint one arbitrator. The two arbitrators thus appointed shall 
choose the third arbitrator who will act as the presiding 
arbitrator of the tribunal. 
2. If within thirty days after the receipt of a party's 
notification of the appointment of an arbitrator the other party 
has not notified the fust party of the arbitrator he has appointed; 
(a) The first party may request the appointing authority 
previously designated by the parties to appoint the second 
arbitrator; or 
(b) If no such authority has been previously designated 
by the parties, or if the appointing authority previously 
designated refuses to act or fails to appoint the arbitrator within 
thirty days after receipt of a party's request therefore, the first 
party may request the Secretary-General of the Permanent Court 
of Arbitration at The Hague to designate the appointing 
authority. The first party may then request the appointing 
authority so designated to appoint the second arbitrator. In either 
case, the appointing authority may exercise its discretion in 
appointing the arbitrator. 
3. If within thirty days after the appointment of the second 
arbitrator the two arbitrators have not agreed on the choice of 
the presiding arbitrator, the presiding arbitrator shall be 
appointed by an appointing authority in the same way as a sole 
arbitrator would be appointed under Article 6. 
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Article 8 
1. When an appointing authority is requested to appoint an 
arbitrator pursuant to Article 6 or Article 7, the party which 
makes the request shall send to the appointing authority a copy 
of the notice of arbitration, a copy of the contract out of or in 
relation to which the dispute has arisen and a copy of the 
arbitration agreement if it is not contained in the contract. Ilie 
appointing authority may require from either party such 
information as it deems necessary to fulfil its function. 
2. Where the names of one or more persons are proposed 
for appointment as arbitrators, their full names, addresses and 
nationalities shall be indicated, together with a description of 
their qualifications. 
Articles 6-8 of the UNCITRAL Rules are maintained unchanged. 
Note to Articles 6-8 
As used in Articles 6,7 and 8 of the UNCITRAL Rules, the terms "party it and 
it parties it refer to the one or both of the two Governments, as the case may be. 
CHALLENGE OF MEMBERS 
ARTICLES 9-12 
Text of UNCITRAL Rules 
Article 9 
A prospective arbitrator shall disclose to those who 
approach him in connexion with his possible appointment any 
circumstances likely to give rise to justifiable doubts as to his 
impartiality or independence. An arbitrator, once appointed or 
chosen, shall disclose such circumstances to the parties unless 
they have already been informed by him of these circumstances. 
Article 10 
1. Any arbitrator may be challenged if circumstances exist 
that give rise to justifiable doubts as to the arbitrator's 
impartiality or independence. 
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2. A party may challenge the arbitrator appointed by him 
only for reasons of which he becomes aware after the 
appointment has been made. 
Article 11 
1. A party who intends to challenge an arbitrator shall send 
notice of his challenge within fifteen days after the appointment 
of the challenged arbitrator has been notified to the challenging 
party or within fifteen days after the circumstances mentioned in 
Articles 9 and 10 became known to the party. 
2. The challenge shall be notified to the other party, to the 
arbitrator who is challenged and to the other members of the 
arbitral tribunal. The notification shall be in writing and shall 
state the reasons for the challenge. 
3. When an arbitrator has been challenged by one party, the 
other party may agree to the challenge. The arbitrator may also, 
after the challenge, withdraw from his office. In neither case 
does this imply acceptance of the validity of the grounds for the 
challenge. In both cases the procedure provided in article 6 or 7 
shall be used in full for the appointment of the substitute 
arbitrator, even if during the process of appointing the 
challenged arbitrator a party had failed to exercise his right to 
appoint or to participate in the appointment. 
Article 12 
1. If the other party does not agree to the challenge and the 
challenged arbitrator does not withdraw, the decision on the 
challenge will be made; 
(a) When the initial appointment was made by an 
appointing authority, by that authority; 
(b) When the initial appointment was not made by an 
appointing authority, but an appointing authority has been 
previously designated, by that authority; 
(c) In all other cases, by the appointing authority to 
be designated in accordance with the procedure as provided for 
in article 6. 
2. If the appointing authority sustains the challenge, a substitute 
arbitrator shall be appointed or chosen pursuant to the procedure applicable to 
the appointment or choice of an arbitrator provided in articles 6 to 9 except 
that, when this procedure would call for the designation of an appointing 
authority, the appointment of the arbitrator shall be made by the appointing 
authority which decided on the challenge. 
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Modification of the UNCITRAL Rules 
1. Article 9 of the UNCITRAL Rules is maintained unchanged 
with the following addition: 
When any member of the arbitral tribunal obtains 
knowledge that nay particular case before the arbitral tribunal 
involves circumstances likely to give rise to justifiable doubts as 
to his impartiality or independence with respect to that case, he 
shall disclose such circumstances to the arbitrating parties in the 
case and, if appropriate, shall disqualify himself as to that case. 
2. Articles 10,11 and 12 of the UNCITRAL Rules are 
maintained unchanged. 
Notes to Articles 9-12 
1. As used in Articles 9,10,11 and 12 of the UNCITRAL Rules, with respect 
to the initial appointment of a member the terms "party" and "parties" mean 
one or both of the two Governments, as the case may be. After the initial 
appointment, the terms "party" and "parties" mean the arbitrating party or 
parties, as the case may be. Arbitrating parties may challenge a member 
only on the basis of the existence of circumstances which give rise to 
justifiable doubts as to the member's impartiality or independence with 
respect to the particular case involved, and not upon any general grounds 
which also relate to other cases. Challenges on such general grounds may 
only be made by one of the two Governments. 
2. In applying paragraph 1 of Article II of the UNCITRAL Rules, the period 
for making a challenge to a member of a Chamber to which a case has been 
assigned shall be fifteen days after the challenging party is given notice of 
the Chamber to which the case has been assigned, or after the 
circumstances mentioned in Articles 9 and 10 of the UNCITRAL Rules 
became known to that party. In the event the case is relinquished by the 
Chamber to the Full Tribunal, the period for challenging a member who is 
not a member of the relinquishing Chamber shall be fifteen days after the 
challenging party is given notice of the relinquishement, or after the 
circumstances mentioned in Articles 9 and 10 of the UNCITRAL Rules 
became known to that party. 
3. In the event a member withdraws with respect to a particular case or if the 
challenge is sustained, he shall continue to exercise his functions as a 
member for all other cases and purposes except in respect of that particular 
case. 
4. In the event that a member of a Chamber is challenged with respect to a 
particular case and withdraws, or if the challenge is sustained, the President 
will order the transfer of the case to another Chamber. 
5. In the event the Full Tribunal is seized of a particular case and a member is 
challenged with respect to that case and withdraws, or if the challenge Is 
sustained a substitute member shall be appointed to the Full Tribunal for 
the purposes of that case in accordance with the procedure set forth in 
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Article 1111 of the Claims Settlement Declaration as was used in appointing 
the member being substitutecL An appointing authority, if needed, shall be designated as provided in Article 12 of the UNCITRAL Rules. 
6. Disclosure statements filed as to each member shall be made available by 
the Registrar to each arbitrating party in each case. 
REPLACEMENT OF A MEMBER 
ARTICLE 13 
Text of UNCITRAL Rule 
Article 13 
1. In the event of the death or resignation of an arbitrator during 
the course of the arbitral. proceedings, a substitute arbitrator 
shall be appointed or chosen pursuant to the procedure provided 
in articles 6 to 9 that was applicable to the appointment or 
choice of the arbitrator being replaced. 
2. In the event that an arbitrator fails to act or in the event of the 
dQ jUM or k facto impossibility of his performing his functions, 
the procedure in respect of the challenge and replacement of an 
arbitrator as provided in the preceding articles shall apply. 
Modirication of UNCITRAL Rule 
Article 13 of the UNCITRAL Rules is maintained unchanged with the 
following additions: 
1. The following is added as the last sentence of paragraph 2: 
In applying the provisions of this paragraph, if the President, 
after consultation with the other members of the Full Tribunal, 
determines that the failure of a member to act or his 
impossibility to perform his functions is due to a temporary 
illness or other circumstance expected to be of relatively short 
duration, the member shall not be replaced but a substitute 
member shall be appointed for a temporary period in accordance 
with the same procedures as are described in Note 5 to Articles 
9-12. 
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2. The following are added as paragraphs 3 and 4: 
3. In the event of the temporary absence of the President, the 
senior other member of the Tribunal not appointed by either of 
the two Governments shall act as President of the Tribunal and 
as Chairman at the meetings of the Full Tribunal. Seniority shall 
be based on the date of appointment, or for members appointed 
on the same date shall be based on age. 
4. A substitute member appointed for a temporary period shall 
continue to serve with respect to any case in which he has 
participated in the hearing, notwithstanding the member for 
whom he is a substitute is again available and may work on 
other Tribunal cases and matters. 
AMENDMENT TO TRIBUNAL RULES 
Article 13 of the Tribunal Rules is amended by the addition of a new paragraph 
(paragraph 5) as follows: 
"5. After the effective date of a member's resignation he 
shall continue to serve as a member of the Tribunal with respect 
to all cases in which he had participated in a hearing on the 
merits, and for that purpose shall be considered a member of the 
Tribunal instead of the person who replaces him". 
(Provisionally applied by decision of the Tribunal on 7 October 1983 at its 86th 
meeting (FTM 86, paragraph 9) and definitively adopted as an amendment to 
the Tribunal Rules by decision of the Tribunal on 7 March 1984 at its 90th 
meeting (FTM 90, paragraph 14) ) 
Note to Article 13 
Iran may, in advance, appoint up to three persons to be available 
to act as a substitute member for a temporary period for a 
specified member, or members, of the Tribunal appointed by 
Iran; and the United States may, in advance, appoint up to three 
persons, to be available to act as a substitute member for a 
temporary period for a specified member, or members, of the 
Tribunal appointed by the United States. The members of the 
Tribunal appointed by Iran and the United States may select, in 
advance, by mutual agreement, a person to act as a substitute for 
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a temporary period for any of the remaining one third of the 
members of the Tribunal. 
REPETMON OF HEARINGS IN THE EVENT OF REPLACEMENT OR 
SUBSTITUTION OF A MEMBER 
ARTICLE 14 
Text of UNCITRAL Rule 
Article 14 
If under articles 11 to 13 the sole presiding arbitrator is 
replaced, any hearings held previously shall be repeated; if any 
other arbitrator is replaced, such prior hearings may be repeated 
at the discretion of the arbitral tribunal. 
Modification of UNCITRAL Rule 
Article 14 of the UNCITRAL Rules is modified to read as follows: 
If a member of the Full Tribunal or a Chamber is 
replaced or if a substitute is appointed for him, the arbitral 
tribunal shall determine whether all, any part or none of any 
previous hearings shall be repeated. 
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SECTION Ill. ARBTRAL PROCEEDINGS 
GENERAL PROVISIONS 
ARTICLE 15 
Text of UNCITRAL Rule 
Article 15 
1. Subject to these Rules, the arbitral. tribunal may conduct the 
arbitration in such manner as it considers appropriate, provided 
that the parties are treated with equality and that at any stage of 
the proceedings each party is given a full opportunity of 
presenting his case. 
2. If either party so requests at any stage of the proceedings, the arbitral 
tribunal shall hold hearings for the presentation of evidence by witnesses, including expert witnesses, or for oral argument. In the absence of such a 
request, the arbitral tribunal shall decide whether to hold such hearings or 
whether the proceedings shall be conducted on the basis of documents and 
other materials. 
3. All documents or information supplied to the arbimal tribunal by one 
party shall at the same time be communicated to the other party. 
Article 15 of the UNCITRAL Rules is maintained unchanged. 
Notes to Article 15 
1. As used in Article 15 of the UNCITRAL Rules, the terms "party" and 
11 parties" mpan the arbitrating party or parties, as the case may be. 
2. In applying paragraph 2 of Article 15, an arbitral tribunal shall determine 
without hearing any written requests or objections of the concerned 
arbitrating parties with respect to procedural matters unless it grants or 
invites oral argument in special circumstances. 
3. In complying with paragraph 3 of Article 15, an arbitrating party shall 
follow the procedures set forth in Article 2 of the Tribunal Rules. 
4. The arbitral tribunal may take an order directing the arbitrating parties to 
appear for a pre-hearing conference. The pre-hearing conference will 
normally be held only after the Statement of Defence in the case has been 
received. The order will state the matters to be considered at the pre- 
hearing conference. 
5. The arbitral tribunal may, having satisfied itself that the statement of one of 
the two Governments - or, under special circumstances, any other person - 
who is not an arbitrating party in a particular case is likely to assist the 
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tribunal in carrying out its task, permit such Government or person to assist 
the tribunal in presenting oral or written statements. 
PLACE OF ARBITRATION 
ARTICLE 16 
Text of UNCITRAL Rule 
Article 16 
1. Unless the parties have agreed upon the place where the place 
of arbitration is to be held, such place shall be determined by the 
arbitral tribunal, having regard to the circumstances of the 
arbitration 
2. The arbitral tribunal may determine the locale of the 
arbitration within the country agreed upon by the parties. It may 
hear witnesses and hold meetings for consultation among its 
members at any place it deems appropriate, having regard to the 
circumstances of the arbitration. 
3. The arbitral tribunal may meet at any place it deems 
appropriate for the inspection of goods, other property or 
documents. The parties shall be given sufficient notice to enable 
them to be present at such inspection 
4. The award shall be made at the place of arbitration 
Article 16 of the UNCITRAL Rules is maintained unchanged. 
Note to Article 16 
As used in Article 16, paragraphs 1 and 2 of the UNCITRAL Rules, the 
term "Parties" means the two Governments. As used in Article 16, 
paragraph 3 of the UNCITRAL Rules, the term "parties" means the 
arbitrating parties. 
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LANGUAGE 
ARTICLE 17 
Text of the UNCITRAL Rule 
Article 17 
1. Subject to an agreement by the parties, the arbitral tribunal 
shall, promptly after its appointment, determine the language or 
languages to be used in the proceedings. This determination 
shall apply to the statement of claim, the statement of defence, 
and any further written statements and, if oral hearings take 
place, to the language or languages to be used in such hearings. 
2. Pie arbitral tribunal may order that any documents annexed 
to the statement of claim or statement of defence, and any 
supplementary documents or exhibits submitted in the course of 
the proceedings, delivered in their original language, shall be 
accompanied by a translation into the language agreed upon by 
the parties or determined by the arbitral tribunal. 
Article 17 of the UNCITRAL Rules is maintained unchanged. 
Notes to Article 17 
1. As used in Article 17 of the UNCITRAL Rules, the term "parties to means 
the two Governments. 
2 In accordance with an agreement of the Agents, English and Farsi shall be 
the official languages to be used in the arbitration proceedings, and these 
languages shall be used for all oral hearings, decisions and awards. 
3. In accordance with the provisions of Article 17 of the UNCITRAL Rules, 
the following documents filed with the Tribunal shall be submitted in both 
English and Farsi, unless otherwise agreed by the arbitrating parties: 
(a) The Statement of Claim and its annexes 
(b) The Statement of Defence, and any counter-claim, including any 
annexes 
(c) The reply (including annexes) to any counter-claim. 
(d) Any further written statement (e. g. reply, rejoinder, brief), including 
any annexes, which the arbitral tribunal may require or permit an 
arbitrating party to present. 
(e) Any written request to the arbitral tribunal to take action or any 
objection thereto. 
(f) Any challenge to a member. 
4. The arbitral tribunal shall determine in each particular case what other 
documents, documentary exhibits and written evidence, or what parts 
thereof, shall be submitted in both English and Farsi. 
5. Any disputes or difficulties regarding translations shall be resolved by the 
arbitral tribunal. 
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STATEMENT OF CLAIM 
ARTICLE 18 
Text of UNCITRAL Rule 
Article 18 
1. Unless the statement of claim was contained in the notice of 
arbitration, within a period of time to be determined by the 
arbitral tribunal, the claimant shall communicate his statement 
of claim in writing to the respondent and to each of the 
arbitrators. A copy of the contract, and of the arbitration 
agreement if not contained in the contract, shall be annexed 
thereto. 
2. The statement of claim shall include the following 
particulars: 
(a) The names and addresses of the parties; 
(b) A statement of the facts supporting the claim; 
(c) The points at issue; 
(d) The relief or remedy sought. 
The claimant may annex to his statement of claim all documents 
he deems relevant or may add a reference to the document or 
other evidence he will submit. 
Modification of UNCITRAL Rule 
Article 18 of the UNCITRAL Rules is modified to read as follows: 
1. A party initiating recourse to arbitration before the Tribunal 
(the of claimant") shall do so by filing a Statement of Claim. Each 
Statement of Claim shall contain the following particulars: 
(a) A demand that the dispute be referred to arbitration 
by the Tribunal; 
(b) The names, nationalities and last known addresses of 
the parties; 
(c) A reference to the debt, contract (including 
transaction which are the subject of letters of credit bank 
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guarantees), expropriations or other measures affecting property 
rights out of or in relation to which the dispute arises and as to 
which the Tribunal has jurisdiction pursuant to Article IL 
paragraphs I and 2 of the Claims Settlement Declaration; 
(d) The general nature of the claim and an indication of 
the amount involved, if any; 
(e) A statement of the facts supporting the claim; 
(f) The points at issue; 
(9) The relief or remedy sought; 
(h) If the claimant has appointed a lawyer or other 
person for the purposes of representation or assistance in 
connection with the claim, the name and address of such person 
and an indication whether the appointment is for purposes of 
representation or assistance; 
(i) The name and address of the person to whom 
communications should be sent on behalf of the claimant (only 
such person shall be entitled to be sent communications). 
2. It is advisable that claimants (i) annex to their 
Statements of Claim such documents as will serve clearly to 
establish the basis of the claim, and/or (ii) add a reference and 
summary of relevant portions of such documents, and/or (iii) 
include in the Statement of Claim quotations of relevant 
portions of such documents. 
3. No priority for the scheduling of hearing or the making of 
awards shall be based on the date of filing the Statement of 
Claim. 
Notes to Article 18 
1. No claims with respect to which the Tribunal has jurisdiction within the 
framework of the Algiers Declarations and pursuant to paragraphs I and 2 
of Article H of the Claims Settlement Declaration may be filed before 
October 20,198 1. 
2. All Statements of Claim with respect to matters as to which the Tribunal 
has jurisdiction pursuant to paragraphs I and 2 of Article 11 of the Claims 
Settlement Declaration which are filed between October 20,1981 and 
November 19,1981 will be deemed to have been filed simultaneously as of 
October 20,1981. All such claims filed between November 20,1981 and 
December 19,1981 will be deemed to have been filed simultaneously as of 
November 10,1981. All such claims will be deemed to have been filed 
simultaneously as of December 20,1981. 
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STATEMENT OF DEFENCE 
ARTICLE 19 
Text of UNCITRAI Rule 
Article 19 
1. Within a period of time to be determined by the arbitral 
tribunal, the respondent shall communicate his statement of 
defence in writing to the claimant and to each of the arbitrators. 
2. The statement of defence shall reply to the particulars (b), (c) 
and (d) of the statement of claim (article 18, para. 2). The 
respondent may annex to his defence or may add a reference to 
the documents or other evidence he will submit. 
3. In his statement of defence, or at a later stage in the arbitral 
proceedings if the arbitral tribunal decides that the delay was 
justified under the circumstances, the respondent may make a 
counter-claim arising out of the same contract or rely on a claim 
arising out of the same contract for the purpose of a set-off. 
4. The provisions of article 18, paragraph 2, shall apply to a 
counter-claim and a claim relied on for the purpose of a set-off. 
Modirication of UNCITRAL Rule 
Article 19 of the UNCITRAL Rules is modified to read as follows: 
1. Within a period of time to be determined by the arbitral 
tribunal with respect to each case, which should not exceed 135 
days, the respondent shall file its Statement of Defence. 
However, the arbitral tribunal may extend the time-limits if it 
concludes that such an extension is justified. 
2. ne Statement of Defence shall reply to the particulars (e), (f) 
and (g) and include the information required in (h) and (i) of the 
Statement of Claim (see Article 18, paragraph I of the Tribunal 
Rules). It is advisable that respondents (i) annex to their 
Statement of Defence such documents as will clearly serve to 
establish the basis of the defence, and/or (ii) add a reference and 
summary of relevant portions of such documents, and/or (Iii) 
include in the Statement of Defence quotations of relevant 
portions of such documents. 
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3. In the Statement of Defence, or at a later stage in the arbitral 
proceedings if the tribunal decides that the delay was justified 
under the circumstances, the respondent may make a counter- 
claim or rely on a claim for the purpose of a set-off, if such 
counter-claim or set-off is allowed under the Claims Settlement 
Declaration. 
4. The provisions of Article 18, paragraph I shall apply to a 
counter-claim or claim relied on for purpose of a set-off. 
Notes to Article 19 
1. In determining and extending periods of time pursuant to this Article, the 
arbitral tribunal will take into account 
(i) the complexity of the case, 
(ii) any special circumstances, including demonstrated hardship to a 
claimant or respondent, and 
(iii) such other circumstances as it considers appropriate. 
In the event that the arbitral tribunal determines that a requirement to file a 
large number of Statements of defence in any particular period would 
impose an unfair burden on a respondent to a claim or counter-claim, it will 
in some cases extend the time periods based on the above-mentioned 
factors or by lot. 
2. In the event of a counter-claim or claim relied on for the purpose of a set- 
off, the claimant against whom it is made will be given the right of reply, 
and the provisions of paragraph 2 of Article 19 of the Tribunal Rules shall 
apply. 
AMENDMENTS TO THE CLAIM OR DEFENCE 
ARTICLE 20 
Text of UNCITRAL Rule 
Article 20 
During the course of the arbitral proceedings either party 
may amend or supplement his claim or defence unless the 
arbitral tribunal considers it inappropriate to allow such 
amendment having regard to the delay in making it or prejudice 
to the other party or any other circumstances. However, a claim 
may not be amended in such a manner that the amended claim 
falls outside the scope of the arbitration clause or separate 
arbitration agreement. 
418 
Modirication of UNCITRAL Rule 
The last sentence of Article 20 of the UNCITRAL Rules is modified to read as 
follows: 
However, a claim may not be amended in such a manner that it 
falls outside the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal. 
Not to Article 20 
As used in Article 20 of the UNCITRAL Rules, the term it party" means the 
arbitrating party. 
PLEAS AS TO THE JURISDICTION OF THE ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL 
ARTICLE 21 
Text of UNCITRAL Rule 
Article 21 
1. The arbitral tribunal shall have power to rule on 
objections that it has no jurisdictions, including any objections 
with respect to the existence or validity of the arbitration clause 
or of the separate arbitration agreement. 
2. The arbitral tribunal shall have the power to determine 
the existence or validity of the contract of which an arbitration 
clause forms a part. For the purposes of article 21, an arbitration 
clause which forms part of a contract and which provides for 
arbitration under these Rules shall be treated as an agreement 
independent of the other terms of the contract. A decision by the 
arbitral tribunal that the contract is null and void shall not entail 
25_ _M 
the invalidity of the arbitration clause. 1 ,Q jp 
3. A plea that the arbitnal tribunal does not have 
jurisdiction shall be raised not later than in the statement of 
defence or, with respect to a counter-claim, in the reply to the 
counter-claim. 
4. In general, the arbitral tribunal should rule on a plea 
concerning its jurisdiction as a preliminary question. However, 
the arbitral tribunal may proceed with the arbitration and rule on 
such a plea in their final award. 
Article 21 of the UNCITRAL Rules is maintained unchanged. 
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FURTHER WRITTEN STATEMENTS 
ARTICLE 22 
Text of UNCITRAL Rule 
Article 22 
The arbitral tribunal shall decide which further written 
statements, in addition to the statement of claim and the 
statement of defence, shall be required from the parties or may 
be presented by them and shall fix the periods of time for 
communicating such statements. 
Article 22 of the UNCITRAL Rules is maintained unchanged. 
Note to Article 22 
As used in Article 22 of the UNCITRAL Rules, the term "parties" means the 
arbitrating parties. 
PERIODS OF TIME 
ARTICLE 23 
Text of UNCITRAL Rule 
Article 23 
The periods of time fixed by the arbin-al tribunal for 
communication of written statements (including the statement of 
claim and statement of defence) should not exceed forty-five 
days. However, the arbitral tribunal may extend the time-limits 
if it concludes that an extension is justified. 
Modirication of UNCITRAL Rule 
Article 23 of the UNCITRAI Rules is modified to read as follows: 
The period of time fixed by the arbitral tribunal for the 
communication of written statements (excluding the Statement 
of Defence) should not exceed 90 days. However, the arbitral 
tribunal may extend the time-limits if it concludes that an 
extension is justified. 
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EVIDENCE AND HEARINGS 
ARTICLES 24 - 25 
Text of UNCITRAL Rule 
Article 24 
1. Each party shall have the burden of proving the facts 
relied on to support his claim or defence. 
2. The arbitral tribunal may, if it considers it appropriate, 
require a party to deliver to the arbitral tribunal and to the other 
party, within such a period of time as the arbitral tribunal shall 
decide, a summary of the documents and other evidence which 
that party intends to present in support of the facts in issue set 
out in his statement of claim or statement of defence. 
3. At any time during the arbitral proceedings the arbitral 
tribunal may require the parties to produce documents, exhibits 
or other evidence within such a period of time as the tribunal 
shall determine. 
Article 24 of the UNCITRAL Rules is maintained unchanged. 
Note to Article 24 
As used in Article 24 of the UNCITRAL Rules, the terms "party" and 
"parties" mean the arbitrating party or parties, as the case may be. 
Text of UNCITRAL Rule 
Article 25 
In the event of an oral hearing, the arbitral tribunal shall 
give the parties adequate notice of the date, time and place 
thereof. 
2. If witnesses are to be heard, at least fifteen days before 
the hearing each party shall communicate to the arbitral tribunal 
and to the other party the names and addresses of the witnesses 
he intends to present, the subject upon and the languages in 
which such witnesses will give their testimony. 
3. The arbitral tribunal shall make arrangements for the 
translation of oral statements made at a hearing and for a record 
of the hearing if either is deemed necessary by the tribunal 
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under the circumstances of the case, or if the parties have agreed 
thereto and have communicated such agreement to the tribunal 
at least fifteen days before the hearing. 
4. Hearing shall be held in camera unless the parties agree 
otherwise. The arbitral tribunal may require the retirement of 
any witness or witnesses during the testimony of other 
witnesses. Ile arbitral tribunal is free to determine the manner 
in which witnesses are examined. 
5. Evidence of witnesses may also be presented in the form 
of a written statement signed by them. 
6. The arbitral tribunal shall determine the admissibility, 
relevance, materiality and weight of the evidence offered. 
Modification of UNCITRAL RULE 
Article 25 of the UNCITRAL Rules is maintained unchanged, 
except that the period referred to in paragraph 2 shall be at least 
thirty days. 
Notes to Article 25 
1. As used in Article 25 of the UNCITRAL Rules, the terms "party" and 
"parties" mean the arbitrating party or parties, as the case may be, except 
that, as used in paragraph 4 of Article 25, the term "parties" means the two 
Governments and the arbitrating parties. 
2. The information concerning witnesses which an arbitrating party must 
communicate pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article 25 of the UNCITRAL 
Rules is not required with respect to any witnesses which an arbitrating 
party may later decide to present to rebut evidence presented by the other 
arbitrating party. However, such information concerning any rebuttal 
witness shall be communicated to the arbitral tribunal and the other 
arbitrating parties as far in advance of hearing the witness as is reasonably 
possible. 
3. With respect to paragraph 3 of Article 25 of the UNCITRAL Rules, the 
Secretary-General shall make arrangements for a tape-recording or 
sentographic record of hearings or parts of hearings if the arbitral tribunal 
so determines. If the arbitral tribunal determines that a transcript shall be 
made of any such tape-recording or sentographic record, the arbitrating 
parties in that case, or their authorized representatives, shall be permitted to 
read the transcript. 
4. Any arbitrating party in the case may make a sentographic record of the 
hearings, or parts of the hearings, and, in that event, shall make a transcript 
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thereof available to the arbitral tribunal without charge. Arbitrating parties 
are not permitted to make tape-recordings of hearings or other proceedings. 
5. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 4 of Article 25, the arbitral 
tribunal may at its discretion permit representatives of the arbitrating 
parties in other cases which present similar issues of fact or law to be 
present to observe all or part of the hearing in a particular case, subject to 
the prior approval of the arbitrating parties in the particular case. 'Me Agents of the two Governments are permitted to be present at pre-hearing 
conferences and hearings. 
In applying paragraph 4 of Article 25 of the UNCITRAL Rules, the 
following provisions shall determine the manner in which witnesses are 
examined: 
(a) Before giving any evidence each witness shall make the following 
declaration: "I solemnly declare upon my honour and conscience that I will 
speak the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth. if 
(b) Witnesses may be examined by the presiding member and the other 
members of the arbitral tribunal. Also, when permitted by the arbitral 
tribunal, the representatives of the arbitrating parties in the case may ask 
questions, subject to the control of the presiding member. 
7. The Secretary-General shall draft minutes of each hearing. After each 
member of the arbitral tribunal present at the hearing has been given the 
opportunity to comment on the draft minutes, the minutes, with any 
corrections approved by a majority of members who were present, shall be 
signed by the presiding member and the Secretary-General. The arbitrating 
parties in the case, or their authorized representatives, shall be permitted to 
read such minutes. 
INTERIM MEASURES OF PROTEMON 
ARTICLE 26 
Text of UNCITRAL Rule 
Article 26 
1. At the request of either party, the arbitral tribunal may 
take any written interim measures it deems necessary in respect 
of the subject-matter of disputes, including measures for the 
conservation of the goods forming the subject-matter in dispute, 
such as ordering their deposit with a third person or the sale of 
perishable goods. 
2. Such interim measures may be established in the form of 
an interim award. The arbitral tribunal shall be entitled to 
require sectirity for the costs of such measures. 
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3. A request for interim measures addressed by any party to 
a judicial authority shall not be deemed incompatible with the 
agreement to arbitrate, or as a waiver of that agreement. 
Article 26 of the UNCITRAL Rules is maintained unchanged. 
Note to Article 26 
As used in Article 26 of the UNCITRAL Rules, the term "party" means the 
arbitrating party. 
EXPERTS 
ARTICLE 27 
Text of UNCITRAL Rule 
Article 27 
1. The arbitral tribunal may appoint one or more experts to 
it, in writing, on specific issues to be determined by the tribunal. 
A copy of the expert's terms of reference, established by the 
arbitral tribunal, shall be communicated to the parties. 
2. The parties shall give the expert any relevant 
information or produce for his inspection any relevant 
documents or goods that he may require of them. Any dispute 
between a party and such expert as to the relevance of the 
required information or production shall be referred to the 
arbitral tribunal for decision. 
3. Upon receipt of the expert's report, the arbitral tribunal 
shall communicate a copy of the report to the parties who shall 
be given the opportunity to express, in writing, their opinion on 
the report. A party shall be entitled to examine any document on 
which the expert has relied in his report. 
4. At the request of either party the expert, after delivery of 
the report, may be heard at a hearing where the parties shall 
have the opportunity to be present and to interrogate the expert. 
At this hearing either party may present expert witnesses in 
order to testify on the points at issue. The provisions of article 
25 shall be applicable to such proceedings. 
Modification of UNCITRAL Rule 
Article 27 of the UNCITRAL Rules is maintained unchanged, except that 
the following is added at the end of paragraph 2: 
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The expert shall invite a representative of each arbitrating party 
to attend any site inspection, and, when the arbitral tribunal so 
determines, a representative of each arbitrating party shall be 
invited to attend other inspections made by the expert. 
Notes to Article 27 
1. As used in Article 27 of the UNCITRAL Rules, the terms "party" and it parties ti mean the arbitrating party or parties, as the case may be. 
2. Every expert, before beginning the performance of his duties, shall make 
the following declaration: 
I solemnly declare upon my honour and conscience that I will perform my 
duties in accordance with my sincere belief and will keep confidential all 
matters relating to the performance of my task. " 
DEFAULT 
ARTICLE 28 
Text of UNCITRAL Rule 
Article 28 
1. If, within the period of time fixed by the arbitral tribunal, 
the claimant has failed to communicate his claim without 
showing sufficient cause for such failure, the arbitral tribunal 
shall issue an order for the termination of the arbitral 
proceedings. If, within the period of time fixed by the arbitral 
tribunal, the respondent has failed to communicate his statement 
of defence without showing sufficient cause for such failure, the 
arbitral tribunal shall order that the proceedings continue. 
2. If one of the parties, duly notified under these Rules, 
fails to appear at a hearing, without showing sufficient cause for 
such failure, the arbitral tribunal may proceed with the 
arbitration. 
3. If one of the parties, 
documentary evidence, fails to dc 
period of time, without showing 
failure, the arbitral tribunal may 
evidence before it. 
duly invited to produce 
so within the established 
sufficient cause for such 
make the award on the 
Article 28 of the UNCITRAL Rules is maintained unchanged. 
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Note to Article 28 
As used in Article 28 of the UNCITRAL Rules, the term "parties" means the 
arbitrating parties. 
CLOSURE OF HEARINGS 
ARTICLE 29 
Text of UNCITRAL Rule 
Article 29 
1. The arbitral tribunal may inquire of the parties if they 
have any further proof to offer or witnesses to be heard or 
submissions to make and, if there are none, it may declare the 
hearings closed. 
2. The arbitral tribunal may, if it considers it necessary 
owing to exceptional circumstances, decide, on its own motion 
or upon application of a party, to reopen the hearings at any 
time before the award is made. 
Article 29 of the UNCITRAL Rules is maintained unchanged. 
Note to Article 29 
As used in Article 29 of the UNCITRAL Rules, the terms "party" and "parties" 
mean the arbitrating party or parties, as the case may be. 
WAIVER OF RULES 
ARTICLE 30 
Text of UNCITRAL Rules 
Article 30 
A party who knows that any provision of, or requirement 
under, these Rules has not been complied with and yet proceeds 
with the arbitration without promptly stating his objections to 
such non-compliance, shall be deemed to have waived his right 
to object. 
Article 30 of the UNCITRAL Rules is maintained unchanged. 
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Note to Article 30 
As used in Article 30 of the UNCITRAL Rules, the term "party" means the 
arbitrating party. 
DECISIONS 
ARTICLE 31 
Text of UNCITRAL Rule 
Article 31 
1. When there are three arbitrators, any award or other 
decision of the arbitral tribunal shall be made by a majority of 
the arbitrators. 
2. In the case of questions of procedure, when there is no 
majority or when the arbitral tribunal so authorizes, the 
presiding arbitrator may decide on his own, subject to revision, 
if any, by the arbitral tribunal. 
Article 31 of the UNCITRAL Rules is maintained unchanged. 
Notes to Article 31 
1. Any award or other decision of the arbitral tribunal pursuant to paragraph I 
of Article 31 shall be made by a majority of its members. 
2. The arbitral tribunal shall deliberate in private. Its deliberations shall be 
and remain secret. Only the members of the arbitral tribunal shall take part 
in the deliberations. The Secretary-General may be present. No other 
person may be admitted except by special decision of the arbitral tribunal. 
Any question which is to be voted upon shall be formulated in precise 
terms in English and Farsi and the text shall, if a member so requests, be 
distributed before the vote is taken. The minutes of the private sittings of 
the arbitral tribunal shall be secret. 
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FORM AND EFFECr OF AWARD 
ARTICLE 32 
Text of UNCITRAL Rule 
Article 32 
1. In addition to making a final award, the arbitral tribunal 
shall be entitled to make interim, interlocutory, or partial 
awards. 
2. The award shall be made in writing and shall be final 
and binding on the parties. The parties undertake to carry out the 
award without delay. 
3. The arbitral tribunal Shall state the reasons upon which 
the award is based, unless the parties have agrred that no 
reasons are to be given. 
4. An award shall be signed by the arbitrators and it shall 
contain the date on which and the place where the award was 
made. Where there are three arbitrators and one of them fails to 
sign, the award shall state the reason for the absence of the 
signature. 
5. The award may be made public only with consent of 
both parties. 
6. Copies of the award signed by the arbitrators shall be 
communicated to the parties by the arbitral tribunal. 
7. If the arbitration law of the country where the award is 
made requires that the award be filed or registered by the 
arbitral tribunal, the tribunal shall comply with this requirement 
within the period of time required by law. 
Modirication of UNCITRAL Rule 
Article 32 of the UNCITRAL Rules in maintained unchanged, except for the 
following: 
1. The following is added as the last sentence of paragraph 3: 
Any arbitrator may request that his dissenting vote or his 
dissenting vote and the reasons therefore be registered. 
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2. Paragraph 5 is modified to read as follows: 
5. All awards and other decisions shall be available to the 
public, except that upon the request of one or more arbitrating 
parties, the arbitral tribunal may determine that it will not make 
the entire award or other decision public, but will make public 
only portions thereof from which the identity of the parties, 
other identifying facts and trade or military secrets have been 
deleted. 
Note to Article 32 
As used in Article 32 of the UNCITRAL Rules, the term "parties" means the 
arbitrating parties. 
APPLICABLE LAW 
ARTICLE 33 
Text of UNCITRAL Rule 
Article 33 
1. The arbitral tribunal shall apply the law designated by 
the parties as applicable to the substance of the dispute. Failing 
such designation by the parties, the arbitral tribunal shall apply 
the law determined by the conflict of law rules which it 
considers applicable. 
2. The arbitral tribunal shall decide as amiable compositeu 
or ex aequo gd bono only if the parties have expressly authorized 
the arbitral tribunal to do so and if the law applicable to the 
arbitral procedure permits such arbitration. 
3. In all cases, the arbitral tribunal shall decide in 
accordance with the terms of the contract and shall take into 
account the usages of the trade applicable to the transaction. 
Modirication of UNCITRAL Rule 
Article 33 of the UNCITRAL Rules is modified to r-ead as follows: 
1. The arbitral tribunal shall decide all cases on the basis of 
respect for law, applying such choice of law rules and principles 
of commercial and international law as the arbitral tribunal 
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determines to be applicable, taking into account relevant usages 
of the trade, contract provisions and changed circumstances. 
2. The arbitral tribunal shall decide tx aNuo cj bono only 
if the arbitrating parties have expressly and in writing 
authorized it to do so. 
Note to Article 33 
Paragraph I of the modified text of Article 33 corresponds to Article V of the 
Claims Settlement Declaration. 
SETMEMENT OR OTHER GROUNDS FOR TERMINATION 
ARTICLE 34 
Text of UNCITRAL Rule 
Article 34 
1. If, before the award is made, the parties agree on a 
settlement of the dispute, the arbitral tribunal shall either issue 
an order for the termination of the arbitral proceedings or, if 
requested by both parties and accepted by the tribunal, record 
the settlement in the form of an arbitral award on agreed terms. 
The arbitral tribunal is not obliged to give reasons for such an 
award. 
2. If, before the award is made, the continuation of the 
arbitral proceedings becomes unnecessary or impossible for any 
reason not mentioned in paragraph 1, the arbitral tribunal shall 
inform the parties of its intention to issue an order for the 
termination of the proceedings. The arbitral tribunal shall have 
the power to issue such an order unless a party raises justifiable 
grounds for objection. 
I Copies of the order for termination of the arbitral 
proceedings or of the arbitral award on agreed terms, signed by 
the arbitrators, shall be communicated by the arbitral tribunal to 
the parties. Where an arbitral award on agreed terms is made, 
the provisions of article 32, paragraph 2 and 4 to 7, shall apply. 
Article 34 of the UNCITRAL Rules is maintained unchanged. 
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Note to Article 34 
As used in Article 34 of the UNCITRAL Rules, the terms "party" and "parties" 
mean the arbitrating party or parties, as the case may be. 
INTERPRETATION OF THE AWARD 
ARTICLE 35 
Text of UNCITRAL Rule 
Article 35 
1. Within thirty days after the receipt of the award, either 
party, with notice to the other party, may request that the arbitral 
tribunal give an interpretation of the award. 
2. The interpretation shall be given in writing within forty- 
five days after the receipt of the request. The interpretation shall 
form part of the award and the provisions of article 32, 
Paragraph 2 to 7, shall apply. 
Article 35 of the UNCITRAL Rules is maintained unchanged. 
Note to Article 35 
As used in Article 35 of the UNCITRAL Rules, the Term "party" means the 
arbitrating party. 
CORRECTION OF THE AWARD 
ARTICLE 36 
Text of UNCITRAL Rule 
Article 36 
1. Within thirty days after the receipt of the award, either 
party, with notice to the other party, may request the arbitral 
tribunal to correct in the award any errors in computation, any 
clerical or typographical errors, or any errors of similar nature. 
The arbitral tribunal may within thirty days after the 
communication of the award make such corrections on its own 
initiatives. 
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2. Such corrections shall be in writing, and the provisions 
of article 32, paragraph 2 to 7, shall apply. 
Article 36 of the UNCITRAL Rules is maintained unchanged. 
Note to Article 36 
As used in Article 36 of the UNCITRAL Rules, the term "party" means the 
arbitrating party. 
ADDITIONAL AWARD 
ARTICLE 37 
Text of UNCITRAL Rule 
Article 37 
1. Within thirty days after the receipt of the award, either 
party, with notice to the other party, may request the arbitral 
tribunal to make an additional award as to claims presented in 
the arbitral proceedings but omitted from the award. 
2. If the arbitral tribunal considers the request for an 
additional award to be justified and considers that the omission 
can be rectified without any further hearings or evidence, it shall 
complete its award within sixty days after the receipt of the 
request. 
3. When an additional award is made, the provisions of 
article 32, paragraphs 2 to 7, shall apply. 
Article 37 of the UNCITRAL Rules is maintained unchanged. 
Note to Article 37 
As used in Article 37 of the UNCITRAL Rules, the term "party" means the 
arbitrating party. 
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COSTS 
ARTICLES 38-40 
Text of UNCITRAL Rule 
Article 38 
The arbitral tribunal shall fix the costs of arbitration in 
its award. the tenn "costs" includes only: 
(a) The fees of the arbitral tribunal to be stated separately as 
to each arbitrator and to be fixed by the tribunal itself in 
accordance with article 39; 
(b) The travel and other expenses incurred by the arbitrators; 
(c) The costs of expert advice and of other assistance required 
by the arbitral tribunal; 
(d) The travel and other expenses of witnesses to the extent 
such expenses are approved by the arbitral tribunal; 
(e) The costs for legal representation and assistance of the 
successful party if such costs were claimed during the arbitral 
proceedings, and only to the extent that the arbitral tribunal 
determines that the amount of such costs is reasonable; 
(f) Any fees and expenses of the appointing authority as 
well as the expenses of the Secretary-General of the Permanent 
Court of Arbitration at 'I'he Hague. 
Modirication of UNCITRAL Rule 
Article 38 of the UNCITRAL Rules is modified to read as follows: 
1. The arbitral tribunal shall fix the costs of arbitration in 
its award. the term "costs" includes only: 
(a) The costs of expert advice and of other special assistance 
required for a particular case by the arbitral tribunal; 
(b) The travel and other expenses of witnesses to the extent 
such expenses are approved by the arbitral tribunal; 
(c) Ilie costs for legal representation and assistance of the 
successful party if such costs were claimed during the arbitral 
proceedings, and only to the extent that the arbitral tribunal 
determines that the amount of such costs is reasonable. 
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2. The Full Tribunal shall fix the fees and expenses of the 
Tribunal which, in accordance with Article VI, paragraph 3 of 
the Claims Settlement Declaration, shall be borne equally by the 
two Governments. 
Note to Article 38 
As used in Article 38 of the UNCITRAL Rules, the term "party" means the 
arbitrating party. 
Text of UNCITRAL Rules 
Article 39 
1. The fees of the arbitral tribunal shall be reasonable in 
amount, taking into account the amount in dispute, the 
complexity of the subject-matter, the time spent by the 
arbitrators and any other relevant circumstances of the case. 
2. If an appointing authority has been agreed upon by the 
parties or designated by the Secretary-General of the Permanent 
Court of Arbitration at 'nie Hague, and if that authority has 
issued a schedule of fees for arbitrators in international cases 
which it administers, the arbitral tribunal in fixing its fees shall 
take that schedule of fees into account to the extent that it 
considers appropriate in the circumstances of the case. 
3. If such appointing authority has not issued a schedule of 
fees for arbitration in international cases, any party may at any 
time request the appointing authority to furnish a statement 
setting forth the basis for establishing fees which is customarily 
followed in international cases in which the authority appoints 
arbitrators. If the appointing authority consents to provide such 
a statement, the arbitral tribunal in fixing its fees shall take such 
information into account to the extent that it considers 
appropriate in the circumstances of the case. 
4. In cases referred to in paragraph 2 and 3, when a party 
so requests and the appointing authority consents to perform the 
function, the arbitral tribunal shall fix its fees only after 
consultation with the appointing authority which may make any 
comment it deems appropriate to the arbitral tribunal concerning 
the fees. 
Article 39 of the UNCITRAL Rules is maintained unchanged. 
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Note to Article 39 
As used in Article 39 of the UNCITRAL Rules, the terms "party" and "parties" 
mean one or both of the two Governments, as the case may be. 
Text of UNCITRAL Rules 
Article 40 
1. Except as provided in paragraph 2, the costs of 
arbitration shall in principle be borne by the unsuccessful party. 
However, the arbitral tribunal may apportion each of such costs 
between the parties if it determines that apportionment is 
reasonable, taking into account the circumstances of the case. 
2. With respect to the costs of legal representation and 
assistance referred to in article 38, paragraph (e), the arbitral 
tribunal, taking into account the circumstances of the case, shall 
be free to determine which party shall bear such costs or may 
apportion such costs between the par-ties if it determines that 
apportionment is reasonable. 
3. When the arbitral tribunal issues an order for the 
termination of the arbitral proceedings or makes an award on 
agreed terms, it shall fix the costs of arbitration referred to in 
article 38 and article 39, paragraph 1, in the text of that order or 
award. 
4. No additional fees may be charged by an arbitral tribunal 
for interpretation or correction or completion of its award under 
article 35 to 37. 
Modification of UNCITRAL Rule 
Article 40 of the UNCITRAL Rules is maintained unchanged, except for the 
following: 
1. The first sentence of paragraph I of Article 40 of the UNCITRAL Rules is 
modified to read as follows: 
Except as provided in paragraph 2, the costs of 
arbitration referred to in paragraph l(a) and I(b) of Article 38 
shall in principle be borne by the unsuccessful party. 
2. The reference in paragraph 2 of Article 40 of the UNCITRAL Rules to 
"Article 38, paragraph (e)" is modified to read "Article 38, paragraph I (c). 
3. Paragraph 3 is changed to read as follows: 
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3. When the arbitral tribunal issues an order for the 
termination of the arbitral proceedings, it shall fix the costs of 
arbitration referred to in article 38 in the text of that order. 
Note to Article 40 
As used in Article 40 of the UNCITRAL Rules, the terms "party" and "parties" 
mean the arbitrating party or parties, as the case may be. 
DEPOSIT OF COSTS 
ARTICLE 41 
Text of UNCITRAL Rule 
Article 41 
1. The arbitral tribunal, on its establishment, may request 
each party to deposit an equal amount as an advance for the 
costs referred to in article 38, paragraphs (a), (b) and (c). 
2. During the course of the arbitral proceedings the arbitral 
tribunal may request supplementary deposits from the parties. 
3. If an appointing authority has been agreed upon by the 
parties or designated by the Secretary-General of the Permanent 
Court of Arbitration at The Hague, and when a party so requests 
and the appointing authority consents to perform the function, 
the arbitral tribunal shall fix the amounts of any deposits or 
supplementary deposits only after consultation with the 
appointing authority which may make any comments to the 
arbitral tribunal which it deems appropriate concerning the 
amount of such deposits and supplementary deposits. 
4. If the required deposits are not paid in full within thirty 
days after the receipt of the requests, the arbitral tribunal shall 
so inform the parties in order that one or another of them may 
make the required payment. If such payment is not made, the 
arbitral tribunal may order the suspension or termination of 
arbitral proceedings. 
5. After the award has been made, the arbitral tribunal shall 
render an accounting to the parties of the deposits received and 
return any unexpended balance to the parties. 
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Modirication of UNCITRAL Rule 
Article 41 of the UNCITRAL Rules is modified to read as follows: 
1. During the course of its proceedings the Full Tribunal 
may from time to time determine the costs referred to in 
paragraph 2 of Article 38 and may request each of the two 
Governments to deposit equal amounts as advances for such 
costs. 
2. The arbitral tribunal may request each arbitrating party 
to deposit an amount determined by it as advances for the costs 
referred to in paragraph l(a) of Article 38. 
3. If the required deposits are not paid in full within the 
time fixed by the arbitral tribunal, the arbitral tribunal shall so 
inform the parties in order that one or another of them may 
make the required payment. If such payment is not made, the 
arbitral tribunal may order the suspension or termination of the 
arbitral proceedings or may take such action to permit 
continuation of the proceedings as is appropriate under the 
circumstances of the case. 
4. The Secretary-General shall transmit monthly, quarterly 
and annual financial statements to the Full Tribunal and to the 
Agents. The accounts of the Tribunal shall be audited annually 
by an independent qualified accountant approved by the Full 
Tribunal. The Secretary-general shall transmit copies of the 
audit report to the Full Tribunal and to the Agents. At the 
request of either Agent, the annual audit shall be reviewed by an 
audit Committee composed of three professionally qualified 
persons, one appointed by each Agent and one by the President. 
The Audit Committee shall submit its report to the Full 
Tribunal, to the Agents, and to the Secretary-General. 
3. After the tem-iination of the work of the Tribunal, it 
shall, after a final audit render an accounting to the two 
Governments of the deposits received and return any 
unexpected balance to the two Governments. 
Note to Article 41 
1. As used in paragraph 3, insofar as it refers to the deposits made pursuant to 
paragraph I of Article 41 of the UNCITRAL Rules, the term "parties" 
means the two Governments; insofar as it refers to deposits made pursuant 
to paragraph 2 that term means the arbitrating parties. 
437 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
A. Primary Sources 
Iran-United States Claims Tribunal Reports, Grotius 
Publications, Vols. 1-16. 
Iran-United States Claims Tribunal Annual Reports, Published 
by the Secretariat of the Tribunal. Vols. 1981/83,1983/84, 
1984/85,1985/86,1986/87,1987/88. 
B., Books 
Anand, R. P. Intemational law and the Developing Countries, 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht, 1987. 
Brownlie, Ian. Principles of Public International Law, 3rd ed, 
Oxford, 1979. 
Bos, A. and Siblesz, H. (Eds. ) Realism in Law Making. Essays 
on International Law in Honour of Willem Riphaggin, Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht, 1986. 
Brzezinski, Zbigniew. Power and Principle, New York, 1983. 
Carbonneau, T. E. (Ed. ), Resolving Transnational Disputes 
Throu6 International Arbitration, University Press of Virginia, 
Charlottesville, 1984. 
Carlston Kenneth S. The Process of International Arbitration, 
Greenwood Press, Westport, 1949, reprinted 1972. 
Carter, Jimmy. Keepi g Faith, Collins, London, 1982. 
Christopher, Warren. American Hostages in Iran, Yale 
University Press, 1985. 
Cohn E. Domke M, and Eisemann F. Handbook of Institutional 
Arbitration in International Trade, North-Holland Publishing 
Co, Oxford, 1977. 
438 
Craig W. L, Park W, and Paulson J. ICC Arbitration. 
International Commercial Arbitration, Loose Leaf, Oceana 
Publications, 1984/6. 
David R. Arbitration in International Trade, Kluwer Law & 
Taxation Publications, London, 1985. 
Deak, Francis. The Hungarian- Rumanian Land Dispute, 
Columbia University Press, New York, 1928. 
Fitzmaurice, The Law and Procedure of the International Court 
of Justice, Cambridge, Grotius Publications, 1986, Vols. 1-2. 
Garcia-Amador, F. V. The Chandne Law of International 
Claims, Oceana Publications Inc., London/New York, 1984, 
Vols. 1-2. 
Gebrehana T. Arbitration an Element of Intemational Law, 
Almqvist & Wiksell Intemational, Stockholm, 1984. 
Gill, W. H. The Law of Arbitration, 2nd edition, London, Sweet 
& Maxwell, 1975. 
Gray, Christine D. Judicial Remedies in International Law, 
Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1987. 
Greig, D. W. International Law, London, Butterworths, 1976. 
Gross, Leo. The Future of the International Court of Justice, 
Oceana Publications, Inc. New York, 1976, Vols. 1-2. 
Habicht, Max. Post-War Treaties for the Pacific Settlement o 
International Disputes, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 
1931. 
Harris, D. J. Cases and Materials on International law, Sweet & 
Maxwell, London, 1983. 
Hudson, M. International Arbitration, Washington, 1944. 
Kaeckenbeeck, Georges. The Internation I Experiment of Upper 
Silesia, Oxford University Press, London/New York, 1942. 
Katouzian, H. The Political Economy of Modem Iran, 
Macmillan Press Ltd, 198 1. 
Lauterpacht, H. The Function of Law in the International 
CommuDLity, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1933. 
Lew, Julian. Applicable Law in International Commercial 
Arbint tion, Oceana Publications, New York, 1978. 
439 
Lew, Julian, (Ed. ), ConteMDorga Problems in International 
Arbitration, Centre for Commercial Law Studies, Queen Mary 
College, University of London, 1986. 
Lillich, R. B. Economic Coercion and New Internafional 
Economic Order, Virginia, 1976. 
Lillich, R. B. The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal 1981- 
1983, Virginia University Press, 1984. 
Mann F. A. Studies in International Law, Clarendon Press, 
Oxford, 1973. 
Merrills, International Dispute Settlement, London, Sweet & 
Maxwell, 1984. 
Moore, International Adjudications, Oxford University Press, 
London, 1931, Vols. 3-4. 
Mosler, H. and Bernhardt, R. Judicial Settlement of 
International Disputes, Springer Verlag, Berlin 1974. 
Nantwi, E. K. The Enforcement of International Judicial 
Decisions and Arbitral Awards in Public International Law, 
Sijthoff, Leyden, 1966. 
Prott, Lyndel. The Latent Power of Culture and Intemational 
Judge, Intemational Books, 1979. 
Reisman, Michael. Nullity and Revision, Yale University Press, 
London,, 1971. 
Redfern Alan and Hunter M. Law and Practice of International 
Commercial Arbitration, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1986. 
Rosenne, Shabtai. The Law and Practice of the International 
Court of Justice, Sijthoff, Leyden, 1965, Vols. 1-2. 
Ronzitti, Natalino. Rescuing Nationals Abroad Through 
Military Coercion and Intervention on Grounds of Humanity, 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht, 1985. 
Roosevelt, Kermith. Countercoup. ne Struggle for the Control 
of Iran, New York, 1979. 
Rubin, Barry. Paved With Good Intentions, oxford University 
Press, 1980. 
Sandifer, Evidence Before International Tribunals, Revised Ed., 
University Press of Virginia, Charlottesville, 1975. 
440 
Saunders, John B. Mozlev & Whitely's Law DictionjiLy, 
London, Butterworths, 1977. 
Saunders, John B. Words and Phrases Legally Defined, 
Supplement 1986,2nd Ed. London Butterworths. 
Schwarzenberger George. International Law as Applied by 
International Courts and Tribunals, Vol 4, International Judicial 
Law, London Stevens & Sons Ltd, 1986. 
Shultz, Jan C. and Van Den Berg, A. (Eds. ), The Art of 
Arbitration : Essays on International Arbitration, Kluwer, The 
Netherlands, 1982. 
Schwebel Stephen. International Arbitration : Three Salient 
Problems, Cambridge, Grotius Publications Ltd, 1987. 
Scott, J. B. Proceedings of the Hague Peace Conferences. The 
Conference of 1907, Oxford University Press, London/New 
York, 1920, Vol. 1. 
Scott, J. B. Hague Court Reports, lst Series, 1916. 
Simpson, J. L. and Fox Hazel, International Arbitration, Stevens 
& Sons Ltd., London, 1959. 
Steele, Robert. The Iran Crisis and International Law, John 
B as set Moore S ociety of International Law, 19 8 1. 
United Nations, Systematic Survey of Treaties for the Pacific 
Settlement of International Disj2utes 1928-1948, UN 
Publications, (Sales No. 49, V. 3), 1949. 
United Nations, A Survey of Treaties for the Pacific Settlement 
of International Disputes 1949-1962, UN Publications (Sales 
No. 66. V. 5), New York, 1966. 
Vance, Cyrus. Hard Choices, New York, Simon & Shuster, 
1983. 
Van Den Berg, Albert. Tlie New York Convention of 1958 : 
Towards a Uniform Judicial Inteipretation, Kluwer Law & 
Taxation, London, 1981. 
Waldock H. International Disputes : Legal Aspects, Europa 
Publications, London, 1972. 
Wetter, J. G. The International Arbitral Process. Public & 
Private, Oceana Publications, New York, 1979, Vols. 1-5. 
441 
Whiteman, M. )nal Law, U. S. Department of 
State Publication, 197 1, Vol 12. 
C. Articles 
Anand, R. P. "The Role of Individual and Dissenting Opinions in 
International Ad udication", 14 ICLQ (1965), p. 788. i 
Becker, J. D. "Standby Letters of Credit and the Iranian Cases : 
Will the Independence of the Credit Survive? ", 13 U. C. C. L. J. 
(1981), p. 335. 
Berglin, Hakan R. "Treaty Interpretation and the Impact of 
Contractual Choice of Forum Clause on the Jurisdiction of 
International Tribunals : The Iranian Forum Clause Decisions of 
the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal", 21 Texas I. L. J. (1985), 
p. 39. 
Branson, David J. "Ethics for International Arbitrators", 1 
Arb. Int'l. (1987), p. 72. 
Brower, Charles N. "Current Developments in the Law of 
Expropriation and Compensation :A Preliminary Survey of 
Awards of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal", 21 Int'l 
Lawyer, (1987), p. 639. 
Brower, Charles N. and Davis, Mark D. "The Iran-United States 
Claims Tribunal After Seven Years :A Retrospective View 
from the Inside", 43(4) Arb. J. (Dec. 1988), p. 16. 
Carlston, Kenneth. "Codification of International Arbitral 
Procedure", 47 AM (1953), p. 203. 
Carlston, Kenneth. "Interpretation of Peace Treaties with 
Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, Advisory Opinion of the 
International Court of Justice", 44 AJIL (1950), p. 728. 
Clagett, Brice A "The Expropriation Issue Before the Iran- 
United States Claims Tribunal: Is Just Compensation Required 
by International Law or Not 11v 16 L. P. I. B. (1984), p. 814. 
Cohen, S. and others. "Ile Iranian Hostage Agreement Under 
International Law and United States Law", 81 Col. L. R. (1981), 
p. 882. 
442 
D'Angelo, J. R. "Resort to Force by States to Protect Nationals : 
The U. S. Rescue Mission to Iran and its Legality Under 
International Law", 21(3) Virg. JIL. (1981), p. 485. 
Dennis, William Cullen. "The Orinoco Steamship Company 
Case Before the Hague Tribunal", 5 AJEL (1911), p. 35. 
De Visscher, Charles. "Reflections on the Present Prospects of 
International Adjudications", 50 ABIL (1956), p. 467. 
Dowd, D. D. "Sovereign Immunity-Act of State Doctrine-Claims 
Lies for Iran's Failure to Compensate Following 
Nationalization", 14 Van. J. T. L. (1981), p. 909. 
"Editorial Note", "Fraud in Transaction : Enjoining Letters of 
Credit During the Iranian Revolution", 93 Harv. L. R. (1980), p. 
992. 
Edwards, R. W. "Extraterritorial Application of the U. S. Iranian 
Assets Control Regulations", 75 AJIIL, (1981), p. 870. 
Erades, L. "The Sudan Arbitration", 17 Neth. I. L. R. (1970), p. 
200. 
Eskridge, W. N. "The Iranian Nationalization Cases: Toward a 
General Theory of Jurisdiction Over Foreign States", 22(3) 
Harv. I. L. J. (1981), p. 525. 
Falk, R. A. "The New States and Intemational Law", 118 
Recueil des Cours, H, (1966), p. 1. 
Fox, Hazel, "States and Undertaking to Arbitrate", 37 ICLQ, 
(1988), p. 1. 
Feldman, Mark B. "Ted L. Stein on the Iran-US Claims 
Tribunal - Scholarship Par Excellence", 61 Wash. L. R. (1986), p. 
997. 
George, Arthur L. "Changed Circumstances and the Iranian 
Claims Arbitration : Application of Forum Selection Clauses 
and Frustration of Contract", 16 G. Wash. J. I. L. Econ. (1982), p. 
335. 
Getz, H. A. "Enjoining the International Letter of Credit : the 
Iranian Letter of Credit Case", 21 Harv. I. L. J. (1980), p. 189. 
Gordon, E. "The Blocking of Iranian Assets", 14 Int'l Lawyer, 
(1980), p. 656. 
443 
Greenberg, J. "Algerian Intervention in the Iranian Hostage 
Crisis", 20 Stan. J. I. L. (1984), p. 259. 
Hamel, Willem A. and others, "'Me Iran-United States Claims 
Tribunal", 1 Hague. Y. B. I. L. (1988), p. 358. 
Hardenberg, H. "The Awards of the Iran-US Claims Tribunal". 
Int'l. Bus. Lawyer, September 1984, p. 337. 
Hinton, D. R. and others, "Legal Response to Afghan/Iranian 
Crisis", 74 Proc. A. S. I. L. (1980), p. 284. 
Howard, Stephen. "Implications of Iranian Assets Case for 
American Business", 16 Int'l Lawyer, (1982), p. 128. 
Hunter, Martin. "Ethics of the International Arbitrator", 53 
Arbitration (1987), p. 219. 
Jaffe, Paul A. C. "Judicial Supervision of Commercial 
Arbitration in England", 55(3) Arbitration, (1989), p. 184. 
Jeffery, Anetha. "The American Hostages in Tehran : the ICJ 
and the Legality of Rescue Mission", 30 ICLQ, (198 1), p. 717. 
Jhabvala, "The Scope of Individual Opinions in the World 
Court", Neth. Y. B. I. L. (1982), p. 33. 
Johnson, D. H. N. "The Constitution of An Arbitral Tribunal", 30 
BYEL, (1953), p. 152. 
Johnson, D. H. N. "International Arbitration Back in Favour", 34 
Y. B. W. A. (1980), p. 305. 
Kimball, G. and Sanders, B. A. "Preventing Wrongful Payment 
of Guarantee Letters of Credit- Lessons from Iran", 39 Bus. 
Lawyer, (1984), p. 417. 
Kitay, Nlichael. and Trout, Robert P. "Escrow :A Private Law 
Device Adopted for the Protection of Foreign Investment", 13 
Virg. J. I. L. (1972), p. 48. 
Lagergren, Gunnar. "Five Important Cases on Nationalization of 
Foreign Property Decided by the Iran-United States Claims 
Tribunal", Raoul Wallenberg Institute of Human Rights and 
Humanitarian Law, Report No. 5, University of Lund, Sweden, 
(1988), p. 5. 
Lagoni, Rainer. "Oil and Gas Deposits Across National 
Frontiers", 73 AJIL (1979), p. 215. 
444 
Lake, William T. and Tucker Dana, Jane. "Judicial Review of 
Awards of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal : Are the 
Tribunal's Awards Dutch", 16 L. P. I. B. (1984), p. 755. 
Lando, Ole. "The Lex Mercatoria in International Commercial 
Arbitration", 34 ICLQ, (1985), p. 747. 
Lewis, Robert P. "What Goes Around Comes Around: Can Iran 
Enforce Awards of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal in 
the United States? ", 26 Col. J. T. L. (1988), p. 515. 
Lloyd Jones, David. "The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal : 
Private Rights and State Responsibility", 24(2) Virg. J. I. L. 
(1984), p. 259. 
Lownfeld, A. F. "The Iran-US Claims Tribunal. An Interim 
Appraisal", 38 Arb. J. (Dec. 1983), p. 14. 
Mann, F. A. "Private Arbitration and Public Policy", 4 C. J. Q. 
(1985), p. 257. 
Mc Greevey, R. "The Iranian Crisis and U. S. Law", 2(2) 
NW. J. I. B. L. (1980), p. 384. 
McNerney, Mary E. and Esplugues, Carlos A. "International 
Commercial Arbitration: The UNCITRAL Model Law", IX(l) 
Bos. C. I. C. L. R. (1986), p. 47. 
Morley, Jeremy D. "Relative Incompatibility of Functions in the 
International Court", 19 ICLQ (1970), p. 316. 
Mosk, Richard M. "The Role of Party-Appointed Arbitrators in 
International Arbitration : The Experience of the Iran-United 
States Claims Tribunal", l(l) Trans. Lawyer, (1988), p. 253. 
Nsereko, Daniel D. "The International Court, Impartiality and 
Judges Ad Hoc", 13 Ind. J. I. L., (1973), p. 207. 
Pellonpaa, A and Fitzmaurice A "Taking of Property in the 
Perspective of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal", XIX 
Neth. Y. B. I. L. (1988), p. 54. 
pirrwitz, Bjorn. "Annulment of Arbitral Awards Under Article 
52 of the Washington Convention on the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other 
States", 23 Texas I. L. J. (1988), p. 73. 
Ramazani, R. K. "Iran and the United States : An Experiment in 
Enduring Friendship", 30 Midd. E. J. (1976), p. 322. 
445 
Redwine, J. "The Effect of Duress on the Iranian Hostage 
Settlement Agreement", 14 Van. J. T. L. G 98 1), p. 847. 
Rubin, P. "Tlie Hostage Incident : The United States and Iran", 
36 Y. B. W. A. (1982), p. 213. 
Sanders, Pieter, "Commentary on UNCITRAL Arbitration 
Rules", 2 YB. Comm. Arb- (1977), p. 172. 
Sanders, Pieter. "Trends in International Commercial 
Arbitration", 145 Recueil des Cours (1975), H, p. 205. 
Scott, J. B. "United States-Norway Arbitration Awards", 17 
ARIL (1923), p. 287. 
Selby, Jamison M. and Stewart, D. P. "Practical Aspects of 
Arbitrating Claims Before the Iran-United States Claims 
Tribunal", 18 Int'l Lawyer, (1984), p. 211. 
Setser, V. "The Immunity Waiver for State-Controlled Business 
Enterprises in United States Commercial Treaties", 55 
Proc. A. S. I. L. (1961), p. 89. 
Simmonds K. R, Lapidoth R, and Baade H. W. "Public 
International Arbitration", 22 Texas I. L. J. (1987), p. 149. 
Smit, H. "The Future of International Commercial Arbitration 
A Single Transnational. Institution? ", 25 Col. J. T. L. (1986), p. 9. 
Sohn, L. B. "The Function of International Arbitration Today", 
108 Recueil des Cours, (1963), 1, p. 1. 
Stein, Ted. "Jurisprudence and Jurists' Prudence : The Iranian 
Forum Clause Decisions of the Iran-US Claims Tribunal", 78 
AJ11L (1984), p. 1. 
Stein, Steven J. and Watman Daniel R. "International 
Commercial Arbitration in the 1980s :A Comparison of Major 
Arbimal Systems and Rules", 38 Bus. Lawyer (1983), p. 1685. 
Stewart, D. P. and Sherman, L. B. "Developments at the Iran- 
United States Claims Tribunal : 1981-1983", 24(l) Virg. J. I. L. 
(1983), p. I. 
Straus, Michael. "The Practice of the Iran-United States Claims 
Tribunal in Receiving Evidence from Parties and from Experts", 
3 J. Int'l. Arb. (1986), p. 57. 
Suh, I. R. "Voting Behaviour of National Judges in International 
Courts", 63 AJIL (1969), p. 224. 
446 
Swan, A. "Reflections on Dames & Moore v Reagan and the 
Maiami Conference", 13 Lawyer of the Americas, (198 1), p. i. 
Swanson, Steven R. "Iran-U. S. Claims Tribunal .A Policy Analysis of the Expropriation Cases", 18 C. W. R. J. I. L. (1986), p. 
307. 
Transcript of a Conference on the Settlement with Iran, (Maiami 
Conference), 13 Lawyer of the Americas, (198 1), p. 1. 
Terry, J. P. "The Iranian Hostage Crisis : International Law and 
United States Policy", 32 JAG Journal, (1982), p. 31. 
Thompson, Terence W. "The UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules", 
17 Harv. I. L. J. (1976), p. 141. 
Tupman, Nfichael. "Challenge and Disqualification of 
Arbitrators in International Commercial Arbitration", 38 ICLQ 
(1989), p. 26. 
Van Den Berg, A. "Proposed Dutch Law on the Iran-US Claims 
Settlement Declaration", Int'l. Bus. Lawyer, September 1984, p. 
341. 
Weiss, Andrew G. "Tbe Status of the UNCITRAL Model Law 
on International Commercial Arbitration Vis-a-Vis the ICC, 
LCIA and UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules : Conflict or 
Complement? ", 13 Syracuse J. I. L. C. (1986), p. 367. 
Wetter, J. G. "Interest as an Element of Damages in the Arbitral 
Process", Int'l. Fin. L. R., December 1986, p. 20. 
Wilson, R. R. "A Decade of New Commercial Treaties", 50 
AJIL, (1956), p. 927. 
Woolsey, L. H. "The Arbitration of the Sabotage Claims Against 
Germany", 33 ARL (1939), p. 737. 
Zimmett, M. "Standby Letters of Credit in the Iran Litigation : 
Two Hundred Problems in Search of a Solution", 16 L. P. I. B. 
(1984), p. 927. 
D. Miscellaneous Sources 
Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Volumes, 1975,1979,1980, 
1981. 
447 
ADDITIONAL SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY ON THE 
IRAN-UNITED STATES CLAIMS TRIBUNAL 
Baker, Stewart A. and Davis, Mark David. "Establishment of an 
Arbitral Tribunal Under the UNCITRAL Rules: The Experience 
of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal", 23 Int'l Lawyer 
(1989), p. 81. 
BeHand, Stanton P. "The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal: 
Some Reflections on Trying a Claim", 1(3) J. Int'l. Arb., (1984), 
p. 237. 
Berglin, Hakan R. "The Iranian Forum Clause Decisions of the 
Iran-United States Claims Tribunal", 39(l) Arb. Int'l. (1987), p. 
46. 
Caron, David D. "Interim Measures of Protection: Theory and 
Practice in Light of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal", 46 
Zeitschrift fur auslandisches offentliches Rech und Volkerrecht 
(1986), p. 466. 
Crook, John R. "Applicable Law in International Arbitration: 
The Iran-U. S. Claims Tribunal Experience", 83 AJIL (1989), p. 
278 
"Decisions of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal", 78 
Proc. A. S. I. L., p. 221. 
Feldman, Mark B. "Implementation of the Iranian Claims 
Settlement Agreement - Status, Issues and Lessons: View from 
Government's Perspective", Private Investors Abroad, Problems 
and Solutions in International Business, 198 1, p. 75. 
Gold, Joseph. "The Fund Agreement in the Courts", 31(l) IMF 
Staff Papers (1984), p. 537. 
Hoffman, John E. "The Iranian Asset Negotiations", 17(l) 
Van. J. T. L. (1984), p. 47. 
"Interriational Agreements: Settlement of Claims Outstanding 
between the United States and Iran: Algeria Declaration I 
Concerning the Settlement of Claims by the United States and 
Iran (19 January 198 1)", 22 Harv. I. L. J. (198 1), p. 443. 
448 
"Iran-United States Litigation", 77 Proc. A. S. I. L., p. 3. 
Larschan, Bradley and Mirfendereski, Guive. "Tbe Status of Counterclaims in International Law, with Particular Reference 
to International Arbitration Involving a Private Party and a 
Foreign State", 15 Denver Journal of International Law and 
Policy, (1986), p. 11. 
Lauterpacht, E. "'Ibe Iran-United States Claims Tribunal- An 
Assessment", Private Investors Abroad, Problems and Solutions 
in International Business, 1982, p. 213. 
Lowenfeld, Andreas F. "The US-Iranian Dispute Settlement 
Accord: An Arbitrator Looks at the Prospects for Arbitration", 
36(3) Arb. J. (1981), p. 3. 
Lowenfeld, Andereas F. "'Me Iran-U. S. / Iran Hostage 
Settlement", 75 Proc. A. S. I. L. (1983), p. 239. 
Mahoney, Peter E. "The Standing of Dual Nationals before the 
Iran-United States Claims Tribunal", 24(3) Virg. J. I. L. (1984), p. 
695. 
McCabe, Monica P. "Arbitral Discovery and the Iran-United 
States Claims Tribunal Experience", 20 Int'l Lawyer (1986), p. 
499. 
Mosk, R. M. "Lessons from the Hague - An update on the Iran- 
United States Claims Tribunal", 14(4) Pepperdine Law Review 
(1987), p. 819 
Newman, Lawrence W. "Enforcement of Judgements", 17(l) 
Van. J. T. L. (1984), p. 77. 
Owen, Roberts B. "Ile U. S. /Iran Hostage Settlement", 75 
Proc. A. S. I. L. (1983), p. 236. 
Robinson Davis R. "Recent Developments at the Iran-United 
States Claims Tribunal", 17 Int'l Lawyer (1983), p. 661. 
Shalvarjian, Haig J. and Richter, Harlan M. "Outline of Settling 
Claims: The Iranian Experience", 9(3) Hastings International 
and Comparative Law Review (1986), p. 47 1. 
Stewart, David P. "The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal: A 
Review of Developments 1983-84", 16 L. P. I. B. (1984), p. 677. 
Straus, Michael. "Causation as an Element of State 
Responsibility", 16 L. P. I. B. (1984), p. 839. 
449 
Suy, Erik. "Settling U. S. Claims against Iran through 
Arbitration", 29 AJCL (American Journal of Comparative Law), 
[1981], p. 523. 
Trooboff, Peter D. "Implementation of the Iranian Claims 
Settlement Agreement- Status, Issues and Lessons: the Private 
Sector's Perspective", Private Investors Abroad, Problems and 
Solutions in International Business, 198 1, p. 103. 
Von Mehren, Robert B. "Ile Iran-U. S. A. Arbitral Tribunal", 31 
AJCL (1983), p. 713. 
Westberg, John A. "The Applicable Law Issues in International 
Business Transactions with Government Parties - Rulings of the 
Iran-United States Claims Tribunal", 2(2) ICSID Review 
Foreign Investment Law Journal (1987), p. 473. 
-150 
